CHARACTERISTICS OF TEMPORARY TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION

Collected Working Papers from the EURA-NET project

Edited by Pirkko Pitkänen and Mari Korpela

UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE

This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 612921

This report presents preliminary findings of the research project Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People (EURA-NET). The project is funded by the European Union under the scheme Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development, Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities, Collaborative project. This report reflects only the author's views and the European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.

ISBN: 978-951-44-9658-5
Tampere 2014

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This state-of-the-art report depicts different types and characteristic features of temporary migration on a global scale, between EU and Asia and, particularly, into and out of the countries taking part in the FP7 research project Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People (EURA-NET). The European and Asian countries under investigation in the report are: China, Finland, Germany, Hungary, India, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine.

The research findings show that there is a lack of preceding research on temporary migration. In many cases, statistical data are not available, or the categories of existing statistics do not match the categories of temporary migration. As transborder migratory processes involve several countries, it is difficult to get statistical data which are comparable between states, as the definitions and registration procedures for migrants differ across countries.

Despite the above-mentioned methodological challenges, the findings indicate that, in the context of Asia's growing markets and increasingly highly educated population, temporary migration between Europe and Asia is growing. An unprecedented number of high- and low-skilled workers, tertiary level students, family-based movers, asylum seekers and undocumented residents are currently on the move from Asia to Europe, often with the intention that afterwards there will be return to the country of origin or onward movement. Although English-speaking countries have attracted most migration flows, recent developments show that non-English speaking EU member states have become increasingly popular among Asian migrants.

It is clear that the volumes of migratory movements from Asia to EU and from EU to Asia are very unbalanced. Whereas the movement of Asian people to EU has intensified massively, in the light of statistics, migration from Europe to Asia is an almost a non-existent phenomenon. However, the picture illustrated in the preceding country reports reveal that also Europeans have adopted increasingly mobile transnational lifestyles. Temporary migratory movements of European intra-company transferees, scientists and other experts, tertiary level students, family-based movers and 'lifestyle migrants' to Asian countries are emerging phenomena, though rare as far as numbers are concerned. Return migration is a further pattern of temporary migration which is relevant in both directions.

International recruitment practices are key when considering the transformation processes in the European-Asian context. Besides highly-skilled and skilled workers this concerns tertiary level students, who represent 'semi-finished' high-skilled workers for countries facing real or prospected skill shortages. Sometimes people's border-crossing mobility between Europe and Asia is pendular. As an example, numerous people from Thailand move yearly to Europe to work in agriculture, services and construction. People's border-crossing movements are not just about a flow between two countries but much circulation occurs. In particular, Chinese and Indian high-tech professionals often pursue career opportunities around the world enabling them to maximize their earnings and savings.

Transnationally mobile people and the transnational social spaces that they gradually create transform not only the socio-economic conditions but wider social patterns are also in a state of change. The growing role of transnational familial ties and networks is an example in this respect. What is feasible at this point is to ask whether the family reunification programmes and other policy regulations take into account the needs of family members of short-term migrants. Persons leaving their country for the purpose of employment or family reasons are not the only groups of transnational movers who want to improve their quality of life. Lifestyle migration is a heterogeneous phenomenon whereby people (typically citizens of affluent industrialised nations) move, permanently or temporarily, to a country with lower living costs (incl. cheaper property prices) and sunny climates. For example Thailand attracts increasing number of pensioners, medical tourists and other lifestyle migrants from Europe. Although the phenomenon is relatively small as far as numbers are concerned, lifestyle migration clearly appears to be an emerging social pattern in the European-Asian context.

Moreover, a number of asylum seekers and irregular migrants are moving back and forth over Asian and European borders (typically from Asia to EU). Although the true scale of the phenomenon is unknown, it is obvious that Turkey and Ukraine are the main corridors for irregular mobility from Asia to EU. Also Hungary, as a Schengen country, has gained growing importance as a country of transit both for Asian companies planning expansion to Europe and for individual people, not only for regular migrants but also for irregular ones.

1.INTRODUCTION

Pirkko PITKÄNEN

While considerable attention has been paid by researchers to the flows and patterns of long-term border-crossing movements, an analysis of the characteristics of temporary transnational mobility has been largely lacking. This state-of-the-art report depicts types and characteristic features of temporary migration on a global scale, between EU and Asia and, particularly, into and out of countries taking part in the EURA-NET project. EURA-NET - Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People - is an international research project, funded by the EUs 7th Framework Programme for the period 2014-2017[1]. In EURA-NET, theoretical and empirical studies are being accomplished to attain an understanding of the current characteristics and related policy impact of temporary migration between Europe and Asia. The findings in the European-Asian context will provide insights to be applied to other world regions.

The basic research question addressed in EURA-NET is: What are the transformative characteristics and development impacts of the temporary mobility of people and what are their policy implications on national, European and international scales? In order to attain an understanding of everyday experiences of transnationally mobile people, 80 respondents will be interviewed in China, Finland, Germany, Greece[2], Hungary, India, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine. One purpose of this report is to provide information of the volume and characteristics of different categories of migrants relevant for the EURA-NET research. In order to assemble migrants/movers into distinct subgroups from which simple random samples may be selected, preceding research literature and statistics (state statistics, Eurostat etc.) were scrutinised for this report.

In many cases, it was noted that previous research findings and statistics are not available or it became apparent that the categories of existing statistical data do not match the categories of temporary migration. Moreover, statistical categories do not necessarily always match real-life phenomena. Due to the lack of preceding statistics it was difficult to reveal the phenomenon in quantitative terms. It was even more difficult to get numbers which are comparable between countries, as the definitions and registration procedures for migrants differ across countries. In the absence of relevant statistics, additional data were collected from preceding research, policy reports, publications of national and international NGOs, information posted in websites (embassies' www-pages, e.g.), journalistic material and so on.

A topical question for the data collection was how to determine who is a 'temporary migrant'. The EU legal framework on migration uses the period between three months and five years in what could be denominated as 'temporary' (up to three months third country nationals holding a Schengen visa may freely travel in the Schengen area), and after five years corresponding with permanent residence as outlined in the Directive 2003/109 on the status of third country nationals who are long-term residents (Carrera, Eisele & Guild, 2014). However, the first state-of-the-art report of EURA-NET (Pitkänen & Carrera, 2014) revealed that there is no commonly accepted definition of temporary migration. It also became clear that the current concepts and target groups are often very much dependent on national specificities in respect of historical, political, economic and societal backgrounds, as well as different interests at play in the setting of priorities and formulation of national policies. Consequently, the report concluded that time is not the only featuring component which matters in characterising mobility as temporary, rather there is a number of other variables which play a role in the framing a phenomenon as 'temporary migration', such as legal status, rights/benefits, changing intentions/expectations of the individual and the security of the state.

1 See more http://www.uta.fi/eura-net

2 Greece is not included in this report, since the Greek team did not take part in this phase of the EURA-NET research.

Even the term 'migrant' is equally contested and no universally accepted definition for the term exists. The United Nations defines migrants as individuals who have resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate. Under such a definition, those travelling for shorter periods would not be considered migrants, or may be seen as temporary migrants. Thus, the UN definition implies that there are two time-bound categories of migration: short-term migration (between three months and one year) and long-term migration (longer than a year). Similarly, European Migration Network (EMN) defines temporary migration as 'migration for a period of at least three months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage' (Asylum and Migration Glossary 2.0, 2012). According to EMN, temporary migration is migration for a specific motivation and/or purpose with the intention that afterwards there will be a return to country of origin or onward movement.

The definition by EMN has been adopted in a number of EU Member States but several unsolved questions remain: What is the relationship between temporary and permanent migration? To what extent do the motivations and intentions of individual migrants play a role in timing the residence? In practice, only the migrants who leave the host country by their own choice, and whose return time is a choice variable, can be considered migrants with temporary migration intentions. Several methodological questions also follow: How can the researcher know the migrants' real intentions (the intentions may also change during the migratory processes)? Temporariness is not necessarily a permanent status; when is the moment when temporary migration becomes permanent? How can the researcher know whether or not residence permits are/will be extended, or whether migrants actually leave the country when their residence permit has expired?

The following chapters introduce preliminary findings of the EURA-NET study. The quality and extent of temporary border-crossing movements will be introduced at a global level, between EU[3] and Asia and, in particular, into and out of the countries taking part in EURA-NET. Finally, the concluding chapter presents a summary about the characteristics of temporary transnational migration and depicts distinct subgroups relevant to EURA-NET.

3 Due to methodological reasons, it was decided to limit the data collection into the migratory movements between EU and Asia and not between Europe and Asia.

References

Asylum and Migration Glossary 2.0, 2012. European Migration Network (EMN). Retrieved from https://www.scribd.com/doc/135370093/Asylum-and-Migration-Glossary-2

Carrera, S., Eisele, K. & Guild, E. 2014. European and International perspectives and Standards on Temporary Migration. In P. Pitkänen & S. Carrera (Eds.) Transnational Migration in Transition: State-of-the-art Report on Temporary Migration: Collected Working Papers from the EURA-NET Project, 13-38. Retrieved from http://www.uta.fi/edu/en/research/projects/eura-net/publications.html

Pitkänen, P. & Carrera, S. 2014 (Eds.). Transnational Migration in Transition: State-of-the-art Report on Temporary Migration: Collected Working Papers from the EURA-NET project. Retrieved from http://www.uta.fi/edu/en/research/projects/eura-net/publications.html

2. FLOWS AND PATTERNS OF TEMPORARY TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION IN TODAY'S WORLD

TIAN Fangmeng, HU Xiaojiang, Agnes HARS, David SIMON, S. Irudaya RAJAN

2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to shed light on the border-crossing migratory movements on a global scale. In order to overview the global aspects of temporary migration, several methodological challenges have to be taken into account (Lemaitre, 2005). As it is stated by the OECD StatsExtracts metadata descriptions, "...countries seldom have tools specifically designed to measure the inflows and outflows of the foreign population, and national estimates are generally based either on population registers or residence permit data". Due to this fact, when trying to measure worldwide migration, especially temporary migration, the researchers face with the problem of lack of relevant data.

In most cases just stock data are available. Furthermore, the data are seldom adjusted to the natural demographic procedure which in case of migrant population can be very different from the population of the host country. Beyond these biasing facts circular migratory movements may remain hidden. Measuring migration on the basis of flow data would be more appropriate. However, in case of flow data other distorting factors occur. First of all the flow data are much less complete than stock data. Furthermore, the data are often rather derived from stock data than measured as real flow data that can cause the biases of stock data. Beyond these factors, the reliability of in- and outflow data is very different. According to the OECD StatsExtracts, "departures tend to be less well recorded than arrivals. Indeed, the emigrant who plans to return to the host country in the future may be reluctant to inform about his departure to avoid losing rights related to the presence on the register".

Beyond the bias of the statistical data, the nation-states tend to define migrant population differently. As an example, the definition of a 'migrant' differs in the OECD countries taking part in the EURA-NET project as follows (OECD metadata, StatsExtracts):

Finland	Holding a residence permit, intending to stay in the country for at least 1 year.
Germany	Holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 1 week.
Hungary	Holding a long-term residence permit (valid for up to 1 year).
Netherlands	Holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 4 of the next 6 months.
Turkey	Residence permits issued for duration of residence longer than one month.

The above-mentioned conceptual differences obviously causes diversity in the published statistics. To sum up, even if there are data on (temporary) migration, it is rather stock data than flow data. In case flow data are available the data are not equally reliable. Furthermore, measuring temporary migration is extremely difficult due to the conceptual differences. Thus, in using the available data, interpretations have to be very cautious. In the following section we try to present a draft picture of world migration stock. After that we try to simulate flow data on the basis of stock data differences, and make an estimation of the occurrence of temporary migration in the countries under investigation in EURA-NET.

2.2 Temporary Border-Crossing Migration on a Global Scale

To give an overview of the overall migration map, we start with the stock data based on UN database. According to the data nearly 60 per cent of total migrant population in the world lives in developed regions and almost one third in Europe. Importantly, however, over 40 per cent of the migrant stock lives in developing regions. Nearly one third of the total world migrant population lives in Asia. The share by regions is rather stable over time, though the yearly increase has remarkable slowed down everywhere, except in Africa, Australia and Oceania 8see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Migration stock by regions (Source: UN ESA, Trends in international migrant stock: The 2013 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013.htm)

Region	**2000**	**2010**	**2013**	**2000**	**2010**	**2013**	**2000-2010**	**2010-/2013**
	million persons			share (%)			change/year (million persons)	
Africa	15,6	17,1	18,6	8,9	7,7	8,0	0,2	0,5
Asia	50,4	67,8	70,8	28,9	30,7	30,6	1,7	1,0
Europe	56,2	69,2	72,4	32,2	31,4	31,3	1,3	1,1
Latin America & Caribbean	6,5	8,1	8,5	3,7	3,7	3,7	0,2	0,1
North America	40,4	51,2	53,1	23,2	23,2	22,9	1,1	0,6
Australia & Oceania	5,4	7,3	7,9	3,1	3,3	3,4	0,2	0,2
World total	174,5	220,7	231,5	100,0	100,0	100,0	4,6	3,6
developed regions	103,4	129,7	135,6	59,3	58,8	58,6	2,6	2,0
developing regions	71,1	91	95,9	40,7	41,2	41,4	2,0	1,6

For presenting the flows and pattern of temporary migration, we quote here the statistical data calculated and visualised by the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital for the period of 2005 and 2010, based on UN ESA data. Data are the minimum proxy to temporary migration and cover flows occurred in the 5 year period, but ignore migration flows, return migrations and new emigrations during the given 5 year period.[1]

Figure 2.1 below shows the in- and outflow patterns in different world regions. Corresponding to the preceding statistics, it seems obvious that considerable emigration has occurred to the neighbouring countries in the same sub-regions. The regional migration is particularly strong from South Asia to West Asia and from Latin America to North America, as well as from and to South-East Asia, Africa and the Post-Soviet regions. On the other hand, there are strong long distance emigration flows from Latin-America to Europe and from South Asia and North Asia to North America. Further, less intense flows can be seen from various less developed regions to developed regions as well as between the developed regions. Nevertheless, emigration flows form more developed to less developed world regions are less recognisable.

1 Annual flow data sourced from administrative records or national surveys capture every move during the reference period, providing the duration of stay exceeds 12 months (the time criterion differs across countries). Our five-year flow estimates capture migrants who changed their country of residence between mid-2005 and mid-2010. http://www.global-migration.info/VID_Global_Migration_Datasheet_web.pdf

Figure 2.1 Overall volumes of migration flows between 2005-2010 (colours show the region of origin) (Source: Wittgenstein Centre Data Explorer Version 1.1. Available at: http://www.global-migration.info)

2.2.1 Migration overview in the Asia-Europe context

In the following the Asian emigration and immigration patterns will be discussed. South and West Asian migration flows and the East and South East Asian ones will be presented differently to see the rather different orientations. The main destinations of South Asian emigration flows are largely in Asia, particularly in West Asia (e.g. the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar). There is also a considerable outflow from India and at a lower number from other South Asian countries to North America. The role of Europe as a destination region of various emigrant flows from South and West Asia can be seen in Figure 2.2.



Figure 2.2 South and West Asian emigration and immigration flows between 2005-2010 (colours show the region of origin) (Source: Wittgenstein Centre Data Explorer Version 1.1. Available at: http://www.global-migration.info)

The flows and patterns of emigration from East and South East Asian regions are rather different, although common features appear too. There is some migration from Indonesia and the Philippines to West Asia and to the neighbouring states of the same region. There is also a considerable long distance migration flow particularly from China to North America and also from various countries of the regions to North America, Australia, Oceania and Europe. These migratory flows are rather balanced. On the other hand, according to the statistics, emigration from Europe to East and South East Asia is hardly recognisable (see Figure 2.3).



Figure 2.3 East and South East Asian emigration and immigration flows between 2005-2010 (colours show the region of origin) (Source: Wittgenstein Centre Data Explorer Version 1.1. Available at: http://www.global-migration.info)

Since the figures presented above represent the lower proxy to migration flows and temporary migration is not easy to show, efforts will be done to investigate more detailed data of the countries taking part in EURA-NET. Table 2.2 shows the available migration stock data between the participating Asian and European countries.

As it can be seen the volume of migration from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia are very unbalanced. However, in the cases of the chosen countries there is migration in both directions. If we measure the number of emigrants from Europe to selected Asian countries, we find that the numbers are small (except in the case of Turkey). The most migrants from Europe to Asia are from Germany and the Netherlands. Other EURA-NET countries, such as Finland, Hungary or Ukraine, have a very low number of emigrants in Asia.

Table 2.2 Migration stocks in 2010 in the participating countries (Source: UN ESA, 2013)

	China	India	Philippines	Thailand	Turkey	Finland	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Netherlands	Ukraine
China (i)		13 247	136 313	156 598	1 657	8 316	135 807	4 252	5 096	38 317	
India (b,r)	12 152		7 143	1 4268	584	4 449	77 601	20 922		15 332	
Philippines (c,r)	98 052			1 980	654	2 092	32 407	13 468		9 838	
Thailand (b,r)	18877		186		165	7 499	94 070	337		2 107	
Turkey (b,r)		250				6 214	2 819 326	1 973	446	201 453	
Finland (b)			664		1 873		21 936	29	164	738	
Germany (b)		4 123	2 525	3 963	306 459	7 746		504	24 897	121 029	
Greece (c)			378		66 345	881	472 805		1 740	8 652	
Hungary (b,r)			194		583	1 859	104 431	398		6523	
Netherlands (b)			354	636	24 450	1 679	229 293	112	318		
Ukraine (b)					4 682	1 016	213 593	41 218	5 988		

b – place of birth *c* – citizenship *r* – number of refugees added *i* – imputation. Gray background indicates the intra continental

Table 2.3 Changes in migration stock data between 2000 and 2010 (Source: UN ESA, 2013)

	China	India	Philippines	Thailand	Turkey	Finland	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Netherlands	Ukraine
China		-2 377	35 300	49 486	174	5 302	76 814	3 656	3 862	5 361	
India	5 692		1850	4509	61	2 783	27 588	14 113		4 831	
Philippines	45 426			626	68	962	-12 371	7 163		3 089	
Thailand	7 935		48		18	4 948	46 627	146		-4 335	
Turkey		-45				3 157	-21 610	-5 652	90	28 998	
Finland			172		196		-670	-732	33	-1 518	
Germany		-740	654	1 252	32 103	2 653		-13 559	10 518	4 278	
Greece			98		6 950	216	-46 669		526	1658	
Hungary			50		61	618	3596	-177		1465	
Netherlands			92	201	2 562	640	71 810	-2 582	64		
Ukraine					490	707	160 478	28 215	1 207		

The number of migrants from Asia to Europe is much higher. The main destination countries are Germany and the Netherlands, but there is a significant migrant population from the selected Asian countries in Greece as well. In Hungary and Ukraine the number of Asian immigrants is quite small according to the quoted database. Turkey has a special position among the countries that can be traced in the numbers as well. While the statistics show that there are very few migrants from other Asian countries in Turkey, the number of migrants from Europe is very high. On the other hand Turkish migrants are presented in all European countries under investigation in EURA-NET, especially in Germany and the Netherlands (we have no data about Ukraine in this sense). Behind these numbers we have to recognise the long lasting presence of Turkish migrants in Europe which yielded in a backward migration of ethnic Turks with the citizenships of European countries (where they were born).

Table 2.3 seeks to measure the changes of the stock migration (on the basis of stock migration data in 2000 and 2010) to estimate some changes in migration process. These numbers together with the flow numbers will form the basis for our estimations on temporary migration. The table shows that changes in the migration from Europe to Asia have been small, but with one exception (from Germany to India) the number of migrants has been increasing. On the other hand, the patterns of migration from Asia to Europe tend to be changing. However, the overall tendency in 2000-2010 has been an increase in migration. General increase can be seen in all investigated migrant populations in the cases of Finland and Greece, but there were significant decreases in the cases of Thais in the Netherland and Philippines in Germany.

In the lfollowing section we try to estimate the temporariness of migration in the cases of the investigated EURA-NET countries. We use for this estimation the cumulative inflow data of the OECD (OECD StatsExtract) and the above mentioned differences in the stock data both for 2000 and 2010. We assume that if the cumulative inflow is significantly higher than the changes in the stock data for the same period, the occurrence of temporary migration is more probable, while if the cumulative inflow and changes in stock data are similar we assume low temporariness of migration. It must be mentioned here that natural demographic procedures (such as death and birth) are not taken into account due to the lack of data. Besides, the temporariness is not well defined in this approximation as it may happen that a long term migrant leave the country in question.

Table 2.4 Cumulative flow data compared to changes in stock, 2000-2010 (Difference of cumulative flow and stock change in percentage of cumulative flow) (Source: UN; OECD data)

	Finland	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Netherlands	Ukraine
China	3,8	48,9	n.a.	60,8	84,3	n.a.
India	27,9	71,5	n.a.	n.a.	71,1	n.a.
Philippines	12,7	132,8	n.a.	n.a.	53,6	n.a.
Thailand	-13,5	3,8	n.a.	n.a.	154,8	n.a.
Turkey	-0,1	105,5	n.a.	96,7	26,8	n.a.
Ukraine	57,5	-28,3	n.a.	95,6	n.a.	n.a.

Table 2.5 Chance of temporariness of migration between the investigated countries

	Finland	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Netherlands	Ukraine
China	NO	LOW	n.a.	HIGH	HIGH	n.a.
India	LOW	HIGH	n.a.	n.a.	HIGH	n.a.
Philippines	LOW	HIGH	n.a.	n.a.	HIGH	n.a.
Thailand	NO	NO	n.a.	n.a.	HIGH	n.a.
Turkey	NO	HIGH	n.a.	HIGH	LOW	n.a.
Ukraine	HIGH	NO	n.a.	HIGH	n.a.	n.a.

Whereas Table 2.4 shows the relative difference between the cumulative inflow and the stock data changes in the percentage of cumulative inflow, Table 2.5 shows our estimation of the chance of temporariness according to these differences. In some cases, such as Finland and Ukrainians in Germany, the changes in stock data are higher than the cumulative inflow. This can be a result of both data problems and high natural birth rate among the migrant population accompanied with low temporariness. According to our estimation there is a high chance of temporary migration to Hungary and the Netherlands, and a low chance of temporary migration to Finland. In the German case we assume a mixed pattern. In the cases of Indians, Philippines and Turks, we assume high chance of temporary migration, while in the case of Thais and Ukrainians we assume the opposite. It seem that the temporariness is much more determined by the country of residence than the country of origin. Thai migrants have lower chance to temporariness while Indians and Philippines have a higher chance for temporary migration. It should, however, be added that the picture is here much less clear than from the viewpoint of countries of residence.

2.3 Appearance of Temporary Migration Flows and Stocks

2.3.1 The size and change of various temporary migration appearances

Temporary migration is fluid in definition, changes in time and various in appearances. As argued earlier, migration flow data is the best available proxy of temporary migration. The most relevant types of migration inflows are presented in Table 2.6. The table refers to 21 OECD countries providing data on migration inflows by the type of migration. Destination countries are split into European countries and countries outside Europe, since the migration patterns between them are rather different.[2] A scarce majority (55%) of total migration flow is oriented to Europe while 45 per cent of the total is directed to the outside European OECD countries.

The principal share of total migration flow has been family type migration, including accompanying family members: over 40 per cent of the world total and 2/3rd of the outside European migration

2 European OECD countries refer to: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Outside European OECD countries refer to: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, and USA.

flow has been on family reasons. In European migration flows, the share of family type migration has been less central, around 1/4th of the total. Migration for work has been more important in Europe than outside Europe. In Europe, the most important type of migration flow took place on the bases of free movement including various labour activities among European countries. Humanitarian and other type of migration has less relevance in share everywhere.

Table 2.6 Migration inflow of foreigners by type, 2011 (Permit based statistics, own standardised calculations) (Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013 - © OECD 2013, Stat Link http://dx.doi.org)

	World total	Europe	Outside Europe	World total	Europe	Outside Europe
	thousand persons			share, %		
Work	680,7	450,6	230,2	18,0	21,7	13,4
Family (incl. accompanying family)	1627,3	512,7	1114,6	42,9	24,6	65,1
Humanitarian	313,0	91,2	221,8	8,3	4,4	13,0
Free movements	982,7	944,4	38,3	25,9	45,4	2,2
Others	188,2	81,2	107,0	5,0	3,9	6,2
Total	3791,9	2080,0	1711,9	100,0	100,0	100,0

In addition to the proxy data of the inflow, OECD statistics presents also data on temporary migration by type including the main temporary categories. According to data, there has been a considerable increase in student migration, around 150 per cent in six years from 2005 to 2011. The financial crisis has considerable changed the temporary labour migration: the number of seasonal workers, other temporary workers and trainees has decreased considerable, particularly in Europe. Although the intra-company transfers are hard to follow, according to the statistics, the numbers have increased sharply during the same period (see Table 2.7).

Table 2.7 Temporary migration by type, 2011 and change 2005-2011 (own calculations) (Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013 - © OECD 2013, Stat Link http://dx.doi.org)

	World total	Europe	Outside Europe	World total	Europe	Outside Europe
	thousand persons, 2011			change 2005-2011, %		
International students	1314,3	524,1	790,2	150,5	155,9	147,2
Trainees	114,0	11,5	102,5	99,1	68,5	104,3
Working holiday makers	413,3	21,2	392,1	132,5	37,2	153,8
Seasonal workers	358,0	242,7	115,3	61,5	50,4	114,7
Intra-company transfers	127,3	32,3	95,0	139,9	526,2	112,0
Other temporary workers	950,1	282,1	668,0	78,0	57,9	91,4
Total	3277,1	1113,9	2163,2	102,7	80,4	119,8

Temporary migration is dominated by student migration which has increased from about one quarter of total temporary migration to 40 per cent, and almost half of the total temporary migration accounts for student migration in Europe. Seasonal workers and other temporary workers are the other relevant groups in temporary migration with sharp decrease, particularly in Europe. Other forms of temporary migration followed by the OECD statistics like trainees, working holiday makers, and intra-company transferees seem to be rather marginal (see Table 2.8). Remarkable, however, family type migration is not covered by the main types of temporary migration statistics of the OECD. While family migration is essential in the global context and is a particularly important type of migration outside European destination countries, it is less intense in European and Asian migration context. There are further types of temporary migration in the European-Asian context, such as humanitarian and irregular migration, but also return migration is important. In the following sections particular types of temporary migration will be examined. Some others will be discussed in the country reports in details.

Table 2.8 Breakdown of temporary migration by type, 2005, 2011 (own calculations) (Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013 - © OECD 2013, Stat Link http://dx.doi.org)

	World total		Europe		Outside Europe	
	2005	2011	2005	2011	2005	2011
	percentage					
International students	27,4	40,1	24,3	47,1	29,7	36,5
Trainees	3,6	3,5	1,2	1,0	5,4	4,7
Working holiday makers	9,8	12,6	4,1	1,9	14,1	18,1
Seasonal workers	18,2	10,9	34,8	21,8	5,6	5,3
Intra-company transfers	2,9	3,9	0,4	2,9	4,7	4,4
Other temporary workers	38,2	29,0	35,2	25,3	40,5	30,9
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

2.3.2 Student migration

Over the last decade, the number of tertiary level students travelling to another country in pursuit of higher education has increased over 75 per cent. Current estimates indicate that there are 3.7 - 4.1 million students worlwidely (Varghese, 2008; OECD[3]). Globalization processes have been a key driving force that has impacted and spurred student mobility. Although the rapid growth of mobility is relatively recent, the desire to acquire a higher education beyond national borders itself is not new; students and scholars have always sought short-term learning opportunities around the world as a way to broaden their educational and cultural horizons. What has changed, however, is the overall context of global mobility, both in terms of who is going abroad, the mix of host and sending countries and the social and economic factors that motivate students to pursue educational opportunities outside their home country.

The demand for international students exists for various reasons. International students in top host countries like the USA and UK are valuable as they pay premium fees for acquiring their degree; in fact, up to three times the amount charged to local students (Lall, 2008). In addition to providing the much needed funds for the higher education institutions, the inflow of international students injects financial resources into host country economies. An important motivation for attracting foreign students is also that they raise the performance standards of thes host universities; this is vital as it bears a positive influence on the global ranking (Khadria, 2001). A further reason why policies are being increasingly designed in favour of student migration is due to the declining labour force of the most developed nations. These countries have an ageing workforce nearing retirement, coupled with very low fertility rates and are thereby heading towards a shrinking workforce and population. As fertility rates remain below replacement level in OECD countries, a shrinking workforce is bound to 'intensify labour-market impacts' (Hawthorne, 2008). These countries consequently have a serious need to attract temporary migrants who will form a vital component of their labour force in the years to come.

3 OECD Education at a glance – 4.1 million international students in 2010 with UK receiving 12 per cent of total share.



Figure 2.4 Number of international students in Europe, 2007 (Source: Eurostat data)

The movement of tertiary level students between countries is currently a mass movement. The global population of internationally mobile students more than doubled from 2.1 million in 2000 to nearly 4.5 million in 2011. Given that growth trajectory, that total number is likely nudging closer to 5 million in 2014. Asia is the key here. Asian students account for 53 per cent of all students studying abroad. China, India, and South Korea are the world's leading sources of international students. One out of six internationally mobile students is from China, and together these three top countries account for more than a quarter of all students studying outside their home countries. China is the most represented by international students and its share has risen significantly over the years. China was the source country for over 15 per cent of the student population globally in 2009. India has also grown into a leading player in the international students market and is the second most important sending country after China. Indian student flows to the world have grown considerably as their share doubled from 3 per cent in 2000 to over 6 per cent in 2009.

The United States is the world's leading destination, but the pattern of global student mobility is changing. It is expected that the USA's market share is falling from about 23 per cent of all internationally mobile students in 2000 to 17 per cent in 2011. This is partly due to the increasing share of other English-speaking destinations, such as the UK, Australia, and Canada, but it also reflects a growing trend to intra-regional mobility – that is, to a growing number of students who study outside their home country but within their home region.

Table 2.9 Main source countries (% share of all international students) (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2011; Global Education Digest, 2011; Montreal, Quebec: UNESCO Institute for Statistics)

2000		2005		2009	
Country of Origin	**Share (%)**	**Country of Origin**	**Share (%)**	**Country of Origin**	**Share (%)**
China	6.6%	China	15.6%	China	15.9%
Korea	4.0%	India	5.4%	India	6.2%
Greece	3.6%	Korea	3.9%	Korea	4.0%
Japan	3.4%	Japan	2.5%	Germany	3.0%
Germany	3.0%	Germany	2.2%	Malaysia	1.7%
India	3.0%	Turkey	2.0%	Turkey	1.5%
France	2.8%	France	1.9%	France	1.5%
Turkey	2.7%	Morocco	1.8%	Canada	1.5%
Mrocco	2.4%	USA	1.7%	Russian Federation	1.4%
Italy	2.3%	Malaysia	1.7%	Japan	1.4%
Others	66.2%	Others	61.4%	Others	61.9%

The Institute of International Education reports that India has been the leading source of foreign students in the United States since 2000-2001. In the 2007-2008 academic year, 15 per cent of all foreign students admitted were from India, corresponding to almost 95,000 people. The majority of these Indian students pursued graduate studies, as did three out of four Indian students in 2006-2007. In a country profile report authored by Daniel Naujoks for the USA based Migration Policy Institute (MPI), the number of Indians submitting applications to USA graduate schools shrunk 12 percent for the 2008-2009 school year compared with 2007-2008, according to a report from the Council of Graduate Schools.

Of all European countries, UK is by far the most preferred destination for Indian students. Since its colonial days India has had strong ties with Britain and has ever since encouraged student migrations. Moreover, the familiarity of Indians with English language makes the transition easier. Given these advantages USA has still been more attractive a destination to Indian students with its wide variety subjects offered at a comparatively lesser cost than in the UK (a difference of almost $ 10,000 for a course)

The reliance of labour markets (in OECD countries) on foreign born migrant professionals has increased over the years. Australia has the strongest presence of foreign born individuals in its workforce while United States and United Kingdom are increasingly employing more foreigners. However, migrants who obtain their degrees as 'international' students outside their home country have greater absorbability in foreign labour markets, compared to overseas-qualified migrants from developing countries. This is because the former are equipped with knowledge resources provided by the host country and thus carry a quality assurance, which improves their 'work-readiness'. On the other hand, overseas-qualified migrants in many cases face considerable delays in finding employment and differential treatment in their salaries due to the perception of education systems in developing countries. Host country employers have serious concerns about the quality of education imparted in many developing countries, as many countries still lack regulatory bodies and quality assurance systems.

Therefore, compared to overseas migrants, there is less 'discounting of skills' for international students and their suitability as skilled human capital is guaranteed (Hawthorne, 2008). This is an important factor that fuels the global demand for international students. In the European context, the growing interest in recruiting international (or non-European) students is also a consequence of the changes in the education policy perspective.



Figure 2.5 International students in Europe, % share in total international students (Source: UNESCO database)

Student migration should be viewed not only from the perspective of educational gains, but also as a facilitating channel for future diasporic growth. Most students also seek to settle abroad and a foreign degree is an easier route to the West. As an example, recent trends show that more and more Indian students are inclined towards foreign education for many reasons. The lack of quality educational institutions in the country, the difficulty in attaining jobs, the cut-throat competition and above all the social status attached to foreign degrees. But the bottom line is that the intention of such movements is migration in a long run. Though students do not come under the purview of international migration laws, it should also be kept in mind that today's students are tomorrow's diaspora and they form an inevitable part of the labour force of the receiving countries, and a hefty source of remittance to the sender. Thus, visa rules, emigration policies, availability of funding opportunities and job prospects of the receiving countries very much influence the students' decision to migrate. As can be seen in Table 2.10, over 28 per cent of the labour force in Australia is constituted by foreign-born people. Austria, Spain, Belgium and the UK are also strong in this league. It is hence very evident as on how today's student community gets attached to tomorrows labour force.

Table 2.10 Share of foreign-born labour force in OECD countries (Source: Rupa Chanda and S. Mukharjee, 2012) (Source: based on statistics from the UNESCO database on international students at tertiary level (ISCED 5 and 6)

	Share of Foreign-born labour force in OECD countries									
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Australia		24.5	24.6	24.7	24.9	25	25.2	25.8	26.5	26.9
Austria	12.4	13.5	13.3	14.3	15.3	15.6	16.2	16.8	16.3	16.3
Belgium	10.4	10.7	11.3	11.4	11.5	11.7	12.3	10.6	10	13.8
Canada		19.9					21.2			
Denmark				5.4	5.9	6.1	6.4	6.6	6.8	6.9
Finland				3.1	3.4	3.6	3.9	4.2	4.6	
France				10.7	11.3	11.1	11.4	11.9	11.8	11.6
Greece	5.9	6.5	7.4	7.5	8.5	8.9	8.3	8.8	9.8	11.8
Hungary	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.3
Ireland	7.9	8.7	9.5	10.1	9.9	11.8	13.9	15.8	20.3	19
Italy						7.9	8.6			7.9
Netherlands	11.2	10.7	11.3	10.9	11.2	11.6	11	11.1	11.4	11.5
New Zealand		19.9					23.8			
Norway	6	6	6.5	7	7.1	7.4	7.8	8.4	8.5	9.5
Poland					0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Portugal	5.6	6.1	6.3	6.8	7.4	7.8	7.9	8.4	9.4	9.4
Slovenia										8.7
Spain	4.5	6.1	7.8	9.5	11.2	13.4	15.1	16.9	18.2	18.5
Sweden	10.1	10	9.9	10.1	10.3	10.8	11.2			
United Kingdom							11	11.8	12.6	12.9
United States	12.9	13.4	14.6	14.8	15.1	15.2	15.6	16.3	16.4	16.2

The USA student visa regulations, compared to other countries are more permissible and thus increase chances of finding employment after completing the degree. It is therefore a combination of attaining quality education in addition to employment opportunities which result in more Indians going to the USA or the UK for higher education. Even after the tight visa rules implemented by the UK and the USA, the student flow has not reduced proportionately; of course newer arenas like Germany, France and New Zealand have been better preferred, but not to an extent of outshining the USA and UK.

Although there are similarities between countries, the differences that exist in educational structures and the (independent) role played by some universities make each national policy on the immigration of international students unique. There seems to be great interest to attract students from emerging economies in an attempt to strengthen economic ties with these nations, but there seems to be very little studies on what happens to students after they secure their degrees abroad. It is hence very important that the governments stay informed about the international students in their territories and proper services are offered to the students in order to make the best use of their opportunities. The visa formalities, migration procedures and future prospects need to be unveiled so that the international student movements benefit all nations alike in the long run.

2.3.3 Labour migration

There exist many migratory spaces between Europe and Asia, which are primarily the aftermath of a colonial era. But times have changed, and the migration from Asia to Europe can no more be sidelined as the outcome of mere colonial ties. After the World War II, the European migratory spaces underwent much transition owing to its strict policies regarding migration. It should be emphasised that the flow of migrant labour from Asia has still been on a rise and is expected to keep up the pace for many years to come. With the changes that have taken place in the socio-political scenario of the Europe, immigration from Asia has gained a prominence. Migrants from countries like India, China, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia and Vietnam form a massive part of the non-native population in the European nations (see Figure 2.6).



Figure 2.6 Non-national population in EU nations based on countries of origin (Source: Eurostat data)

In terms of destinations, nationalities, age, gender and social status of migrants, migration to Europe is today dynamic creating a very heterogeneous non-native population. Migration is created both due to the socio-economic situations prevailing in the sending countries and also much due to the politico-legal climate in the destination countries.

The Asian migration has much responded to the globalisation and related restructuring of the world economies. This includes privatisation and lesser state interventions, labour market changes and, most of all, the regulations the various nations have brought in to their respective labour and migration laws. These changes in the labour market have instigated the demand for flexible labour in many European countries. The Asian labour, once categorized as the weakest sections of the European economic ladder has now become an inevitable part of its economic requirements, which can explain the transitions that the European labour market has undergone in recent past. The urgent need for labour has also accelerated much illegal practices in these economies. As Hillman and van Naerssen (2007) rightly points out, this is a new phenomenon that holds true in different levels of qualifications:

- It is apparent that in several European countries, the demand for certain categories of skilled labour from outside the EU is expanding. The EU labour markets themselves open up different spaces and niches for migrants as compared to the situation a decade ago. In this demand, immigration of Asians is becoming more conspicuous and shows certain specific characteristics. Examples include the Indian ICT workers in Germany or Indonesian nurses in the Netherlands.
- Asian female domestic workers in several EU countries are a part of ongoing feminisation of migration on the one hand and the engendering of labour markets on the other hand. Many highly skilled Asian immigrants suffer from the de-qualification on the labour market.
- Among certain Asian groups the propensity for being self-employed is relatively high. Labour force participation and the fostering of entrepreneurship are considered important for the successful integration of new immigrant groups in the host countries.

As we have already stated, the Asian migration to Europe has deep rooted colonial ties, which make some regions more preferred destinations or sources than some countries as such. For instance, for a very long time most migrants from India to the UK were from the states of Gujrat or Rajastan, which have had the oldest and the strongest bondage with the British empire. Similarly, most Chinese migrants have been from the provinces of Jhejiang and Guangdong. It is only recently that the concerns of brain drain caused by the student and skilled migrations struck the Asians. Vietnamese on the other hand, entered Europe mostly after the war in Vietnam and the Vietnamese population in Europe is substantially higher than any other Asian population in the continent.

As far as labour migration is concerned, the Philippines is the greatest source country. With over seven million Overseas Contract Workers (OCWs), Philippines is the second largest exporter of labour in the world and the country is the forerunner of the so called 'migration industry' in the world. It is estimated that over 0.8 million Philippino migrants live in Europe. As far as south East Asia is concerned, the Philippines and Thailand are the major source countries.

Table 2.11 Number of emigrants, immigrants and net-migrants in Asian and European EURA-NET countries, 2010 (Source: World Bank data files)

EURA-NET countries	Emigrants	Immigrants	Net-migrants
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) = (2) – (3)
Finland	329,269	225,646	+ 103,623
Belgium	454,522	1,465,677	- 1,011,015
China	8,344,726	685,775	+ 7,658,951
Germany	3,529,460	10,758,061	- 7,228,601
Greece	1,209,813	1,132,794	+ 77,019
Hungary	462,418	368,076	+ 94,342
India	11,360,823	5,436,012	+ 5,924,811
Netherlands	992,913	1,752,869	- 759,956
Philippines	4,275,612	435,423	+ 3,840,189
Thailand	811,123	1,157,263	- 346,140
Turkey	4,261,786	1,410,947	+ 2,850, 839
Ukraine	6,525,145	5,257,527	- 1,267, 618

Table 2.11 shows the immigration emigration statistics in the EURA-NET nations. It can be seen that India is the nation with the highest emigrant population and Germany receives the highest number of immigrants. As far as net migration is concerned, China has the highest positive figure, whereby emigration rates outnumbers immigration to a larger extent compared to other countries. Germany has the most negative net migration, which means that the number of received immigrants is much higher than the number of people who migrate to other countries. Interestingly, Greece is the nation which exhibits the lowest net migration, followed by Hungary.

Europe as a continent is undergoing many transformations in this era. The shift from manufacturing to services, increasing demand for low-skilled labour, the ageing population which also result in huge technological gap and the high volume of out-migration by the youth are challenges that the EU nations are likely to face in the years to come. However, statistics show that the Asian labour is more or less confined to self-employment or low-skilled job categories and are very much restricted the access to high-skilled jobs which increases the unemployment rate among the non-natives compared to the native workforce. Though the restrictive practices of countries vary in forms, we may still conclude that non-natives face much occupational barriers compared to the natives, which are bound to increase with time.

2.3.4 Humanitarian migration

Humanitarian migration is a challenge for migration study since persons in a need may be conflicting with legal or institutional categories (Long, 2013; Linde, 2009). Nevertheless, it can be said that humanitarian migration accounts for a rather small proportion of the global migrant stock. According to OECD data in 2013, the total number of refugees in the world was estimated at 15.7 million, representing about 7 per cent of all international migrants. Nearly nine of every ten refugees in the world had found asylum in developing regions. (OECD, 2013)

Recent refined data of UNHCR (2013) present detailed picture of the origin and destination regions of humanitarian migrants. Figure 2.7 clearly presents that the geographic character of humanitarian migration is sizeable in Africa and Asia, and that the origin and destination of humanitarian migration are largely regional. After Asia and Africa, Europe is the most important destination region for humanitarian migration while North America is considerable beyond.



Figure 2.7 Humanitarian migration stock by origin and destination regions, 2013 (million persons) (Source: data based on UNHCR, 2013)

Remarkable, refugee and refugee like situation outnumbers other asylum seekers with pending decision regarding refugee status. Nevertheless, asylum seekers are particularly sizeable in Europe as compared to persons in refugee status. At a lower number the case is similar in North America as well (see Figure 2.8).



Figure 2.8 Humanitarian migration stock of refugees vs those in refugee like situaton and asylum seekers by origin and destination regions, 2013 (million persons) (Source: data based on UNHCR, 2013)

While the stock of migrants has been rather balanced (around 10 million persons) since the mid-

2000s, the number of refugees who are able to return to their country of origin is decreasing. As a consequence, the share of refugees on a permanent situation is increasing (Figure 2.9).



Figure 2.9 Refugee returns, 1990-2013 (Source: UNHCR, 2013: 20)

2.3.5 Irregular migration

Irregular migration refers to migration across national borders, or residence of foreign nationals in a country, in a way that is illegal according to the immigration laws of the host country (IOM, 2011:54). Convention No. 143 adopted by the 1975 ILO Conference defines irregular migration as those where migrants find themselves "during their journey, on arrival or during their period of residence and employment [in] conditions contravening relevant international multilateral or bilateral instruments or agreements, or national laws or regulations" (OECD, 1999: 229). Typical activities of irregular migration include unauthorised entry, breach of a condition of entry, the expiry of visa, or lack of legal status in a host country.

Although there might be slight differences between the terms 'irregular migration', 'illegal migration', 'clandestine migration', 'unauthorised migration' and 'undocumented migration', the terms are often used interchangeably as synonyms in policy discussions. The term 'irregular' is adopted preferably to 'illegal' by an increasing number of official documents, because the latter contains a criminal connotation and is regarded as irrespective of a migrant's dignity. Consequently the term 'illegal' is often used only when referring to an action or condition (e.g. illegal entry or illegal residence) but not to a person.

According to an estimate made by the United Nations, there are approximately 30 to 40 million irregular migrants in the world, which represent 15 to 20 per cent of all international migrants. About 1.9 million to 3.8 million of irregular migrants are estimated to live in the European Union, and over 10 million stay in the United States. Roughly 30 to 40 per cent of all international migration within Asia is estimated to occur through irregular channels (ICHRP, 2010: 13). In addition, there are nearly three million actual or potential irregular migrants in Arab Mediterranean countries (Fargues, 2012).

It should be noted that most estimates of irregular migration are not accurate due to data unavailability and technical difficulties. The 2009 Human Development Report points out that most estimates of migrant numbers are based on national censuses, and "there are good reasons to suspect that censuses significantly undercount irregular migrants, who may avoid census interviewers for fear that they will share information with other government authorities" (UNDP, 2009: 23). However, census data remain probably the most reliable source for any estimation at an national level. For example, the American national censuses are believed to cover half to three quarters of irregular migrants (Papademetriou, 2005). The size of the irregular migrants is estimated by a residual method in the USA, which compares data from the national census to administration records on regular immigration with various adjustments.

The United States hosts the largest group of irregular migrants in the world. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, 11.2 million unauthorised immigrants were living in the USA in 2010, representing 3.7 per cent of the national population and 5.2 per cent of the country's labour force (Pew, 2011: 1). However, the number of people entering the country illegally had declined by nearly two thirds between 2005 and 2009, from an annual total of 850,000 averagely in the early 2000s to 300,000 by the end of the decade (Bahrampour, 2010). Mexican migrants constitute the largest group of irregular migrants in USA; they account for 58 per cent of the irregular population (Pew, 2011: 2).

Irregular migration to Europe is more blurred since every European country has its own statistical coverage and legal system. In 2008, the estimated number of irregular migrants in the EU15 was between 1.8 million and 3.3 million, while the estimate for the EU27 was between 1.9 million and 3.8 million, since most of the irregular residents live in the old Member States (EC, 2009: 4). Among the up to 3.8 million irregular migrants, Russia is estimated to have two million, and the UK hosts around 700,000 irregular migrants, about 425 thousand of whom live in London (ICHRP, 2010: 18). The annual inflow to Europe might be as phenomenal as hundreds of thousands.

Irregular migration to the European countries varies greatly in terms of source countries. In some cases, irregular migrants from a particular origin may dominate in the receiving country, such as Albanians in Greece. In some other cases, like Germany and the UK, irregular migrants might have diverse national backgrounds (EC, 2009: 7). The concrete number of irregular migrants fluctuates in accordance with regularisation programmes in some EU countries (Papademetriou, 2005). Spain, Italy and Greece have all regularised a considerable number of foreign residents in their countries, which led to the establishment of legal status of at least 1.8 million persons between 2003 and 2008 (EC, 2009: 7).

Irregular migration has also increased rapidly and affected many Asian countries. According to an estimate, up to one out of four migrant workers have illegal status in the continent (Castles and Miller, 2009). The average annual flow of migration from China was between 100,000 and 180,000 in the period from 1978 to 1995, among whom irregular migrants accounted for around 20 per cent (Laczko, 2003). It is also reported that twenty million irregular migrants live in India (ICHRP, 2010: 18). Hugo (2005) has estimated that about 3.8 million unauthorised migrants stayed in Southeast Asian countries in the early 2000s.

In addition, it is reported that there are 2.8 million or more actual or potential irregular migrants in Arab Mediterranean countries, among which Libya hosts the largest number in the region (Fargues, 2010). Syria and Jordan follow as the second and third largest destination countries, both of which have accommodated over half a million migrants with irregular status. A majority of these migrants are Iraqi refugees who left their home country during the Iraq War (Fargues, 2010). By contrast, 400,000 to 500,000 Syrian workers without formal employment permit constitute the largest group of irregular migration to Lebanon.

As a special type or irregular migration, human trafficking should also be mentioned. Human trafficking is different from human smuggling, though they are sometimes interrelated phenomena. With the assistance from other people, a smuggled person travels illegally to a foreign country on a voluntary base, while a trafficked person is coerced or deceived to travel to a foreign country for the purpose of exploitation. The size of human trafficking at an international level is notoriously inaccurate, and there is a large variation between different estimates. The Department of State in the USA suggests that 600,000 to 800,000 people were victims of worldwide human trafficking in 2004, among whom 80 per cent were females, 50 per cent minors, and 70 percent trafficked for sexual exploitation (Shelly, 2010: 5; Aronowitz, 2009: 16).

In the receiving countries, irregular migration brings negative impacts on the employment system and the social order. Irregular migrants are often associated with issues like threats to security, lack of border control, and competition with domestic workers. Exploitation of irregular migrants becomes a serious concern also for the source countries. Facing such a reality, it might be better to regularize the irregular population by providing more formal migration channels than to exclude potential unauthorised migrants, because the root of the problem lies in a constant and unbalanced struggle between "the inspector who carries out his duty and the migrant in search of his destiny" (OECD, 1999: 246).

2.3.6 Return migration

Return migration refers to people who, after migration to other countries, return to their country of origin. The return can be a one-time move or a continuous circular movement between country of origin and host country. While all types of migrants can and do return[4] the study on 'return migration' is mostly focused on highly-skilled migrants, such as professionals and students (Rosenzweig, 2006).

Statistics of return migration at the global level are not available, but studies have shown that the rates of return vary in time and by region and country. Some countries see a significant proportion of high skilled migrants and students return. For example, in China, as of the end of 2012, the cumulative number of Chinese students who had left to study abroad was 2.64 million, and among those 1.09 million had come back, a return rate of 41 per cent[5]. In Canada, about 40 per cent of those who entered with skilled worker or business class visa left within 10 years after arrival, much higher than other types of migrants. (Aydemir and Robinson 2008). Data from the USA shows that 80 per cent of foreign students do not become permanent resident aliens and most presumably return home upon completion of their term of study (Rosenzweig, 2008). On the contrary, some countries, such as Italy, show a low rate of return migration of the highly skilled (Biondo et al., 2012).

At the global level, evidence has shown that high skilled migrants are more likely to return or move onward than other types of migrants (Aydemir and Robinson, 2008). Secondly, return migration is more prevalent than before because of the formation of the new global market for talent (Solimano, 2010). Thirdly, the transnational social networks that are enabled by the development of communication and transportation have given people freedom of choice to return or to move back and forth (Ding, 2014).

At an individual level, the determinants of return are multifaceted. They include economic factors such as the varying price for skills in different markets, perception of skill use opportunities and rewards for skills (Lee and Kim, 2010; Rosenzweig, 2006; Soon, 2010), but also non-economic factors such as culture and life style, family, perception of different aspects of country of origin (for example, the perception of stability) and initial intention for return. (Biondo, 2012; Gibson and McKenzie, 2011; Güngör and Tansel, 2008; Salaff and Greve, 2013; Wolfeil, 2009).

The return migration is considered the positive counterpart of the 'brain drain'. New evidence shows that through return migration, country of origin benefits from brain-return or brain-gain or brain-circulation to get important know-how, connection, capital and so on (Mayr and Peri, 2009; Kumar et al., 2014).

4 As an example, in Mexico 2005-2010, 1.4 million Mexicans returned to Mexico between 2005-2010, the exact same number as those who migrated into the USA (Passel et al., 2012).
5 http://www.chinasmack.com/2013/stories/why-are-overseas-chinese-students-not-returning-to-china.html

2.4 Summary

It has become evident that temporary migration at a global level is on increase. Nearly 60 per cent of total word migrant population lives in developed regions and almost one third in Europe. Migrant flow data as the minimum proxy to temporary migration show considerable migration within the less developed regions among the neighbouring countries or regions. As of the Asian region, the regional migration from South Asia to West Asia and within South-East Asia are particularly strong. There is also some migration from East and South East Asia to West Asia. In South Asia there is a considerable outflow from India and at a lower number from other South Asian countries to North America. There is a considerable long distance migration flow particularly from China to North America but also from various countries of the regions to North America, Australia and Oceania. Europe is a destination region of various emigrant flows from Asian regions, and the flows are rather balanced. According to the statistical data, emigration from Europe to Asia is hardly recognisable.

The gradually changing forms of temporary migration are different in Europe and outside Europe. Temporary migration is fluid in definition, changes in time and various in appearances. The principal share of total migration flow has been family type migration in total developed world (OECD countries), including accompanying family members: over 40 per cent of the world total and 2/3rd of the outside European migration flow has been on family reasons. The share of family type migration has been less central, around 1/4th of the total, in European migration flows while migration flow for work has been more important in Europe than outside Europe.

Temporary migration is dominated by student migration which has increased considerable, to around 150 per cent in six years from 2005-2011. The increase has been more intense in Europe, though the larger share of total student migrants study outside Europe, mainly in the USA. Temporary labour migration, on the other hand, has been hit by the financial crisis: the number of seasonal workers, other temporary workers and trainees has decreased considerable, particularly in Europe.

References

Aronowitz, A. (2009) Human Trafficking,Human Misery. London: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Aydemir, Abdurrahman and Chris Robinson (2008) Global labour markets, return, and onward migration Canadian Journal of Economics. 41(4):1285-1311

Bahrampour, T. (2010) Number of illegal immigrants in U.S. drops, report says, The Washington Post, 1 September, 2010, accessed 13 September, 2014.

Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N. and Szantos Blanc, C. (1997) 'From immigrant to transnational migration' , in ludger Pries (ed.) Transnational Migration. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 121-40

Biondo, Alessio Emanuele (2012), What's up after brain drain? Sometimes, somewhere, someone comes back: a general model of return migration International Review of Economics 59(3): 269-284

Biondo, Alessio Emanuele, S.Monteleone, G.Skonieczny, B.Torrisi (2012), The propensity to return: Theory and evidence for the Italian brain drain Economics Letters 06/2012; 115(3).

Castles, S. and Miller, M. (2009), Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region, Migration Policy Institute, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migration-asia-pacific-region, accessed 10 September, 2014

Clandestine immigration: economic and political issues. In: Trends In International Migration. Paris: OECD, 229-251.

Commission of the European Communities (2003) Communication from the Commission of the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Immigration, Integration and Employment. Brussels, COM 92003) 336 final, 3 June 2003.

Ding ,Yueya (2014) Return Migration: New Characters and Theoretical Models Migration in China and Asia: Experience and Policy International Perspectives on Migration 10: 247-263

European Commission (2009) Comparative Policy Brief - Size of Irregular Migration, Counting the Uncountable: Data and Trends across Europe, October 2009

Fargues, P. (2012) Irregular Migration in the Arab Mediterranean Countries, Middle East Institute, 2012, available at http://www.mideasti.org/content/irregular-migration-arab-mediterranean-countries, accessed 5 September, 2014

Fong, Pa E and Lim, L.Y.C (1996) 'Structural change in the labour market, regional integration and international migration', in Migration and the Labour Market in Asia: Prospects to the year 2000. Paris: OCED, 61-74.

Georges Lemaitre (2005) The Comparability of International Migration Statistics, Problems and Prospects http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/36064929.pdf

Gibson, John and David McKenzie (2011) The microeconomic determinants of emigration and return migration of the best and brightest: Evidence from the Pacific Journal of Development Economics, 95(1): 18-29

Güngör, Nil Demet and Aysit Tansel (2008). Brain drain from Turkey: an investigation of students' return intentions. Applied Economics, 40(23):3069-3087.

Hillmann, Felicitas, and Ton Van Naerssen. (2007) Asian Migrants and European Labour Markets: Patterns and Processes of Immigrant Labour Market Insertion in Europe. Ed. Ernst Spaan. Vol. 10. N.p.: Routledge, Print. Routledge Research in Population and Migration.

Hugo, G. (2005) Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region. Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration

ILO (International Labour Office) (2004) Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy. Report VI. Geneva: ILO.

International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) (2010) Irregular Migration, Migrant Smuggling and Human Rights: Towards Coherence. Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011) Glossary on Migration. Geneva: International Organization for Migration

IOM (International Organization for Migration) (2003) World Migration: Managing Migration, Geneva, IOM.
Krishna Kumar, S and S Irudaya Rajan, Emigration in 21st-Century India: Governance, Legislation, Institutions. Routledge India, 2014.
Kumar, Perveen, Uttam Bhattacharya, and Jayanta Kr. Nayek (2014) Return Migration and Development: Evidence from India's Skilled Professionals Dynamics of Asian Development 2014: 263-284
Laczko, F (2003) Europe Attracts More Migrants from China, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe-attracts-more-migrants-china, accessed 18 April, 2014
Lee, Jenny J.; Kim, Dongbin (2010) Brain Gain or Brain Circulation? U.S. Doctoral Recipients Returning to South Korea Higher Education: The International Journal of Higher Education and Educational Planning, 59(5): 627-643
Linde, Thomas (2009) Humanitarian assistance to migrants irrespective of their status – towards a noncategorical approach, International Review of the Red Cross, vol 95, No 875, September pp 567-578
Long, Katy (2013) When refugees stopped being migrants: Movement, labour and humanitarian protection, Migration Studies, vol 1, No 1. pp 4-26
Mayr, Karin, and Giovanni Peri (2009) Brain Drain and Brain Return: Theory and Application to Eastern-Western Europe The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 07/2009; 9(1):49-49.
Mkherjee, S., and R. Chanda. 2012. Indian Student Mobility to European Countries: An Overview. Florence: Migration Policy Centre.
Mukhopadhyay, C. C., and S. Seymour. eds. 1994. Women, Education, and Family Structure in India. Boulder: Westview Press.
OECD (2013) World Migration in Figures, http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1999) Part III,
Papademetriou, D. (2005). The Global Struggle with Illegal Migration: No End in Sight, Migration Policy Institute, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/global-struggle-illegal-migration-no-end-sight accessed 5 September, 2014
Parikh, P. P., and S. P. Sukhatme. 2004. Women engineers in India. Economic and Political Weekly 39 (2):193-201.
Passel, Jeffrey S, D'Vera Cohn and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera (2012) Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero–and Perhaps Less. (Washington DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2012), <http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/Mexican-migrants-report_final.pdf>
Pew Research Center (2011), Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010
Raghuram, P. 2012. Global care, local configurations–challenges to conceptualizations of care. Global Networks 12 (2):155-174.
Rajan, S.I and N. Wadhawan. 2014. Future Diasporas? International Student Migration from India to UK. In India Migration Report 2014, ed. S.I. Rajan. 149-167. New Delhi: Routledge.
Rajan, S.I. ed. 2014. India Migration Report 2014. New Delhi: Routledge
Rosenzweig Mark R. (2008) Higher Education and International Migration in Asia: Brain Circulation Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2008, Regional: 59 -84
Rosenzweig, Mark R.(2006) The circulation migration of the skilled and economic development Proceedings from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 2006, 147-170
Salaff, Janet W. and Arent Greve (2013) Social Networks and Family Relations in Return Migration International Handbook of Chinese Families pp 77-90
Shelley, L. (2010) Human Trafficking - A Global Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Solimano, Andrés (2010) Chapter Six: Who Migrates and What They Offer: A Focus on People and

Elites with Talent, Knowledge, and Entrepreneurial Skills. In International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization Historical and Recent Experiences. Cambridge University Press

Soon, Jan-Jan (2010) The determinants of students' return intentions: A partial proportional odds model Journal of Choice Modelling, 3(2), pp 89-112

UNHCR (2013) Global Trends 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009) Human Development Report 2009. New York: United Nations Development Programme

Wolfeil, Nina (2009) Student migration to Germany and subsequent return to Poland — an analysis of return migration determinants and returnees' labour market outcomes Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft34(3-4):227-252

Zachariah, K. C., and S. Irudaya Rajan. (2012) Kerala's Gulf Connection, 1998-2011. Economic and Social Impact of Migration. Delhi: Orient Blackswan,. Print.

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF TEMPORARY MIGRATION BETWEEN CHINA AND EUROPE

TIAN Fangmeng and HU Xiaojiang

3.1 Introduction – a Revived Modern Silk Road

3.1.1 Historical review

3.1.1.1 Migration in the history before 1978

Personnel exchange between China and Europe can be dated back to two thousand years ago, when the Silk Road was connected across the Eurasian continent as a series of commercial and cultural transmission routes. A maritime “Silk Road” was also paralleled with it and linked port cities along the coasts from the Red Sea to the South China Sea (Vadime, 2001). Merchants, pilgrims, soldiers, and adventurers moved back and forth across the two routes linking East Asian and the Mediterranean Sea during various periods of time (Chanda, 2007). Among them a few legendary figures like Marco Polo were so influential that their depiction of the Far East inspired Christopher Columbus to take a voyage toward China (Landström, 1967).

Chinese migrants to Europe first appeared in European literature in the late sixteenth century. Some Chinese believers of Catholics, who were converted by Jusuits in China, visited Europe afterwards (Li, 2002: 59-61). China was forced to open its doors to the Western world the First Opium War (1839–41). Some European communities, mainly governed by Britons or French, were established in several treaty ports afterwards (Bickers, 2011).

It was not until the middle nineteenth century that ethnic Chinese migrated as merchants, students, seamen and contract labourers to European countries in significant numbers. They introduced cultures, languages and goods of the late Qing China to Europeans and gradually established sizeable communities (Pieke, 1998: 3-9; Latham and Wu, 2013).

Chinese migration to Europe reached a height before and during the First World War. Some 550 thousand Chinese moved to the Soviet Union from Shandong, Hebei and Northeast Chinese provinces between 1906 and 1910, and hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers migrated to Europe in the decade between 1901 and 1910 (Zhu, 1994: 233). Many of these early immigrants settled in northern Europe – in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Around 140 thousand Chinese labourers were recruited to work for Britain and France during their Great War against Germany, and the majority of them returned to China later (Xu, 2011), while some moved to other countries like Spain (Nieto, 2003: 218).

Around 1920s, some Chinese intellectuals launched an overseas study program named “work-study group”, which sponsored many Chinese students to France and Germany, including famous communist leaders Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai. Over six hundred Chinese youths studied and worked in France between 1919 and 1921 (Ye, 2001: 9). However, the Great Depression led to a high level of return migration of overseas Chinese from Europe a decade later. In the year of 1931 alone, 280 thousand Chinese went back home (Shen, 2010: 30), some of whom were actually expelled by the increasingly restrictive immigration policy of the host country (Li, 2002: 289).

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the communist government nearly isolated itself from the Western European countries and maintained some connections with the East Europe for the ideological struggle in the Cold War. Over 200 thousand foreigners stayed in China in 1949, most of whom “either chose to leave China voluntarily, or else were expelled, imprisoned, or executed as foreign or Guomindang spies, imperialist exploiters, or Christian missionaries”

(Pieke, 2012: 4).

Emigration from China was strictly controlled, particularly in the period of the "Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)" (Skeldon, 1996). Only a few Chinese students stayed in the Soviet Union and Easter Europe. As a snap shot, there were only 13.7 thousand Chinese immigrants in Europe in 1956, with several hundred in most countries (Zhu, 1994: 271). Even migration flow to the Soviet Union and eastern European countries was very limited, as the Soviet government sealed its borders after the 1920s (Nyíri,2003: 241).

Meanwhile, thousands of Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South East Asia migrated to the UK and other European countries after the Second World War, which constituted the next large wave of Chinese migration to Europe. It lasted for three decades from the 1960s, and peaked in the 1970s in the wake of the Vietnam War. Most migrants worked in the catering and laundry industries during this period (Skeldon, 1992). Table 3.1 provides a detailed statistical picture of overseas Chinese in Europe.

Table 3.1 Distribution of overseas Chinese in major European countries (1955 - 1997)

Country	**1955**	**1965**	**1975**	**1985**	**1995**
UK	3000	45000	120000	230000	250000
France	2000	6000	90000	210000	200000
Netherland	2000	2353	30000	60000	120000
Germany	500	1200	8000	30000	100000
Belgium	99	565	2000	11400	20000
Italy	330	700	1000	5000	60000
Spain	132	336	2000	5000	21000
Austria	30		1000	12000	12000
Portugal	120	176	300	6800	4700
Denmark	900		1000	3753	6500
Luxembourg	1	10	20	200	100
Switzerland	30	120	1500	6000	7500
Greece	2	16	10	130	300
Ireland					10000
Sweden	2347		1000	9000	12000
Norway			500	1000	2000
Finland					1000
Poland					1500
Czech					10000
Hungary					20000
Former Soviet Union					200000
Total	11491	56476	258330	584283	1058600

3.1.1.2 Chinese migration to Europe in China's reform era

Thanks to Deng Xiaoping's economic reform and 'open door' policies in the end of the 1970s, China gradually relaxed the country's emigration policy, and shifted from a total ban on non-officially approved emigration to less restriction that allowed international trips (Pieke, 2002). The Chinese government issued "Entry and Exit Law" in 1985, which claims to protect the legal right of emigration of its citizens. The new international migration regime triggered a continuous migration tide from China to Europe, which is ongoing till today.

At the start of the 1980s, the number of Chinese migrants in Europe was not very high. The Chinese population in Spain was not less than one thousand. Chinese migration gradually increased after the first amnesty in the country in 1986 (Nieto, 2003: 219). Thanks to the prosperity of tourism in the 1980s, the Chinese catering industry boomed and more Chinese arrived by family integration process. A majority of Chinese new migrants in Europe came from coastal regions, particularly some counties in Zhejiang and Fujian. For example, many of them were attracted by the migration networks established by previous Chinese residents from Qingtian and Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province.

According to the statistics of European Union, 180 thousand Chinese were recorded as residents in the fifteen member countries around 2000 (Fu, 2009: 64). The population was mainly composed of new comers from China, because the statistical caliber did not include those from Hong Kong and Taiwan and the number of old immigrants was small. One source estimated the scale of net migration from China to Europe and found that Chinese population in Europe soared from 250 thousand in 1975 to 1.05 million in 1995, indicating at least 500 thousand Chinese mainlanders moved to Europe (Fu, 2009: 64). This overall trend is confirmed by the growth pattern in individual countries. For example, the Chinese population increased 64 times in Germany between 1978 and 2001, whereas the total foreign population was less than doubled during the same period (Giese, 2003: 157).

China experienced a continuous rapid growth of international flows in commodity, investment, technology and information with the European Union in the 1990s. Chinese incoming migration to Europe has also been increasing with these international trends, which has resulted in the diversification of Chinese in Europe in terms of geography, occupation and economic, cultural, and educational background. The new migrants from mainland China is generally viewed as different from previous cohorts. They originated from different communities and displayed a variety of skills (Wang and Zhuang, 2010: 51-61). Consequently, it has also transformed the characteristics of many Chinese communities in Europe, such as their size, structure, organization, economic activity, linguistic feature and relations with hometowns in China (Latham and Wu, 2013).

The number of foreigners in China also grew substantially in the reform era. According to the United Nations, China's foreign population was 245,700 in 1960, 376,400 in 1990 and 590,300 in 2005 (Pieke, 2012: 6). They are mainly composed of three groups: foreign students from both developing countries and the developed world, expatriate merchants, diplomats, and journalists, and scholars, and foreign experts working for higher institutions or other agencies affiliated with the Chinese government.

3.1.2 Review of current policy and practice

The Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People's Republic of China has come into force in 2013, which regulates movement and residence of foreign population within Mainland China. The Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Administration of the Entry and Exit of Foreigners were promulgated and became effective in accordance with the Exit and Entry Administration Law from late of the year. According to the two legal documents, China's visa system mainly serves the management of temporary migration of foreigners, and foreign migration to China is temporary by nature in most cases.

Although China has been relaxing its control on persons crossing its border, the current Exit and Entry Administrative Law stipulates that the validity period of a foreigner's work-type residence permit is between 90 days at the minimum and five years at the maximum. The Regulations on Examination and Approval of Permanent Residence of Aliens in China of 2004, functions as China's immigration law. Nonetheless, it was designed for attracting highly skilled foreign experts and facilitating foreign investment in China. Only a few people were admitted by this programme.

The current regulatory framework is neither integrated nor updated. China is still short of a comprehensive legal system to tackle issues related to the entry, residence, and employment of foreigners. For example, China provides protection for international refugees, but no detailed application procedure exists for asylum seeking in China. A more applicable system should follow accepted international practices and cover important themes like assimilation, immigration and citizenship, which would help a sound governance of both temporary and permanent residence of foreigners.

The administrative system in charge of foreign migration also has some urgent problems of management. The Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs play a major role in daily operation of management. The Ministry of Public Security is the primary policymaker on issues of exit and entry control, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages international personnel flows to China. Other government branches also have supplementary functions, and management responsibilities are distributed across them. Due to lack of a single centralized system, the social control of foreign migrants in China is not efficient and effective in respect to communication mechanism, administrative cooperation, and crisis management. It is necessary to develop an integrated information platform on the services and administration

Like many host countries, many less skilled foreigners overstay or work illegally without proper documents in China. The problem of irregular migrants has been worsened by some institutional loopholes. For example, foreign employment is managed by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, while its violation is punished by the Ministry of Public Security. This separation causes the problems of inconsistency, incoordination, and mismanagement.

In addition, China's diaspora and returnee policies should also be mentioned. A number of governmental and non-governmental administrative branches are in charge of overseas Chinese affairs, and the major organs include the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office and the All-China's Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC). In recent years, China's policy activities targeting overseas Chinese have expanded from rehabilitating the status of overseas Chinese and utilizing their financial and commercial resources to uniting and engaging all overseas Chinese, particularly the new generation of migrants.

With regard to China's returnee policies, one common practice is building high-tech industrial parks to nurture high-tech enterprises funded by skilled returnees in mainland China. In the scientific research sector, China launched several programmes targeting overseas Chinese scientists from the late 1990s. The government also changed its visa policy and residence management system to facilitate returnees' transnational mobility. China's experience reveals that national strategies can be successful in luring skilled nationals back home to some extent.

3.1.3. Population coverage and data limitation

This report has explored the following sources: European Union and European Commission reports and statistical datasets, the annual reports of the European Migration Network and the International Migration Organization, statistical reports and data published by EU national governments, the Chinese government and other organizations; published statistical data in academic works in Chinese or English, and migration data collected by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The report entirely relies on the secondary sources to depict a big picture and draw some general conclusions.

The different sources use a variety of statistical calibers. For instance, the definition of Chinese migrant was not consistent in different surveys and even the meaning of "Chinese" is blurred in some cases. Hence a caveat should be mentioned here that some figures in the report should be taken as indicative signals rather than accurate information. For the purpose of simplicity, this report mainly focuses on Chinese from mainland China, or people with a citizenship of the PRC, and does not cover much on the status of those from the regions not directly governed by the Chinese government, including Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other countries.

Although it is often difficult to distinguish immigrants from temporary migrants due to poor data accuracy, the emphasis of this report lies in the latter group. Statistical data are often available only in the demographic sense, and we are not able to tell the legal status of Chinese migrants, or whether they residence status is permanent or temporary. However, since the immigration policy of most EU countries is relatively restrictive, it is difficult for non-EU citizens to acquire permanent residence permit. We may assume that demographic statistics reflect temporary migration rather than permanent immigration. For instance, only 10 per cent of the 63,100 Chinese in Germany had a permanent residence permit by the end of 2001. More than 17 thousand were of temporary residence status with designated purpose of stay, and nearly 2,000 had qualified for the status of de facto refugees, with others lingering in the country for a variety of reasons (Giese, 2003: 159).

Since some important data are either not collected at all, or not released for confidentiality reasons by the Ministry of Public Security in China, only aggregated statistics on European migrants in China is available. Hence we cannot provide a detailed table showing their demographic distribution by legal status or source country.

3.2 Chinese Temporary Migrants in Europe

The second part of this report introduces the primary background and current situation of Chinese Temporary Migrants in Europe today. It first presents a general profile of contemporary Chinese migrants in Europe, and then describes the group of students, whose study prepares for entering into the labor market. The next two sections discuss about labour migrants and business oriented personnel, who constitute Chinese employees and employers in the European market. Family and humanitarian migrants follow as their significance is not as important as the above groups. The last section deals with irregular migration.

3.2.1 Current situation of Chinese migrants in Europe

If we take a look at the global distribution of Chinese overseas population, Europe can be found to represent only less than 5 per cent of the total in 2007, ranking the third after Asia and the Americas (Latham and Wu, 2013: 17). Within the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, Europe accounted for 14.2 per cent of China's emigrant population around the year of 2005, the lowest among all the large sending countries (Table 3.2).

However, the growth rate of Chinese migration into Europe has been the second highest over the past three decades, partly because it had a low base population. The number of Chinese migrants increased dramatically from 600 thousand in 1980 to 2.15 million in 2007, indicating an increase of 3.5 times, which is much higher than the average global growth rate (0.68 times). The phenomenal expansion is only lagged behind by the booming Chinese communities in Africa (Latham and Wu, 2013: 17).

Table 3.2 Emigrants aged 15 and over from large emerging economies in the OECD by destination (2005/06) (Source: Table 3, Widmaier and Dumont (2011)

			Main destinations (%)			
Country of origin	**Emigrant population** (thousands)	**Recent immigrants** (%)	Europe	The US and Canada	Japan	Australia and New Zealand
Brazil	857	44.2	36.1	41.6	21	1
China	2,723	28.3	14.2	62.8	12.1	10.9
India	2,759	28.7	24.6	68.8	0.3	6.3
Indonesia	336	14.1	51	28.5	5.2	15.4
South Africa	465	26.9	47.1	25.8	0.1	26.9
Total	7,140	29.3	24.7	58.6	7.5	9.2

As an important feature of Chinese population in Europe, new migrants have been contributing to an increasingly large share of the total. New migrants accounted for 79 per cent of Chinese population in Europe in 2007, much higher than the global average (22.7 per cent) (Gui, 2011:62), and the share of recent immigrants to OECD countries[1] (28.3 per cent, Table 3.2).

China's migration to Europe maintained its momentum at a high level in recent years. The EU countries received less than two million migrants from other EU countries in 2008. The remaining 1.8 million immigrants to the Member States were non-EU citizens. Among them, Moroccans were the largest group, whose number exceeded 100 thousand persons, followed by citizens of China (97 thousand) and India (93 thousand) (Table 3.3). Spain received the largest share of Chinese immigrants (28 % or 27 000 in absolute terms) (Eurostat, 2011: 18).

Thanks to continuous inflow, China has become the tenth largest group of non-nationals in the EU-27 in 2009. With over 500 thousand population, it represented 2.1 per cent of all foreign citizens in the region, and was the fourth biggest group in the countries outside EU, following Turkey, Morocco, and Albania (Eurostat, 2011: 75). Its position in terms of contribution to EU inbound migration did not change till the updated statistics were released in 2011, though China was not listed on the top three source countries for any EU member country (Vasileva, 2012: 2-3). For example, the three largest migration groups in Spain came from Romania, Morocco, and Ecuador. Despite the continued increase of the Chinese migrants over the past two decades, they still represented the fourth largest group in Spain. (Nieto, 2003: 224)

Table 3.3 Top 10 citizenships of non-EU migrants to EU Member States, 2008 (Source: Eurostat, 2011: 18)

Country of citizenship (1000)	Population	Share (%)
Morocco	157	20.1
China	97	12.4
India	93	11.9
Albania	81	10.4
Ukraine	80	10.2
Brazil	62	7.9
United States	61	7.8
Turkey	51	6.5
Federation	50	6.4
Colombia	49	6.3

According to a recent estimation, the total overseas Chinese population in Europe has reached more than 2.5 million in 2012, of which more than 2.3 million or 86 per cent live in EU countries. Their distribution in the EU is very uneven, and is skewed in several countries. Some 95 per cent of them live in ten host countries, and more than 72 per cent stay in just four countries - the UK, France, Italy, and Spain (Latham and Wu, 2013: 26). As Chinese migration stocks and flows in Europe are constantly changing, Table 3.4 shows the most comprehensive and updated statistical data by far.

1 Recent immigrants to OECD countries are defined as residents in the destination countries for less than 5 years by 2005/06.

Table 3.4 Growth and distribution of the Chinese population in Europe (1998–2011) (Source: Latham and Wu, 2011: 27)

Region	Rank (2011)	Country	1998	2008	2011[a]	Current
EU	1	United Kingdom	250000	600000	630000	Growing
	2	France	225000	500000	540000	Growing
	3	Italy	70000	300000	330000	Slowing
	4	Spain	35000	168000	170000	Slowing
	5	Germany	100000	160000	170000	Growing
	6	Netherlands	127500	150000	160000	Growing
	7	Ireland	10000	60000	70000	Growing
	8	Belgium	23000	40000	45000	Level
	9	Austria	20,000b	40000	40000	Level
	10	Portugal	2700	30000	30000	Slowing
	11	Sweden	12800	30000	28000	Slowing
	12	Greece	600	12000	20000	Dropping
	13	Denmark	12800	18000	18000	Slowing
	14	Hungary	10000	16000	18000	Growing
	15	Romania	3000	10000	9000	Dropping
		Other	16320	19970	24200	Growing
		EU subtotal	939720	2153970	2307200	Growing
Non-EU		Russia	200000	300,00	-	-
		Other	28000	60500	-	-
		Subtotal	228000	360500	-	-
Europe: total			1167720	2514470	-	-

Meanwhile, it should be mentioned that the rapid growth of Chinese population in a short period caused social tension and even conflicts between Chinese and host communities in some countries. It remains an open question about how to integrate Chinese new migrants into European host societies successfully.

In the global financial crises since 2008, Europe experienced an economic downturn and has not showed strong signs of recovery, while China has largely maintained its previous growth rate. In the first half of 2012, despite slowing growth rates, China had an economic growth of 7.8 per cent. Similar to the situation of the Great Depression, many Chinese migrants returned to China for better domestic jobs.

3.2.2 Educational migrants

3.2.2.1 Chinese student migration in perspective

As China began to open up in the late 1970's, the central government promptly sent 860 students and scholars to study abroad. Since then the number of students studying abroad has rapidly increased, adding up to a total of 1,067,000 from 1978 to 2006 according the China's MoE (GHK, 2011: 39). Despite the introduction of the one-child policy in 1979, China's huge population has generated a demand for quality higher education that exceeds the capacity of its current university system. In light of the intense competition and strenuous preparation associated with China's national university entrance examination, or *gao kao*, many families are seeking to send their children abroad to study.

In China, the most salient "push" factors[2] that influence students and parents to study abroad are markedly differ. While students' decision to study abroad are principally concerned with the quality of higher education (European universities are seen to be of a higher standard than Chinese ones) and availability of international experience, Chinese parents are more concerned with factors such as the inadequate supply of university places in China, improved employment opportunities in the international labor market, as well as immigration prospects (Bodycott, 2009: 358-59).

For Chinese parents these factors are further enhanced by their belief that a good education will ensure a better future for their children (Bodycott, 2009), and the fact that Chinese graduates with

2 "Push" factors operate within a source country to influence the decision to migrate abroad, and entail the economic, social, political and cultural context of that country (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002).

foreign degrees are perceived by parents and society to have better employability prospects than domestic graduates (Gareth, 2005). According to a survey conducted in 2001 by China's National Bureau of Statistics, more than 60 per cent of Chinese families invest one-third of their income in their children's education (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002)

In addition, rapid economic growth in China has led to the emergence and growth of a sizeable middle class. Following China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the demand for highly skilled international human resources has also increased. This has given China's growing middle and upper classes even more incentive to send their children abroad to study. Indeed, individual families self-financing their children's education abroad has outgrown the government initiatives started in 1978. Chinese parent's willingness to invest in their children's education is apparent from the fact that over 95 per cent of Chinese students sent abroad were estimated to be self-financed in 2012 (EOL, 2012)

3.2.2.2 Chinese student migration to Europe

Despite the fact that the United States has remained the top destination country for Chinese students seeking to study abroad, their migration to higher education institutions in the European Union has experienced rapid growth since the start of the new millennium. From 2000 to 2010, the total number of Chinese students going to the EU multiplied approximately six times. Outside the EU, Russia also experienced high growth of Chinese students between academic year 2000/01 and 2008/09, as the number of Chinese citizens enrolled in Russian higher educational institutions by 2.8 times and they have become the largest foreign student group (Arefev, 2012: 25-26).

Although methodological issues[3] make it difficult to give precise figures, national statistics compiled by the European Commission (EC) and China's Ministry of Education (MOE) suggest that Europe already attracted over a quarter (27.9 per cent) of the total Chinese overseas students, lower than Americans (32.1 per cent) but higher than Asia (25.2 per cent) (MOE, 2005). There were approximately 120 thousand Chinese students in the EU in 2010 (GHK, 2011: 18). Although the study costs in most European universities remain much higher than those in China, low tuition fees in some European welfare states, such as Scandinavia, France and Germany, make studying abroad in Europe an attractive and cost efficient option.

In terms of the distribution of this population over various countries, the United Kingdom (UK) had 40 per cent; France, 23 per cent; Germany, 20 per cent; Italy, Ireland and Sweden, 3 per cent each; and 1-2 per cent in Finland, Cyprus and Denmark (See details in Table 3.5). Although the number of Chinese students studying in the EU is generally increasing, there is some differentiation at the national level. In particular, although Chinese student migration is growing in Finland, France, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands, available data suggests that growth has slowed in the UK, Ireland and Belgium, with declines reported in Germany and Denmark. This differentiation and reduction in migration in various countries are related to stricter regulations/controls, stronger competition from emerging "receiving" countries outside the EU, and methodological changes in data collection (GHK, 2011: 17-18).

3 Differing criteria used across the EU to count international students, and a general lack of clarity of how national statistics were compiled make it difficult to make definitive claims. For a more detailed discussion of see GHK (2011: 19-22)

Table 3.5 Number of Chinese students in the EU – Data from national Ministries (academic years 2000/01 – 2009/10)
(Source: Table 2.1, GHK (2011)

Country	Definition of Chinese student	Breakdown per type of education	00/01	01/02	02/03	03/04	04/05	05/06	06/07	07/08	08/09	09/10
Austria	No information available											
Belgium (Fr)	No information available											
Belgium (NL)	Prior education in China	Total in HEI							473	479	476	465
		Academic (University, College)							445	465	446	445
		Vocational HEI							28	14	30	20
		Study Certificates (Courses completed/ Graduates)							833	722	625	
		Credit certificates							656	516	474	
		Diplomas (BA, MA, PhD)							177	206	151	
Bulgaria		Total (1)	up to 25 until 2007						up to 35 since 2007			
Cyprus	Citizenship	Total								925	1136	
		Full-Degree University								57	130	
		Full-Degree Non-University								868	1,006	
Czech Republic	Citizenship	Full-Degree	17	16	18	17	24	38	38	65	66	77
		Academic Exchange	87 in the decade									
Denmark	Prior residency	Total	233x	467	467	800	1,113	1,289	1,198	1,095	989	
		Full-Degree University	126	138	222	373	592	777	663	495	357	
		Full-Degree non-University	107	84	245	427	463	446	440	493	511	
		Exchange					58	66	95	107	121	
Estonia	Prior residency	Total (Full degree)						60	90	51	51	60
Finland	Citizenship	Total	1,108	1,107	1,200	1,397	1,496	1,584	1,840	2,025	2,234	2,344
		Full degree	1,011	1,029	1,107	1,308	1,382	1,444	1,677	1,859	1,988	2,105
		Exchange	97	78	93	89	114	140	163	166	246	239
France	Citizenship	Total						20,700	22,452		27,112	
		University	3,452	5,536	8,774	11,908		15,963	17,176	18,278	20,160	
		Non-University						4,737	5,276		6,952	
Germany	Prior education in China	Total (University)(2)	8,745	13,523	19,374	24,095	25,987	26,061	25,651	23,983	23,140	
Greece	On scholarship (likely prior residency)	Hellenic Ministry & Aid								13	16	15

		State Scholarship			17 Students 2000-2010							
Hungary		Full degree		57	73	88	111	138	167	197	220	260
Italy	Citizenship	Total Full Degree						958	1,677	3,059	4,009	
		University						943	1,627	2,999	3,863	
		Art & Music sector (AFAM)						15	50	60	146	311
Ireland	Citizenship/ Non-resident	Total		1,223	1,770	2,874	3,080	3,465	3,573			3,355
Latvia		Total	45 during the decade									
Lithuania		Total	269 during the decade									
Luxembourg	Prior education China	Total (Full Degree)								14	14	14
Malta				No prior exchange between University of Malta and China								
Netherlands		Total						4,425	4,195	4,125	4,415	5,065
		Government. Financed HEI					3,805	3,800	3,525	3,370	3,440	3,615
		Other						625	670	755	975	1,450
Poland	Citizenship	Total HEI									297	335
Portugal		Academic	38	39	53	60	75	80	77	103	127	
Romania			More than 24/year									
Slovakia	Prior education China		81 during the decade									
Slovenia										2	2	
Spain										629	927	
Sweden	Citizenship	Total HEI					892	1,148	1,649	2,375	3,147	
		Full degree					734	937	1,391	2,012	2,652	
		Exchange					158	211	258	363	495	
UK	Prior residency	Total	12,095								47,035	
		Entrants	7,340	12,920	23,130	29,050	27,575	23,960	24,055	24,785	27,680	

The flow data also reveal the importance of the four countries. More than 42,600 Chinese students moved to study in EU countries in 2008, and the UK represented 65 per cent of all, followed by France (10 per cent) and Germany (9 per cent). Over half (54 per cent) of Chinese students studying the UK expect to spend less than one year in the country (GHK, 2011: 27). Table 3.6 shows the flows of Chinese students to the EU member countries with available data by destination and funding in 2008. As a general pattern, the more developed the host country is, the less financial support is derived from the Chinese Scholarship Council for its overseas students.

Table 3.6 Outgoing mobility of Chinese students to the EU in 2008 – number of entrants by destination and funding (p28) (Source: GHK, 2011: 28)

Country	Outgoing mobility (flow) in 2008	Support from Chinese Scholarship Council	
		absolute numbers	per cent
Austria	110	21	19
Bulgaria	19	16	84
Belgium	216	48	22
Czech Republic	26	5	19
Denmark	882	63	7
France	4,420	398	9
Finland	487	28	6
Germany	3,709	454	12
Hungary	177	21	12
Ireland	1,078	27	3
Italy	1,878	112	6
Netherlands	814	127	16
Poland	183	16	9
Portugal	107	17	16
Romania	10	10	100
Sweden	964	127	13
UK	27,559	1091	4
Total	42,639		6

Overseas Chinese students are most heavily concentrated in major European cities, particularly capital cities due to their size, cultural status, developed urban infrastructure and metropolitan lifestyle. As one important factor, many Chinese students in Europe originate from major Chinese urban centers that entail similar services and living standards. Another factor is that many national education systems in Europe have concentrated prestigious institutions of higher education in larger cities. For example, Paris is home to the most elite *grande ecoles* (e.g. HEC, Sciences-Po, ESSEC and EAP-ESCP). For these reasons, cities such as London and Paris, which are the economic, financial, political and cultural capital of the UK and France respectively, have become some of the main destinations for Chinese students in Europe (Shen, 2005: 430).

In terms of areas of study, Chinese students in the EU mirror those found in the rest of the world and are most heavily concentrated in science, technology and business studies. A significant proportion of these students are pursuing full-degree programs at the undergraduate level, while it is estimated that the percentage engaged in doctoral studies in 2010 was generally less than 10 per cent in most EU member states (GHK, 2011: 37).

For some major host countries in Europe, the migration of mostly self-financed students from China has created a considerable economic contribution to them and a significant source of income for local universities. This is particularly the case of the UK. For example, the 43 thousand Chinese students who were officially registered in the UK in the academic year 2003-2004 were estimated to have generated at least 300 million pounds just in terms of tuition fees (Shen, 2005). Considering the introduction of higher fees for international students in many EU member countries, and the overall growth of Chinese student migration since then, the financial impact that the migration of China's international students have on the EU as of today is very phenomenal.

Looking to the future, China's economic growth will continue to increase Chinese student migration to Europe in the short run, while growth will eventually slow due to shifts within China's demographics. In the short run, with China's continued economic growth, the number of wealthy households will continue to increase. According to a 2010 survey by HSBC Affluent Asian Tracker, 82 per cent of affluent families in China plan to send their children overseas to study. Considering the appreciation of China's currency against most foreign currencies since the start of the economic recession in 2008, the number of households who can afford to send their children abroad to study will also significantly increase (British Council, 2010).

From a long-term perspective China's shifting demographics will result in a smaller absolute number of young Chinese people. China's one-child policy, which has been in place since 1979, is expected to reduce the number of 15-19 year-olds from 117 million in 2005, to 85 million in 2020 (British Council, 2008). Taken in conjunction increasing capacity and development of China's domestic higher education sector, a gradual decline of student migration from China can be expected to develop overtime.

3.2.2.3 Return migration and remigration of Chinese students

After completion of their studies, many Chinese students who study abroad do not return back to China but pursue employment in their host country, continue further studies abroad, or move to another country. According to MoE statistics, out of the 1,067,000 Chinese students who went to study abroad during the period from 1978-2006, only 275,000 students returned (GHK, 2011: 39).

Both the governments of EU member states and China have an important stake in Chinese students choice to stay or go. Although the accurate number of returnees graduated from European universities is not available, their size probably reaches tens of thousands if we assume their return rate is similar to the average or higher. It is a that we can not single out the specific contribution of Chinese returnees with European background, though some studies show the return migration of Chinese students from European is not a "migration failure", but rather a "unique link and network" which might lead to a win-win brain circulation given the cooperation from both China and Europe (Shen, 2008: 17).

However, China's rapid economic growth has lured more overseas students to return for better career development. A media survey reported in 2008 that a typical returnee has an average age of 26 years old on departure and 32 on return. They studied for five years and worked for three years abroad. Their major occupations are consulting and other services in the cultural sector or in the media in China, with an average salary between 60 thousand to 120 thousand yuan. Recruitment agencies expressed that the labor demand for Chinese with international experience has increased among multinational companies based in China, who are in a good position to serve as reputational intermediaries between foreign firms and the local market (Bail and Shen, 2008: 13-14).

Despite the fact that wage levels are still lower in China, there is an increasing trend for Chinese educational migrants to return. This trend has been pushed by preferential measures put in place by the Chinese Government since the 1990s to attract the return of *haigui*[4], as well as the growing demand for workers with international experience among multinationals based in China. The value of soft skills in China, the perceived glass ceiling for managerial positions abroad, and opportunities for faster career growth are a few common reasons for students to return (GHK, 2011: 40).

Considering China's integration into the global market, Chinese students who study abroad represent a valuable source of skilled labour. The IT (information technology) sector is often taken as a showcase of returnees' impacts on the national economy. The returnees have brought with them innovation in management and technical skills, venture capital, and a new mentality. They have launched many startups which pushed the development of the IT sector over the past twenty years. However, their achievement might also be restricted by the domestic business and innovation environment (Chen, 2008).

4 *Haigui* is a homophone for sea turtle used to describe student returnees from overseas.

3.2.3 Labour Migration

3.2.3.1 Profile of Labour Migration

China sent 650 thousand migrants to OECD countries in the five years prior to 2005/06, half of whom were highly educated people (320 thousand) and tend to be employed in professional occupations (Widmaier and Dumont, 2011: 10). Table 3.7 shows the number and share of Chinese emigrants in the labor force of some European countries by their educational background. At least a quarter of Chinese migrant workers received tertiary education in any of these countries, and nearly half of them were highly educated in some receiving countries like Germany (47.1 per cent), Ireland (49.9 per cent) and Sweden (48.7 per cent).

Table 3.7 Chinese emigrants in the labor force of some European countries by education level (Source: author's calculation based on database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries: DIOC (2005/06)

Country	Below secondary education	Secondary education	Tertiary education	Unknown	Total
Germany	6066	11769	15911	0	33746
Share(%)	18	34.9	47.1	0	100
Denmark	710	1129	1214	1175	4228
Share(%)	16.8	26.7	28.7	27.8	100
Finland	1003	163	612	0	1778
Share(%)	56.4	9.2	34.4	0	100
France	20155	5394	10286	0	35835
Share(%)	56.2	15.1	28.7	0	100
Ireland	1039	1398	2431	0	4868
Share(%)	21.3	28.7	49.9	0	100
Norway	580	438	547	634	2199
Share(%)	26.4	19.9	24.9	28.8	100
Sweden	1040	1265	2735	580	5620
Share(%)	18.5	22.5	48.7	10.3	100

Table 3.8 Activity rate of persons aged 25–54 in the 20 main citizenship groups of third country nationals in the EU by gender, 2008 (%) (Source: Eurostat, 2011: 84)

Country	Men	Women	Gap (percentage points)
Average	92	78	14
Pakistan	90	17	73
Morrocco	89	43	47
Algeria	88	43	45
Turkey	90	47	43
Albania	97	55	42
India	94	58	37
Serbia	89	61	29
United States of America	90	68	23
Other	91	70	21
Russia	87	66	21
Bosnia	91	71	20
Brazil	97	78	19
Ukraine	93	76	17
China	81	66	15
Croatia	92	78	14
Argentina	95	81	14
Peru	96	85	11
Ecuador	96	89	8
Bolivia	97	90	7
Philippines	97	91	7
Colombia	94	88	6

The ratio of employment in the total Chinese emigrants also varies greatly by country. Almost 80 per cent of Chinese residents in Spain were employed around 2005, but over 40 per cent of those in the UK did so, which might result from the different demographic profiles and welfare policies in these countries (Widmaier and Dumont, 2011: 21). There is no big gender gap in the Chinese population in the EU, as the activity rate of male Chinese was 81 per cent in 2008, while that of their female counterparts was 66 per cent (Table 3.8). The gender gap of 15 per cent has a low rank among all the source countries, which probably reflects the cultural value of Chinese from other ethnic groups, particularly those with Islamic background.

Service export (*guoji laowu shuchu*) is another form of temporary labor migration from China to Europe, which means that Chinese workers are employed in a foreign labour market, either organized or independently. China had approved around 450 thousand temporary contracts for its nationals to work abroad by 1996, and 380 thousand were deployed in the year (Hugo, 1997: 282). The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MFTEC) in China is in charge of the management of overseas labour cooperation, including technical service, project design, and consultation, which involves professional personnel (Zhang, 2003).

Table 3.9 shows the number of Chinese contracted labours abroad and in major European countries in 2010. There were over 35 thousand workers in Europe at the end of the year, which accounted for a small share of all Chinese contracted labours abroad (84.6 thousand). Over half of those in Europe concentrated in Russia (16.6 thousand), while a few thousands also stayed in the UK, Germany, Spain, and Netherland.

Table 3.9 Chinese workers by service export in Europe by country (2010) (Source: Table 142010, The World Trade Organization Chinese Yearbook, 2010 (Chinese)

	Total		**Contracted project**		**Labour cooperation**	
Country/ region	Expatriate worker in the year	The number of worker at the end of the year	Expatriate worker in the year	The number of worker at the end of the year	Expatriate worker in the year	The number of worker at the end of the year
Total	411455	846605	224624	376510	186830	470095
Europe	17860	35276	5805	8810	12055	26466
UK	639	1269	74	134	565	1135
Germany	2369	5194	87	310	2282	4878
Netherland	602	1858	0	0	602	1858
Greece	714	578	0	131	714	447
Spain	58	1057	58	1057	0	0
Russia	10726	20809	4002	4148	6724	16661

3.2.3.2 Skilled migrants

Skilled Chinese migrants mainly move to the United States, Canada, Europe and other developed countries. Many Chinese students would seek jobs in the host countries after graduation, though some of them return to China or elsewhere for employment. Hence a growing amount of Chinese students in the EU lead to more technical and professional workers. Other potential skilled migrants, particularly those trained in China, might apply a working visa to a European country. For example, the German government introduced the Green Card Programme for highly skilled foreign workers in 2001, and 437 Chinese professionals had been employed by German firms under this policy by May the next year (Giese, 2003: 170).

The skilled manpower from China has changed the image of Chinese workers in Europe. The Chinese in EU Member States used to take lowly skilled jobs in labour-intensive manufacturing or service industries, but now new migrant workers have shifted to computer programmer, product designer, and project manager and other high-tech or creative occupations from the late 1990s (Xu, 1999).

Chinese skilled migrants are also hired by native firms with investment in Europe, or follow the expansion of their overseas market as expatriates. For example, Huawei and ZTE (Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation), two telecom technology companies have invested in German-speaking countries. Huawei also opened its European supply centre Austria in 2009 (Latham and Wu, 2013: 34). With business booming in Europe, Huawei has established 18 subsidiaries in

Germany and employs 1,600 employee (Schüller and Schüler-Zhou, 2013: 6). Although most of them are German natives, quite a few belong to the Chinese nationality.

International academic exchanges between China and Europe constitute another flow of temporary skilled migration, which help Chinese scholars get access to the knowledge frontier of contemporary scientific and technological development. Exchange programmes funded by both the EU and China have facilitated Chinese academics to visit to European countries (Zhang 2003).

No systematic data are available with regard to Chinese academics in Europe. A recent survey reports that there were at least 6,697 academic staff of Chinese nationality employed in the EU between 2008 and 2009, most of whom were recorded in German and British universities (GHK, 2011: 49).

Table 3.10 Academic staff mobility from China (national Ministry Data) (Source: Table 2.8, GHK (2011)

Country		2005	2006	2007	2008	
Finland		34	32	36	48	
Germany	Scientific staff of Chinese nationality	1027	1174	1298	1636	
	Chinese scientists exchange programme	1535	1678	1779	2199	
Country		41763	41795	41826	41858	41890
Portugal		10	12	11	12	9
Sweden		18	18	18	26	35
UK						2770

Table 3.10 presents the number of Chinese migrants with academic background in five EU Member countries. Not all of these Chinese academics were hired by local institutions of higher education, but only the German data distinguish Chinese scientists sponsored by exchange programmes from formal employees. The data also have some limitation in identifying the temporality of Chinese scholars[5]. It is striking that very few Chinese scholars can be found in Finland, Portugal, and Sweden, which might be caused by language barriers and inadequate funding.

A joint study by the European Commission and the Ministry of Education in China depicts the profile of academic staff visiting Europe as follows: "They are mainly 30-40 years old, predominantly male and focused on engineering. They mostly come from institutions located in Beijing or Shanghai. Their number is steadily increasing, and they mostly travel to Europe for short-term periods (GHK, 2011: 50)". More academic exchange can be organized for Chinese researchers in basic sciences and in regions other than the two megacities.

Despite the fact that the migration of students from China has become increasing rapidly in Europe, the skill composition of Chinese migrants in Europe remains at a low level compared with the United States. The return rate of overseas students graduated from Europe is higher than that of those from the US, largely because of the cultural gap, labour market barriers, and relatively restrictive immigration policies in the EU countries (Fu, 2009: 61). For example, the return rate for Chinese students was nearly half in France and the UK (47.6 per cent and 46.8 per cent, respectively) (Editor, 2003: 11).

On the side of China, the governemnt launched several talent programs targeting returnees from the late 1990s, such as the Chunhui Plan, the Yangtze River Scholar Plan, the Hundred Talents Programme, and the National Distinguished Young Scholars Program (Xiang, 2003; Zweig, 2006). Chinese universities also competed with each other to attract overseas scientists, including those graduated from Europe, and provided them with favorable conditions, including suitable working platform, large research funds, free housing, high salary, and other benefits for their dependents. Despite some satisfactory cases, such as the One Hundred Talents Program at CAS (Liu and Zhi, 2010), Tian (2013)

5 For example, the UK data cover staff employed in British universities with Chinese nationality, irrespective of how long they have been in the UK.

finds that these programs only achieved limited success in bringing back scientists with higher qualifications by 2006.

3.2.3.3 Lowly skilled migrants

Lowly skilled migrants from China specialize in certain industries in major regions of Europe. The catering service continues to dominate in Western and Central Europe. For example, cooks and waiters have long been the dominant image of Chinese workers in Germany. Around 46 per cent of male and 29 per cent of female workers of Chinese nationality were employed in the catering business in the mid-2001 in Germany (Giese, 2003: 168). By contrast, the main economic activities lie in the importation, wholesale and retail of Chinese goods in Eastern Europe. Following local tastes and fashions, Chinese migrants in Southern Europe are more likely to be hired in small workshops and join the production line of leather goods, garments or other products (Pieke and Speelman, 2013: 7).

The economic structure of the host countries might have shaped the Chinese ethnic economy in Europe. The labour trajectory of many Chinese migrants can also help to explain their industrial distribution. Newly comers might try to open their own business in the same industry, when they have paid off debts and learned the usual commercial practice (Pastore and Castagnone, 2011: 12). In addition, language and cultural barriers also limit their employment options in alternative occupations (Latham and Wu, 2013, 43).

These migratory flows have to be understood as aspects of domestic patterns of geographical and social mobility created by the fundamental changes that have taken place in Chinese society, rather than caused by the near-universal “culture of migration” in many overseas Chinese areas. Migrants of this type end up in a range of employment and living conditions. Many expect to find white-collar employment or self-employment, but, as we will see in section four, a considerable number may actually have to settle for low-skilled work (Pieke and Xiang, 2007).

Chinese from Zhejiang and Fujian has dominated the migration flows to Europe at low skill level in the contemporary era (Pieke et al, 2004), while a new wave from Northeast China has also joined them. The reform of state owned enterprises (SOE) in China led to the unemployment or underemployment of tens of millions of former employees in the late 1990s. As Northeastern China was the country’s heavy industrial heartland, the local firms were seriously affected, and a large number of former SOE employees went to Europe for job opportunities. Only by pursuing a foreign career, can they keep pace with their compatriots under the background of rapid economic growth and social inequality in China (Xiang, 2012).

Many of Chinese migrants from Northeast China found jobs in Hungary or other eastern European countries, partly because of the relaxed visa policy. As a result, the Chinese migration profile in Europe has been reshaped in terms of both local labour supply and Chinese population structure. Chinese northeasters tend to gain increasing influence in the local ethnic community, relative to those from Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. The former also prefer waged employment with native employers rather than a more entrepreneurial career practiced by the latter (Zanin and Wu, 2009; Wu and Latham, 2014: 306).

3.2.4 Business migrants

3.2.4.1 Profile of Chinese business

International trade and mutual investment between China and Europe have reached an all time high. International trade between the two regions increased from 68.1 billion to 427 billion US dollars in the decade between 1999 and 2009. The outward direct investment (ODI) from China to Europe has also grown rapidly from 500 million US dollars in 2005 to over 3 billion US dollars in 2009, a dramatic rise of 6.6 times in only four years (Latham and Wu, 2013:20).

Chinese ethnic economies in the EU countries have adjusted accordingly as local migrant entrepreneurs have attempted to exploit new opportunities brought by China economic achievement. Their ethnic businesses have stated to diversify from the traditional catering sector to other areas of commerce, such as wholesale and retail of Chinese products and services for growing Chinese tourists visiting Europe (Wu and Latham, 2014: 310).

Business oriented migration from China to Europe has also reinforced the growth of international trade and investment. Chinese traders spread widely from Russia to Hungary. Nearly 10 thousand Chinese traders were registered to run their business in Moscow in 1992. The number of Chinese entering Hungary rose from nearly zero in the mid-1980s to 27,330 in 1991 (Nyíri, 2003: 242). A scholar describes the business savvy of Chinese entrepreneurs as follows:

> *Most Chinese in Eastern Europe deal with the import, wholesale, or retail of lowprice clothes and shoes from China. The Chinese took advantage of economies that were, to varying degrees, undersupplied, and filled a supply gap by offering cheap but popular clothes of the kind made in China for low-price Western retail chains. Contrary to traditional Chinese migrants to western Europe, these migrants, thanks to their background, had the cultural capital, the mobility, and the means of communication necessary to develop close ties with state enterprises in China, which supplied them with merchandise at low subsidized prices and on favourable credit terms (Nyíri,2003: 251).*

As a consequence, Chinese businessmen in Europe have joined some new economic sectors in the past two decades. These emerging businesses include clothing fashion manufacturing, leather-goods production, import-export trade, and wholesale distribution of products made in China. For example, Chinese entrepreneurs managed to imitate the Italian style of fashion throughout Europe and built up a substantial production base in Naples and Prato. Chinese import-export and wholesale businesses have similarly been set up in Milan, Paris, and Madrid, which rely upon the low-price advantage of Chinese goods (Latham and Wu, 2013: 23).

Chinese commercial migrants are still mobile after they enter the EU countries, and their internal migration is also very active. For better business opportunities, they move from one country to another if necessary (Wu and Latham, 2014: 310-311). People from Zhejiang Province are good at catching entrepreneurial chances in new markets. The recent economic crisis might have triggered greater internal migration of Chinese entrepreneurs within the EU.

Another group of businessmen follow larger strategic investments made by Chinese big corporations, which attempts to get access to European technology, markets and talents. They tend to hire local overseas Chinese or those from Hong Kong or Taiwan for utilizing their expertise in western business practices. A recent survey finds that in Chinese large companies in Europe, about two fifths of the overseas Chinese executives in Germany origin from European host countries, while the other three fifths come from third countries in general, and Hong Kong and Taiwan in particular (Pieke and Speelman, 2013: 8).

3.2.4.2 Intermediary roles of overseas Chinese

As Oliveira (2003) argues, several structural factors affect business opportunities of new migrants from China, including immigration policy of the host society, drivers of the migratory flow, existence of a co-ethnic community, and potential market of the host society. The final factor lies in the operation of social networks and capital mobilization capacity within the community. Here overseas Chinese play an important intermediary role for small and larger investors from their home country.

Smaller individual firms constitute the majority of Chinese business in Eastern Europe. They tend to be owned privately or operated in close corporation with local Chinese, who can be very helpful in bringing these investments to Europe (Pieke and Speelman, 2013: 8). Larger Chinese corporate subsidiaries concentrate in Western Europe, which are more likely to focus on high tech sectors. Skill Chinese diaspora, including both new graduates and experienced professionals, can provide crucial manpower to these firms.

For example, Chinese investment groups have targeted Germany as one of their destinations, as the country has many high-tech firms, famous brands and distribution networks in the developed world. Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in Germany have facilitated the process of their commercial activities. Their local knowledge and experience reduce the transaction costs between the two parties from both sides. Employees in Chinese companies have a similar bridging role, indicating a positive economic externality. A recent survey targeting Chinese migrants in Germany provide their demographic and economic profile as follows:

> *They were mostly under 50 years and had a stable family background. They were almost all born in China but had lived in Germany for a long period of time before deciding to stay. Most of them possessed an unlimited residence permit or held a German passport.*
>
> *Those Chinese students who decide to stay in Germany tend to set up their own companies, relying on their acquired expert knowledge and cultural understanding. They too can help Chinese investors who are unfamiliar with Germany and the German business landscape to reduce their transaction costs (Schüller and Schüler-Zhou, 2013: 22).*

In sum, Chinese ethnic businesses and entrepreneurial networks have strong cultural and historic links with their home country, which is advantageous in for firms of all size to enter and operate in the European commercial environment. Chinese firms can utilize the expertise, manpower, and market given by the overseas Chinese communities in major European cities. Both assimilated second generation Chinese and new skilled migrants can be the crucial talent pool and relational bridge for China economic expansion in Europe.

3.2.5 Humanitarian migrants

Much attention has been given to outbound migration from China over the past few decades. Although most migration is motivated the prospect of economic opportunity, there is a smaller, but significant population that migrates to another host country by submitting an application for asylum. In 2013 estimated 612,700 asylum applications were registered in 44 industrialized countries throughout the world, with those from China constituting an important part of this figure (UNHCR, 2014: 2).

Most Chinese nationals claiming political asylum in Europe come from the lower social class today, but this type of migration actually started from the intellectual elite. After the Tiananmen Incident of in 1989, some European countries granted Chinese students and scholars legal permanent residence as political refugees. They represented a small portion of all asylum seekers from China, and most of the remaining applicants are irregular Chinese workers, whose number dramatically increased in the 1990s.

The migration tide by the refugee channel reached a high point in 2000, when China was listed among the top ten origin countries in terms of asylum seekers in Germany. More than 2,000 Chinese nationals applied for asylum to the German government in that single year. China also ranked fifth in terms of applications received in the entire Europe in the early 2001 (Giese, 2003: 173).

Over the past decade, China has consistently ranked in the top five source countries of asylum-seekers in the world. However, Chinese asylum-seekers have become relatively few in 2013 in comparison to the increasing number of applications originating from other source countries, such as Syria, Russia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Serbia. Hence China dropped from the second highest source country in 2011 to the tenth highest in 2013 (UNHCR, 2014a: 20).

Despite this drop in rank, the total number of Chinese who have fled abroad and have been granted asylum is quite substantial. According to an estimate from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the total number of refugees originating from China was approximately 191,069, while the total number of asylum seekers was 16,703 (UNHCR, 2014a).

France and the UK are the two European countries which received the greatest number of requests for asylum from Chinese nationals in 2012. According to the UNHCR, France received more than half of the total number of application made by Chinese nationals to Europe in the year, receiving 4,443, while the UK received 1,372 requests, or 16 percent (UNHCR, 2014a). While these numbers are not unsubstantial, they remain much fewer than those received by the United States, which received 15,884 applications from Chinese nationals in the same year.

There are numerous possible explanations to explain this differentiation between countries. However, one salient factor country specific rules and regulations that determine the relative ease of being granted asylum. For example, 4,077 (or 91.7 per cent) of the 4,443 applications in France by Chinese nationals were rejected in 2012. In comparison, of the 15,884 requests received by the US, only 1,789 (11 per cent) were rejected. With regard to the asylum requests of Chinese nationals, most EU nations are generally characterized by higher levels of caution and circumspection, thus resulting in fewer instances when asylum is granted.

Despite rapid economic growth and opening that China has experienced in its three decades of reform, a large amount of its nationals still face poor living conditions, and seek highly paid opportunities abroad by irregular migration. Requests for asylum become a possible channel for these migrants to acquire formal residence permits in their host countries. Common reasons stated by these applicants include fear of persecution based on adherence to unsanctioned religious groups, or participation in organized political dissidence, to human rights abuses such as forced abortions or sterilization under China's family planning laws (Fu, 2009: 65). Only a small number of Chinese asylum seekers are likely to be political dissidents and ethnic minorities, such as Tibetans and Uighurs, whose restive home provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang experience high levels of ethnic tension, as well as state control.

As a consequence, there is growing concern that a large number of requests from Chinese nationals are unfounded, and a potential source of immigration fraud. In the US, a recent case revealed numerous law firms and lawyers had assisted Chinese in applying for asylum under false pretensions so that they could gain permanent immigration status. In most cases lawyers would assist and coach the applicants, creating fictitious narrative involving forced abortion or religious persecution to make their claim (NYTimes, 2014). Although this discovery was made in the US, it is likely that Europe is also the target of unfounded asylum claims.

3.2.6 Irregular migrants

As Chin and Godson (2006) argue, Chinese irregular migration and human smuggling have triggered global concern for four reasons: the high level of organization of transnational crime groups, the tremendous profitability of the smuggling business, the incompetency of Western law enforcement agencies in combating irregular migration activities, and finally, a vast population of potential migrants from China.

A substantial number of irregular migration from China to the EU countries emerged in 1989 as a result of the collapse of the socialist camp and the reconnection between the West and East. In the case of irregular migration to Germany, the majority of Chinese migrants apprehended in Germany came from Lishui and Wenzhou counties in Zhejiang province in the early and middle 1990s. By contrast, migrants from Fujian and Guangdong were usually apprehended on their way to the United States through Germany (Giese, 2003: 171).

From a global perspective, it was estimated that 100 thousand to 180 thousand Chinese migrated abroad per year averagely between 1978 and 1995, among whom irregular migrants accounted for about 20 per cent (Laczko, 2003). In total, 750 thousand Chinese had emigrated illegally by the mid-1990s, with 200 thousand having settled in Asia outside China, 200 thousand in the US, 150 thousand in Russia, and 100 thousand in Europe (Hugo, 1997: 283).

Analysis of border record data collected in eleven eastern European countries indicated that Chinese accounted for only three per cent of those apprehended at the European national borders in 2000 (Laczko, 2003). The small contribution might be explained by the growing alternative and safer channels of entering Europe legally. This trend has continued and Chinese human smuggling has been declined in the late 2000 (Wu and Sheehan, 2010). Nonetheless, it is estimated that the proportion of irregular migration in the overall human flow from China to Europe has been increasing, and 260 thousand irregular migrants live in the UK, Italy, and France, which account for half of new arrivals from mainland China (Fu, 2009: 65)[6]. Anecdotal evidence suggests that up to 20 per cent of the total Chinese workers are irregular by nature in certain European cities like Veneto in Italy (Wu and Latham 2014: 314).

Irregular migration to the EU from China is particularly severe in the southern European countries (Klaus, 2004), partly due to the de facto acceptance of unauthorized migrant workers and many job opportunities in the informal economy. As another important institutional factor, amnesties for undocumented migrants in these countries also attracted a large number of Chinese who wait for obtaining formal residence permit.

Chinese irregular migration to Europe can involve many dangers and risks for migrants, including exploitation by the snakeheads, treacherous oceanic journeys, and apprehension by European guards or policemen (Denison et al., 2009:2). Two group death incidents, which occurred in the UK in the early 2000s, have alarmed the EU and China to take measures for better prevention of such tragedies.

3.3 European Temporary Migrants in China

Thanks to the huge population of Chinese diaspora, China is always perceived as one of the largest source country in the world. Not until in recent years did people realize that China is also a major destination country for many migrants from both the developing countries and the developed world. A specialist on Chinese migration shares his observation as follows:

> *For decades, China has had large numbers of foreign students, expatriates, returned overseas Chinese, and ethnic Chinese refugees. However, in the past few years, immigration to China has become much more diverse and numerous. Chinese students and scholars abroad return to China in ever greater numbers. Traders and labor migrants from all over the world are attracted by China's trading opportunities, political stability, and prosperity (Pieke, 2012: 1).*

With incomplete and dispersed data collected by different Chinese administrative branches, the size of foreign residents in China had long been mythical. The 2010 population census collected nationwide demographic information of foreign citizens for the first time. The statistical result based on it reports a total number of 593,832. though its share remains small in a country with 1.3 billion population (Xinhua News, 2011).

The absolute majority (79.5%) of foreigners in China are aged between 15 and 64 and are active economically (Pang, 2014: 82). There are more males than females in all age groups over 25. The sex ratio (male/female) reaches 200 in the age group of 50 and beyond (Pang, 2014: 84). A striking feature of foreign population in China is their high skill selectivity. Two thirds of those over the age of six have received higher education, and 11.6 per cent of them are master degree holders (Pang, 2014: 85). Most of foreign migrants stay in China for a short period, as the duration of only 17.5 per cent of them lasted over five years (Pang, 2014: 86). In addition, foreign residents are highly concentrated in several large cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.

The foreign migrants in China come from over 200 countries, among which 19 countries have an

6 Given the high levels of illegal migration into the EU and the exclusion of illegal migration from official statistics in China, the number of Chinese irregular migrants in Europe is inevitably imprecise.

overseas national community of more than 5,000 people in China (Pang, 2014: 88). South Korea, the United States, and Japan are the three largest source countries, which contributed over 40 per cent of all foreign population in 2010.

Only two European countries, France and Germany, ranked among the top ten source countries in terms of migrant population. Each of them has around 15 thousand nationals living in China (Pang, 2014: 88). The UK, Russia, and Italy also sent a considerable number of nationals to China. Another source estimated that the number of Europeans in China has reached over 200 thousand, and more than ten per cent of them have bought a house, which is a strong indicator of long-term residence (Pieke, 2012: 10).

The next two sections cover educational migrants and labour migrants to China, respectively. There are surely other types of migrants, but no adequate data are available for even describing their profiles. It should be noticed that the types of European migrants are often overlapped, changed, and blurred, possibly because they are busy at catching the development opportunities in China's dynamic world.

3.3.1 Educational migrants

Following the trend of internationalization of higher education, Chinese universities have become competitive in the lucrative international student market, and actively developed their programs for training foreign students in China in the past decade. With regard to nature of these programs, the share of degree students increased from 26.9 per cent in 2001 to 35.8 per cent in 2008, and then grew to 40.7 per cent in 2011 (Li, Hu and Zhou, 2010:50; MoE, 2012). The remaining majority of students studied in non-degree programs.

Despite of the upgrading of foreign student programs, undergraduate education still dominate the degree programs, and account for over 80 per cent of all degree students (Liu and Wang, 2011: 76). There were 36 thousand foreign students in master and doctoral programs in 2012, indicating a growth of 18.7 per cent relative to the figure in 2011. Among them, 27.8 thousand were master students, and 8.3 thousand were doctoral ones (MoE, 2012). Most degree students come from Southeast and South Asia (Pieke, 2012: 7). The structure of China's educational system for foreign students indicates that it remains at a relatively lower level, and requires further improvement.

With the rise of China on the global stage, fluency of Chinese language and culture becomes a valuable asset. Most non-degree students attend language training programs in China, and most of them major in Chinese. The majority of such students take short-term courses specifically tailored to foreigners. As a consequence, nearly two thirds (64 per cent) of foreign students belong to a discipline of humanities and arts, 13 per cent of them study medical sciences, and 12 per cent are trained in social sciences, such as economics, management, and law science (Liu and Wang, 2011: 78).

Table 3.11 Foreign students in China by source continent 1997-2007 (Source: Table 3 and 4, Li, Hu and Zhou (2010)

Year	Total	Asia	Europe	America and Oceania	Africa
1997	43712	33603	4305	4589	1215
Share, %	100	76.9	9.9	10.5	2.8
1998	43084	31090	5160	5439	1395
Share, %	100	72.2	12.0	12.6	3.2
1999	44711	31914	5621	5792	1384
Share, %	100	71.4	12.6	13	3.1
2000	52150	39034	5818	5910	1388
Share, %	100	74.9	11.2	11.3	2.7
2001	61869	46142	6717	7484	1526
Share, %	100	74.6	10.9	12.1	2.5
2002	85800	66000	8100	10000	1600
Share, %	100	76.9	9.4	11.7	1.9
2003	77715	63672	6462	5788	1793
Share, %	100	81.9	8.3	7.5	2.3
2004	110844	85112	11524	12022	2186
Share, %	100	76.8	10.4	10.9	2
2005	141087	106840	16463	15027	2757
Share, %	100	75.7	11.7	10.7	2
2006	162695	120930	20676	17352	3737
Share, %	100	74.3	12.7	10.7	2.3
2007	195503	141689	26339	21560	5915
Share, %	100	72.5	13.5	11	3

Table 3.11 shows the distribution of foreign students in China by their source continent. It is noticeable that the number of European students rose from 4,305 in 1997 to 26,339 in 2007, with its share also increasing from 9.9 per cent to 13.5 per cent. Over 328 thousand foreign students from 200 countries were studying in 690 Chinese universities in 2012. Among all the European countries, Russia (14,971), France (8,386), and Germany (6,271) sent most students to China's higher education sector, though they were dwarfed by South Korea (63,488), the US (24,583), and Japan (21,126) (MoE, 2012). Anecdote evidences show that European students are more adoptive culturally than their counterparts from Southeast Asia. (Sun et al. 2009).

The rapid growth of foreign students was pushed by policy change in China. The state relaxed its policy of higher education, and allowed domestic universities to enroll international students autonomously in 2000, when three ministries jointly promulgated the Regulation on Admission and Management of Foreign Students (Liu and Wang, 2011: 74). China also provided an increasing amount of scholarship to foreign students. The number of students receiving official scholarship was just over 400 at the beginning of the reform era, but it grew by more than 30 times to 13,516 in 2008 (Liu and Wang, 2011: 75). There were 28,768 foreign students receiving such scholarship in 2012, who represented 8.8 per cent of all students from other countries (MoE, 2012).

3.3.2 Labour migration

The Ministry of Labor and Social Security reported that 217 thousand foreigners held a work permits issued by the ministry in 2008, double the number in 2003 (Zhao, 2009:50). A quarter of these labour migrants (55 thousand) worked in Shanghai, 30 thousand in Beijing, and 6,800 in Guangzhou (Pieke, 2012: 6). Large Chinese cities have lured a larger number of foreign workers at all kinds of educational and cultural backgrounds for their career development or business opportunities. "To all of these foreigners, China is a land of opportunity, not just a stopover on an international career (Pieke, 2012: 8)."

There are four primary types of foreign workers in terms of the nature of their employment, including high-level managers and experts of large projects, foreign investors and self-employed freelancers, technocrats and professionals at middle and senior level in foreign multinationals and domestic firms, and common clerks hired by Chinese employers. Despite the large labor force in China, it is still short of highly skilled labor in a number of areas, who can fuel the economy in an international commercial environment.

Foreign talents are not only brought by market force, but also invited by the state. China constantly invites scholars from developed countries for advancing its scientific and technological development. According to the National Foreign Experts Bureau, the number of foreign experts increased from less than 10 thousand at the end of 1980s to nearly 70 thousand in 2007 (Xinhua News, 2008). Around 400 thousand foreign experts were invited to work in China through the bureau in 2010 (Pieke, 2012: 6), most of whom stayed for only a short period. One source estimated that 156 academic staff at Chinese universities come from the EU countries in 2008 (GHK, 2011: 49).

It should be noticed that many foreign skilled workers are actually of ethnic Chinese background, some of whom previously immigrated into another country and acquired its citizenship. For instance, the government's launched the Thousand Talents Programme in 2011, which already recruited over 1,500 scientists and entrepreneurs. Over 70 per cent of them were ethnic Chinese with a foreign passport (Pieke and Speelman, 2013: 16).

Most foreign labours are temporary migrants by nature, because only a few of them are qualified for applying a permanent permit in China according to the Regulations on Examination and Approval of Permanent Residence of Aliens in China. Thanks to its high qualification requirement, only 649 foreigners were approved with permanent residence in one year after the regulation was issued in 2004. The government has not released data afterwards (Liu, 2010: 23).

As a result of the legal immigration system, many foreign labours, particularly those with low skills, turn to undocumented migrants, if they overstay in China without renewing their temporary visas or work permits. Some Chinese individuals or companies employ these migrants working in the black economy in China, who are named as "three illegalities" (*Sanfei*) - illegal entry, residence, and work. The presence of undocumented migrants and their criminal activities are particularly severe in coastal provinces like Liaoning and Guangdong, which are adjacent with neighbor countries (Zhao, 2013). Strict measures are called for controlling irregular migration to China, such as manpower supply and training programmes for the policy system, information sharing across the public security branch.

With regard to foreign labours, lack of social integration is another policy issue, similar to the case in many European countries. For foreign skilled workers, there is not much daily interaction between them and Chinese, since they tend to live in particular communities with other foreigners, go to hospitals and schools special for them. For lowly skilled migrants, they are more likely to concentrate in poorly managed neighborhoods without adequate public service (Liu, 2010: 24).

3.3.3 Foreign population in Hong Kong

As a harbor city and former British colony, Hong Kong has a long history of foreign presence. It has evolved into one of the global major destinations for tourists and business visitors. The number of passengers entering and departing Hong Kong totaled about 268 million in 2012 (HKISDa, 2013:1). As a Special Administrative Area, it has its own independent immigration policy and information collection system. Considering Hong Kong's importance in connecting China and the world, here we present a rough profile of local foreign population based on the population census data in Hong Kong[7].

Table 3.12 presents the number of foreign population and their proportion in Hong Kong by nationality in three observation years – 2001, 2006, and 2011. Overall, Hong Kong's foreign population increased from 370 thousand in 2001 to 475 thousand in 2011. The table gives the ten largest source countries in term of migration stock in Hong Kong, and other countries are collapsed into a single

7 The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Government has conducted the population census in Hong Kong every ten years since 1961 and the by-census between two census. The last census data are available for the year of 2011.

group. It is not possible to figure out the size of local Europeans, but there should not be a large of number of migrants from each EU country, as the total population in the “other” category is merely over 55 thousand.

Nonetheless, British nationals constitute the third largest migrant group after Indonesian and Filipinos over the decade, and they represented 0.5 per cent of the total population in Hong Kong in 2011. Its size increased from nearly 25 thousand to 33.7 thousand between 2006 and 2011. The British demographic presence is understandable as the city used to be a colony of the British Empire. For similar historical reasons, Indians represented 0.4 of the total population in 2011, and Pakistanis and Nepalese represent 0.2 per cent.

It should be noted that nationality is not necessarily identical with birth of place, but the two variables are largely overlapped for most nationals in Hong Kong, which means most nationals from a foreign country were also born in that country. The national distribution is also consistent with the ethnical structure in Hong Kong, as local ethnic minorities in 2011 were comprised of Indonesians (29.6%), Filipinos (29.5%), Whites (12.2%), Mixed (6.4%), Indians (6.3%), Pakistanis (4.0%), Nepalese (3.7%), Japanese (2.8%), Thais (2.5%), Other Asians (1.6%), Koreans (1.2%) and Others (0.3%) (HKCSD, 2013: 7).

Table 3.12 Foreign population and proportion in Hong Kong by nationality (2001-2011) (Source: Hong Kong census and statistics department)

Nationality	Total population			Proportion of population(%)		
	2001	2006	2011	2001	2006	2011
Indonesian	54629	110576	137403	.08	1.6	1.9
Filipino	143662	115349	135081	2.1	1.7	1.9
British	25418	24990	33733	.5	.4	.5
Indian	16481	17782	26650	.4	.3	.4
Pakistani	9922	10256	17252	.2	.1	.2
American	14379	13608	16742	.2	.2	.2
Australia	9505	10190	9505	.2	.1	.2
Nepalese	12379	15845	15945	.2	.2	.2
Thai	14791	16151	14791	.2	.2	.2
Japanese	14715	13887	13858	.2	.2	.2
Others	53746	55439	53746	.8	.8	.8
Total	369627	404073	474706	5.08	5.8	6.7

Table 3.13 presents the sex ratio, median age, and labor force participation rate of foreign population in Hong Kong by nationality. It is striking that foreigners from different countries are highly gendered for several countries. Migrants from the developed world, such as Americans, Australians, and Japanese, are slightly balanced to males, and British’s sex ratio is as high as 1500. By contrast, those from the developing world, including Indonesians, Filipinos, and Thais, are predominantly female, most who take the jobs of maid service in Hong Kong.

The median age of foreign residents also differ greatly by nationality. Thais have the highest median age (46.3) in 2011, while Pakistanis have the lowest (23.8). The median age of British and other nationals are in the thirties. In terms of labor force participation rate, Indonesians and Filipinos have the highest rate (over 95%) in 2011, and Pakistanis and Thais have the lowest. Other nationals’ participation rates are between 60 per cent and 80 per cent, which seem closer to the common level in an industrial society.

Table 3.13 Sex ratio, median age, and labor force participation rate of foreign population in Hong Kong by nationality (2001-2011) (Source: Hong Kong census and statistics department)

Nationality	Sex ratio			Median age			Labor force participation rate		
	2001	2006	2011	2001	2006	2011	2001	2006	2011
Indonesian	30	91	10	26.4	30.4	30.9	89.6	85.0	97.1
Filipino	54	66	66	33.9	36.2	37.7	97.5	95.3	96.2
British	1551	1499	1508	33.9	35.2	36.8	77.4	70.4	69.4
Indian	985	1027	985	30.6	33.1	32.5	67.1	64.9	68.5
Pakistani	1998	1344	1287	24.9	26.8	23.8	61.2	54.4	44.9
American	1227	1305	1282	18.6	25.4	28.2	63.0	61.3	61.6
Australia	1245	1207	1081	28.4	30.9	33.3	78.0	70.7	67.9
Nepalese	1337	1000;	1100	28.8	31.1	31.9	81.7	74.7	74.4
Thai	115	137	115	37.7	43.1	46.3	71.6	60.3	55.4
Japanese	1091	1014	1077	34.5	37.1	38.7	66.9	65.4	68.2
Others	907	1037	976	32.0	35.2	34.7	61.5	59.6	63.4

Note: Sex ratio refers to the number of males per 1000 females.

According to Table 3.14, foreign residents from several countries show high selectivity, such as Indians, Americans, Australians, and Japanese. The proportion of British nationals who ever attended degree course was as high as 46.8 per cent. By contrast, migrants of Indonesian, Filipino, Pakistani, Nepalese, or Thai origin tend to have low education attainment averagely.

The occupational distributions of different nationals are largely consistent with their educational structures. Based on the census data of 2011, we find that nationals with higher education level also tend to concentrate in managerial and professional positions. For example, over 80 per cent of British workers in Hong Kong were employed to take skilled jobs in 2011, while most Thais were hired to be manual labour.

Table 3.14 Foreign population in Hong Kong by educational attainment (highest level attended) and nationality in 2011 (Source: Hong Kong census and statistics department)

Nationality	Education							
	Pre-primary	Primary	Lower Secondary	Upper Secondary	Diploma / Certificate	Sub-degree course	Degree course	Total
Indonesian	544	23510	51542	51861	2580	2435	4931	137403
%	0.4	17.1	37.5	37.7	1.9	1.8	3.6	100
Filipino	2216	5019	13359	74905	11611	7284	20687	135081
%	1.6	3.7	9.9	55.5	8.6	5.4	15.3	100
British	3483	2945	2498	6211	1598	1208	15790	33733
%	10.3	8.7	7.4	18.4	4.7	3.6	46.8	100
Indian	2716	3740	3069	6481	536	447	9661	26650
%	10.2	14.0	11.5	24.3	2.0	1.7	36.3	100
Pakistani	3409	5778	2747	3689	230	251	1149	17253
%	19.8	33.5	15.9	21.4	1.3	1.5	6.7	100
American	1828	1915	1512	2694	435	444	7914	16742
%	10.9	11.4	9.0	16.1	2.6	2.7	47.3	100
Australia	2181	1594	1339	2062	648	437	7688	15949
%	13.7	10.0	8.4	12.9	4.1	2.7	48.2	100
Nepalese	1974	2594	2184	7140	774	175	1102	15943
%	12.4	16.3	13.7	44.8	4.9	1.1	6.9	100
Thai	1350	5996	2703	2739	339	120	964	14211
%	9.5	42.2	19.0	19.3	2.4	0.8	6.8	100
Japanese	1303	1180	602	2080	667	475	7551	13858
%	9.4	8.5	4.3	15.0	4.8	3.4	54.5	100
Others	4387	5410	5694	10323	2771	1621	27971	58177
%	7.5	9.3	9.8	17.7	4.8	2.8	48.1	100

A large portion of foreign residents had stayed in Hong Kong for quite a long time by 2011, but two third of them resided in the city for less than ten years (Table 3.15). Duration in Hong Kong also differs greatly by nationality. Nearly three out of five (58%) of British nationals had stayed in Hong Kong for ten or more years, while only 10 per cent of Indonesians did so. Table 3.15 also showed that Hong Kong experiences high temporary mobility of foreign migration, as over 40 per cent of them lived in the city for four years or less.

Table 3.15 Foreign population in Hong Kong by duration of residence (year) and nationality in 2011 (Source: Hong Kong census and statistics department)

Nationality	Duration of Residence (Year)					Total
	< 1	1 - < 4	4 - < 7	7 - < 10	10+	
Indonesian	25697	52907	29741	15630	13428	137403
%	19	39	22	11	10	100
Filipino	18954	37457	19472	15187	44011	135081
%	14	28	14	11	33	100
British	3050	5146	3414	2437	19686	33733
%	9	15	10	7	58	100
Indian	3858	5533	3082	2616	11561	26650
%	14	21	12	10	43	100
Pakistani	1261	3202	2601	2003	8186	17253
%	7	19	15	12	47	100
American	1801	3445	1310	1358	8828	16742
%	11	21	8	8	53	100
Australia	1855	3361	2304	2199	6230	15949
%	12	21	14	14	39	100
Nepalese	1128	2638	2185	2194	7798	15943
%	7	17	14	14	49	100
Thai	412	808	1004	936	11051	14211
%	3	6	7	7	78	100
Japanese	2067	4024	1857	1482	4428	13858
%	15	29	13	11	32	100
Others	7134	11782	7521	5526	26214	58177
%	12	20	13	9	45	100
Total	67217	130303	74491	51568	161421	485000
%	14	27	15	11	33	100

In addition, there are also some irregular migrants. Their accurate number is difficult to obtain, but we know how many are caught each year. There were 1,286 Mainland illegal migrants arrested in 2012, so were 342 Vietnamese and 414 non-ethnic Chinese (excluding Vietnamese) (HKISD, 2013b: 350).

There is far less information on emigration from Hong Kong than Immigration to the city. An official estimate reports that 7,600 emigrants left Hong Kong in 2012, and the majority of them went to three traditional immigration countries: the United States (2,600), Australia (2,200) and Canada (1,000) (HKISD, 2013b: 350).

3.4 Conclusion

3.4.1 Characteristics of migration flows between China and Europe

Personnel exchange between China and Europe can be dated back to two thousand years ago. However, it was not until the middle nineteenth century that ethnic Chinese migrated as merchants, students, seamen and contract labours to European countries in significant numbers. There were also many European officials, missionaries, and businessmen visited China from then on.

After a tight control period of exit and entry, foreign travelers and migrants appeared in China again in the end of the 1970s. The number of foreigners in China also grew substantially in the reform era. They are mainly composed of the following groups: foreign students, expatriate merchants, diplomats, and journalists, and foreign experts. In the same period, 180 thousand Chinese were recorded as residents in the fifteen EU member countries around 2000. The population was mainly composed of new comers from China, of whom this report first presents a general profile.

According to the global distribution of Chinese overseas population, Europe represents only less than 5 per cent of the total in 2007. However, the growth rate of Chinese migration to Europe has been the second highest over the past three decades. The number of Chinese migrants increased dramatically from 600 thousand in 1980 to 2.15 million in 2007, indicating an increase of 3.5 times. According to a recent estimation, the total overseas Chinese population in Europe has reached more than 2.5 million in 2012, of which more than 2.3 million or 86 per cent live in EU countries.

The number of Chinese overseas students increased even faster than the overall migrants in Europe since the start of the new millennium. Between 2000 and 2010, the total number of Chinese students going to the EU multiplied approximately six times. More than 42,600 Chinese students moved to study in EU countries in 2008 alone, with the UK receiving 65 per cent of the total, followed by France (10 per cent) and Germany (9 percent). China's economic growth will continue to increase Chinese student migration to Europe in the short run, while growth will eventually slow due to shifts within China's demographics.

Possibly related to the student flows, Chinese labour migration to some European countries is highly selected, as nearly half of Chinese workers were highly educated in some receiving countries like Germany (47.1 per cent), Ireland (49.9 per cent) and Sweden (48.7 per cent). Nowadays, service export (guoji laowu shuchu) is another form of temporary skilled labor migration from China to Europe, which means that Chinese workers are employed in a foreign labour market, either organized or independently. There were over 35 thousand workers in Europe at the end of 2010. Over half of those in Europe concentrated in Russia (16.6 thousand), while a few thousands also stayed in the UK, Germany, Spain, and Netherland. Chinese skilled migrants are also hired by native firms with investment in Europe, or follow the expansion of their overseas market as expatriates.

Since international trade and mutual investment between China and Europe have reached an all time high, Chinese ethnic economies in the EU countries have adjusted accordingly and local migrant entrepreneurs have attempted to exploit new opportunities brought by China economic achievement. As a consequence, Chinese businessmen in Europe have joined some new economic sectors in the past two decades. Another group of business migrants follow larger strategic investments made by Chinese big corporations, which attempts to get access to European technology, markets and talents.

On the other end of the labour force, lowly skilled migrants from China specialize in certain industries in major regions of Europe. The catering service continues to dominate in Western and Central Europe. The main economic activities lie in the importation, wholesale and retail of Chinese goods in Eastern Europe. Following local tastes and fashions, Chinese migrants in Southern Europe are more likely to be hired in small workshops and join the production line of leather goods, garments or other products. In terms of their source regions in China, those from Zhejiang and Fujian have dominated the migration flows to Europe at low skill level in the contemporary era, while a new wave from Northeast China has also joined them.

A large amount of Chinese nationals still face poor living conditions, and they may seek highly paid opportunities abroad by irregular migration. It is estimated that the proportion of irregular migration in the overall human flow from China to Europe has been increasing, and 260 thousand irregular migrants live in the UK, Italy, and France, which account for half of new arrivals from mainland China. Irregular migration to the EU from China is particularly severe in the southern European countries, partly due to the de facto acceptance of unauthorized migrant workers and many job opportunities in the informal economy. As another important institutional factor, amnesties for undocumented migrants in these countries also attracted a large number of Chinese who wait for obtaining formal residence permit.

In addition, requests for asylum become a possible channel for Chinese migrants to acquire formal residence permits in their host countries. The migration tide by the refugee channel reached a high point in 2000, when China was listed among the top ten origin countries in terms of asylum seekers in Germany. France and the UK are the two European countries which received the greatest number of requests for asylum from Chinese nationals in 2012. Only a small number of Chinese asylum seekers are likely to be political dissidents and ethnic minorities, so there is growing concern that a large number of requests from Chinese nationals are unfounded.

Based on the latest data presented in the previous sections, we generate the following table and display the demographic distribution of Chinese migrants in Europe by category and destination country.

In each category, there are some blank cells, for which we can not find comparable figures. Refugees and irregular migrants are not listed because it is difficult to find necessary data at national level. Neither can we gauge the size of permanent migrants and citizens without adequate information.

Table 3.16 Chinese migrants in Europe by legal status and category

Country	Workers by service export	Labors	Students	Total[1]
Year	2010	2006	2009[2]	2011
Austria			.	40000
Belgium			476	45000
Bulgaria			35	
Cyprus			1136	
Czech Republic			66	
Denmark		4228	989	18000
Estonia			51	
Finland		1778	2,234	
France		35835	27,112	540000
Germany	5194	33746	23,140	170000
Greece	578		16	20000
Hungary			220	18000
Ireland		4868	.	70000
Italy			4,009	330000
Luxembourg			14	
Netherlands	1858		4,415	160000
Norway		2199		
Poland			297	
Portugal			127	30000
Romania			24	9000
Russia	20809			3,000,00[3]
Spain	1057		927	170000
Sweden		5620	3,147	28000
United Kingdom	1269		47,035	630000
Other			.	60500[3]
Total	35276	NA	115470	2514470

Note: 1. Estimates in this column were made by Latham and Wu (2011). Based on data from sources like Eurostat and the European Migration Network, they cover people of Chinese ethnic origin, including older generations of Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong and Indochina. As the authors say, "the ultimate accuracy of these figures is always questionable". 2. It actually refers to the academic year starting from 2009. 3. These are estimates for the year of 2008.

The migration pattern China and other countries is never a one-way process. In the past few years, immigration to China has become much more diverse and numerous. It is reported that the total number of foreign residents reached nearly 594 thousand according to the 2010 population census. The absolute majority (79.5%) of foreigners in China are aged between 15 and 64 and are active economically with high skill selectivity. Two thirds of those over the age of six have received higher education, and 11.6 per cent of them are master degree holders. In addition, foreign residents are highly concentrated in several large cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. South Korea, the United States, and Japan are the three largest source countries, which contributed over 40 per cent of all foreign population in China in 2010. Only two European countries, France and Germany, ranked among the top ten source countries in terms of migrant population.

Foreign migrants came to China mainly for study or employment. Following the trend of internationalization of higher education, Chinese universities have become competitive in the lucrative international student market, and actively developed their programs for training foreign students in China in the past decade. With regard to nature of these programs, the share of degree students increased from 26.9 per cent in 2001 to 35.8 per cent in 2008, and then grew to 40.7 per cent in 2011. The remaining majority of students studied in non-degree programs. Most non-degree students attend language training programs in China and major in Chinese.

It is noticeable that the number of European students in China rose from 4,305 in 1997 to 26,339 in 2007, with its share also increasing from 9.9 per cent to 13.5 per cent. The rapid growth of foreign students was partially pushed by policy change in China. The state relaxed its policy of higher education, and allowed domestic universities to enroll international students autonomously in 2000. China also provided an increasing amount of scholarship to foreign students.

As another migrant group, about 217 thousand foreigners held a work permits issued by the ministry in 2008. Their occupations range from high-level managers and experts of large projects to common clerks hired by Chinese employers. Foreign talents are not only brought by market force, but also invited by the state. China constantly invites scholars from developed countries for advancing its scientific and technological development.

Many foreign labours with low skills turn to undocumented migrants, if they overstay in China without renewing their temporary visas or work permits. Some Chinese individuals or companies employ these migrants working in the black economy in China, who are named as “three illegalities” (*Sanfei*) - illegal entry, residence, and work. Lack of social integration is another policy issue, similar to the case in many European countries.

As China’s southern gate, Hong Kong has a long history of foreign presence, and we also introduced the demographic profile of local foreign residents. Hong Kong’s foreign population increased from 370 thousand in 2001 to 475 thousand in 2011. British nationals constitute the third largest migrant group after Indonesian and Filipinos over the past decade, and they represented 0.5 per cent of the total population in Hong Kong in 2011. No other European country sends enough migrants to be ranked as one of the top ten sending countries.

It is striking that foreigners from different countries are highly gendered for several countries. Migrants from the developed world are slightly balanced to males, while those from the developing world are predominantly female, most who take the jobs of maid service in Hong Kong. Foreign residents from several countries also show high selectivity. For example, the proportion of British nationals who ever attended degree course was as high as 46.8 per cent. The occupational distributions of different nationals are largely consistent with their educational structures.

3.4.2 Policy issues related to Chinese migrants in Europe

As we have provided policy suggestions on foreign management in China in the report of the state-of-the-art knowledge on temporary migration, here we only focus on related policy in the EU countries. Immigration policies in host countries have multiple effects on migration inflows and outflows. It is beyond the scope of this report to analyze all the policy implementation by the EU countries and their impacts on Chinese migrants. Instead, we would discuss several significant policy issues related to Chinese migration to the EU.

3.4.2.1 Student migration and academic exchange

Both the EU and China have set up some programmes to facilitate more student migration and academic exchange between the two regions. Specific policy dialogues have be given regularly in the fields of education and culture between China and the EU since 2003, and they have helped to facilitate China's participation in the Erasmus Mundus program[8]. Over 2,800 students and 320 scholars have taken part in joint masters courses and doctorates under Erasmus Mundus between 2004 and 2011 (GHK, 2011: 55).

On the side of China, the government also attempts to fund overseas study of Chinese students in some joint programmes. The China Scholarship Council (CSC) is affiliated with the Ministry of Education, which helps to provide financial assistance to Chinese citizens who seek to study abroad, as well as foreign students in China. In addition, the Post-graduate Study Abroad Program was launched in 2007, which has sent qualified Chinese students abroad for studies at master or doctoral level. The programme has sent 4,152 students to Europe out of a total of 12,769 by 2009 (GHK, 2011: 66).

The increasing student migration to Europe and other developed countries has triggered a concern of brain drain again in China. For example, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), an official think tank, issued a report on Chinese migration in 2007 and argued that China has become a loser in the global talent competition. However, China's experience actually reveals that some expatriates returned to their country of origin even when emigration of skilled nationals persists. If national strategies targeting the skilled diaspora can only make a limited contribution in luring a large number of returnees back home, a brain circulation can be realized to compensate the loss of brain drain by sending Chinese students and scientists to the EU countries for short-period training or visiting.

3.4.2.2 Irregular migration and regular amnesties

Some countries in southern Europe have offered one or more amnesties favoring irregular migrants over the past several decades. Italy offered a series of amnesties in the 1990s, by which hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants were legalised, including a large number of Chinese (Latham and Wu, 2013: 41). Several amnesty programmes in Spain, including the last one in 2005, have offered irregular Chinese migrants residence permits. After one amnesty launched in 1991, local Chinese population increased by 58 per cent relative to the previous year, partly because their compatriots living in Portugal, France, and the Netherlands came to Spain to regularize their status (Xu, 1999).

Mass amnesty programmes have not only regularized existing irregular migrants, but also attract new migrants from China. Undocumented migrants would rationally expect legalization of their status on the next round of amnesty. Therefore, a migrant might be encouraged to enter one EU country illegally as an intermediary stage in his entire immigration plan, whose ultimate objective lies in a legal status via an amnesty programme.

Amnesty programmes thus push a chain migration from China and other countries. Once the previous migrants acquired legal status and more decent jobs, their original positions are taken newly arrived migrants, who would in turn wait for the next round of amnesty. The extended networks of Chinese families also facilitate this process and migration by family unification. As the EU has integrated with a high level of labour freedom, they can fully explore potential opportunities and "shop" amnesty policies across countries. It remains an open question of how to regularize irregular migrants without generating new one in Europe.

3.4.2.3 Strict immigration control

Immigration has become a hot political issue in many European countries in the past decade, which sometimes push the authorities to tighten border controls and expel irregular migrants. For instance, the British government introduced a range of measures for reducing regular and irregular non-EU immigration to the UK after the general election in 2010. Both France and Denmark followed the suit in recent years.

Such restrictive policy could result in growing tension between the EU, local Chinese community,

8 Erasmus Mundus is a cooperation and mobility programme in the field of higher education that aims to enhance the quality of European higher education and to promote dialogue and understanding between people and cultures through cooperation with Third-Countries.

and China. For example, the municipal government in Prato, an Italian town, has attempted to adopt a tough policy on illegal economic activities and poor working conditions in the local Chinese workshops since 2009. The subsequent tension triggered by the new policy brought the Chinese embassy and the authorities in Rome to get involved (Latham and Wu, 2009: 41). With regard to migration issue, a unilateral action might not work well in realize the expected policy goals without tensions and even conflicts.

The EU member countries already acknowledged the principle that a common EU asylum and immigration policy must cooperate with the source countries in 1999 (EC, 2000). The EC issued a declaration titled "Integrating Migration Issues in the European Union's Relations with Third Countries" in 2002. It proposed that migration issues should be given a priority on the political agenda and dialogue with non-EU countries should be regularized in respect to migration management (EC, 2002). Increased cooperation between the EU and China is particularly necessary in dealing with urgent issues like irregular migration and human trafficking (EC, 2002:29).

References

Arefev, A. (2012) Chinese Students in the Higher Educational Institutions of Russia, *Russian Education and Society,* 54(1): 25 - 46

Bail L., and Shen, W. (2008) The Return of the "Brains" to China: What are the Social, Economic, and Political Impacts, Asie Visions 11, Centre Asie Ifri.

Bodycott, P. (2009) Choosing a higher education study abroad destination: What mainland Chinese parents and students rate as important, *Journal of Research in International Education,* 8(3): 349-373

British Council. (2010) Education Market Intelligence – China, http://www.britishcouncil.org/eumd- information-background-china.htm, accessed April 19, 2014.

British Council and Economist Intelligence Unit (2008) Forecasting internatonal student mobility - What does the future hold? China country report: the outlook for international student mobility, from www.atlas.iienetwork.org/file_depot/0-10000000/10000-20000/16766/folder/74726/forecasting+international+student+mobility+-+china+report+-+executive+summary.pdf, accessed April 19, 2014.

Chanda, N. (2007) *Bound Together - How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped Globalization*, Yale University Press.

Chen, Y. (2008) The Limits of Brain Circulation: Chinese Returnees and Technological Development in Beijing, *Pacific Affairs*, 81(2):195-215.

Chin, K., and Godson, R. (2006) Organized Crime and the Political–criminal Nexus in China, *Trends in Organized Crime*, 9(3): 5-44.

Denison, T, et al. (2009) The Chinese Community in Prato, in Johanson, G. et al. (eds), Living Outside the Walls: The Chinese in Prato, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2-24.

Editor, (2003) Introduction-Understanding Migration between China and Europe, *International Migration,* 41 (3)

Elisseeff, V (2001) The Silk Roads: Highways of Culture and Commerce. UNESCO Publishing

EOL (China Education Online), 2012 Annual Report, http://www.eol.cn/html/lx/report2012/, accessed April, 20, 2014

Eurostat, (2011) *Migrants in Europe, a statistical portrait of the first and second generation*, Brussels: the Europe Union

European Commission, (2000) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy, Brussels: the Europe Union

Faligot, R. (2001). La Mafia Chinoise en Europe [The Chinese Mafia in Europe]. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

Finckenauer, J. (2007) Chinese transnational organized crime: Fuk Ching. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice.

Forbes News. (2011), China Hits Foreigners And Their Employers With New Social Benefits Tax", http://www.forbes.com/sites/russellflannery/2011/09/10/china-hits-foreigners-and-their-employers-with-new-social-benefits-tax-2/, accessed April 20, 2014

Gareth, D. (2005) Chinese students' motivations for studying abroad, *International Journal of Private Higher Education*, 2: 16-21.

Giese, K. (2003) New Chinese Migration to Germany: Historical Consistencies and New Patterns of Diversification within a Globalized Migration Regime, *International Migration*, Vol. 41 (3).

Goldstein, K., Semple, J., and Singer, E. (2014) Asylum Fraud in Chinatown: An Industry of Lies, *The New York Times*, February 22, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/nyregion/asylum-fraud-in-chinatown-industry-of-lies.html> accessed May 3, 2014.

GHK, (2011) EU China Student and Academic Staff Mobility: Present Situation and Future Developments, a joint study between the European Commission and the Ministry of Education in China, GHK Consulting and Renmin University.

Gui, S. (2011) The contribution of overseas Chinese to China's development, in Qu, Zhang, Luo and Li (eds), Annual Report on Overseas Chinese Studies, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic press (Chinese), 51-84

Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (HKCSD) (2013). 2011 Census, Thematic Report: Ethnic Minorities

Hong Kong Information Services Department (HKISD) (2013), Hong Kong, the Facts, Immigration

Hong Kong Information Services Department (HKISD) (2013), Hong Kong Yearbook, Immigration

Hugo, G. (1997) Asia and the pacific on the move: workers and refugees, a challenge to nation states, *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, 38(3).

ICEFF Monitor. (2014) "Summing up international student mobility in 2014," from http://monitor.icef.com/2014/02/summing-up-international-student-mobility-in-2014/

Koser, K. (1998) Out of the frying pan and into the fire: a case study of illegality amongst asylum seekers. In Koser and Lutz (eds), The New Migration in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, 185–98.

Laczko, F (2005) Europe Attracts More Migrants from China http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe-attracts-more-migrants-china, accessed April 18, 2014

Klaus J. (2004) Legal and illegal immigration into Europe: experiences and challenges, *European Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 339-375.

Kwong, P. 1997. Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labour, New York: The New Press.

Landström, B (1967), Columbus: the Story of Don Cristóbal Colón, Admiral of the Ocean, New York City: Macmillan.

Latham, K and Wu, B. (2013) Chinese immigration into the EU: new trends, dynamics and implications, Europe China Research and Advice Network.

Li, L., Hu, L., Zhou, P. (2010) Trends and Strategic Choices of Education for International Students in China, *Fudan Education Forum*, 8(1)

Li, M. (2002). A history of Chinese immigrants in Europe (Chinese).

Li, M. (2011). Latest development and trends of overseas Chinese in Europe, in Wang and Liu (eds), Overseas Chinese and Local Society in Europe: Social Integration, Economic Development and Political Participation, Guangzhou: Zhongshan University Press, 3–25 (Chinese)

Liu, G. (2010) International Migration and Modernlization - the Case of China, *Theory and Modernization*, 2010 (6) (Chinese)

Liu,Y. and Wang, Y. (2011) Educational Policies and Practice in Higher Education for Foreign Students in China, *Higher Education Development and Evaluation*, 27(6) (Chinese)

Mazzarol, T. and Soutar, N. (2002) "Push-pull" factors influencing international student destination choice, *The International Journal of Educational Management,* 16(2): 82-90.

Margot Schüller, Yun Schüler-Zhou(2013), Chinese Investment Strategies and Migration –Does Diaspora Matter? A Case Study on Germany, *MPC Research Report*.

MoE (Ministry of Education in China). (2012) Statistical Report on Foreign Students in China http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s5987/201303/148379.html, accessed April 25, 2014

OECD. (2013) Education Indicators in Focus.

Oliveira, R. (2003) Immigrants' Entrepreneurial Opportunities: the case of the Chinese in Portugal, NOTA DI LAVORO, SociNova, New University of Lisbon, Portugal

Nyíri, P. (2003). Chinese Migration to Eastern Europe, *International Migration,* 41(3)

Pang, L. (2014) Characteristics of population of foreign nationalities in China. In: Wang, H. and Liu, G. (eds), Annual Report of Chinese International Migration. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 81-91 (Chinese).

Philstar.com. (2013) Huawei's enterprise business booms in W. Europe on innovation November 17, 2013 http://www.philstar.com:8080/world/2013/11/17/1257832/huaweis-enterprise-business-

booms-w.-europe-innovation, accessed 15, April, 2014.
Pieke, F. et al. (2004) Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe, *Stanford University Press*
Pieke. F. (2012) Immigrant China, *Modern China*, 38(1):40-77
Pieke, F. and Speelman, T. (2013) Chinese Investment Strategies and Migration: Does Diaspora Matter? MPC Research Report.
Pieke, F. and Xiang, B. (2007) Legality and Labour: Chinese Migration, Neoliberalism and the State in the UK and China, BICC Working Paper Series, No. 5, University of Oxford
Pinna, C. (2009) EU–China relations in higher education: Building bridges in global cultural dialogue, *Asia Europe Journal*, 7(3-4).
Reuters (2011), 'China's Huawei picks Hungary for logistics centre', http://www.reuters.com.
Soudijn, J. (2006) Chinese Human Smuggling in Transit. The Hague: BJU Legal.
Skeldon, R. (1996) Migration from China. *Journal of International Affairs,* 49:1–22.
Skeldon, R. (1992) International migration within and from the East and Southeast Asian region: a review essay. *APMJ*, 1(1):19–62.
Shen, W. (2005) A study on Chinese student migration in the United Kingdom.
Shen, W. (2008). Made in France? Chinese student return migration from French Business Schools, European university institute
Sun, L. Feng, J. Lin, L. and Huang Y. (2009) A survey of acculturation of foreign students in China and some suggestions, *Language Teaching and Research*, 2009(1) (Chinese)
The World Trade Organization Chinese Yearbook (2010)
Tian, F. (2013) Skilled flows and selectivity of Chinese scientists at global leading universities between 1998 and 2006, Journal of Science and Technology Policy in China, (4)2: 99-118
UNHCR (2014), Asylum Trends 2013, <http://www.unhcr.org/5329b15a9.html> [accessed April 20, 2014].
UNHCR (2014a) Population Statistics Database, <popstats.unhcr.org/Default.aspx> [accessed April 20, 2014]
Vasileva, K. (2012) Nearly two-thirds of the foreigners living in EU Member States are citizens of countries outside the EU-27, Eurostat, Statistics in focus.
Widmaier, S. and Dumont J. (2011) Are recent immigrants different? A new profile of immigrants in the OECD based on DIOC 2005/06, OECD Publishing.
Wu, B., Guo, L., and Sheehan, J. (2010) Employment condition of Chinese migrant workers in the East Midlands: A pilot study in a context of economic recession, a report submitted to the ILO, Beijing: International Labour Office for China and Mongolia.
Wu, B. and Latham, K (2014) Migration from China to the EU: the challenge within Europe. In: Brown, K. (eds), China and the EU in Context: Insights for Business and Investors. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 303-327.
Wang, W. and Zhuang, G. (2010) *Review of Overseas Chinese 2008*, Beijing: World Knowledge Press (Chinese).
Xinhua News (2011) Primary data release of residents from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and foreign population based on the sixth national population census, April 29th
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-04/29/c_121365315.htm
Xu, G. (2011) *Strangers on the Western Front: Chinese workers in the Great War,* Harvard University Press.
Xiang, B. and Shen, W. (2009) International student migration and social stratification in China, *International Journal of Education Development,* 29: 513-522.
Xinhua News. (2008) Beijing Celebrated the 25th Anniversary of Deng's Talk on Utilizing Foreign Talent, July 8, 2008
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/08/content_8509749.htm, accessed April 25, 2014
Ye, W. (2001) *Seeking Modernity in China's Name*, California: Stanford University Press.
Zhang, G. (2003) Migration of Highly Skilled Chinese to Europe: Trends and Perspective,

International Migration, 41 (3).
Zhu, G. (1994) *China's overseas migration - An historical analysis of international migration*. Shanghai Fudan University Press, Shanghai (Chinese).
Zhang, S., and Chin, K. (2002). Enter the dragon: Inside Chinese human smuggling organizations, *Criminology*, 40(4): 737–768.
Zhang H. (2013) The role of migration in shaping China's economic relations with its main partners, MPC Research Report.
Zhao, Y. (2009) The evaluation of Credibility of Chinese Media among Foreigners in China, *International Journalism*, (2009, 12) (Chinese)

4. TYPES OF TEMPORARY BORDER-CROSSING MOVEMENT TO AND FROM FINLAND

Mari KORPELA, Jaakko HYYTIÄ, Pekka RANTANEN, Pirkko PITKÄNEN and Mika RAUNIO

4.1 Introduction

Historically, Finland has not received many migrants; those who migrated to Finland were usually from Sweden or Russia, the two countries that ruled Finland in different eras. During the decades after the World War II, Finland was a rather closed nation and not particularly welcoming towards foreigners. The cold climate and a language that is viewed as difficult have also caused Finland not to be a particularly attractive destination for migrants. The few migrants who did come, were spouses of Finnish citizens or they worked in very particular fields, for example as musicians (see Matyska, 2014). Labour shortages were mainly filled with domestic folk who moved to urban areas from the countryside. Since the 1990s, Finland has started to receive increasing numbers of migrants. In particular, international mobility to and from Finland has increased significantly after the country joined the European Union in 1995 and the Schengen Agreement in 1996. Yet, in spite of the increasing numbers of immigrants, Finland has received significantly less immigrants than many other European countries and the Finnish immigration policy has been particularly strict.

In 2010, 29 500 foreigners moved to Finland, about 50% of them originating from EU countries. During the same year, 12 650 Finns moved abroad, most of them to EU countries. (Tammilehto et al., 2012: 10) In other words, nowadays, the inbound migration to Finland is higher than the outbound migration away from Finland. It is also different in character as most Finns who move abroad are highly educated whereas many people moving to Finland are less educated. Moreover, Finland has been rather unable to utilise the skills of educated immigrants effectively and many highly skilled migrants end up in low skilled jobs, or unemployed, in Finland.

The population of Finland is approximately 5,5 million. In 2014, there are about 245 000 people whose mother tongue is other than Finnish, Swedish or Sami[1]. It has been estimated that in 2030, the death rate of Finns will be higher than the birth rate. Consequently, Finland needs immigration. The public discourse is, however, not very welcoming towards foreigners. In the recent years, a populist "True Finns" party has rapidly become popular and critical views towards immigration have been very visible in state politics and media. At the same time, traffic on Finland's borders, especially at the eastern border, is constantly increasing. "The Finnish Border Guard estimates that the traffic at the eastern border will grow to 1.5–2 times the current volume by the end of the decade, to approximately 20 million border crossers" (EMN, 2012: 155). Russians come to Finland above all as shopping tourists but also increasingly in order to buy holiday homes and to spend vacations on those properties.

Tourists are obviously the largest group of foreigners entering Finland but there are also increasing numbers of permanent and temporary migrants. Immigration to Finland has changed in the new millennium so that there has been a shift from humanitarian (and family-based) migration to labour migration (Björklund et al., 2008: 3). There are increasing numbers of foreigners working in Finland. Their exact numbers remain unknown but it has been estimated that there would be even over 100 000 foreigners working in Finland, half of them being in Finland permanently and the other half on temporary bases (Björklund et al., 2008: 4). There are also increasing numbers of people who work in Finland but live somewhere else, typically in Estonia. Indeed, a significant number of the foreigners who move to Finland in order to work, sojourn in the country only temporarily. Finland can thus be characterised as a transit country of migration nowadays. In other words, in practice there are many

1 The three official languages of Finland are Finnish, Swedish and Sami.

temporary migrants in Finland although the emphasis in policy documents has been on permanent migration.

Finnish people have migrated away from Finland during different historical periods. In the end of the 19th century and early 20th century, almost 400 000 Finns moved to North America. There was some Finnish migration to North America until mid-twentieth century and over 20 000 moved to Australia but a much more significant migration flow took place in the 1960s and 1970s when over 500 000 working-class Finns went to Sweden where they could achieve a much higher standard of living than in Finland (Björklund et al., 2008: 12). Therefore, in historical perspective, Finland has not been a significant country in terms of receiving migrants but it has been a country from where there has been significant flows of outbound migration, to the USA, Canada and Sweden.

In the new millennium, Finland has experienced a new kind of outbound migration, that is, the temporary emigration of highly educated Finns working for example in the ICT industry (Björklund et al., 2008: 13). For most of these career expatriates, the migration is temporary as they eventually return to Finland. Most Finns moving abroad go to EU countries but there are also increasing numbers of Finnish career expatriates moving to Asia although the numbers are small on international scale. China is the most common destination in Asia because Finnish companies have made business investments there in the recent years. The United Arab Emirates is another important destination. (Heikkilä, 2012: 13) During the last two decades, it has also become popular for retired Finns to spend the winter months in Spain (Björklund et al., 2008: 13; Könnilä, 2014) or in Thailand (Heikkilä, 2012: 13). Europe and Asia are thus the two most popular destinations among Finnish emigrants and there has been less Finnish emigration to other continents (Heikkilä, 2012: 13).

In this report, we discuss the characteristics of temporary migration to and from Finland. First, we summarise visa and residence permit statistics. Then, we discuss various categories of temporary migrants (labour migrants, educational migrants, family-based migrants, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants, lifestyle migrants etc.). Of some of these categories, there is statistical information available whereas of others, there are no statistics and we rely more on qualitative data or even merely on our knowledge of the existence of a particular phenomenon of temporary migration.

4.1.1 Methodology

The report provides an overview of current characteristics of migration from Asia to Finland and from Finland to Asia. Various sources were used for the report. First of all, we examined academic literature and policy reports. Secondly, we used various statistical sources. On some types of temporary migrants, there is no statistical information available and in these cases, we rely more on qualitative data or even merely on our knowledge or media coverage of the existence of a particular phenomenon of temporary migration. Based on our reading of the various data sources, we decided the relevant categories of temporary migrants in Finland (high skilled and low skilled labour migrants, academics and researchers, students, family-based migrants, lifestyle migrants, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants, health tourists and nomadic precariat). In general, we considered people who stay for over three months but less than five years. There was, however, an important exception: seasonal work with Schengen visas is a significant category of labour migration in Finland and for that phenomenon, we paid attention also to people who stay for less than three months. We used statistical data from the following sources: Statistics Finland, Eurostat, the Finnish Immigration Service, Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Centre for international mobility (CIMO), European Migration Network, OECD, Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland, National Police Board and the Social Insurance Institution of Finland. We acquired some of the statistics online or from published reports and some of them by personal requests from the relevant institutions. Different authorities compile statistical data on different phenomenon and that is why we had to consult so many sources. The categories on which statistical data is collected change over years and consequently, it is often difficult to obtain long-term trends on particular phenomena. Different authorities also use different criteria for their statistical data, which makes is difficult to compare different statistics.

We chose the relevant statistical information with regard to the research questions of the EURA-NET. General trends of migration to and from Finland can be seen from the numbers of inflow and outflow of people and from the amount of foreigners registered as residents in Finland. More detailed information on the immigration to Finland can be found in the statistics on different types of residence permits, including different length of the permits and the different reasons for acquiring the permits. The problem with the existing statistical data on residence permits is that we cannot know how many of those people who get a fixed-term residence permit to Finland end up staying in the country permanently and how many stay only temporarily and for how long. Grasping temporary migration on statistics is indeed a great challenge and not many useful statistics on temporary migration exist in Finland at all.

Acquiring detailed information on Finnish emigration is difficult. We can know the yearly numbers of people who emigrate but that number does not reveal whether those people move abroad on temporary or permanent basis. Information gathered from the Finnish Social Insurance Institution gives some indication of the numbers of Finns staying abroad on temporary bases but one must keep in mind that not everyone registers their transnational mobility with these authorities.

4.2 Flows and Patterns of Temporary Transnational Migration and Mobility

People coming from outside the Schengen area need visas and residence permits in order to stay in Finland. Statistics on visa and residence permits thus provide an overall picture of international mobility to Finland.

4.2.1 Visas, residence permits and the availability of statistical information

In the past decade, there has been a significant increase in the number of visa applications to Finland. Most visa applications come from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, India, China, Thailand and Turkey. The majority of the visa applications are from Russia and tourism is the most significant reason to visit Finland. It is notable that there are significant increases in the numbers of visa applications from Asian countries: Asia dominates the statistics compared to other continents where Schengen visa is required for travel to Finland.

Table 4.1 Visa decisions of the Finnish embassies 2013 (Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2014)

2013	Business	Cultural	Medical reasons	Official visit	Other	Sports	Study	Tourism	Visiting Family & friends
Asia	16420	600	62	671	12464	412	548	12054	8381
Russia	22326	4964	246	664	23025	5662	2706	1398530	32551
Other Continents	2478	421	17	845	1087	279	480	2442	4329
Total	41224	5985	325	2180	36576	6353	3734	1413026	45261

Russia and Asian countries dominate the numbers also in residence permit applications. The most common reasons for a residence permit to Finland are family-based reasons (37% in 2013). Another popular category is studies (31% in 2013).

Table 4.2 Residence permit applications to Finland in 2013 (Source: MIGRI, 2014a)

Russia	4128
India	1744
China	1698
Ukraine	1 026
USA	1 019
Thailand	815
Turkey	732
Vietnam	678
Somalia	544
Philippines	503
Top 10 nationalities, total number of applications	12 887
All applications, total	21259

In terms of temporary migration, these statistics are problematic as they include data on permanent migration which is defined as lasting for at least a year. There are no accurate statistics on all the migrants who sojourn in Finland on temporary basis (Tammilehto et al., 2012: 10) and the absence of such statistics has been identified as a significant problem in the Finnish migration policy (Tutka-työryhmän loppuraportti, 2014: 3-4; Tervo & Halonen, 2012). The lack of statistics is partly due to the fact that there is no clear definition of who a temporary migrant is. In addition, the phenomenon is multi-faceted. There is data on particular groups but that data are collected by different actors for different purposes and it is stored by these different actors instead of being combined together. This means that one cannot make comprehensive statistical analysis. For example, due to gaps and overlaps in register information, no reliable estimate of the amount of foreign labour can be made. Moreover, since the "registration of temporary labour is inadequate, it is not possible to produce comprehensive statistics" that would enable, for instance, estimating the impact of temporary workers on the Finnish labour markets. The lack of comprehensive information also weakens the opportunities of administrators to assess the effectiveness of policy measures. (EMN, 2012: 135) The only group of temporary migrants of which there is accurate statistical information available is students: the Centre for International Mobility (CIMO) focuses on international mobility of students and keeps updated statistics on the related phenomena.

In the following, we discuss characteristics of the most relevant categories of temporary migrants in the Finnish context. They include labour migrants, academics and researchers, governmental workers, educational migrants, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants, lifestyle migrants, health tourists, nomadic precariats, and those who migrate because of family reasons.

4.2.2 Labour migration

There are increasing numbers of labour migrants in Finland. Regardless of their permit type, labour migrants can be distinguished according to their position on labour market to two main categories; independent job seekers and posted workers. The former category includes seasonal workers and shorting experts who arrive with a visa only and workers, entrepreneurs and experts who arrive with residence permits. Similar work can be done also as posted workers, or as work through employment agencies.

4.2.2.1 Posted and independent workers

The term independent worker refers to individuals who work directly for employers in Finland, and the term posted worker refers to those who normally work in another state than Finland, or whom the employer in another state sends to work in Finland for a limited period. Being a posted worker has significant impacts on taxation, wage levels and on one's role in the labour market for those who have arrived under that label as leased labour or through sub-contractors (as service not as worker). A notable amount of changes in control and regulation mechanisms has been created in order to better control this bias in the labour market.

- the worker is posted under the management of the sending enterprise, i.e. the worker's em-



	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Russia	340477	367256	348556	343999	366933	501725	623114	734308	729720	952177	1182965	1314129	1490191

ployer enterprise, and for work on behalf of it on the basis of an agreement made between the employer and the receiver of services working in Finland

- the worker is sent for work to a working place or enterprise belonging to the same conglomerate
- an enterprise practising hiring or exchange of labour sends a worker for work for another enterprise.

There have been many estimations about the numbers of posted-workers in Finland. In 2010, it was estimated that there were 31000 posted-workers in Finland (Tervo & Halonen, 2012: 48), while before the economic downturn of 2008, the estimated amount was from 40 000 to 50 000. They mainly work in the construction industry and a few thousand in the metal industry. About 2/3 of the workers come from Estonia. Therefore, despite the relatively high numbers of posted-workers and important new regulations and policies controlling the phenomenon, it mainly concerns EU/EEA countries, and to some extent Russia and Ukraine, but not Asian countries. Although there are recruitment agencies or other 'brokers' organising the migration process of experts, seasonal workers and health care personnel arriving from outside of EU/EEA region, the arriving individuals are working mostly as independent employees in Finland, not as posted-workers.

Construction industries have been the most significant sites for employing temporary migrant workers. The majority is other EU-citizens, particularly from Estonia, but other countries, for example Poland, have been significant too. The percentage of foreign workers in subcontractor companies has been significantly high (26-37 %), and in specific sectors it has been even higher, for example, in renovation sites in the capital area (64% in 2010). Other notable sectors that employ migrant work force are technology industry (IT-industry has not been studied much in terms of migrant work), metal industry (especially in shipbuilding industry), transportation (especially in South-East Finland, and there are small transportation entrepreneurs taking part in the business, instead of being employed). Thus, the areas and importance of migrant work vary regionally in different parts of the country (Hertzen-Oosi et al., 2009). Secondly, the use of posted workers is common in many sectors. Tax authorities have evaluated that during 2009, there were 35 000-40 000 migrant workers working under six months and about 29 500 people who worked for over six months but did not have the municipality of residence in Finland (Hirvonen, 2011: 55-62). A person needs to have a residence permit for at least a year in order to get a municipality of residence, which is statistically considered to mean permanent stay in Finland. The applicant's intention for staying permanently is also required (Alastalo, Homanen & Rantanen, 2014: 117-118). There is scant information on how the above sectors relate to temporary migration from outside the EU/EEA area, and how such use of labour force has developed and what kind of employment practices facilitate such migration.

4.2.2.2 Seasonal workers and shorting experts arriving with visa only

Temporary work migration to Finland lasting for less than three months from non-Schengen countries can require only a visa, not necessarily a residence permit. Two major groups eligible for this may be simplified *as seasonal workers*[2] *in agriculture* and *experts with specific skills*. It should be noticed that international assignments of experts have become shorter from 2000 on and often take a few weeks rather than six months and are consequently called as "*shorters*". (Tahvanainen, 2005).

Working with a visa without a residence permit is strongly skill, sector and country specific. Largest visa-application countries are Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, India, China, Thailand and Turkey. A vast majority of issued visas are from Russia (ca. 95 %) and for tourism (ca. 90 %). The number of issued visas from Russia has risen considerably while the number of issued visas from other countries has grown more moderately for the past 10 years, from 27580 in 2001 to 49190 in 2013 (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). These numbers in tables below show that also temporary mobility to Finland has risen during the past ten years, as has been the case with permanent migration.

Figure 4.1 Visas to Finland, Russia (Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2014)

2 Seasonal work is a form of temporary employment linked to specific periods of the year and sectors: for example, in agriculture (fruit pickers) or the tourist industry and services (cleaners, etc. in holiday resorts).



Figure 4.2 Visas to Finland 2001-2013, non-EU EURA-NET countries (Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2014)

Visa applications from Ukraine have clearly increased, while those from China have decreased during the 2000s. Other countries show either moderate growth (Thailand) or slight decrease (India, Turkey and Philippines) (Figure 4.2). Asia dominates the statistics compared to other continents where Schengen visa is required for travel to Finland. In terms of temporary migrant work, Russia is the most significant single country but also Eastern European countries and Asian nations are relevant sending countries of workers, and also in terms of business related travel (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Visas to Finland by relevant work-related and other categories, Asia by countries & other continents 2013[3] (Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2014)

	Business		Cultural		Medical Reasons		Other		Sports		Study		Tourism		Visiting Family & Friends	
	Russia	22326	Russia	4289	Russia	246	Russia	23025	Russia	5662	Russia	2706	Russia	1398530	Russia	32551
	China	8480	Ukraine	227	Ukraine	40	Ukraine	7571	Ukraine	243	China	232	Ukraine	4343	Thailand	2109
	India	3600	China	184	Turkey	11	Thailand	3559	India	44	Ukraine	125	China	4426	Ukraine	1978
	Ukraine	1967	Indonesia	57	China	3	India	457	Indonesia	39	India	42	Thailand	1186	China	1633
	Turkey	1061	Vietnam	45	India	3	Turkey	414	Turkey	36	Turkey	35	Turkey	482	India	865
	Thailand	365	Turkey	30	UAE	3	China	159	China	16	Indonesia	21	Indonesia	399	Turkey	763
	UAE	336	Iran	27	Japan	1	Iran	91	Iran	8	Thailand	21	UAE	247	Iran	410
	Indonesia	298	India	17	Iran	1	Nepal	61	Nepal	7	Vietnam	16	Japan	60	Vietnam	207
	Iran	130	Israel	11			Vietnam	49	Thailand	6	UAE	16	Iran	39	UAE	169
	Vietnam	92	Nepal	1			UAE	39	UAE	6	Japan	14	Israel	35	Indonesia	122
	Japan	39	Japan	1			Israel	25	Israel	6	Nepal	13	S. Korea	27	Nepal	68
	Nepal	16					Indonesia	15	Japan	1	Iran	10	Vietnam	19	Japan	26
	Israel	15					Japan	12			S. Korea	2	Nepal	13	Malaysia	14
	Malaysia	13					S. Korea	8			Israel	1	Malaysia	7	Israel	13
	S. Korea	8					Malaysia	4							S. Korea	4
Asia	**TOTAL**	**38746**	**TOTAL**	**4889**	**TOTAL**	**308**	**TOTAL**	**35489**	**TOTAL**	**6074**	**TOTAL**	**3254**	**TOTAL**	**1409813**	**TOTAL**	**40932**
Other	**TOTAL**	2478	**TOTAL**	**421**	**TOTAL**	**17**	**TOTAL**	**1087**	**TOTAL**	**279**	**TOTAL**	**480**	**TOTAL**	**2442**	**TOTAL**	**4329**

Visa categories and the number of visas specified by selected Asian countries show differences between countries. For example, business travel from China is significant whereas for Ukraine and Thailand, the visa category ‘other’ is more significant, because most seasonal work from these countries is classified under the category. It can be assumed that when connections between Finland and other countries develop and increase, such changes make reasons to come to Finland more nuanced and

3 The numbers are based on location of the Finnish embassies, not on nationality of visa applicants. This creates minor deviation to estimations based on nationality.

intertwined.

The classification of visas by *main purposes* does not reveal specifically under which category temporary work is done. The most visible group, and largest by number, consists of a variety of sectors of agriculture and Non-timber forest product (NTFP) industries. The country of origin is often connected to a specific sector. For example, a considerable number of Thai-pickers work in NTFP-sector, specifically picking wild berries (Rantanen & Valkonen, 2011), whereas the garden berry sector is dominated by Ukrainian and Russian seasonal migrants (Marjanpoimintatilastot 2011-2013). The category *other* in the table 3 includes work without a residence permit. Nevertheless, work can also occur in the business category as short-term business activity, like inter-company transferees, or other business ventures that are looking for local markets and as experts to such companies. Top five countries are Russia, Ukraine, Thailand, India and Turkey. These figures indicate the relative importance of the sending countries. The figures do not, however, reveal the nationalities of the visa applicants. This is a minor deviating factor in the numbers of figure 2 and table 3, but in specific cases, it is a significant factor. For example, Finland does not have an embassy in Belarus, which means that visa applications for temporary work from Belarus nationals are submitted in Moscow. There are also specific differences concerning sending countries and Finnish embassy practices. For example, the Finnish embassy in Hanoi does not allow seasonal work to Finland with visa, but expects the workers to have a residence permit of an employee because there has been significant problems in securing sufficient income to migrants working in Finland. The Finnish embassy in Bangkok, on the other hand, issues visas for seasonal work, especially to wild berry industry.

A closer look at a specific country and sectors sheds more light to the numbers that “the other” category consists of. As noted before, the statistical information becomes even more challenging in trying to locate areas of temporary work, the significance of different sending countries and sectors of work. However, Aliens Act (2004, §79) provisions limit the number of possible sectors where work without a residence permit is possible. Some information exists concerning sectors where significant amount of seasonal migrant work takes place (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 Seasonal migrants to Finland 2010-2013 in garden and wild berry sectors (Source: Marjanpoimintatilastot 2011-2013; Rantanen & Valkonen, 2011)

Garden berries	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Russia	4840	4071	3223	2727
Ukraine	3100	3620	5153	6150
Thailand	213	213	245	259
Vietnam	128	130	36	48
Belarus	20	25	20	-
Moldova	-	-	-	48
Total	8301	8049	8677	9184
Wild berries	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Thailand	1578	2398	2774	3229
Ukraine	670	600	611	950
Russia	475	429	480	140
Belarus	-	-	-	20
Vietnam	-	-	-	-
Total	2723	3427	3865	4339

Table 4.4 sheds sector specific light to visas issued in the category *other* on the visa application form. In the case of Thailand, the wild berry sector and the garden berry sector combined shows that 3488 Thais worked in these sectors in 2013. 71 additional persons were given visas in the category, and presumably worked in other sectors. In the case of Russia, however, there is a significant difference. For the garden berry and wild berry sector there were 2867 Russians working temporarily. Visas given to Russians were in total 23025 in the category *other*. Then 20158 people remain unexplained whether or not they were doing temporary work in Finland, and if so in what sectors. Statistical information

on the matter does not exist, but it is possible to get at least indicative information from the relevant Finnish embassies during further research efforts.
Seasonal work in the specific sectors above has grown steadily (from 11848 to 13523 people) over the period of 2010-2013, but the significance of the sending countries has changed considerably. In the garden berry sector, Ukraine has become the most important sending country and the share of Russia has declined. In the wild berry sector, Thailand is a dominating sending country, but the importance of Ukraine has grown compared to Russia.

The use of recruiting companies, or informal brokers, is common especially in the wild berry industry. In the garden berry sector, the situation is slightly different, as the Finnish local industry has developed cooperative practices for informing about available jobs. The garden berry industry has worked with the Finnish regional employment and economic offices and with similar government employment offices in the near region countries, for example with the city of Petroskoi in Russia. Therefore, also the role of recruiting agencies is much smaller than in the case of wild berry industry (Asa & Muurinen 2011). However, in the sectors that use temporary workforce based on *seasonal work without a residence permit,* there is evidence that informal recruiting channels exist which may have a variety of different gate-keeping practices that facilitate access to jobs, or restrict mobility of some people.

Temporary work based on visa is a significant practice for working in Finland because the number of annual workers is relatively high. Its very nature is temporary and often circular as the same people may come seasonally to work several times, for example, in berry industries. Many regional ELY-centres (The Centres for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment) indeed also inform that there is a lack of local workers in branches of agriculture and horticulture. In the wild berry industry, the conditions of unregulated work are so harsh that the local population is hardly interested to pick berries commercially, and therefore there is a need for seasonal workers from abroad.

Regarding the case of "shorters" there are some qualitative studies especially from the field of human resources management discussing internal assignments of global firms or field of science studies focusing on academics moving abroad, but statistical data to analyse is rather scant. In case of science studies there are surveys focusing on mobility of researches and also some statistical analyses. Bluntly they conclude, that short visits (less than one month) are common in best performing research units, and the most important mode of mobility. However, destinations are mostly within the EU or North -America, and rarely, although increasingly in Asia (e.g. Raunio et al 2009; Löppönen et al 2009). Similarly, in the case of human resource management literature, qualitative research suggests among other things, that short time assignments are the most common mode of international mobility within the big firms and they are frequently related to career development and professional learning (Tahvanainen et al 2005). However, again, studies focus mostly on EU and North-America and, further, in the case of Finns moving abroad, reveal that there are well organized services to help expatriation, especially in case of health care professionals who move to UK or other advanced economies (Heikkinen 2004). Studies focusing on Asia are scant, but they have revealed some dynamics related to short-term visits. For example, Finnish expatriates in Japan are rather active learners of the new culture than passive objects of foreign environment (e.g Peltokorpi 2006.), and very competitive and distant culture of Shanghai makes it an interesting place to work for a while, but a rather unlikely place for a permanent settlement for the highly-skilled Finns (Mykkänen 2004). Shortly, short-term visits are highly important for academia and international business, and they increasingly embrace Asian locations, but comprehensive studies related to matter are lacking.

4.2.2.3 Workers, entrepreneurs and experts arriving with residence permits

The numbers of accepted work-related applications are shown in Figure 3. These numbers include only those who have applied from outside of EU and EEA countries for the first time, and do not belong to specific professional categories who may work in Finland with visa only. Sectors of work with visa are specified in Aliens Act (2004) but reports indicate that the dividing line on categories of work between visa and residence permit is not always clear (Tervo & Halonen, 2012: 91-94). It is worth noting that the rejection rates vary greatly depending on the applicant's country of origin both with residence permits and with visas. Since 2011, also those applying for a permit as experts or for scientific research count as their own group (table 5.). It is not possible to say from the numbers who is a temporary migrant and who is a permanent migrant but they illustrate the annual size of the labour flows from outside of EU/EEA region to Finland. In 2013, the number of scientific research and expert visas was about 1600 that is almost 2/3 compared with the number of residence permits *of employees*. It may be claimed that work based immigration with residence permits from outside of EU/EEA countries is then fairly expertise oriented, although temporal nature of the movement cannot be seen from these figures (see Figure 4.3 and Table 4.5).



Figure 4.3 Residence permits of employees and other work related categories to Finland 2006-2013 (Source: MIGRI, 2014b)

Table 4.5 Residence permits of other work related categories to Finland 2011-2013 (Source: MIGRI, 2014b)

	Employees	Experts	Scientific research	Other work	Interns	Sports & coaching	Au pairs	Blue cards
2011	3029	883	522	504	171	169	75	-
2012	2831	747	519	413	184	220	72	8
2013	2600	991	583	214	257	221	60	7

Overall, it seems that temporary work based on a residence permit is less usual than seasonal work without a residence permit from non-Schengen countries. The list of the largest sending countries is rather similar which gives ground for researching the nature of temporary mobility to Finland. Construction sectors, service sectors, health sectors and cleaning branch are the most significant areas where significant numbers of migrants work. However, there is a lack of statistical information on the most important sectors of employment of temporary migrants based on residence permits and how they relate to migration between Asia and Europe. Overall statistics on residence permits of employees show significance of sending countries (Table 4.6.)

Table 4.6 Residence permits of employees (%) by 8 largest sending country (Source: EMN, 2014)

2013	Percentage
India	25
Russia	22
Ukraine	21
USA	11
China	9
Philippines	6
Thailand	3
Vietnam	3
TOTAL	**100**

Finally, the *number of immigrating entrepreneurs* is small. However, there is an emerging "transnational socio-economic space" in which business visas are broadly utilised. Business related policies between Finland and the economic hubs of China and India are increasing, which suggests that these links have significant transformative potential. Strengthening the link between Finnish and Asian business is not only visible in the numbers of visas (table 3), but also in concrete structures and policies that are emerging especially between China and India, and Finland.

One phenomenon to support this relation between the entrepreneurs and temporary migration in Finland is related to foreign students in higher education and their increasing access to various "business accelerators or start-up and business training platforms" that aim to turn students to entrepreneurs, or link them with business (e.g. New Factory Tampere, Start-up sauna, Espoo) (Raunio et al., 2013). This is relevant in the context of Finland, because the number of foreign students is steadily growing, and their employment in Finland has been a constant problem (e.g. Shumilova et al., 2012). It should be noticed that 40 % of foreign students come from Asia; it is a slightly higher share than of those coming from Europe (CIMO, 2013). In addition, the share of foreign students in these start-up and business accelerators is frequently quite high (30 to 50 %) at least in some of the biggest cities.

Further, trans-nationalization of business service organizations (in private, public, tertiary sector) have set up facilities increasingly also in Asia and its key business (and administrative) hubs (e.g. Peking, Shanghai, Delhi). These facilities ease mobility and offer guidance for Finnish business people and experts who aim to link with these regions or work there for a while (e.g. FinChi houses several Finnish expert organizations and firms in Shanghai). Similarly, in this case, some universities have been active platform builders. For example, Aalto University[4] has set up its "design factory" in Shanghai and now offers a platform for students but also for international firms and entrepreneurs to link with "the innovation and business ecosystem of Shanghai". (Raunio et al., 2013; Raunio & Kautonen, 2014.)

Finally, there are thousands of Finnish highly skilled expatriates working abroad annually, increasingly also in Asia. For this group of temporary migrants these services and networks, or platforms, offer a rather permanent transnational support infrastructure to link Finland and Asia. It is not only multinational corporations that build trans-national channels between Asia and Finland, but maybe even more so other semi-public business and innovation related actors. These activities have been supported by governmental policies and its business and innovation related agencies (e.g.TEKES, FinPro, Sitra[5]) since 2007 with the globally spread *FinNode* network[6] in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and later on with the prime minister led *Team-Finland* network[7] (Raunio et al., 2013; Team Finland, 2013.) In many locations, e.g. in Shanghai and New Delhi, the representatives of

4 Aalto University is specialised in science, economics, and art and design.

5 Tekes: Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation; Sitra: The Finnish Innovation Fund; FinnPro: the National trade, internationalisation, and investment development organization in Finland

6 FinNode is a global network of Finnish innovation organizations.

7 The Team Finland network promotes Finland and its interests abroad: Finland's external economic relations, the internationalization of Finnish enterprises, investments in Finland and the country brand.

the Finnish embassies have acquired also an official role in the business promotion network. The importance of emerging trans-national structures between Asia and Finland should not be omitted since they significantly ease especially business related temporary migration, or even directly facilitate it. This mobility and its supportive structures are also highly important for economic development related to temporary mobility.

In sum, temporary labour migration is an increasingly important form of mobility in Finland, and a link with Asia (especially China and India) in strengthening in terms of both mobile individuals and organizational arrangements of government and business organizations. Two most relevant groups are seasonal workers (mostly in agriculture) from Asia to Finland, and business related visits between Asia and Finland. There is variation of migrants from experts to low-skilled seasonal workers. Finland's relation to sending countries is significant and produces sector-specific mobility, for example, health care workers from Philippines, wild berry pickers from Thailand, and business-related mobility from China. Still, specific knowledge and statistical data related to the matter remain scant. A lot more specific knowledge should be acquired to back up the policymaking in this field. Labour migration policy in Finland is significantly needs based, and a clear dividing line exists between work with visa and residence permit.

4.2.2.4 Academics and researchers

A particular category within labour migration is academics and researchers. The internationalisation of the Finnish academia is an often-stated goal in policy texts and political debates. Finnish academics are encouraged to conduct visits abroad and Finland hopes to attract researchers from abroad to visit the country. Universities and universities of applied sciences (UAS) report the mobility periods of their staff to the Ministry of Education and Culture. Most of the reported mobility takes place within the EU, undoubtedly related to the support afforded by the EU for such mobility periods. Still, there are also some non-EU countries among the "top 10" source and destination countries of researchers and academics. Apart from HEI staff's mobility periods, there are no statistics on Finnish scientists who take up work abroad as independent job seekers. However, since 2011, the Finnish immigration services (MIGRI) has supplied Eurostat with statistics on researchers coming to Finland.

If we look at the Eurostat statistics (figure 4) on first residence permits issued to third country citizens in the category of researchers, mobility to Finland seems to be heavily tilted towards Asian countries. The numbers include all permits from 3 to12 months. It should also be noted that numbers in Figure 4.4 are not comparable to the numbers in the tables below, since the latter also include a lot of shorter under 90 day visits on visas.



Figure 4.4 Issued researcher's first residence permits to Finland in 2012 (citizens of countries with more than 10 issued permits) (Source: Eurostat, 2014)

In *universities*, all visits over a period of one week are compiled as teacher and researcher mobility periods. Before 2010, only post-graduate studies and work assignments for over two weeks were compiled (CIMO[8], 2014). Therefore, mobility periods before 2010 are not included in Table 4.7. There is considerably more mobility from Finland than there is to Finland, albeit the difference in university mobility periods is not as significant as in UAS mobility periods.

Table 4.7 International mobility of university teachers and researchers to/from Finland 2010-2012 (Source: CIMO, 2014; Finnish Board of Education, 2014)

Year	To Finland	From Finland
2010	2869	3712
2011	2731	3705
2012	2960	3760

According to statistics compiled by CIMO, in 2013, the most popular source and destination country among university teachers and researchers was the United States, followed mainly by other European Union countries. However, apart from other EU countries, teacher and researcher exchange was active with Russia, China and Japan.

Table 4.8 Most popular source and destination countries for university teachers and researchers in 2013 (Source: CIMO, 2014; Finnish Board of Education, 2014)

From Finland		To Finland	
United States	567	United States	288
UK	318	Russia	267
Germany	307	UK	250
Sweden	273	Germany	210
Russia	183	Sweden	112
Italy	178	France	109
China	174	China	104
France	174	Spain	94
Spain	134	Italy	91
Japan	97	Japan	90

In *universities of applied sciences* (UAS), all teacher and expert mobility periods lasting for over a week are included in the statistics (CIMO, 2014). The numbers of staff participating in these exchanges has been steadily growing in popularity, as table 9 indicates.

8 Centre for International Mobility

Table 4.9 International mobility of teachers and experts in universities of applied sciences 2003-2012 (Source: CIMO, 2014)

Year	To Finland	From Finland
2005	1445	2939
2006	1515	3362
2007	1689	3252
2008	1988	3409
2009	1763	3915
2010	2073	4546
2011	2118	4977
2012	2484	4788

The most popular destination and source countries of UAS teachers and experts differ from those in the university sector. Mobility periods of UAS staff are far more concentrated in other EU countries as Table 4.10 shows. In fact, only United States and Russia reach the "top 10".

Table 4.10 Most popular source and destination countries for UAS teachers and experts in 2013 (Source: CIMO, 2014)

From Finland		To Finland	
Germany	516	Russia	205
Russia	349	Germany	297
UK	330	the Netherlands	164
Spain	238	UK	161
Sweden	232	Spain	122
the Netherlands	214	Belgium	113
Belgium	197	Poland	87
United States	184	China	76
Turkey	176	France	70
France	129	Czech Republic	69

The international mobility of academics and researchers is usually of temporary nature and a form of mobility that is encouraged in Finland. Still, international mobility within Finnish academia has remained relatively low until recent years.

4.2.2.5 Governmental workers

Governmental workers, especially those in diplomatic service, are a well-known group of people who reside abroad temporarily. By definition, however, they are not migrants as they are sent by governments to represent their countries. Consequently, they are employed by their home country, not by the host country, although they reside there. There are a bit over 100 Finns working in diplomatic service in Asia. In addition, there are 10-20 Finnish people who work in Asia in order to promote Finnish business there. Such work is usually conducted with the support of networks like FinnPro and Team Finland.

Another group of Finnish citizens working temporarily abroad is the peace keeping forces. In Afghanistan, there are currently 110-130 Finnish peacekeepers and the operation has been active for about ten years, which means that hundreds of Finnish peacekeepers have lived in Afghanistan temporarily. There are six Finnish military observers at the border of India and Pakistan and Finland has been participating in this project already since 1961.

In Asia (excluding the Arab countries), Finland has an embassy in Afghanistan, India, Thailand, China, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, Kazakhstan, Nepal, Singapore, and Taiwan. The embassies that have the most representatives (7-20 Finnish staff members) are located in India, Thailand, China, Japan, Nepal and Vietnam. Among the non-EU EURA-NET countries, Finland has relatively many diplomatic workers also in Ukraine and Turkey. In addition to the embassies, Finland has business councils and Chambers of Commerce in several locations in Asia (Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan). There are a few Finnish people working in those centres. The nature of their work is such that many of them may be residing in the destinations temporarily.

In Helsinki, there are about 400 foreigners working in diplomatic service and about 450 foreigners assisting those in diplomatic service. Asian countries are not particularly strongly represented in terms of diplomatic service in Finland; most Asian embassies have only a few workers and many countries do not have an embassy in Helsinki at all. All in all, it becomes clear that there are many more Finnish governmental workers in Asia than Asian governmental workers in Finland.

4.2.3 Educational migration

Finland's upper secondary education system is divided into general upper secondary education (similar to high school) focusing more on theoretical education and preparing students for higher education, and vocational education and training (VET) which addresses the needs of the labour market and awards professional qualifications[9]. Following a similar logic, Finland's higher education (HE) sector is divided into two complementary systems. While traditional universities emphasise theoretical education and research, universities of applied sciences (UAS), sometimes also called polytechnics, are more practice oriented and linked to working life. They also differ in terms of the degrees they award: students in Finnish universities can complete degrees from Bachelor's level to PhDs, whereas an UAS student can complete a Bachelor's degree, or ultimately a special UAS Master's degree.

All forms of education are entirely or almost entirely publicly funded in Finland, though the shares between municipality and state vary according to type and level of education. All education, from primary to university level, is free of charge, also for all foreigners. During the past decade, free tuition and the large variety of English language degree programmes on offer, have attracted a growing number of international students to Finland. At the same time, an increasing number of Finnish students have headed abroad for studies. Advancing globalisation and the unfavourable age structure of the local population have sparked a strong political drive to internationalise the Finnish education system and to attract more international students[10]. Amidst pressures of luring in more international students and covering the costs they incur, the Finnish higher education sector is at a turning point.

Student mobility into and from Finland can be divided into two distinct groups: exchange students and degree students. An exchange student only completes a part of his/her degree abroad, whereas an international degree student completes a full degree. Both groups are often simply referred to as international students. Here the focus will be on the different types of mobility in higher education institutions (HEI) and vocational education and training; short and long term mobility periods (exchange studies and trainee placements) and degree studies, all of which are considered temporary sojourns in technical terms. There is very little evidence of other types of educational migration to Finland (most likely due to language issues); e.g., students moving to Finland already at secondary level in order to secure a place at a university (cf. "educational immigration" in Brooks and Waters, 2013: 48-50). There is also a difference between foreign students who have moved to Finland for the purpose of study and non-Finnish citizens who are in Finland for other reasons, but also happen to study. Yet, both are considered "foreign" students in official statistics.

In Finland, international degree students do not have to pay tuition fees, and have not, until fairly recently, been considered from a cost covering point of view (not to mention profit). However, there is an ongoing trial period during which Finnish higher education institutions can pilot tuition fees[11] for students from outside the EU/EEA area and who study in foreign language programmes. The trial has fallen short of expectations and has not resulted in anything solid in terms of the possible impacts of

9 Students may also attain a dual diploma from both VET and general upper secondary.

10 In this section, "international student" refers to all non-Finnish citizens, if not mentioned otherwise. Even though internationalisation of education entails much more than just border-crossing mobility, due to the scope of this report, the focus is on international student mobility.

11 The trial period runs from 1 February 2010 until 31 December 2014 (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2013b)

introducing tuition fees. Developments in other Nordic countries, however, can offer some indication of possible outcomes. Introduction of tuition fees for non-EU/EEA students in Denmark and Sweden, for instance, have resulted in notable reductions of international degree students. Although there has been some recovery in recent years, a lot of it can be attributed to non-fee-paying EU/EEA students filling the niches left by third-country citizens. (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2013; 2014.) Since the majority of international degree students in Finland are non-EU citizens, introducing tuition fees would undoubtedly have an impact on their numbers as well.

4.2.3.1 Statistics on student mobility

All forms of inbound and outbound student mobility across Finnish borders during the past decade have increased substantially, both in absolute and relative numbers. The growth has been particularly visible with incoming international degree students in higher education. (Garam & Korkala, 2013). Notably, more and more students originate from areas outside the European Union/EEA. According to the Finnish Immigration Service's (MIGRI) statistics, the share of student permits of all first residence permits issued to non-EU/EEA/Swiss citizens has been growing significantly over recent years (Table 4.11). Majority of the first student permits are issued for 12 months (or more) (Table 4.12). This relates to the fact that most non-EU/EEA students are in Finland as degree students.

Table 4.11 Residence permits issued to students compared to all permits 2005-2012 (Source: MIGRI, 2014c)

Year	Studying	All issued 1. residence permits	Studying, share (%)
2005	3107	14431	22
2006	3196	12787	25
2007	3810	17287	22
2008	4496	19606	23
2009	3993	15208	26
2010	4490	16322	28
2011	5460	17683	31
2012	5519	17157	32

Table 4.12 Permits issued to students according to length of validity 2007-2012 (Source: Eurostat)

Length of permit	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Permission valid for at least 3 months and less than 6 months (%)	23	26	30	29	27	27
Permission valid for at least 6 and less than 12 months (%)	22	22	24	16	14	16
Permissions valid for 12 months and more (%)	55	52	45	56	59	57

Different agencies are responsible for collecting statistics regarding different student groups. CIMO is responsible for statistics on exchange students in higher education and international mobility of students in vocational education and training to and from Finland, Statistics Finland is responsible for statistics on international degree students in Finland, and the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela), collects data on Finnish degree students abroad. CIMO's research teams compile much of the data from different sources into convenient yearly reviews and other publications.

The number of *international degree students in Finnish institutions of higher education* has increased rapidly during the past decade. In 2005, there were 8,955 international degree students in the Finnish institutions of higher education (both universities and universities of applied sciences), slightly under three per cent of the total student body. Less than a decade later, in 2012, the number of international students was already at 19,138, representing over six per cent of all students in universities of applied sciences and universities (Figure 4.5) (CIMO, 2013; Statistics Finland, 2013b).

All foreign nationals registered as degree students in Finnish universities are recorded as international degree students in the statistics. The numbers include both graduate and post-graduate students (CIMO, 2013; Statistics Finland, 2013a).



Figure 4.5 All international degree students in tertiary education in Finland 2005-2012 (Source: Statistics Finland, 2013b)

The vast majority of international degree students in Finnish HEIs (76% in 2012) come from non-EU countries (Figure 4.6). In 2012, "the top 10" of international degree students in Finnish higher education consisted of citizens from countries in Table 4.13 (numbers of students in brackets).

Table 4.13 Top 10 nationalities in Finnish higher education in 2012 (Source: CIMO & Statistics Finland, 2013)

1. Russia (2500)	6. Estonia (791)
2. China (2177)	7. Pakistan (691)
3. Vietnam (1162)	8. India (639)
4. Nepal (1140)	9. Germany (607)
5. Nigeria (844)	10. Bangladesh (577)



Figure 4.6 Non-EU citizens as degree students (according to EU member states in 2012) (Source: Statistics Finland, 2013b)

According to the final report of the Working Group for the Prevention of Illegal Immigration (as cited in Kiuru, 2012: 191), the highest refusal rates of student residence permits between 2008 and 2011 were observed among applicants from certain West African countries. For instance, in 2009, 73 per cent of applications from Ghana, 71 per cent from Cameroon and 61 per cent from Nigeria, were refused. Consequently, as a risk management measure, Finnish HEIs have started avoiding organising entrance exams in "high-risk" countries.

Statistics on *Finnish degree students abroad* are based on the state study grant information provided by Kela. The numbers only include students who are receiving the Kela study grant[12] for degree studies abroad (Figure 4.7.) (CIMO, 2013). Whereas the vast majority of foreign degree students in Finland are not from EU countries, most Finnish degree students abroad study in other EU countries. During the academic year 2012/2013, 87 per cent of Finns who studied abroad studied in Europe and 63 per cent of them in the UK, Sweden and Estonia. Some 7 per cent of Finnish degree students studied in North America, but only around 2 per cent studied in Asia (Garam & Korkala, 2013).



Figure 4.7 Finnish degree students abroad (academic year) 2004/2005-2012/2013 (Source: CIMO & Kela, 2013)

Study periods and trainee placements abroad of at least 3 months (Figure 4.8) are considered as *exchange studies* in the statistics if they count towards the students' degrees at their home universities. The numbers include exchange students from all types of exchange programmes and students who have arranged their own mobility, the so-called free movers (CIMO, 2013). Annually, around 3 per cent of all tertiary students in Finland complete a study or a trainee period abroad. The share of exchange students in Finnish HEIs is more or less the same (Garam & Korkala, 2013: 4-5). The average length of a university student's exchange period was 5,5 months, while an UAS student's was 4,6 months (Garam, 2013: 5). Even though Europe is still the most popular destination for Finnish students, Asian destinations are growing in popularity. While in 2005, 73 per cent of students from Finland chose another European country, in 2012, 66 per cent chose a European destination. During the same period, Asia's popularity grew from 10 per cent to 17 per cent. The same trend can be observed among Asian exchange students to Finland; their share grew from 6 per cent to 12 per cent between 2005 and 2012 (Garam & Korkala, 2013: 8-11).

12 The Study Grant is a government financed benefit, which is paid monthly. Students receive the Study Grant for the months when they study.



Figure 4.8 All tertiary level exchange students to/from Finland 2005-2012 (Source: CIMO, 2013)

Finnish HEIs collect data on students' *short mobility periods*, covering both incoming and outgoing students. Outside the HEIs official framework, there is no systematic collection of information regarding students who come to Finland on short courses or visits. The same applies to Finnish students going abroad for short visits. There are also some international students taking part in courses of Finnish language organised by CIMO, but the amount of non-EU/EEA students among them is not very significant. In CIMO's statistics, a period of more than one week, but less than three months abroad, count as a short mobility period. Most of the students from Finland choose European destinations close by, such as Germany, Sweden and Russia. Similarly, most students coming to Finland are from Germany, Russia and the Netherlands. However, both China and Japan reach the top 10 of most common source countries for students on short stays in Finland (Garam, 2013). As Figure 4.9 shows, short mobility periods have clearly grown in popularity, especially among Finnish students.



Figure 4.9 Short mobility periods in universities and universities of applied sciences (Source: Garam, 2013)

Study visits and on-the-job learning periods abroad of any length are recorded as *international mobility of students in vocational institutions*. Long mobility periods in VET are over two weeks and short periods under two weeks (CIMO, 2013). Mobility periods of all lengths are included in incoming and outgoing exchange periods in Figure 4.10 below. Compared to mobility in higher education, annual fluctuation seems to be more common in VET. Among Finnish students, the most popular destination countries, for both long and short-term periods, were Estonia, Sweden, Spain, Germany and the UK. Most of the students coming to Finland were from Germany, France, Spain, Estonia and Hungary. In other words, mobility in VET is highly concentrated in Europe. In 2012, approximately 94 per cent of Finnish VET students chose a European country. Similarly, around 95 per cent of students coming to Finland were from other European countries. On-the-job learning period was the most popular way for Finnish students to go abroad (95%) and for foreign students (59%) to come to Finland (Korkala, 2013). Around 5 per cent of all students in Finnish VET institutions complete a mobility period abroad, whereas exchange students to Finland represent fewer than 2 per cent of the whole student body (Garam & Korkala, 2013: 5). In 2005, around 3 per cent of all VET students were other than Finnish citizens. In 2012, the share was 4 per cent. Since there is very little tuition in English, it is more likely that most of the students have originally arrived to Finland for other reasons than a VET qualification (Statistics Finland, 2013b).



Figure 4.10 Long and short-term international mobility of VET students 2005-2012 (Source: CIMO, 2013)

Statistical data on student mobility in Finland is widely available and reliable. Still, although good to examine wider trends in student mobility, the use of citizenship as the basis of statistical compilation by Statistics Finland is somewhat problematic. This practice makes it difficult to make a difference between foreigners who have arrived in the country for the purpose of study and those who are non-Finnish citizens, but also happen to study. The distinction is important, since it is much more likely that an internationally mobile student, with a lot less ties to Finland, would move on after completing his studies than a permanent resident.

There are other ways to assess the numbers of new non-EU students on an annual basis, but this information has to be gathered from various sources. The Finnish Immigration Service provides statistics according to the length of first student residence permits, but no distinction is made between different student categories; exchange students, degree students, attendees of other education/courses. With permits valid less than 12 months, the difference is clear, but 12-month permits may be issued to both exchange students and degree students.

In Finnish policy texts, it is stated that the country hopes that many of the international degree students would stay in the country permanently after graduation. According to a study on foreign graduates of 2011 by CIMO (The Centre for International Mobility), 45,5 per cent of them were part of the Finnish labour force a year after graduation. A bit over five per cent had continued their studies and slightly less than a fifth were neither working or studying for a degree. The rest, less than a third, are presumed to have left the country. (CIMO, 2014b.) Yet, various studies indicate that, given the chance, more would stay in Finland (cf. Niemelä, 2008; Shumilova et al., 2012). In other words, there is an obvious conflict between political aspirations and the prevailing reality. However, if the political goals are achieved, another challenge will surface: how to reconcile the needs of the Finnish labour market with the promotion of global responsibility?

4.2.4 Asylum seekers

There is no evidence on Finnish citizens applying for international protection after the II World War but Finland has entered into a number of international treaties and conventions under which it is committed to provide international protection to those who are in need of it.

In the period, 2003–2013, between 1,500 and 6,000 people sought asylum in Finland each year. The number of asylum seekers has remained small compared to other EU member states, and less than 15 per cent of the decisions on asylum have been positive[13] (MIGRI, 2014b). Table 4.14 presents the figure of the asylum applications and decisions made during the ten-year period.

Table 4.14 Decisions on asylum 2005-2013 (Source: MIGRI, 2014b)

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Asylum applicants	3,574	2,324	1,505	4,035	5, 988	4,018	3,088	3,129	3,238
Positive decisions	12	38	68	89	116	181	169	553	556
Negative decisions	2,472	1,481	961	1,011	2,568	3,428	1,890	1,738	1,903

The asylum seekers typically originate from Asian and African countries. Ten top countries of origin and the number of asylum applicants in 2013 are in Table 4.15.

Table 4.15 Asylum applicants in 2013 (Source: MIGRI, 2014b

Country of origin	Number of applicants
Iraq	819
Russian Federation	246
Somalia	217
Nigeria	206
Afghanistan	199
Iran	167
Syrian Arab Republic	149
Algeria	82
Morocco	76
Kosovo	70

The impact of the situation in the Middle East on the number of asylum applications for Finland has remained small compared to other EU member states. However, the applications submitted by Syrians increased significantly after March 2011 (the number increased from 41 in 2010 to 110 in 2011). In 2012, 183 Syrians sought international protection in Finland (a 66% increase from the previous year). A significant share of applicants, 71 persons, were granted asylum, 49 persons were granted a residence permit on the basis of subsidiary protection and 22 persons on the basis of humanitarian protection. Of the negative decisions, 22 decisions were made based on the EU Regulation on determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application (the Dublin Regulation) and 3 decisions based on a safe country of asylum. (EMN, 2012: 175.)

Asylum seekers may work in Finland. They are entitled to work without a particular permit three months after they have left an asylum application[14]. There are no exact statistics of the employment

13 The share of positive decisions in Finland is within the scope of European average (MIGRI, 2014b).

14 An asylum seeker who does not assist the authorities in establishing her or his identity may only start working six months after

of asylum seekers but the Refugee Advice Centre (2014) has estimated that today more and more asylum seekers find work in Finland. Nevertheless, in practice, most asylum seekers have serious difficulties in finding work in Finland, in spite of their professional qualifications. In case asylum seekers succeed in finding a job, they typically work in low-skilled jobs, which the representatives of the host population do not want to do. In practice, this often means wasting their previous professional skills and qualifications.

For a long time, Finland has been one of the most efficient EU member states when it comes to the enforcement of removal from the country. The police have been able to remove approximately 65–70 per cent of all recipients of an expulsion decision. In 2012, 80 per cent of persons who received an expulsion decision were removed, while the rest remained unaccounted for in Finland or moved abroad (typically to another EU Member State). (EMN, 2012: 170)

4.2.5 Irregular migration

Estimations vary on how many undocumented persons there are in Finland. According to an estimation based on international scale of comparison, there would be 1500-2000 undocumented persons in Finland but also higher estimations exist (Leppäkorpi, 2011: 28-29). The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health estimates that there are approximately 3000 undocumented persons in Finland (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2014). Due the nature of irregular migration, definitive information is difficult to obtain. The estimated numbers depend on definitions. For example, asylum seekers, who make their asylum application in Finland, can be classified as undocumented for a short time, i.e. before filing their request for asylum. After a potential rejection of the application and subsequent complaint processes, a person can become an undocumented person in Finland, again. Estimations are also based on the statistics on how many undocumented persons are annually located and found in Finland. Before Estonia became an EU-member, half of the undocumented workers were estimated to be from there. Part of the problem is that there can be many undocumented persons in Finland for a short time. This relates to the fact that Finland is also a transit-country for irregular migration (EMN, 2012: 85). A recent trend in Finland has been that illegal migration to Finland has been declining. The largest nationalities have been Somalis, Russians and Iraqis. Asian countries are not as significant in terms of illegal migration but there have been cases where illegal entry and work-related human trafficking from Asian countries have been suspected, involving organised criminal activity. (EMN, 2012: 58-59).

Estimations of undocumented persons relate to similar difficulties as estimations on temporary work but the basic difference is that undocumented persons stay in the country under the fear of being caught and deportation (Könönen, 2012; Viitanen & Tähjä, 2010). Police and other authorities locate annually around 3000 persons illegally in Finland. The figure includes also cases in which illegal entry to Finland takes place, for example with false documents. Other significant cases are traveling with documents belonging to another person, overstaying visas, rejected asylum seekers, but also cases of human smuggling (EMN, 2012: 56). At the EU level, Finland has been relatively effective in deportations (ibid. 66), which can partly explain why irregular migrants avoid publicity in Finland, and may view even migrant-NGOs with suspicion.

Currently in Helsinki, there is a voluntary based clinic where Finnish doctors treat undocumented migrants at particular times. This service covers mostly only basic medical needs. Currently, the NGO-driven and publicly funded project Paperittomat (Paperless) is developing projects to help irregular migrants, and takes part in public discussion in order to promote the rights of irregular migrants (EMN, 2012: 64-65).

Finland has issued only few residence permits for victims of human trafficking (3 in 2012, 1 in

submitting an asylum application.

2013 and 1 in 2014). Between 2006 and 2012, 272 persons have been included into the system of assistance for victims of human trafficking (EMN, 2012: 85), which means that a residence permit and assistance is given during the time of investigations. Currently, a specific national legislation on human trafficking is under development (Ombudsman for Minorities, 2012).

Both irregular migration and human trafficking can produce a vulnerable position, which often relates to potentially harsh conditions of work that an irregular migrant may need to do. Irregular migration can be stated to belong to temporary mobility, as the person's conditions of stay in a country can alter at any time, but on the other hand, the irregularity of conditions and threat of being caught produces opposite effects, for example accepting demeaning conditions or reluctance to complain or even reveal these conditions (EMN, 2012: 56-57). The relatively small numbers of irregular migrants in Finland indicate that currently there exists only limited possibilities in labour markets to maintain at least some level of livelihood. Policy measures to combat underground economy, one of the priorities of the current government, is aimed to limit possibilities of unregulated work, and this eventually affects irregular migration too.

Although it is difficult to estimate the numbers of undocumented immigrants, the following tables give some indication on the phenomenon in Finland. First of all, the numbers of refused entry of third country nationals have remained very similar in the past few years

Table 4.16 Third country nationals refused entry (Source: Eurostat).

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Finland	1,775	1,300	1,185	1,420	1,640	1,735

The amount of foreigners found to reside in Finland illegally has clearly dropped from 2008-2009 to 2010 after which the numbers have remained similar.

Table 4.17 Foreigners found illegally in Finland (Source: Eurostat).

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Finland	5,375	6,660	3,755	3,305	3,620	3,365

There is, however, a clear increase in the number of people ordered to leave Finland.

Table 4.18 Foreigners ordered to leave Finland (Source: Eurostat).

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Finland	1,775	3,125	3,835	4,685	4,300	4,330

4.2.6 Lifestyle migration

Lifestyle migration to Finland from outside EU is not possible but EU citizens are allowed to move to the country. Some lifestyle migrants are attracted by Finnish nature. Especially migrants from German speaking countries spend time in the Finnish countryside. In addition, Russians buy holiday homes in Finland. The Swedish countryside has been reported popular among Dutch lifestyle migrants (Eimermann 2013) and it is possible that Finland will attract similar people in the future. The visa and residence permit regulations in Finland, however, prevent citizens of Asian countries from migrating to Finland for lifestyle reasons.

Foreign citizens were not allowed to own land in Finland until the country joined the European Union in 1995 after which Europeans were allowed to buy land. In the year 2000, property ownership was allowed also to non-EU citizens. Russians are the biggest foreign nationality (70%) buying properties in Finland (TEM, 2013; Lipkina, 2013a, 2013b). Foreigners are involved in 1-2 per cent of property transactions in Finland but in some municipalities, even 30 per cent of property purchases are conducted by foreigners. Typically, Russians buy properties in the Finnish countryside for holiday purposes (so called second-home ownership). Russians buy currently 400-500 houses in Finland each year and in total, they own about 6000 properties in Finland, most of them in the Eastern part of the country. It has been estimated that the amount of properties owned by Russians in Finland will double or even triple by the year 2030. Russians are interested in Finnish holiday properties above all because Finland is close, that is, they can reach it by car, and because the prices are cheaper than in Russia and the locations of such properties are better in Finland than in Russia. In addition, Finland is considered safe for unattended properties whereas in Russia, the owners need to invest in various kinds of security measures.

An increasing number of Finnish people are living abroad as lifestyle migrants. The most common destination for Finnish lifestyle migrants has been Costa del Sol in Spain (Könnilä, 2014) but lifestyle migration to Asia is an increasingly popular trend. Yet, we do not have much information of Finnish lifestyle migrants in Asia. Especially Thailand is a popular destination among Finns, particularly among retired males. The Embassy of Finland in Bangkok estimates that about 1000 Finns live in Thailand permanently and there are about 1500-2000 Finnish citizens who reside in Thailand during winters (4-6 months at a time). There are old people's homes in Thailand for example for Germans and Swedes (where the service is provided in German and Swedish) but there is no such place for Finns. In addition, there are schools in Thailand that operate in various European languages, even in Swedish, but not any that would operate in Finnish. Nevertheless, Thailand is a very popular holiday destination for Finns and it seems that a few thousand Finns end up spending long periods of time in Thailand as lifestyle migrants too although there are no accurate statistics on this. Another popular Asian tourist destination for Finns is India, the state of Goa in particular. There are surely also Finnish lifestyle migrants in India but it is impossible to know their numbers as most of them reside in India on tourist visas. First of all, the beaches of Goa and Kerala are popular but there are also hundreds of Finns who spend long periods in India at yoga retreats and being involved in other spiritual activities. Dozens of Finns travel to the city of Mysore every year to practice asthanga yoga and about 1000 Finns have spent time in the Mother Amma ashram in Kerala. Most probably, there are Finns also in other yoga centres and spiritual centres in India.

4.2.6.1 Health tourism

Health tourism to Asia is not common among Finnish people yet but there is at least one company that takes Finnish patients to India to get hospital treatment to their illnesses. The company has been operating only for a year, thus so far, it has provided services to only a very small number of Finns. Mostly likely, there are also Finnish individuals who have sought medical care in Asian destinations on their own, without the help of a Finnish mediating company but the numbers are definitely small. According to the Embassy of Finland in Thailand, there is an increasing number of Finns who travel to Thailand in order to use the services of the local beauty industry.

There are some Russians who come to Finland for health care reasons, especially for childbirth, but in general, Finland is not an attractive health tourism destination because of the high costs of the private health care services. It has, however, been estimated that there is much potential in health tourism and well-being tourism of well-off Russians in Finland. St. Petersburg and even Moscow are relatively close to Finland and there are many Russians who can afford costly health care, providing that they are satisfied with the quality. In fact, Russians were given 246 visas for medical reasons in 2013, in total there were 308 medical tourists to Finland then (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2014).

4.2.5.2 Nomadic precariat

The concept of nomadic precariat refers to people who live temporarily in many countries working in various low-skilled jobs there. Typically, such people work in agriculture and tourism industry. Traditionally, this kind of a lifestyle has been typical for youth but nowadays, an increasing number of middle-aged and older people are involved in nomadic precariat work too. Sometimes, working in temporary jobs in various countries is a voluntary choice: very often a strategy to make money for one's travels. Sometimes, however, the lifestyle is a necessary survival strategy: a means to cope with the situation of there being no permanent work available (see Rogelja 2013). In such a situation, instead of a short voluntary phase, being a nomadic precariat can become a long-term necessity against one's own will. There is a famous quotation stating that 'in the 1960s the young dropped out, in the 1980s they are dropped out' (Fountain in McKay 1996, 52). In other words, dropping into the precariat is not necessarily a choice but a necessity and this does not concern only youth but also others. There are simply not enough permanent jobs available for all Europeans and some people take the destiny into their own hands by leaving Europe and working in various jobs in several countries instead of settling down permanently in one destination (on the problems of such a lifestyle, see Korpela 2013).

Finland is not an attractive destination for nomadic precariat because of the high living costs, high taxation, cold climate and a difficult language. There are, however, Finnish people who are leading this kind of a lifestyle abroad, including Asian countries. The work of European nomadic precariat in Asia involves above all bar and restaurant work in beach destinations. In addition, many self-employed people finance their lifestyle in Asian destinations by scattered work there. Such people work, for example, as massage therapists, yoga teachers, homeopaths, musicians, diving instructors, spiritual healers, fashion designers etc. Such business ventures do not require much capital or official qualifications and can be practiced wherever. At the same time, the income is insecure and irregular. It is difficult to estimate how many Finns are leading such lifestyle but the phenomena definitely includes many Europeans. Popular destinations in Asia include Goa in India, Bali in Indonesia, and Koh Phangan and other beach destinations in Thailand.

4.2.7 Family-based mobility

Family-based mobility is a very significant form of international migration. It can be divided into three types:

- (nuclear) family moves together to another country
- family re-unification: one family member has moved earlier and others follow later
- marriage migration: people living in different countries marry and one of them moves to the home country of the spouse. (Säävälä, 2013: 102)

Migration to Finland is also very often family-based (Säävälä, 2013: 101). By definition, such migration is permanent but rather often in practice, it turns out to be temporary.

4.2.7.1 Bi-cultural marriages

A rapidly increasing number of Finnish citizens marries foreigners (see Heikkilä et al. 2014). In 2011, 15 per cent of the Finnish people who married in Helsinki married a foreigner (Säävälä, 2013: 108). The numbers are lower in other areas in Finland but the trend is nevertheless clear. Finnish men marry above all women from Thailand, Russia, Estonia, China Japan, and Philippines, whereas Finnish women find spouses from Europe and Turkey (Lainiala & Säävälä, 2012, 29). Over 30 per cent of foreign wives of Finnish men come from Asia (Lainiala & Säävälä, 2012: 30) and Finnish men marrying Thai women is an increasing trend: in 2011, there were already 490 such marriages (Lainiala & Säävälä, 2012: 22; on Finn-Thai marriages see Sirkkilä, 2005; 2006).

Marriage migration is obviously by definition permanent. However, in practice it is often temporary. In Europe in general, international marriages do not end up in divorce more often than marriages between spouses of the same nationality. In Finland, however, there are three times more divorces among international couples than among those where both spouses are Finnish (Lainiala & Säävälä, 2012: 20). It has been estimated that one reason for this is that the strict rules on residence permits force couples to marry quickly (Lainiala & Säävälä, 2012: 34-35). The main reason, however, is most likely the strikingly high unemployment rate of foreigners in Finland (Lainiala & Säävälä, 2012: 47-48) as integration to a new society is difficult without a job. Other contributing factors to the high divorce rates are cultural differences, institutional problems, racism, difficult language and climate, experiences of social exclusion and problems with social and economic obligations to several locations (Säävälä, 2013: 119-120; Lainiala & Säävälä, 2012: 14). Divorcing one's Finnish spouse does not necessarily mean that one moves away from Finland but this may happen, in particular if the marriage has not lasted for a long time and the foreign spouse does not have many ties to the Finnish society. Those couples that do not end up in a divorce, often end up moving away from Finland because of the above-mentioned problems (Lainiala & Säävälä, 2012: 14). Consequently, the migration of the non-Finnish spouse to Finland ends up being temporary.

4.2.7.2 Migration for family reasons

In addition to marriage migration, foreigners move to Finland as families. For example, during the success years of Nokia, Finland received hundreds of Indian ICT professionals who often came with their spouses and children (or very often, children were born during their stays in Finland). It is indeed important to keep in mind that "professional migration is also about migration of partners, children and relatives" (Forsander et al., 2004: 154-5). Finland is a particularly challenging destination for this type of migration because of its strong two-breadwinner model. The spouse is expected to work, and it is often necessary in terms of the family's economic survival, yet foreigners face serious problems to be employed in Finland. This easily causes the residence of such families in Finland to be temporary: they simply move on to other countries where both spouses have better opportunities to find work according to their qualifications (Martikainen & Gola, 2007:10). This trend applies above all to highly educated migrants (Martikainen & Gola, 2007: 25). For them, international career building is often important and they view Finland as a temporary destination from where to move elsewhere for career reasons (Martikainen & Gola, 2007: 41). Some highly educated migrants want to settle down in Finland permanently and they value long-term contracts, clean nature and the safe and organised society that Finland provides (Raunio, 2002). Many others, however, view Finland as a temporary destination that is beneficial for their career. They are satisfied with short-term contacts and want to move away from Finland when better opportunities open up elsewhere. Lack of Finnish language skills seriously restricts the spouses' opportunities to be employed in Finland. However, if people plan their stay in Finland to be temporary, they do not necessarily have high motivation – or enough time – to learn Finnish (Martikainen & Gola, 2007: 66). Instead of settling permanently in Finland, the option of moving to a third country or back to their native country, is prominent also in the fact that many highly educated migrants, for example the Indian ICT professionals, prefer an English-language education for their children in favour of a Finnish one (Martikainen & Gola, 2007: 70).

Finland is a particular country in regard with children's education because all children who reside in the country have the right to attend schools, even the children of the undocumented migrants. Finnish politicians and administrators have been keen to emphasise how good and equalising the Finnish education system is, and the good results of Finnish children in the PISA testing have been widely publicised. The highly educated migrants are, however, not always very content with the Finnish education system as their point of comparison are often competitive high quality private schools instead of public education systems. In recent years, new international schools have been established in Finland but they are not necessarily following the kind of curricula that highly educated migrants appreciate and there are still many towns in Finland where there is no English medium school at all or if there is, the teachers are not native-English speakers. Consequently, some highly educated migrants move away from Finland in order to obtain (in their view) better education for their children. Parents may also feel that Finnish schools do not provide their children with advanced English skills.

When discussing family-based migration, it is good to remember that an important factor in the phenomenon is the break-up of family units due to migration (Säävälä, 2013: 103). Migration does not only affect those who move but also the family members who stay. The circumstances are not necessarily the result of an individual's choice but migration rules and regulations of the receiving state affect strongly how and which family ties can be maintained when moving transnationally (Säävälä, 2013: 103). Those labour migrants who come to work in professions that do not provide high salaries, are often denied the possibility of bringing their families to Finland because of the relatively high-income limits that Finland uses as a qualification for family-based migration (Asa & Muurinen, 2011: 46). For example, nurses recruited from Asia may not earn enough to be qualified to bring their spouse and children to Finland. These people, then, are forced to be temporary single migrants even when they themselves might want to migrate to Finland permanently with their families.

The most common nationalities receiving residence permits because of family reasons are Somalia, Russia, Iraq, Turkey, China, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Vietnam.

Table 4.19 Family-based residence permits in 2013 (Source: MIGRI, 2014b)

guardian of a person who has asylum in Finland	1
a child of a person who has asylum in Finland	674
other relative of a person who has asylum in Finland	38
a spouse of a person who has asylum in Finland	162
a guardian of other foreigner	12
a child of other foreigner	2907
other relative of other foreigner	15
a spouse of a other relative	1826
a guardian of a Finnish citizen	18
a child of a Finnish citizen	28
other relative of a Finnish citizen	7
a spouse of a Finnish citizen	772

4.2.7.3 Finnish families moving abroad

According to estimations, there are about 40 000 Finnish expatriates. This includes an increasing number of families living abroad. Usually, such families move abroad because one of the highly educated parents gets a job there. Most of such people are sent to the destinations by Finnish companies and the accompanying family members (spouse and children) benefit from the expatriacy packages that the companies offer, including help with finding and financing accommodation and education. Asia is a common destination for Finnish expatriate families because Finland has relatively much business presence there, in China and India in particular. Some expatriate families end up living as global nomads for years, changing their country of residence several times according the career needs but most families return to Finland after one or two stints abroad and thus, their migration abroad ends up being temporary. In fact, very often, career expatriates leave Finland with the intention of returning after a specific period, thus assuming from the beginning their stay abroad to be temporary.

4.3 Permanent and Temporary Migration in Finland in the Light of Statistics

In this report, we have argued that the amount of foreigners, including temporary migrants, has increased in Finland in the past years. In addition, the amount of Finns sojourning abroad temporarily has increased. In this section, we provide statistical information on these trends.

First of all, the numbers of immigrants and emigrants have clearly increased in the past decades. The table below illustrates how immigration to Finland shows a clearly increasing trend.

Table 4.20 Immigration to Finland (Source: Eurostat and Statistics Finland).

1990	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2012	2013
13558	17,838	21,355	26,029	26,699	29,481	31,278	31941

The number of foreigners living permanently in Finland has also increased clearly from 2008 till 2013: in 2008, there were 143 197 foreigners living in Finland whereas in 2013, the number was 208 171. The following table illustrates the amounts of the most common Asian nationalities among those registered to live in Finland on permanent basis.

Table 4.21 The most common Asian nationalities living in Finland (Source: The Finnish Immigration Service).

	2008	2013
China	4515	6978
Thailand	3924	6485
Turkey	3437	4412
India	2716	4390
Ukraine	1809	2737
the Philippines	981	1959

The amount of given first residence permits has remained rather stable in the past six years.

Table 4.22 First residence permits in Finland (Source: Eurostat).

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
21,873	18,034	19,210	20,230	20,264	21,122

According to the statistics of the Finnish Immigration Service, however, there is a clear increase in the number of negative decisions although the overall number has remained the same. For example, the percentage of negative first residence permit decisions was 12% in 2008 but 24% in 2012 and 22% in 2014. The most common nationalities among those receiving residence permits to Finland are Russia, China, Somalia, India, Ukraine, USA, Turkey, Vietnam, Iraq and Nepal (Statistics of the Finnish Immigration Service).

Statistics show that Finland usually gives rather long first residence permits, that is, for over 12 months.

Table 4.23 First residence permits to Finland according to length (Source Eurostat).

	First residence permits: 3-5 months					
Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Permits	1,754	2,236	2,293	2,380	2,443	2,560
	First residence permits: 6-11 months					
Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Permits	2,363	3,036	2,910	3,049	3,344	3,361
	First residence permits: Over 12 months					
Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Permits	17,756	12,762	14,007	14,801	14,477	15,201

Residence permit statistics do not, however, tell whether one's migration is permanent or temporary; we do not know how many of the first residence permits are renewed and for how long and whether they eventually become permanent. Nevertheless, although the amount of first residence permits has not increased significantly in the recent years, there is a clear increase in the amount of all valid residence permits, which indicates that many foreigners have settled in Finland on long-term basis.

Table 4.24 All valid residence permits to Finland (Source: Eurostat).

2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
107,015	112,914	122,108	119,328	154,396	163,234

In 2013, the most residence permits were given to people from Russia (3 778), India (1 733), China (1 496), Ukraine (956) and the USA (811). Most residence permits (37%) were given because of family reasons. The second popular reason was studies (31%) and the third popular reason work. (the Finnish Immigration Service, Statistical Review 2013) The table below presents positive residence permit decisions according to the reason for application.

Table 4.25 Positive residence permit decisions (Source: the Finnish Immigration Service 2013).

Certain groups according to the reason for application		**2011**	**2012**	**2013**
Family	Family members of those under international protection	502	651	875
	Family members of Finnish citizens	703	613	825
	Family members of other foreigners	4 604	4 499	4 760
Total		**5 809**	**5 763**	**6 460**
Work	Entrepreneur	55	61	65
	Special expert	883	774	991
	Blue card	0	3	7
	Internship	171	211	257
	Work that requires labour market testing (partial decision)	3 030	2 992	2 600
	Scientific research	522	544	583
	Sports and sports coach	169	224	221
	Other work	504	225	214
Total		**5 334**	**5 034**	**4 938**
Studies		**5 460**	**5 502**	**5 426**
Return migration				
Total		**636**	**579**	**417**
Others	Other grounds	358	181	172
	Adoption	25	40	29
	Au pair	75	69	60
	Victim of human trafficking	0	6	1
Total		458	296	262
All total		**17 697**	**17 174**	**17 503**



Figure 4.11 Positive residence permit decisions according to grounds for application 2013 (Source: the Finnish Immigration Service, Statistical Review 2013).

The figures above explain why people migrate to Finland, yet, they do not reveal whether those people end up moving to Finland permanently or temporarily.

In 2013, an estimate of 130 000 foreigners worked in Finland, 80 000 of them being in the country on temporary basis. Most temporary labour migrants come from EU countries. (OECD 2014) The majority of work-based residence permits require the labour market testing (partial decision).

Table 4.26 Positive residence permit decisions by the Finnish Immigration Service based on labour market testing decisions (partial decisions)[15] (Source: Ministry of Employment and Economy statistics)

Year	number of positive residence permit decisions	percentage of negative labour market testing decisions
2012	4859	22 %
2013	5881	19 %
2014	5942	16 %

The numbers above include both decisions concerning the first permits and the continuation of permits. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on the length of the given permits. The most common nationalities include Russia, Ukraine, the Philippines, China, Nepal, and Bangladesh. The biggest professional groups were lorry and articulated vehicle drivers, cleaners, agricultural and garden workers, chefs and cooks, welders, plumbers, and airport staff. Again, we do not know how many of those migrants ended up staying in Finland permanently and who came only temporarily and for how long.

Another significant group of temporary migrants in Finland is students.

15 The regional Employment and regional development agencies give the partial decisions after which, the Finnish Immigration Service (first permit) or the police (continuing permit) give the final decision. It may be that even if one gets a positive decision from the employment agency, the migration officials or the police deny the residence permit based on issues like national security. In addition, the numbers provided by the employment offices and the Immigration service vary because not all decisions made by the employment office are further processed during the same calendar year (personal communication with Senior Government Counsellor Olli Sorainen, Ministry of Employment and the Economy 8.1.2015).

Table 4.27 Students' first residence permits to Finland according to length. (Source Eurostat).

	First residence permits: 3-5 months					
Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Permits	1140	1198	1265	1448	1457	1602
	First residence permits: 6-11 months					
Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Permits	995	958	692	757	841	1028
	First residence permits: Over 12 months					
Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Permits	2306	1793	2476	3165	3107	2684

The numbers above indicate that most non-EU/EEA students come to Finland for longer periods, i.e. to study for a degree. The same has been explained in more detail in a previous section on student migration to Finland. Statistics as such, though, won't explain whether the students are in Finland permamently or temporarily. According to CIMO's estimates, less than a third of the foreign graduates of 2011 had left Finland after one year from graduation. Yet, only 45,5 per cent of them were part of the Finnish labour force (CIMO 2014b). Naturally, one year is too short a timespan to make conclusions about temporality or permanence of the students' stay. Individual decisions to stay or to leave are made in a web of factors and are therefore mostly beyond the scope of statistical methods.

Problems with the integration of foreign population in Finland become visible in the unemployment statics. The table below shows that the unemployment rate of foreign citizens is clearly higher than that of the native population. It is noteworthy to also point out that most foreigners who are seeking for employment in Finland have professional or college education (Statistics Finland 2011).

Table 4.28 Unemployment rate of native-born and foreign-born populations (Source: OECD 2014).

Unemployment rate	2000	2005	2011	2012
Native-born men	10,3	9,3	8,3	8,2
Foreign-born men	36,6	22,4	14,7	14,7
Native-born women	12,0	9,4	6,9	6,7
Foreign-born women	21,3	22,7	13,3	17,1

Differentiating between permanent and temporary migration is difficult in terms of statistics. Below is a table on temporary migration prepared for an OECD report.

Table 4.29 Temporary migration in Finland (Source: OECD 2014).

Temporary migration	2005	2011	2012	Average 2007-2011
Thousands				
International students	-	5,5	5,5	4,6
Trainees	-	-	-	
Working holiday makers	-	-	-	
Seasonal workers	12,2	12,0	14,0	12,5
Intra-company transfers	-	-	-	
Other temporary workers	6,5	9,0	8,0	10,2

4.3.1 Finns abroad

As we stated earlier in this report, emigration of Finnish citizens has increased in the past decades too. The table below shows that emigration from Finland has clearly increased since early 1990s. However, the numbers have remained rather similar in the new millennium.

Table 4.30 Emigration from Finland (Source: Eurostat and Statistics Finland).

1990	1998	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2012	2013
6477	10817	12,083	12,369	12,443	12,151	12,660	13,845	13893

Table 4.31 KELA insured Finns abroad 2013 (Source: KELA 2014, the Social Insurance Institution of Finland).

All countries	**2013 (number of recipients)**
EU/EEA	13,598
Other countries	9,969
Altogether	23,567
The most popular Asian countries (+ EURA-NET countries)	
China	1,295
Thailand	446
Arab Emirates	304
Japan	296
Singapore	207
India	174
Malaysia	167
Turkey	164
South Korea	115
Indonesia	64
Vietnam	60
Nepal	53
the Philippines	37

It should be noted that the table above tells only a partial truth of the amount of Finns living abroad temporarily: there are also many who are not insured in Finland anymore (e.g. if they stay abroad for more than a year) but who may nevertheless eventually return there. On the other hand, there are Finns abroad who do not report their sojourns abroad to the Finnish authorities.

Most Finns who sojourn abroad temporarily are working there or accompanying family members who work there. As this report has stated earlier, the amount of retirees who spend long periods of time abroad is increasing too. The table below presents the numbers of Finnish citizens who receive pensions abroad. Thailand and India are included since they are EURA-NET countries and there are Finnish pensioners there according to the existing statistics.

Table 4.32 Pension recipients abroad (Source: KELA 2014)

	2006	2007	2010	2013
EU/EEA	53,980	54,193	57,180	56,046
Others	4,398	4,481	5,667	6,326
Thailand	23	28	60	92
India	-	-	-	17
All	58,378	58,674	62,847	62,372

In addition, in 2013, there were Finnish pensioners in the Philippines (11), Japan (11), China (7) and about 40 in other Asian countries and 60 in Israel. (source: Kela statistics) Here again, it is important to note that the statistics tell only a partial truth: there are presumably many Finnish pensioners spending long periods of time abroad without reporting it to the Finnish authorities.

4.3.2 Comparing temporary and permanent migration in Finland

It is difficult to come up with figures that would compare temporary and permanent migration to Finland because of the various statistical problems that have been mentioned earlier in this report. Below is, however, a table that gives some comparative indication on the phenomena.

Table 4.33 Temporary and permanent migration in Finland, a comparative table (Source: Eurostat & the National Police Board, Marjanpoimintatilastot 2011-2013; Rantanen & Valkonen, 2011)

Residence permits	3-5 months	6-11 months	over 12 months (but fixed term)	Total of fixed-term permits (first permits)	Permanent permits	All valid permits	Schengen visas for garden and wild berry pickers
2008	1754	2363	17756	21873	-	107015	-
2009	2236	3036	12762	18034	-	112914	-
2010	2293	2910	14007	19210	-	122108	11024
2011	2380	3049	14801	20230	-	119328	11476
2012	2443	3344	14477	20264	8834	154396	12542
2013	2560	3361	15201	21122	9451	163234	13523

When reading the numbers above, one must keep in mind that the fixed-term residence permits refer to first permits. Many of them become renewed eventually. Moreover, all those individuals who have received a permanent residence permit, must have had a temporary permit for five years before they can acquire a permanent permit. There are no figures of permanent residence permits available before the year 2012.

4.4 Conclusion

Historically, Finland has not been a significant immigration destination but there have been a few important waves of outbound migration, especially to the USA, Canada and Sweden. During the past few decades, however, Finland has started to receive increasing numbers of immigrants, albeit clearly smaller numbers that many other European countries. The majority of foreigners who come to Finland originate from other EU countries or from Russia. However, the amount of Asians is increasing. The most common categories of those receiving residence permits are those who arrive as students or because of family ties. In Finland, there are not accurate statistics of temporary migrants. Information is scattered with various authorities and organisations and in some cases, there is not systematic statistical information at all.

There are significant numbers of posted workers in Finland, especially in the construction industry, but they mostly come from other EU countries. Finland wishes to attract educated and skilled migrants as well as researchers and academics but their numbers have remained rather low. However, Finland did attract hundreds of foreign, especially Asian, ICT professionals in the past decade but the current economic downturn has diminished such migration considerably. Seasonal migrant work is a significant phenomenon in Finland. It is often conducted with a Schengen visa (valid up to ninety days), that is, without a work permit. Above all, there are people from Thailand who work as wild-berry pickers, Ukrainians, and Russians who work in the garden berry industry. Finland actively promotes business in Asia, especially in China and India, which indicates increasing entrepreneurial activities between Finland and particular Asian countries.

Finland implements a very strict policy towards asylum seekers and their numbers have remained rather low. Asylum seekers are entitled to work in Finland while waiting for the final decision on their application. In practice, however, it is difficult for them to get work. There is not much information available on undocumented migrants and trafficking in Finland but the phenomena have been recognised and they have caught the attention of policy-makers and researchers recently.

Education is free in Finland and there are several tertiary level programmes available in English. The amount of international degree students in the Finnish higher education institutions has increased rapidly in the past years. Most of the non-European students come from Asia. All the non-EU citizens who come to study in Finland reside in the country on temporary residence permits. At the same time, the Finnish state is hoping that many of the foreign students would eventually become permanent residents because the population is aging and there will be an increasing need for labour force. This is, however, contradictory considering the temporary residence status and the fact that the students do not learn Finnish or Swedish when the degrees are taught in English and they are not required to learn Finnish/Swedish or the language courses offered are not effective. Consequently, the students do not have the required language skills when trying to enter the labour markets in Finland.

Family-based migration is the most common way for foreigners to move to Finland. Increasing numbers of Finns are marrying foreigners, including nationals of various Asian countries, and there are increasing amounts of migrant families. Those migrants who work in low-paid jobs in Finland may not be able to bring their family members to Finland because they do not earn enough money to meet the official financial requirements. The highly skilled and well-paid migrant families often end up moving away because, due to strict language skill requirements, it is very difficult for the spouse to gain employment in Finland and because high-quality English language education may not be available for the children.

An increasing number of Finns are involved in temporary migration abroad too, including many Asian destinations. Finnish students study abroad, skilled experts work as expatriates, often accompanied by their families and some people, especially retirees, spend long periods in warmer climates as lifestyle migrants. In particular, many Finnish retirees live, either permanently or seasonally, in Spain and Thailand. Finland has not attracted (or allowed) such lifestyle seekers except for Russians who are increasingly buying holiday homes in Finland.

This report has illustrated that we can recognise many types of temporary migrants in Finland. Our knowledge on these categories is, however, limited. In Finland, there are critical data gaps that impede the understanding of the characteristics of temporary migration and mobility. In particular, there is a lack of high-quality statistics on temporary forms of migration. There are no accurate statistics on the number of migrants who sojourn in Finland on temporary basis and the existing information is fragmented among different authorities. Since there are gaps and overlaps with this information, it is not possible to produce comprehensive statistics that would enable well-justified policy measures and effective evaluations of measures taken. For example, it is known that an increasing number of Finnish employers are meeting the demand for workers through temporary migration routes but the number of temporary migrant workers is currently unknown.

The Finnish policy documents either ignore short-term movers or attempt to keep temporary and permanent systems separate. In real life, however, a considerable number of temporary movers eventually become permanent immigrants and a considerable number of those who might have the potential to become permanent migrants, end up being temporary. Those who end up leaving Finland include, for example, many highly skilled migrant families who find better work opportunities, especially for the spouse, somewhere else or many low-skilled labour migrants who are not allowed to bring their families to Finland because of the official income restrictions (e.g. the migrant nurses). Those who initially come to Finland with a temporary intention but end up becoming permanent migrants include for example the ones who come to the country in order to work or study for a specific period but end up marrying a Finnish citizen.

Overall, temporary migration is increasingly common in Finland and the phenomenon has been recognised. There are various categories of temporary migrants in Finland and we have limited knowledge of their characteristics.

4.5 Discussion

The research revealed that, in Finland, there is a need to collect data on how many and what types of short-term residents become permanent immigrants, and how long it takes them to do so. At the same time, it would be useful to collect reliable data on people who migrate to Finland and whom the Finnish state would like to become permanent residents but who, for one reason or another, do not stay but move either back to their native countries or to some other countries. This phenomenon concerns above all highly educated migrants– the group that the Finnish state (as well as many other states) would like to welcome warmly.

It would also be useful to develop a system for collecting data on the characteristics and extent of different forms of sojourns of Finnish citizens abroad. An increasing number of Finnish experts are working abroad on temporary working contracts and many Finns study abroad. Lifestyle migration and health tourism are increasingly popular but very little is known about them, in fact, it is difficult to even estimate the numbers of people involved in such phenomena as there are no statistics. The impact of these increasingly popular phenomena on the Finnish society (and the receiving societies) remains currently unknown. Irregular migration is another issue that has gained attention in Finland only in recent years and we know very little of the numbers of undocumented migrants in Finland. Many of them reside in the country temporarily.

Finland is a particular country in terms of offering free schooling for any child residing in the country. In an international comparison, the Finnish education system is well prepared to offer education for foreign children with an intention of permanent stay in the country (preparatory training, language training in diverse mother tongues etc.). This right to education is, however, not necessarily known and utilised by all migrants, especially if they are undocumented. Another problem is that there are not enough international schools or English language tuition for the children of short-term migrants, and the curricula offered in the existing international schools are not necessarily the kind that some expatriate families would like them to be. In addition, especially temporary migrants may have some specific educational needs considering that they intend to return to the education system somewhere else after a temporary residence in Finland. Opportunities to obtain vocational training in English are limited too.

Based on the existing policy documents, statistics and a review on existing research scrutinised for this report, the following tentative policy recommendations may be done:

- There is a need for accurate statistical information on the phenomena related to temporary migration because without reliable statistics, it is difficult to develop and evaluate policies. This problem has been acknowledged already previously, and a recent intra-governmental report suggests legislative measures to improve the situation.

- The Schengen Visa applications include several categories for “main purpose(s) of the journey” under which temporary work can be done. Consequently, it is difficult to scrutinise
- the type of work these categories may include, and a clear system should be developed for this in order to be able to construct accurate statistics on the issue. Similarly, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland has acknowledged that actual numbers and areas of work are difficult to obtain currently.
- The previous studies and qualifications of migrants should be better recognised in Finland and the process should be quick and easy. Finland should provide more effective updating training for highly skilled foreigners so that they could enter the Finnish labour markets utilising the skills they have instead of ending up in low-skill professions. The updating should also be easy and quick since those with the intention of temporary migration will not want to invest a lot of time and energy in the updating training.
- It is important to acknowledge that not everyone wants to stay in Finland on permanent basis and the policies should address their situations too instead of focusing only on permanent migration and integration. For example, Finland should pay more attention to the education of the children of temporary migrants. In practice this means providing high quality education in English. In addition, it should be taken into account that instead of emphasising the Finnish curriculum, the children of temporary migrants should be supported in a way that would take into account the curriculum that they are following in their country of permanent residence.
- Concrete measures are needed in order to decrease the unemployment rate of foreigners residing in Finland. For example, the employment rate of asylum seekers and foreign spouses should be improved.
- The Finnish language education of the foreign tertiary level students (who usually stay for more than a year although they are still considered temporary) should be developed and provided so that the students would gain the necessary language skills in order to be able to enter the Finnish labour markets when they graduate. When implementing this, the variations between different fields of professions in terms of the needs of language skills should be taken into account.
- The language requirements in the Finnish public sector labour markets should be somewhat loosened in order to facilitate migrants’ entry. In addition, there is a need to affect the attitudes towards the language skill requirements in the private sector.

References

Alastalo, M., Homanen, R and & Rantanen, P. (2014) Eriarvoistavatko maistraattien rekisteröitymiskäytännöt Suomessa asuvia ulkomaalaisia? In: EMN: Oikeus sosiaaliturvaan ja terveydenhuoltoon maahanmuuttajan näkökulmasta. Helsinki: Euroopan muuttoliikeverkosto, 115-124.
Aliens Act 2004/301
Asa, R. & Muurinen, H. (2011) Temporary and circular migration. Empirical evidence, current policy practice and future options in Finland. European Migration Network.
Björklund, K. & Koivukangas, O. (eds.) (2008) Suomalaiset Euroopassa. Turku: Siirtolaisuusinstituutti.
Brooks, R. & Waters, J. (2013) Student Mobilities, Migration and the Internationalization of Higher Education. Palgrave Macmillan.
CIMO (2014) Oppilaitosten henkilökunnan kansainvälinen liikkuvuus. [Data file]. Available from: http://cimo.fi/nakokulmia/tietoa_ja_tilastoja/opiskelijoiden_ja_oppilaitosten_henkilokunnan_liikkuvuus/oppilaitosten_henkilokunnan_liikkuvuus
CIMO (2014b). Faktaa Express 5A/2014: Ulkomaalaisten opiskelijoiden työllistyminen Suomeen. Retrieved from: http://www.cimo.fi/instancedata/prime_product_julkaisu/cimo/embeds/cimowwwstructure/54160_netti_Express5A_14.pdf
CIMO & Kela (2013) Suomalaiset tutkinto-opiskelijat ulkomailla 2002/2003–2012/2013 [Data file]. Retrieved from: http://www.cimo.fi/services/statistics/international_mobility_of_students
CIMO & Statistics Finland (2013) The most common nationalities of international degree students in Finland 2003–2012 [Data file]. Retrieved from: http://www.cimo.fi/services/statistics/international_mobility_of_students
Eimermann, M. (2013) Lifestyle Migration to the North: Dutch Families and the Decision to Move to Rural Sweden, Population, Space and Place. DOI: 10.1002/psp.1807
EMN (2012) Annual Report on Migration and Asylum Policy in Finland. EMN. Helsinki.
EMN, (2014) Maahanmuuton tunnusluvut 2013. Helsinki: Euroopan muuttoliikeverkosto.
Eurostat (2014) Eurostat Statistics Database. [Data set]. Available from: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home
Finnish Board of Education (2014) Vipunen - Statistics and indicator data portal. [Data set]. Retrieved from: http://vipunen.csc.fi/fi-fi/Pages/default.aspx
Finnish Immigration Service, Residence permit statistics http://www.migri.fi/tietoa_virastosta/tilastot/oleskelulupatilastot
Finnish Immigration Service (2012) Press release, 23 January 2012, http://www.migri.fi/medialle/tiedotteet/lehdistotiedotteet/lehdistotiedotteet/170/pelkka-kidutus_ei-ole_oleskelulupaperuste.
Finnish Immigration Service (2013). Statistical Review. http://www.migri.fi/download/50381_Tilastokatsaus_Oleskeluluvat_2013_pdf.pdf?3cd2efbeb7fed188
Forsander, A, Raunio, M, Salmenhaara, P. & Helander, M. (2004) Sykettä ja suvaitsevaisuutta: Globaalin osaamisen rajat. Helsinki: Edita.
Garam, I. (2013) Kansainvälinen liikkuvuus yliopistoissa ja ammattikorkeakouluissa 2012. Tietoja ja tilastoja –raportti. 3/2013. CIMO Centre for International Mobility.
Garam, I. & Korkala, S. (2013) Mitä tilastot kertovat kansainvälisestä opiskelijaliikkuvuudesta Suomessa? Faktaa. Tietoa ja tilastoja. 1A/2013.
Heikkilä , E. (2012) Finns Abroad –the profile of emigrants and their thoughts about returning to Finland. In: Koikkalainen S. & Heikkilä E. (eds.) Finns Abroad: New Forms of Mobility and Migration. Turku: Siirtolaisinsituutti.
Heikkilä, E., Oksi-Walter P. & Säävälä M. (2014) Monikulttuuriset avioliitot sillanrakentejina. Turku: Siirtolaisinstituutti.
Heikkinen, S. (2004). Sairaanhoitajat tienpäällä. In Ruckenstein, M. (Ed.) Työpaikkana maailma. Lähtijöiden näkökulma globaaliin talouteen. Helsinki: Edita. pp. 149-166.

Hertzen-Oosi Von, N., Harju, H., Haake, N. and Aro, T. (2009) Ulkomaalaisten tilapäinen työ Suomessa. Helsinki: Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriön julkaisuja 37/2009.
Hirvonen, M. (2011) Ulkomaista työvoimaa koskevan sääntelyn toimivuus. Poliisihallituksen toimeksiannosta tehty selvitys. Helsinki: Harmaa Hirvi oy.
KELA (The Social Insurance Institution of Finland). 2014. Statistics on Finns abroad.
Kiuru, B. (2012) Immigration of International Students to the EU. National Report from Finland for EMN Study on Immigration of International Students to the EU. The European Migration Network (EMN).
Korkala, S. (2013). Kansainvälinen liikkuvuus ammatillisessa koulutuksessa 2012. Tietoa ja tilastoja-raportti. 2/2013
Korpela, M. (2013) Marginally Mobile? The Vulnerable Lifestyle of Westerners in Goa, Two Homelands 38: 63-72.
Könnilä, P. (2014) Sisua ja mañanaa. Suomalaiset Espanjan Aurinkorannikolla. Turku: Siirtolaisuusinstituutti.
Könönen, J. (2012) Prekaari työvoima ja uudet hierarkiat metropolissa. Ulkomaalaiset matalapalkkaisilla palvelualoilla, Sosiologia, 49(3): 190-220.
Lainiala, L. & Säävälä, M. (2012) Perhebarometri: Rakkautta, rikkautta ja ristiriitoja. Suomalaisten solmimat kaksikulttuuriset avioliitot. Helsinki: Väestöntutkimuslaitos.
Leppäkorpi, M. (2011) Asiaton oleskelu kielletty. Helsinki: Into Kustannus oy.
Lipkina, O. (2013) Motives for Russian Second Home Ownership in Finland, Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism 13(4): 299-316.
Lipkina, O. & Hall, M. (2013) Russian second home owners in Eastern Finland: Involvement in the local community. Janoschka, M. & Haas, H. (eds.) Contested Spatialities, Lifestyle Migration and Residential Tourism. London: Routledge. pp. 158-173.
Löppönen, P., Lehvo, A., Vaahtera, K. and Nuutinen, A. (Eds.) 2009. Suomen tieteen tila ja taso 2009. Academy of Finland. Vammalan kirjapaino: Vammala.
Marjanpoimintatilastot 2011-2013. Helsinki: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland.
Martikainen, T. & Gola, L. (2007) Women From the Indian Subcontinent in Finland. Patterns of integration, Family life, Employment and transnationalism among marriage migrants. Helsinki: Väestöliitto.
McKay, G. (1996) Senseless Acts of Beauty. Cultures of Resistance Since the Sixties. London: Verso.
Matyska, A. (2013) Transnational Families in the Making. The Polish Experience of Living between Poland and Finland during and after the Cold War. Tampere: Tampere University Press.
MIGRI (2014a) The Finnish Immigration Service. Vireille tulleet ensimmäiset oleskelulupahakemukset välillä 1.1.2013-31.12.2013. [Data file]. Retrieved from: http://www.migri.fi/download/44459_Vireille_tulleet_ensimmaiset_oleskelulupahakemukset_top-10_1.1.-31.5.2013.pdf?1ae3d789840dd188)
MIGRI (2014b) The Finnish Immigration Service. Statistics on residence permits. [Data file]. Retrieved from: http://www.migri.fi/about_us/statistics/statistics_on_residence_permit
MIGRI (2014c) The Finnish Immigration Service. Residence permits issued to students compared to all permits 2005-2012. [Data file]. Received via email from MIGRI 16.4.2014.
Ministry of Employment and Economy. The official statistics of Finland. Foreign Employment seekers in 2011. Helsinki: Ministry of Employment and Economy. http://www.tem.fi/tilastojulkaisut.
Ministry of Employment of Economy. Statistics on residence permits based on labour market testing 2012-2014.
Ministry of Education and Culture (2013) Korkeakoulujen lukukausimaksukokeilun seuranta ja arviointi. Työryhmän väliraportti III. 11.2.2013.
Ministry of Education and Culture (2014) Korkeakoulujen lukukausimaksukokeilun seuranta ja arviointi. Työryhmän loppuraportti. Opetus- ja kulttuuriministeriön työryhmämuistioita ja selvityksiä 2014:16.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland (2014) Statistics on visa decisions by Finnish embassies

abroad. [Data file received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs].
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (2014) Health care of undocumented persons. [Web document]. Retrieved from: (http://www.stm.fi/en/social_and_health_services/health_services/health-care-of-undocumented-persons).
Mykkänen, J. (2004). Seikkailijoiden ja insinöörien Shanghai. In Ruckenstein, M. (Ed.) Työpaikkana maailma. Lähtijöiden näkökulma globaaliin talouteen. Helsinki: Edita. pp. 127-149.
National Police Board. (Poliisihallituksen lupahallinto) 2014. Poliisin lupahallinnon toimintaa kuvaavia tilastoja. http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/home.nsf/ExternalFiles/Poliisi-fi_tilastot%20tammi-huhtikuu_2014/$file/Poliisi-fi_tilastot%20tammi-huhtikuu_2014.pdf
Niemelä, A. (2008) Kansainväliset tutkinto-opiskelijat Suomen yliopistoissa. Suomen ylioppilaskuntien liitto (SYL) ry. Opiskelijajärjestöjen tutkimussäätiö OTUS rs.
OECD. International Migration Outlook 2014.
Ombudsman For Minorities (2012) The Finnish National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings – Report 2012. Helsinki: Ombudsman For Minorities.
Peltokorpi, V. (2007). Intercultural communication patterns and tactics: Nordic expatriates in Japan. International Business Review. Vol 16, (1). pp. 68–82.
Rantanen, P. and Valkonen, J. (2011) Ulkomaalaiset metsämarjanpoimijat Suomessa. Helsinki: Ulkorajarahasto.
Raunio, M. (2002) Suomi globaalitalouden osaajien valintojen kentällä. Ulkomaalaisten huippuosaajien mielikuvat ja todellisuudet suomalaisessa työ- ja kaupunkiympäristössä. Tampere. Tampereen yliopisto, Alueellisen kehittämisen tutkimusyksikkö.
Raunio, M., Korhonen, M. and Hoffman, D. 2009. Kannattaako kansainvälistyä? Suomen yliopistot kansainävälisinä akateemisina ympäristöinä. Loppuraportti. Tasti-working papers 7, University of Tampere. Available from: http://www.uta.fi/yky/tutkimus/tasti/Julkaisut/Sahkoinenkirjasto/RaunioKorhonenHoffman_tastityoraportti_72010.pdf
Raunio, M., Saarinen, J. and Kautonen, M. (2013) Models for International Innovation Policy: Transnational Channels and Regional Platforms. Fostering Globalizing Innovation Communities in Finland and Abroad. Tasti-working papers 9, University of Tampere. Available from: http://www.uta.fi/yky/tutkimus/tasti/Julkaisut/Sahkoinenkirjasto/Models_for_International_Innovation_Policy.pdf
Raunio, M. and Kautonen, M. (2014) Transnationalizing innovation systems by transplanting innovation platforms. Innovation and Development, 1(3). Pp.
Refugee Advice Centre – Pakolaisneuvonta (2014) [Web site] Available from: http://www.pakolaisneuvonta.fi/
Rogelja, N. (2013) Contemporary peripatetic adaptations: Mobility, marginality and inventiveness, Two Homelands 38: 49-62.
Shumilova, Cai & Pekkola (2012) Employability of International Graduates Educated in Finnish Higher Education Institutions. Helsinki: VALOA-project, Career Services, University of Helsinki.
Sirkkilä, H. (2005) Elättäjyyttä vai erotiikkaa. Miten suomalaiset miehet legitimoivat parisuhteensa thaimaalaisen naisten kanssa? Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto.
Sirkkilä. H. (2006) Suomalaismiesten käsityksiä thaimaalaisista vaimoistaan. In: Martikainen T. (ed.) Ylirajainen kulttuuri. Etnisyys Suomessa 2000-luvulla. Helsinki: SKS. 126-143.
Statistics Finland. Statistics on Immigration and unemployment. http://www.stat.fi/til/
Statistics Finland. 2011. Employment statistics of foreigners 2011. http://www.stat.fi/til/tyokay/index.html
Statistics Finland (2013a) Foreign student. Concepts and definitions. Retrieved from: http://www.stat.fi/meta/kas/ulkomaal_opisk_en.html
Statistics Finland (2013b) Oppilaitosten opiskelijat ja tutkinnot. Tilastotietokannat [Statistical databases, Education]. Retrieved from: http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/databasetree_fi.asp
Säävälä. M. (2013) Maahanmuutto perheilmiönä. In: Martikainen, T., Saukkonen, P. & Säävälä,

M. (eds.) Muuttajat. Kansainvälinen muuttoliike ja suomalainen yhteiskunta. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 101-122.

Tahvanainen, M. (2005) Implications of Short-term International Assignments. European Management Journal 23(6): 663–673

Tammilehto, T. and Koskinen S. (2012) Suomen sosiaaliturvajärjestelmä ja työperäinen maahanmuutto. In: Koikkalainen S. & Suikkanen A. (eds.) Siirtymät ja kansalaisuus kanvainvälisen liikkuvuuden maailmassa. Turku: Siirtolaisinstituutti.

Team Finland (2013) Strategy 2014. Prime Minister's Office Publications. 10/2013.

TEM, Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö. (2013) Venäläiset vapaa-ajan asukkaina Suomessa 2030. TEM raportteja 20/ 2013.

Tervo, H. and Halonen, O. (2012) Tuloksellisuustarkastuskertomus. Työperäinen maahanmuutto. Valtiontalouden tarkastusviraston tarkastuskertomukset 12/2012. Helsinki: Edita Prima Oy.

Tutka-työryhmän loppuraportti (2014) Esitys ulkomaisen työvoiman rekisteröinti- ja seurantajärjestelmäksi. Tilapäisen ulkomaisen työvoiman tilastointia kehittävän työryhmän (TUTKA) loppuraportti. Helsinki: Tilastokeskus.Viitanen, K. and Tähjä K. (2010) Paperittomat. HS Kirjat: Helsinki.

5. CHARACTERISTICS OF TEMPORARY TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE GERMAN CASE

Mustafa AKSAKAL and Kerstin SCHMIDT-VERKERK
PI: Thomas FAIST

5.1 Introduction

In 1892, the German sociologist Max Weber published his study *Die Lage der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland*, in which he analysed empirically the immigration of foreign land workers to Germany. In doing so, he aimed to comprehend the root causes of the emerging migration patterns, reveal why German agricultural labourers moved to urban areas, and why they were replaced by Polish and Ruthene rural workers; as well as he intended to understand the societal consequences that changes in the ethnic composition bring about for the eastern Elbe region (Mommsen, 1993).

After more than 100 years, immigration still plays a significant societal role in Germany, whereby it's qualitative and quantitative characteristics were subject to change over the last decades. These social dynamics lead to the following central question, which guides this report:

In which manner and to what extent have the characteristics of immigration shifted in the German-Asian migration context?

As hypothetical assumption it can be argued that categories of immigration between Asian countries and Germany, and vice versa, are gradually changing on a qualitative and quantitative level. This trend is reflected empirically by the increasing importance of a broad range of migrant categories in both directions.

In order to analyse these changes, existing empirical information will be retrieved from official data sources. Before addressing this question in the main part of this report, the historical background of temporary migration, as well as current migration policies are addressed.

5.1.1 Methodology

The report provides an overview of current characteristics of Asian immigration to Germany. Therefore, existing academic literature and policy reports were examined in order to extract the most important Asian migrant categories, on which a stratified (purposeful) random sampling can be carried out. To this end, statistical material provided by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge - BAMF) was accessed and relevant information with regard to the research questions of the EURA-NET project was compiled and interpreted. Data collection methods on migration to Germany can be accomplished in two ways; on the one hand case-related that is simply based on inflows and outflows of people (counting of border crossings), on the other hand person-related, according to specific migrant features (Central Aliens Register – Ausländerzentralregister). Since the latter information represents the more appropriate source for the purpose of the report "characteristics of temporary transnational migration", this data was preferably used.

General and category-specific information on temporary migration was obtained in the following way. Information by the Central Aliens Register provides data of migrant stock categorised according to the time periods 0-1 year, 1-4 years, 4-8 years, etc. Based on this data background, the most appropriate way to define temporary migrants is to sum up the migrants in the first and second time frame. In this way, by subtracting the sum of the first two time periods from the total migrant stock, a distinction between temporary migrants (first two time periods) and permanent migrants (remaining time periods) becomes possible. To identify a medium-term trend in the development of the proportion of permanent and temporary migrants in Germany, data of the last seven years are considered.

In order to identify temporary migration in relation to the relevant migrant categories and to their origins, it is necessary to determine for the year 2012 the outflow of each specific category and respective destination country of those who entered Germany after 2008. Yet, person-related information for this purpose is not available. Therefore, to achieve an as accurate as possible estimate of temporary migrants according to the relevant criteria (professionals, students, family members and asylum seekers from Asian countries), annual inflows (2009-2012) were added up for each considered migrant category and for the five most significant cases of Asian countries. Wherever it was meaningful, the respective EURA-NET consortium partner countries in Asia were considered. These national shares of the most important Asian countries were put in relation to the total inflow of the considered migrant categories between 2009 and 2012. With the exception of successful asylum applicants, migrants belonging to all other categories can be expected to stay in Germany only temporarily to fulfil the purpose of their visa type (Blue Card, student visa and family members of those visa holders).

Most migrant categories relevant in the Asian-German context contain sub-categories, which are sometimes based on different data sources as well as on different selection criteria for the presentation of information by the BAMF. Since this impedes a comprehensive overview of all sub-categories in a coherent way, the quantitatively most important sub-category was used and contrasted with the total number of persons pertinent to this sub-category.

Furthermore, since the EURA-NET project aims to define temporary migration in most migrant categories as migration between three months and five years, there are additionally two caveats in the calculation of migration between Asia and Germany used in this report. First, migrants staying for less than three months are considered. Nonetheless, tourists are not considered by Central Aliens Register data because persons staying in Germany with a tourist visa do not register centrally. Second, different categorisations of Central Aliens Register data are considered in sections of four years and not five years, which means that migrants staying for five years cannot be included. Yet, this approach to temporary migration represents the most appropriate way of addressing temporary forms of immigration to Germany.

5.1.2 Historical background of migration

Immigration to Germany after 1945 took place under two different political circumstances, 1) previous to the East-West division until 1949, and 2) after the division from 1949 until 1989. Following this idea, immigration to Germany until 1949 as well as immigration to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 onwards are in the next subsection (*Federal Republic of Germany)* discussed together. As immigration to the German Democratic Republic represents a special and distinguishing case, this geopolitical context is addressed separately.

Federal Republic of Germany

In the case of West Germany, we can find different waves of immigration. The first immigration influx proceeded after 1945, with which the need of labour forces could be satisfied in West Germany. These flows were constituted by mainly three groups of post-war returnees:

- The first group was represented by German prisoners of WW-II, who were released and returned to West Germany. It is estimated that from 1945 until the End of the 1950s four million prisoners of war returned to the Federal Republic of Germany (Borkert & Bosswick, 2011).
- The second group of returnees was constituted by displaced persons mainly from Central Europe. This group was represented by Germans by origin, which were deported or fled from war. The number is estimated at 4.7 million people (ibid.).

- The third group was constituted by immigrants from the east occupation zone to West Germany, whose number is estimated by Bade at 1.8 million people (Bade, 1985:60).

These immigration flows continued until the 1960s. According to Herbert (1990), the number of the noted three groups represented 16.7 per cent in 1950 and rose to 23.9 per cent of West Germany's total population in 1960.

During the 1950s, when the West German economy boomed certain labour gaps emerged. These gaps could be filled partly by the above noted three immigration groups. Although in this period the unemployment rate was up to seven per cent (Treibel, 2008) "regional labour demands in specific rural sectors" on the one hand, and "increasing demand in construction and industry" (Borkert & Bosswick, 2011: 96) emerged. The positive economic circumstances stimulated the initiation of temporary labour recruitment initiatives, with the objective to attract relatively short-term cheap and young labour from the peripheral neighbour countries of Southern Europe. The initiative was called *Gastarbeiterprogramm* (guest worker programme) and its principal idea was to shift unskilled work force from regions where labour was abundant to Germany, where it was partly scarce. Therefore, temporary labour migrants were recruited, whereby, as already noted above, the temporariness should be based on the rotating system, meaning that workers should be only contracted for a fixed time, "usually for one or two years [because] it was thought that most would then return to waiting families in their native countries" (OECD, 1978:16). And if so, they could be quickly replaced by other guest workers.

First, temporary agricultural workers were recruited from Italy in 1952. In order to attend the construction and industrial sectors recruitment contracts were concluded in 1955 again with Italy, in 1960 with Spain and Greece, in 1961 with Turkey, in 1963 with Morocco, in 1964 with Portugal, in 1965 with Tunisia and in 1968 with Yugoslavia (ibid.). The programme ended with the recruitment ban in 1973, which had to do with adverse developments in the global economy that influenced the German economy too (e.g. the oil crisis, the overproduction crisis). It particularly adversely affected the organisation of industrial production and respective labour markets. Those guest workers, who had the intention to stay after 1973, had the possibility for family reunification, meaning the right to bring close relatives from the sending regions to West Germany to stay with them (OECD, 1978).

In the period between the end of the 1950s and 1973, around 14 million temporary guest workers came to West Germany (Bade & Oltmer, 2007: 75). This number rose until 1990 due to family reunifications to 16 million people (Treibel, 2008: 58). Until 1990, around 12 million immigrants returned to their home lands. The remaining four million guest workers and their family members were mainly represented by the Turks (33 per cent of the total population in 1980), former Yugoslavian (14 per cent of the total population in 1980) and Italian (13.9 per cent of the total population in 1980) population segments (Bade & Oltmer, 2007: 75/6; Treibel, 2008: 59).

The recruitment ban of 1973 did not mean that immigration to Germany had stopped completely. Although significantly lower in quantities, after the end of the *Gastarbeiterprogramm* exceptional regulations existed regarding foreign skilled labour immigration to West Germany. This was the case for various sectors, including gastronomy, medical care, fair, home care, and child care sectors, but also for family reunification, refugee and asylum seekers and in some cases for university studies in Germany (Treibel, 2008: 59).

Further larger immigration movements after 1973 can be identified on the one hand by the inflow of ethnic German emigrants (*Aussiedler*) and late-repatriates (*Spätaussiedler*); their number is estimated shortly before and after the dismantling of the Iron Curtain (1987-1992) to 1.5 million people (ibid.: 39). On the other hand, after the German reunification the inflow of refugees from former Yugoslavia played a central role. In this context inflow by "refugee movements culminated in 1992 at a peak of 438,000 applications" (Borkert & Bosswick, 2011: 97).

German Democratic Republic

The motivation for the employment of foreign temporary labour migrants was in the GDR very similar to the reasons in West Germany. The objective behind the recruitment was mainly guided by the idea to "organise the industrial production in a more effective way and to compensate for the labour shortage in the GDR economy" (Gruner-Domić, 1999: 215/6), as well as to occupy the least appreciated jobs (Bade & Oltmer, 2007). However, in comparison to West Germany the labour forces were recruited from different geographical areas (ibid.). In this vein, above all contract workers were recruited, those represented mostly temporary low-skilled and partly skilled and high-skilled immigrants from socialist sister states. In some cases, occupational trainings were offered for the temporary migrants (Gruner-Domić, 1999). Based on bilateral governmental agreements in the course of the 1960s, labour recruitment from East European countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary, etc.) was achieved, in the 1970s recruitment from non-European regions (USSR, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Algeria, Mozambique) was accomplished, and in the 1980s recruitment from Angola and China was carried out (ibid.). The total number of foreigners amounted in 1989 to 190,400 people in the GDR. Around 50 per cent of this quantity was represented by foreign contract workers, those numbers increased sharply from 3,500 people in 1966 to 93,568 in 1989 (Gruner-Domić, 1999: 224). The recruitment from Vietnam and Mozambique was dominant in this context. The number of Vietnamese contract workers amounted in 1989 to 59,000 and that of Mozambique labourers to 19,000 people (Bade & Oltmer, 2007).

After this general overview of past and current migration patterns for the case of Germany and related policies, the text will now turn to historical trends of Asian migration. In the context of West German guest worker programmes in the 1960s, migrants from South Korea were recruited, particularly to work in mining. Yet, their share of 8,000 people (Kreienbrink & Mayer, 2014) is small compared to the total of about 2.6 million guest workers who lived in Germany when recruitment ceased in 1973. Also, recruitment of nurses from South Korea and the Philippines from the 1960s on only brought a small number of Asians to Germany. Vietnamese nationals constituted until 2011 the largest group of Asian migrants in Germany, which was caused by two historical developments. Between 1978 and 1982, West Germany had provided asylum to 23,000 refugees from Vietnam. At the same time, East Germany had recruited workers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Kreienbrink & Mayer 2014).

Another important inflow of Asian migrants to Germany already took place in the early 1950s. It was represented by Chinese immigrants, who "gradually developed restaurants as a niche of entrepreneurship and employment, [therewith they tried to compensate] limited opportunities for Chinese in the local labour market" (Christiansen & Xiujing, 2007: 289). The highly heterogeneous Chinese immigration was mainly based on chain migrants and refugees, those numbers increased until 2000 to an estimated 100,000 persons (ibid: 290).

5.1.3 Current immigration policies

Newly implemented immigration policies have contributed significantly to qualitative and quantitative shifts in migration volumes and patterns. The following sections briefly summarise these amendments of the last years:

The New Foreigner Law (*Neues Zuwanderungsgesetz*), implemented in 2005, inter alia institutionalised the privileged entrance of professionals to Germany. In this vein, the New Foreigner Law (NFL) represented an important legal change related to immigration-concerning politics of the country. The NFL consists of two articles containing policies related to the following aspects: Article 1 is divided into the Politics of Integration (*Integrationspolitik*), and the Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*). Article 2 regulates the free entrance, stay, and settlement of EU nationals in EU member states. Changes based on the NFL include a) Reforms in the Residence Act, b) Reformation of temporal stays for studies and vocational training, c) Changes to the labour migration regulation, d) Foreign researcher residence, e) Immigration due to humanitarian, political or similar reasons, f) Family reunification, and g) Promotion of Integration (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012)[1]. After the execution of the Foreigner Law several other reforms where implemented in the aftermath, as listed in the following:

- The 2007 Directive Implementation Act (*Reform des Zuwanderungsgesetzes gemäß der EU-Richtlinien*) is an amendment of the NFL, regulating residence in Germany in the categories of family reunification and asylum according to European directives. Germany fully adopted the 2003 European Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification in 2007.
- The law on the regulation of labour migration (*Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz*) of 2008 is an additional legal measure to stimulate the attraction of foreign professionals, as well as entrepreneurs to the country.
- This measure was followed by the Implementation of the EU-Directive for High-qualified Immigrants, Blue Card (*Umsetzung der EU-Hochqualifizierten-Richtlinie*) in August 2012, which is a further measure initiated by the European Union in order to stimulate and facilitate the entrance and temporal stay of high-skilled personnel from third country states. The EU directive was introduced in Germany in August 2012 (BAMF, 2014a).
- With the amendment in the employment regulation (*Novelle der Beschäftigungs-verordnung*) in July 2013, it was aimed to restructure and facilitate the previous employment regulation.
- The law for the improvement of the legislation for international beneficiaries of protection and foreign employees (*Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechte von international Schutzberechtigten und ausländischen Arbeitnehmern*) of August 2013 was designed to enhance the legal framework for both international beneficiaries and foreign employees by addressing foreigners, who already reside or stay in Germany or who are about to receive a residence title.

In summary, it can be said that since 2005, several legal reforms were accomplished to facilitate the entrance of professionals, and on these grounds it can be argued that Germany currently represents one of the countries in the European Union "with least restrictions on the employment oriented immigration of highly-skilled workers" (OECD, 2013: 15). With the above addressed legal measures, it is aimed to respond politically to the expected adverse impacts of the demographic change (population aging and long-term shrinking) that most of the European countries and especially Germany will confront in the future.

5.2 Statistical Data on Temporary Migrant Categories

For the purpose of this report, numbers of migrants in Germany were divided into the two categories permanent and temporary. The following table shows a general seven year trend of temporary migration to Germany.

1 For a detailed overview of these amendments in the NFL, refer to the report State-of-the-art knowledge on temporary migration (D.1.1)

Table 5.1 Number of permanent and temporary migration in Germany (2007-2013). Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Permanent *(more than 4 years)*	5,771,536	5,790,029	5,775,956	5,776,430	5,815,154	5,863,496	5,931,017
Temporary *(up to 4 years)*	973,343	937,589	918,820	977,191	1,115,742	1,350,212	1,702,611
Total	6,744,879	6,727,618	6,694,776	6,753,621	6,930,896	7,213,708	7,633,628



Figure 5.1 Development of temporary immigration to Germany, (2007-2013). Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

Table 5.1 and figure 5.1 show the development of the numbers of permanent and temporary migrants between 2007 and 2013. While in 2007, there were almost 5.8 million permanent migrants in Germany, this number increased by almost three per cent to more than 5.9 million in 2013. In contrast, the number of temporary migrants in Germany increased by almost 75 per cent in the same time frame, that indicates the growing importance of temporary forms of mobility.

The report now turns to an analysis of available statistics and quantitative data on Asian migration to Germany, again focused on the most relevant categories in the Asian-German migration context: professionals, students, independent job seekers, migrant entrepreneurs, family reunification, and refugees and asylum seekers.

5.2.1 Migration from Asia to Germany

The largest group of immigrants to Germany is represented by people from former und new member states of the European Union (EU). This is related to the permission of free movement of workers from EU countries, as well as to the enlargement of the EU. According to the most recent report on Germany's migration profile in 2012 by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge - BAMF)*, the percentage of this type of immigration amounted in 2004 to 40.6 per cent and rose in 2012 to 63.9 per cent, whereby immigration from the new EU-member states increased by 18.8 per cent, significantly represented by immigrants from Poland and increasingly from Bulgaria and Romania (BAMF, 2014a). This influx is followed by immigrants from other European countries outside the EU. This percentage decreased from 27.4 per cent in 2004 to 21.4 per cent of all migrants in 2012. The next largest immigration group is represented by international movers from the continent of Asia. This regional group was represented by 14.5 per cent of all international immigrants in 2004 and declined slightly to 12.4 per cent in 2012. This category is followed by immigrants from Africa (3.2 per cent) and America (6.3 per cent) in 2012 (BAMF, 2014a).

China, Vietnam and Iraq were the most highly represented nationalities among Asian migrants with 1.2 per cent each, followed by Thailand, Iran and India with 0.8 per cent each. Since 2011, Chinese migration to Germany has been strongly growing, a trend which continued in 2012, making migration from China the largest migrant inflow from Asia (Kreienbrink & Mayer, 2014). The migration balance between China and Germany was positive in 2012 (+ 6,688), with 21,575 persons coming to Germany from China and 14,887 persons leaving Germany for China.

Table 5.2 Most important immigrant categories from selected sending and transit countries 2012 (absolute numbers) (Source: BAMF, 2014a: 37)

	Higher education	Language course, education	Other training	Employment	Humanitarian reasons	Family reasons
China	7.685	435	408	3.352	51	1.974
India	2.598	46	351	4.978	50	3.634
Turkey	1.433	140	114	1.575	125	7.332
Ukraine	955	96	86	1.495	145	1.937

The most important category of Chinese migrants are students, followed by skilled and high-skilled workers (see table 5.2). A similar trend shows for the case of India with 17,474 immigrants and 11,262 emigrants, leading to a migration balance of +6,212 persons in 2012. As Table 5.1 shows the most important migration category for migrants from India is employment, particularly to skilled and high-skilled jobs. Migration of family members of these Indian employees to Germany also plays a very important role. The major country of origin of academics is also India, with a share of 39 per cent of all migrant academics. Further important countries of origin of academics are China (6.3 per cent), the Russian Federation (5.8 per cent), and Ukraine (3.3 per cent). For the case of Turkey, family reunification remains the most important reason for migration to Germany. Yet, with 1,433 persons, Turkey was also one of the most important sending countries of international students in Germany in 2012 (BAMF, 2014a).

Table 5.3 Gender ratio of immigrants from selected countries in 2012, in per cent (Source: BAMF, 2014a: 34)

	Male	Female
China	48	52
India	68	32
Ukraine	35	65
Philippines	75	25
Thailand	26	74
Turkey	62	38

Table 5.3 shows that the gender ratio of migrants is significantly dissimilar for different Asian countries. Highly qualified labour migrants from China and India are predominantly male, while labour migrants from Ukraine are predominantly female, often working in unqualified employment. Three quarters of migrants from Thailand are female, which is likely to be related to female participation in programmes, which foster the migration of healthcare professionals to Germany and to international marriage migration (BAMF, 2014a).

Although Asians are currently not among the most important group of migrants in Germany as far as numbers are concerned, their importance, particular for the German education system and for the German labour market, is likely to grow in the future. Recently, growing fears of shortages of professionals on the German labour market have generated a public debate about the need to recruit skilled workers. In general, migration from Asia is considered an important source of skilled labour, including engineers (Kreienbrink & Mayer, 2014).

With the aim to provide an overview of the most important recent developments of Asian temporary migration to Germany, the report now turns to a specific analysis of available statistics and quantitative data on Asian migration categories to Germany. It particularly focuses on the numerically most relevant categories in the Asian-German migration context: professionals, students, independent job seekers, migrant entrepreneurs, family reunification, as well as refugees and asylum seekers.

5.2.1.1 Professionals: qualified and highly-qualified migrants

As discussed above, the category ‘professionals’ is in the German political framework conceived as a broad target group with diverse specific subfields. In order to address different subgroups in a more differentiated way, the authors have divided the group of professionals along the lines of analytical sub-categories. These immigrant groups are regulated in different Articles in the Residence Act. According to the Article 18 (2) of the Act, qualified immigrants from third countries possess the right to enter and stay in Germany temporally. This means that according to Article 39 of the same Act, the Federal Employment Agency needs to allow the occupational entrance or a particular legal decree according to Article 42. Particularly, under Article 18b the granting of a temporal residence permit for tolerated skilled and high-skilled persons is regulated. As noted above, highly-qualified immigrants’ entrance and occupational stay is regulated since 2012 under the Article 19a of the Residence Act, also known as the EU Blue Card. Under the Article 19 of the Residence Act, distinguished academics represented by researchers with particular research topics or specialist knowledge, and research staff in key positions obtain the right for direct settlement permission. Researchers are those who stay in Germany temporarily with the objective to accomplish an investigation in cooperation with or within a German university or research institute. According to Article 20 of the Residence Act, this immigrant group can obtain residence permission, if there is a hosting agreement for the implementation of a research project with or within a recognised research organization. Article 18 (2), 19, 19a and 20 that regulate the entrance and stay of skilled and high-skilled immigrants can be defined as an employee-driven legal measure, because entrance and residence permit are only allowed in combination with a concrete occupation offer in Germany and a respective employment contract in a German company (Mayer, 2014; Tollenaere, 2014).

Intra-company transferees are in most cases skilled and high-skilled employees, who work in internationally operating companies and are sent to branch offices abroad, whereby usually the existing labour conditions and a work contract from the sending country are maintained (Tollenaere, 2014). In line with this definition, it is important to mention that foreign professionals, who already live or are employed in Germany and take from there a job for an employer from a sending country, are considered local labour force and not intra-company-transferees (BAMF, 2013a).

Before starting to illustrate some selected empirical data on skilled and high-skilled professionals in each sub-category and interpret this statistics for the case of Germany, it is useful to note that the role of Asian skilled and high-skilled immigrants have played since several years a significant role and in recent years the relevance has increased in the country. It can be anticipated that the most significant Asian countries of origin regarding distinguished academics are India, the Russian Federation, and Japan, regarding researchers indeed China, India, and Japan. With regard to locally recruited professionals India, China, Japan and the Ukraine are the most important sending countries in Germany. On the other hand, professionals from India, the Russian Federation, and China are those, who entered particularly frequently with a Blue Card to the country. Finally, relevant Asian countries of origin with regard to intra-company transferees are represented by India, China, Japan, the Russian Federation and the Philippines, as shown in detail in the following sections (BAMF, 2014a).

Locally recruited professionals

Previous to the Blue Card implementation in Germany, third country labour immigrants that include also skilled and high-skilled persons received residence permission in the framework of the Article 18, Residence Act established with the New Foreigner Law of 2005. Table three illustrates the medium-term development between 2007 and 2012 and shows the total number of residence permissions and the female share for the most important Asian countries of origin. Accordingly, since 2007, Indian professionals represent quantitatively the most important group of immigrants, who received residence permission under Article 18. In 2007, the number of this group amounted to 3,226 persons, whereby 474 persons were represented by women, equivalent to 14.7 per cent. While until 2010 total numbers remained constantly under 4,000 people, thereafter the total number rose to over 4,000 people. In 2011, the total number reached a peak with 4,720, equivalent to an increase of 46 per cent in comparison to 2007. The share of women increased in absolute numbers with 619 women in comparison to 2007 (increase of 30 per cent). In relation to the total numbers of 2011, it meant however a decrease of 1.6 per cent in comparison to the base year 2007. In 2012, the total number of Indian professionals, who received residence permission decreased slightly by nine per cent, whereby the share of women increased marginally by 0.8 per cent.

Table 5.4 shows that in relation to Indian immigrants, the share of women in the case of Chinese immigrants is significantly higher; with the exception of 2008, where the total share accounted for 34.1 per cent, the percentage of women oscillated between 26 and 30 per cent, meaning that the share of females is more than twice as high as in the case of Indian immigrants. The case of Turkey reveals that 2007 1,339 persons entered Germany as labour immigrants. This number declined until 2009 by 23 per cent and began to rise again until 2012 by ten per cent in comparison to the base year 2007 to 1,473 immigrants. Female labour immigrants accounted in 2007 for 10.9 per cent and increased slightly in 2012 to 12 per cent

Table 5.4 Quantity of entrances of labour immigrants (Article 18, RA), selected sending and transit countries, by sex, 2007-2012 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF, Bundesamt in Zahlen 2013b: 79)

Country of origin	2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012	
	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women	Total	Women
India	3.226	474	3.626	474	2.987	398	3.404	496	4.720	619	4.318	602
China	2.921	787	2.406	821	2.204	629	2.707	747	3.137	930	3.052	809
Japan	1.677	293	1.724	322	1.258	201	1.585	257	1.855	370	1.715	312
Russian Fed.	1.770	1.220	1.701	1.084	1.460	1.010	1.411	947	1.553	966	1.329	860
Turkey	1.339	146	1.417	205	1.029	157	912	196	1.209	196	1.473	177
Ukraine	1.538	1.078	1.330	869	1.191	825	1.231	897	1.346	946	1.320	950

Ukrainian labour immigrants, who obtained residence permit, amounted in 2007 to 1,538 persons, whereby the share of women was with 1,078, equivalent to 70.1 per cent, disproportionally high. In the following year, the total numbers dropped below 1,500 and amounted in 2012 to 1,320, signifying a decrease of 14.2 per cent in comparison to 2007. In contrast, the share of women increased slightly by 1.9 per cent in relation to the base year, to 72 per cent in 2012.

Under the discussed table 5.4, all residence permissions regulated under Article 18 of the Residence Act are illustrated. According to the development of the German Foreigner Law of the last years, this means that above all professionals from third countries have received residence permissions under the Article 18. Next to this focus group, also residence permissions for low-skilled immigrants and other labour immigrant groups from Asian sending countries are registered, as shown in the next table.

Table 5.5 illustrates that in the case of Indian immigrants 166 persons in 2012, equivalent to 3.9 per cent of the total numbers were represented by less-qualified labourers or by other types of labourers. 94.2 per cent, equivalent to 4,067 persons were represented by skilled and high-skilled immigrants, and 85 persons were professionals, who work in occupational sectors in the public interest.

Table 5.5 Quantity of labour immigrants according to qualification (Article 18, RA), selected sending and transit countries, base year 2012 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF, Bundesamt in Zahlen, 2013b: 80)

Country of origin	Total	No qualified occupation	Qualified occupation	Qualified occupation, pub. interest	Other types of qualification
India	4.318	99	4.067	85	67
China	3.052	353	2.654	39	6
Japan	1.715	207	1.490	13	5
Russian Fed.	1.329	714	584	22	9
Turkey	1.473	274	1.156	32	11
Ukraine	1.320	1.035	266	16	3
Korea, Rep.	526	86	432	8	0

In the case of Chinese labour immigrants 359, equivalent to 11.8 per cent of the total quantity were represented by low-skilled labourers or by distinct types of workers in 2012. Qualified and highly-qualified persons were represented by 2,654 immigrants, corresponding to 87.5 per cent. Only 1.3 per cent, corresponding to 39 persons was engaged in occupations in the public sector. In the cases of Japanese, Korean and Turkish labour immigration, a similar trend is observable in 2012.

The case of Ukrainian labour immigrants reveals indeed another trend; 1,038 persons embodied low-skilled labourers or distinct types of workers in 2012, corresponding to 78.6 per cent. In contrast, only 266 people, equivalent to 20.2 per cent were performing skilled and high-skilled jobs, and 16 persons (1.2 per cent) have worked in the public sector in the base year 2012. Similar to labour immigration from Ukraine, also labour immigration from the Russian Federation is characterised by high numbers of low-skilled or by distinct types of labourers.

In sum, this means that with the exception of labour immigrants from the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the major part of labour immigrants of Asian origin received residence permission in the framework of the Article 18 of the Residence Act due to skilled and high-skilled occupations.

As noted above**,** in August 2012 the European Blue Card was implemented in the German Residence Act, meaning that after this date the residence permit for high-skilled immigrants was regulated formally under the Article 19a of the respective Act. Accordingly, the permissions granted for professionals in 2012 are reflected statistically until August 2012 under residence permissions that were granted under the Article 18 (see Table 5.4), and since August 2012 under residence permits that were granted under Article 19a, as illustrated in the following Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Quantity of professionals with BlueCard residence permission (Article 19a, RA) in 2012, selected sending countries (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF 2014a: 76)

Country of origin	Total	Regular occupation	Shortage occupation
India	611	426	185
China	108	71	37
Russian Federation	143	96	48

Table 5.6 shows that after the implementation of the Blue Card in the German Residence Act the most significant migrant group was represented by Indian high-skilled migrants with 611 persons, who received residence permit. Thereby, 426 persons were employed in regular jobs, equivalent to 69.7 per cent, while 185 Indian professionals were employed in the realm of shortage occupations in 2012. In the case of Chinese professionals, 106 persons obtained a Blue Card, 65.7 per cent, corresponding to 71 persons in the realm of regular jobs and 34.3 per cent, equivalent to 37 people in shortage occupational sectors. Around 143 persons from the Russian Federation received a Blue Card in 2012, whereby 66.4 per cent (95 persons) in regular jobs and 33.6 per cent (48 people) in shortage professions. These numbers represent only the quantity of permits from August to December 2012, therefore they are not totally representative for the whole year 2012. Data from 2013 were not available when the report was written. Yet, they are likely to reveal higher numbers of migrants entering Germany, as well as a broader range of relevant sending countries under the Blue Card scheme. While the tables

above provide the numbers of professionals from Asia living in Germany in 2012, they do not offer any information about the length of stay of those migrants, which can be estimated by looking at annual migrant inflows. As the following table and figure show, in 2012, there was an important share of professionals from Asia who came to Germany as temporary migrants between 2009 and 2012.

Table 5.7 Cumulative inflows of professionals from selected Asian countries (2009-2012). Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

China	9,848
India	12,657
Japan	5,849
Ukraine	1,255
Turkey	3,751
Total selected	*23,512*
Total (2009-2012)	**85,490**
Percentage of total selected	35%



Figure 5.2 Cumulative inflows of professionals from selected Asian countries (2009-2012), in per cent. Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

In relation to the total of high-skilled and skilled persons who migrated to Germany over the last four years, migrants from India represent 13 per cent, migrants from China 11 per cent and migrants from Japan six per cent.

Intra-company transferees

Intra-company transfers are common practices in international cooperation and according to Tollenaere (2014) the reasons for a placement abroad can vary; a specific career policy, a long-term project abroad, or the desire of an individual employee (ibid: 239). The maximum permitted duration of residence amounts up to three years. In most cases, after the end of the posting, transferees return to the previous occupation in the sending country (ibid.). Thus, this professional immigrant group represents typical temporary immigrants. The discussed professional immigrant group is not explicitly considered in the Residence Act, but instead in the legal frame of the German occupation regulation that differentiates this group into different transferee realms. Consequently, we can identify the following sub-categories:

- According to Article 10 (1) 1 of the German occupation regulation third country high-skilled persons are considered in the frame of international staff exchange. The relevant personnel requires a university or equivalent degree in order to enter and stay in the context of staff exchange.
- According to Article 10 (1) 2 of the German occupation regulation, third-country professionals are also defined as intra-company transferees, if they arrive with the objective to prepare a business project abroad.
- According to Article 4 of the occupation regulation also chief executives and specialists are considered as intra-company transferees, if they have company-specific special knowledge crucial for the foreign company or if a German-foreign joint venture is established on the base of an interstate agreement.
- According to Article 19 (2) of the occupation regulation, also long-term posted personnel can be subsumed under intra-company transferees.
- In the legal framework under intra-company transferees different types of temporal immigrants are conceptualised. In this report only the two most significant sub-categories for immigration from Asian sending and other relevant transit countries are addressed: international staff exchange and chief executives and specialists, as shown and discussed in the following tables.

Table 5.8 Quantity of international staff exchange (Article 10 (1) 1, Occupation Regulation) selected sending and transit countries, 2006-2012 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF, 2014a: 65)

Country of origin	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
India	1,710	2,225	2,556	2,195	3,031	3,724	4,238
China	591	740	608	472	645	795	753
Russian Federation	107	115	147	74	136	162	144
Japan	187	188	173	150	127	160	151
Philippines	32	62	71	50	108	130	111
Turkey	111	105	166	137	95	116	110

Table 5.8 shows a medium-term development in the numbers of Asian immigrants, who entered and stayed in Germany in the context of international staff exchange. Consequently, the most significant case represents intra-company transfers from India to Germany; the total number of Indian transferees amounted in 2006 to 1,710 persons. This number increased in the following years gradually, amounted in 2010 to 3,031 persons, equivalent to an increase of 77 per cent. In 2012, the total number rose to 4,238 persons, corresponding to an increase of 148 per cent. Chinese intra-company transfers represent the second most important group. In 2006, the number of these transfers amounted to 591 persons that rose in one year by 149 people. In the next two years the quantity decreased and amounted in 2009 to only 472 transferees, equivalent to a decline by 20 per cent. In the following years these numbers began to rise again, and in 2012 the total quantity amounted to 753 persons, corresponding to an increase by 27 per cent in comparison to 2006. Intra-company transferees from the Russian Federation amounted in 2006 to 107 temporal immigrants. After increasing slightly, the absolute numbers reached a low point in 2009 with 74, equivalent to 69 per cent of the total numbers of 2006. In the following years, the numbers rose again and in 2012 they reached 144 persons, corresponding to an increase of 35 per cent in comparison to the base year 2006. The quantity of Japanese students amounted in 2006 to 187 transferees, this number decreased gradually after 2007 to 151 in 2012, meaning a decline by 19 per cent. Finally, intra-company transfers from the Philippines amounted in 2006 to 32 persons. This quantity began to rise in the following years, and reached a peak in 2011 with 130 transferees. These numbers decreased in 2012 slightly by 19 persons to 111 individuals, equivalent to a growth by 247 per cent in relation to the base year 2006. Finally, the case of Turkish

intra-company transferees shows a balanced development; while in 2006 only 111 professionals entered temporally to Germany, in 2012 the entrances decreased only by one to 110 immigrants.

The following Table 5.9 illustrates the medium-term development with regard to the temporal immigration of chief executives and specialists from selected Asian countries of origin to Germany, considered in the following sections.

Table 5.9 Quantity of chief executives and specialists (Article 4, Occupation Regulation), selected sending and transit countries, 2006-2012 Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF, 2014a: 64)

Country of origin	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
China	209	336	447	427	594	758	653
India	71	191	473	783	506	413	547
Korea, Rep.	175	306	353	269	225	248	166
Russian Federation	63	66	94	57	67	85	56
Turkey	58	74	113	59	67	81	70
Japan	71	85	79	77	104	89	48
Malaysia	8	14	18	37	14	28	48

Accordingly, the table shows that chief executives and specialists from China represent the most significant group in this context. In 2006, the number of this group amounted to 209 persons and increased in the following years. In 2011, this development reached a peak with 758, equivalent to an increase of 263 per cent. The numbers decreased slightly in 2012 by 105 persons to a total of 653 transferees, meaning a decrease of 14 per cent in comparison to the previous year. The number of Indian executives and specialists amounted in 2006 to 71 persons. This quantity rose significantly until 2009, reaching an amount of 783 in 2009, corresponding to an increase of 1,003 per cent. This quantity began to decrease again and to to level off at 547 persons in 2012. The number of Korean intra-company transferees amounted in 2006 to 175 persons and rose in the following years. This development reached a peak in 2008 with 353, equivalent to an increase by 102 per cent. In the following years the numbers began to decrease again and amounted in 2012 to 166, meaning a reduction by 5 per cent in comparison to the base year 2006. Turkish chief executives and specialists were represented in Germany in 2006 by 58 persons. After various up and down motions in 2012 the number amounted for 70 intra-company-transferees, equivalent to an increase of around 21 per cent. Finally, in 2006 only eight Malaysian chief executives and specialists obtained a residence permit in Germany, after a changing development the numbers levelled off in 2012 by 48 high-skilled temporal Malaysian immigrants, an increase by 500 per cent in comparison to the base year 2006.

Researchers

The following table 5.10 illustrates a four year trend with regard to residence permissions granted for reseachers from most important Asian countries of origin, addressed in detail below.

Table 5.10 Quantity of residence permission for foreign researchers (Article 20, RA), selected sending and transit countries, 2008-2012 Source: Authors' compilation based on data from Mayer, 2013: 23)

Country of origin	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
					Total	Women
China	11	17	28	53	67	13
India	7	12	24	45	43	13
Russian Federation	7	10	12	21	22	5
Japan	3	14	11	17	26	1

Table 5.10 shows that Chinese researchers, who received residence permission according to Article 20 of the Residence Act constitute the most important group. Accordingly, in 2008 the number of residence permissions amounted to eleven persons. In the following years, this number rose gradually, reaching a peak in 2012 with 67 persons, equivalent to an increase of 509 per cent. The share of wom-

en in the same year was relatively low, accounting for only 19 per cent. In the case of Indian researchers, there is also an observable gradual growth in numbers. While in 2008 the total number amounted to seven persons, in 2012 there was an increase of 514 per cent, equivalent to 67 persons. As opposed to other Indian immigrant categories, the share of women is relatively high with 13 women, corresponding to 20 per cent. The quantity of Russian researchers, who obtained a respective permission for stays, amounted in 2008 to seven persons. Also here an ongoing rise is visible, accounting after four years to an increase of 340 per cent, equivalent to 22 persons. The share of female researchers is accounting for 23 per cent. Finally, in the case of Japan there is also a slow increase notable. While in 2008 the number amounted to three persons, the quantity grew to 26 persons, representing an increase of 767 per cent. In contrast to other immigrant categories, female Japanese researchers are very slightly represented with only one woman in 2012.

It could be demonstrated that in all significant cases of researchers from Asian sending countries the absolute numbers increased over the last four years. Nevertheless, it remains clear that within this table not all existing foreign researchers in Germany are illustrated. Rather the shown numbers refer only to those researchers, who received an explicit residence permit for the objective of accomplishing research in Germany. However, it is worth noting that these numbers neither include third country post-graduates, who stay after studies in Germany, nor researchers, who received a residence permit due to family unification. Moreover, academics with exceptional proficiencies are also not considered, as demonstrated in the following table nine.

Distinguished academics

Finally, Table 5.11 illustrates the quantities of those particular academics, who received immediate settlement permission due to exceptional faculties and its future contribution for the German society, as addressed in detail in the following text.

Table 5.11 Quantity of academics obtained a settlement permit (Article 19, RA), selected sending and transit countries, 2005-2012 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a: 75)

Country of origin	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
								Total	Women
India	3	3	2	10	21	17	38	25	3
Russian Federation	6	1	7	13	6	15	50	23	4
Japan	7	5	9	4	13	5	19	17	0
Turkey	3	3	3	5	5	12	12	7	0

Table 5.11 shows the three most important Asian countries of origin of distinguished academics, who received a settlement permit according to Article 19 of the German Residence Act between 2005 and 2012. Consequently, Indian academics, who obtained settlement permission amounted in 2005 to only three persons. This number rose in the course of the next seven years to a high of 38 persons, equivalent to an increase of over 1.150 per cent. In 2012, this number decreased to 25, which signifies a decline of 34 per cent. The share of women is amounting in the same year to three female academics, corresponding to 12 per cent. Indian academics are followed by those of the Russian Federation. Also here a gradual increase is notable. While in 2005 the total quantity was amounting to six persons, who received settlement permit, the inflow of members of this immigrant group reached a peak in 2011 with 50 persons. In 2012, the number decreased by more than the half to 23 per cent, equivalent to a decline of 54 per cent. The share of women is relatively low with only 15 per cent in 2012. Japanese academics, who obtained a settlement permit were represented in 2005 by seven immigrants. Similar to the other cases the quantity grew over the next seven years to a high point of 19 in 2011, and decreased again by two persons in 2012. Female academics are not represented in the same year. In sum, it can be argued that in all three cases an increase is observable until the year 2011, thereafter the numbers began to decrease again. Finally, the amount of entrances and stays of Turkish distinguished academics was between 2005 and 2007 amounting to constantly three persons. This number

rose gradually to 12 persons between 2010 and 2011 and began to decrease again thereafter.

5.2.1.2 International students

As an operational definition, students are conceived here as those persons, who are engaged in a professional education with the aim to obtain a certification or rather a degree. In this vein, this definition involves university students, participants of language schools, school students (Article 16 of the Residence Act) and vocational training students (Article 17 of the Residence Act). Additionally, we also will address in this category Au-Pair students (Article 12 of the Employment Regulation). Although the category of university students and within this category, those, who obtained the university entrance qualification abroad (*Bildungsausländer*) will receive most attention, also other relevant types will be considered in order to gain a complete picture of this category.

University students are those, who are matriculated in an educational institution of tertiary education and who are according to the UNESCO classification *International Standard Classification of Education* (ISCED) studying for a Bachelor or Master degree or an advanced research programme (Mayer *et al.*, 2012). Foreign university students can be differentiated in two sub-categories:

- *Bildungsausländer* are those foreign people, who obtained the university entrance qualification abroad, and after the recognition of the entrance qualification they start to study in a German university (Isserstedt & Kandulla, 2010). Although the differentiation gives neither information about the nationality nor about the residence title, it is however assumable that the majority of this group are university students from foreign countries, who arrived to Germany with the particular objective of university study.
- *Bildungsinländer* are foreign persons, who achieved the university entrance certificate in Germany or in a German school in a foreign country. Accordingly, the majority of this group are persons, who were born in Germany or who have lived for a long period in the country (Mayer *et al.*, 2012). This means that it is reasonable to assume that the major parts of this group are immigrants of the second or third generation, meaning family members of previously immigrated persons.

Language school participants are people, who come to Germany with the aim to study the German language and to obtain a language certification. According to Article 16 (5) of the Residence Act, a temporal residence permit for participating in a language course can be granted. An occupation is not permitted.

Vocational training students are foreigners, who arrive to the country to accomplish a professional training (*Berufsausbildung*). According to Article 17 of the Residence Act, foreigners from third countries, including from Asian countries, can receive a residence permit for the purpose of occupational education and training. The grant depends on the approval of the Federal Employment Agency, as far as the education or training is not covered by the Employment Regulation, or covered by intergovernmental agreements.

Finally, Au-Pair Students are young persons who stay for a limited time in a foreign country with the objective to live with a host family. The Au-Pair student supports the family temporarily with childcare and housework. In return the student receives free accommodation, meals, and a small allowance. The main aim is a common cultural exchange. In addition, the Au-Pair students should deepen the language knowledge by participating in a language school and by practising the language in the family (Au-PairWorld, 2014). According to Article 12 of the Employment Regulation, Au-Pair students require basic knowledge of the German language, need to be younger than 27 years of age, and the mother tongue of the host family needs to be German. Finally, the residence permission can be granted for up to one year.

According to the *Federal Statistical Office* (*Statistisches Bundesamt*), the total number of all foreign students from Asia amounted in the winter semester 2012/2013 to 84,097 (2013: 377) people, whereby 44 per cent were represented by women. The number of the same group of students, who started in the winter semester 2012/2013 accounted for 10,649 (ibid.). Almost 13 per cent of the total number of Asian students has enrolled only in the winter semester 2012/13. This indicates that the involvement of foreign Asian students in German Universities represents an increasingly significant trend that is assumedly related to the foreign student-friendly reforms in the German immigration policies of the last years. On the other hand the share of women reaches 46 per cent in the winter semester, showing that the proportion of men and women remained constant in relation to the total numbers in the referred semester.

Table 5.12 Quantity of university students from selected sending and transit countries in Germany, winter semester 2012/13, by sex (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by the Federal Statistical Office (2013b: 377f)

Country of origin	Total number			First semester		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
China	27,364	13,614	13,750	6,259	2,847	3,412
Georgia	2,245	626	1,619	320	113	207
India	7,532	5,792	1,740	2,535	1,991	544
Indonesia	3,046	1,732	1,314	952	545	407
Japan	2,213	752	1,461	707	244	463
Pakistan	2,523	2,169	354	667	571	96
Korea, Rep.	5,287	2,014	3,273	1,133	386	747
Syria	2,575	2,053	522	329	264	65
Turkey	30,645	16,427	14,218	6,480	3,133	3,347
Ukraine	9,044	2,789	6,255	1,591	501	1,090
Vietnam	5,155	2,752	2,403	1,133	575	558

Table 5.12 shows the total share of foreign university students of selected countries. The ten most significant countries of origin are represented by Turkey with a very high share of 27 per cent, China with a high share of 24 per cent (27,364), India with seven per cent (7,532), Republic of Korea with five per cent (5,287), Vietnam with 4 per cent (5,155), Indonesia with three per cent (3,046), Syria with two per cent (2,575), Pakistan with two per cent (2,523), Georgia with two per cent (2,245) and Japan with a proportion of two per cent (2,213) of all students from Asia. Also Ukrainian students play an important role in this context; with 9,044 international students in the winter semester 2012/13 this group represents quantitatively one of the most important sending countries to Germany. While the share of women and men of the total number of Chinese university students is almost balanced, males are dominant among university students from Syria with 80 per cent, from India with 77 per cent and from Indonesia with 57 per cent. On the other hand, females are highly represented among university students from Georgia with 72 per cent, from Ukraine with 69 per cent, from Japan with 66 per cent, and from the Republic of Korea with 62 per cent. These varying gender-related shares are likely to be related to cultural and religious aspects in the respective countries of origin, which needs to be analysed in detail, in order to understand the existing differences.

The share of foreign people, who obtained the university entrance qualification abroad (*Bildungsausländer*) amounted in 2012 to 86 per cent (72,483 persons) of the total quantity, showing that the majority of the relevant university students were neither born in Germany, nor had remained over a long period in the country. The share of university students, who started to study in Germany in the winter semester 2012/2013, amounted to 24 per cent, showing that the percentage of university beginners among the group of *Bildungsausländer* is 11 per cent higher than in the framework of the university beginners that include all kinds of foreign university beginners. The balanced share of men and women is also reflected in this context: around 44 per cent of all *Bildungsausländer* are represented by women, as well as 45 per cent of the university beginners. This empirical information indicates that the majority university students of relevant sending and transit countries have arrived in Germany with the purpose of accomplishing a university degree and that most of them are not immigrants of the second or third generation.

Furthermore, the numbers indicate that this influx is increasing recently, because the share of the university beginners is relatively high with 24 per cent (Federal Statistical Office, 2013a: 397). The following table shows the country-specific distribution of *Bildungsausländer* from eleven selected sending and transit countries.

Table 5.13 Quantity of Bildungsausländer students from selected sending and transit countries, winter semester 2012/13 by sex (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by the Federal Statistical Office (2013b: 397f)

Country of origin	Total number			First semester		
	Total	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**	**Men**	**Women**
China	25,564	12,721	12,843	6,001	2,723	3,278
Georgia	2,116	575	1,541	301	108	193
India	7,255	5,618	1,637	2.484	1.961	523
Indonesia	2,875	1,642	1,233	926	534	392
Japan	1,908	639	1,269	655	224	431
Pakistan	2,228	1,983	245	601	530	71
Korea, Rep.	4,279	1,574	2,705	996	327	669
Syria	2,345	1,919	426	285	236	49
Turkey	6,666	4,024	2,642	1,819	891	928
Ukraine	6,264	1,456	4,808	1,119	285	834
Vietnam	2,717	1,485	1,232	469	248	221

Table 5.13 shows that China with 32 per cent, India with nine per cent, Turkey with eight per cent, Ukraine with seven per cent and the Republic of Korea with five per cent are the most significant countries of origin in comparison to all Asian *Bildungsausländer* in Germany, whereby Chinese university students are significantly more represented than any other student group. There are country-specific differences with regard to gender-related shares. The share of men (49.7 per cent) and women (50.3 per cent) is very balanced in the case of university students from China. In contrast, female students from Pakistan with eleven per cent, from Syria with 18 per cent and from India with 22 per cent are highly underrepresented in the total numbers of *Bildungsausländer*. On the other hand, females from Ukraine with 77 per cent, from Georgia with 73 per cent, from Japan with 67 per cent and from South Korea with 63 per cent are highly represented in Germany. Similarly, these imbalances are reflected in the female and male share of university beginners. As noted above, the reasons for this imbalance are in many cases related to cultural, religious, as well as political factors in the sending countries, which require an in-depth analysis. It is notable that inflows from China are very balanced regarding the gender distribution that influence essentially the whole men/women dispersion due to the fact that China represents the most significant source country of *Bildungsausländer*.

After illustrating the numbers of foreign university students and those of the *Bildungsausländer* and discussing relevant aspects, we will turn to the fields of study, in which the Asian *Bildungsausländer* obtained their university degrees in 2012 as illustrated in Table 5.14. This is particularly interesting in order to understand, what the motivation for *Bildungsausländer* is to stay and study particularly in Germany.

Table 5.14 Quantity of foreign graduates (*Bildungsausländer*) from selected sending and transit countries in 2012, by academic disciplines (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a: 87)

Country of origin	Total foreign graduates	Bildungsausländer								
		Total	Linguistic and Cultural science	Law, Social science, Economics	Maths, Natural sciences	Engineering	Human medicine	Art, Art studies	Others
China	4,919	4,640	399	1,117	788	1,954	93	202	87
India	1,069	1,039	22	167	347	440	23	5	35
Indonesia	552	530	27	196	82	148	25	11	41
Japan	326	257	42	21	14	13	8	154	5
Pakistan	342	325	10	23	116	136	10	1	28
Russian Fed.	2,218	1,745	453	705	219	182	57	99	30
Korea, Rep.	930	764	63	51	33	63	24	516	14
Turkey	2,980	943	108	236	203	286	41	39	30
Ukraine	1,524	1,127	285	460	160	103	43	49	27
Vietnam	669	471	16	165	106	157	8	3	16
Belarus	339	300	96	120	33	16	17	13	5

Table 5.14 shows the total number of foreign graduates, who received their university entrance qualification abroad, those we have termed here as *Bildungsausländer*, divided according to the academic discipline in that they conclude their university studies. Consequently, it is shown that Chinese, Turkish, Indian, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Ukrainian and Pakistani, Belarusian, and *Bildungsausländer* from the Russian Federation graduated predominately in one of the following academic disciplines a) law, economics or social science, b) mathematics and natural science, or in c) engineering: Chinese university students hold the major share of *Bildungsausländer* with 4,640 people, who graduated in 2012. About 42 per cent of all Chinese *Bildungsausländer* graduated in engineering and 24 per cent obtained a degree in law, social science or economics. Meanwhile, 17 per cent of the students received a degree in mathematics or natural science. A similar trend is observable in the case of Indian and Turkish university students, 42 per cent of the 1,035 Indian *Bildungsausländer* graduated in engineering (30 per cent of Turkish students), and 33 per cent in mathematics or natural sciences (22 per cent of Turkish students). *Bildungsausländer* from Indonesia graduated with 28 per cent mainly in engineering and 37 per cent in law, social science or economics. Foreign university students from Vietnam predominately graduated in law, economics, or social science with a share of 35 per cent, and engineering with 33 per cent. Ukrainian *Bildungsausländer* put the mass centre of studies to law, economics or social science with 41 per cent. Pakistani foreign students graduated in 2012 mainly in engineering with 42 per cent, followed by mathematics or natural sciences with 36 per cent. Foreign students from Belarus graduated mostly in law, economics, or social sciences. Finally, also *Bildungsausländer* from the Russian Federation graduated predominantly in law, economics, or social sciences with a total share of 40 per cent.

The main area of studies was differing in the case of *Bildungsausländer* from Japan. Here the majority (60 per cent) graduated in arts or art studies. Similar to Japan, also Korean *Bildungsausländer* graduated with 68 per cent principally in arts or art studies.

While the previous tables have offered a general overview of Asian university students in Germany, and have revealed the main academic disciplines in which foreign student groups have graduated, the quantitative development of immigration for the purpose of university studies of the last years was not addressed, which is accomplished in the following tables 5.15 and 5.16.

Table 5.15 Quantity of *Bildungsausländer* students from seven sending and transit countries, development in medium-term, 1999-2011 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by DAAD/HIS, 2013

China			India			Korea, Rep.		
Year	Number	1999=100	Year	Number	1999=100	Year	Number	1999=100
1999	5.054	100,0	1999	622	100,0	1999	3.764	100,0
2000	6.179	122,3	2000	853	137,1	2000	3.661	97,3
2001	8.745	173,0	2001	1.120	180,1	2001	3.605	95,8
2002	13.523	267,6	2002	1.745	280,5	2002	3.729	99,1
2003	19.374	383,3	2003	2.920	469,5	2003	3.899	103,6
2004	24.095	476,8	2004	3.697	594,4	2004	3.775	100,3
2005	25.987	514,2	2005	3.807	612,1	2005	3.830	101,8
2006	26.061	515,7	2006	3.583	576,0	2006	3.875	102,9
2007	25.651	507,5	2007	3.431	551,6	2007	4.030	107,1
2008	23.983	474,5	2008	3.217	517,2	2008	3.963	105,3
2009	23.140	457,9	2009	3.236	520,3	2009	4.136	109,9
2010	22.779	450,7	2010	3.821	614,3	2010	4.193	111,4
2011	22.828	451,7	2011	4.825	775,7	2011	4.224	112,2

Russian Federation			Turkey			Ukraine		
Year	Number	1999=100	Year	Number	1999=100	Year	Number	1999=100
1999	4.280	100,0	1999	6.306	100,0	1999	1.841	100,0
2000	5.045	117,9	2000	4.774	75,7	2000	2.386	129,6
2001	5.955	139,1	2001	5.104	80,9	2001	3.067	166,6
2002	7.098	165,8	2002	5.188	82,3	2002	4.049	219,9
2003	8.113	189,6	2003	5.728	90,8	2003	4.975	270,2
2004	8.906	208,1	2004	6.474	102,7	2004	5.825	316,4
2005	9.594	224,2	2005	6.587	104,5	2005	6.532	354,8
2006	9.826	229,6	2006	7.077	112,2	2006	6.928	376,3
2007	9.951	232,5	2007	7.180	113,9	2007	6.950	377,5
2008	9.502	222,0	2008	6.911	109,6	2008	6.404	347,9
2009	9.740	227,6	2009	6.711	106,4	2009	6.324	343,5
2010	9.764	228,1	2010	6.635	105,2	2010	6.326	343,6
2011	10.077	235,4	2011	6.575	104,3	2011	6.204	337,0

Vietnam		
Year	Number	1999=100
1999	542	100,0
2000	511	94,3
2001	582	107,4
2002	662	122,1
2003	850	156,8
2004	1.199	221,2
2005	1.668	307,7
2006	2.148	396,3
2007	2.366	436,5
2008	2.507	462,5
2009	2.515	464,0
2010	2.576	475,3
2011	2.602	480,1

Table 5.15 shows the seven most important countries of origin of international students (*Bildungsausländer*), including an overview of the quantitative development over the last 13 years. Accordingly, the quantity of Chinese *Bildungsausländer* has increased from 5,054 students in 1999 to 22,828 students in 2011, corresponding to an increase of 352 per cent. Over the last 13 years, China represented by far the sending country with the highest absolute numbers of *Bildungsausländer* students, who enter Germany. In line with this fact, the most significant peak in the immigration of *Bildungsausländer* was reached between 2005 and 2006, where a growth of over 400 per cent was achieved. Turkish *Bildungsausländer* represent the second strongest group; while in 1999 around 6,306 students entered into Germany. However, after 13 year the increase was slightly, it amounted to 6,575 persons, corresponding to an increase of only four per cent.

Similar to the Chinese case the entrance of Indian *Bildungsausländer* has risen significantly over the last years. While in 1999 the total number of this particular group was amounting to 622, in 2011 this quantity rose by 676 per cent, equivalent to 4,825 students. Educational immigration to Germany has increased importantly after 2003. In comparison to 2001, in 2003 the influx climbed by nearly 300 per cent.

In the case of Ukrainian *Bildungsausländer* the total number of immigrants corresponding to this group was accounting to 1,804 people. Over 13 years this number grew by 237 per cent that is equivalent to 6,204 *Bildungsausländer* in Germany. A significant peak was reached between 2005 and 2007, where the percentage increased to over 350 per cent. Finally, also an important growth is observable in the case of Vietnam. In 1999, only 542 Vietnamese students entered Germany, this number rose by 380 per cent in 2011 with a total quantity of 2,602 *Bildungsausländer* students. In the case of the Republic of Korea, the increase of *Bildungsausländer* between 1999 and 2011 amounted only to 460 students, equivalent to a growth of 12 per cent.

The presented numbers provide an overview of the general development regarding the entrance of Asians and other relevant nationalities to Germany with the objective to carry out a university study. This overview shows that the quantity of influxes of international students from relevant countries has increased over the last 13 years nearly in all cases strongly. However, these numbers do not give any information about the performance of these students, meaning if these students could conclude their university studies successfully. This, in turn could provide further information about qualitative aspects of this immigration group, as addressed in the following Table 5.16.

Table 5.16 Quantity of foreign graduates (Bildungsausländer) from eight sending and transit countries, medium-term development 2000-2011 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by DAAD/HIS, 2013)

China			India			Indonesia		
Graduation year	Number	2000=100	Graduation year	Number	2000=100	Graduation year	Number	2000=100
2000	511	100,0	2000	59	100,0	2000	140	100,0
2001	608	119,0	2001	91	154,2	2001	226	161,4
2002	823	161,1	2002	164	278,0	2002	229	163,6
2003	1.046	204,7	2003	234	396,6	2003	281	200,7
2004	1.443	282,4	2004	445	754,2	2004	288	205,7
2005	2.227	435,8	2005	767	1.300,0	2005	359	256,4
2006	2.919	571,2	2006	814	1.379,7	2006	351	250,7
2007	3.815	746,6	2007	814	1.379,7	2007	362	258,6
2008	4.388	858,7	2008	709	1.201,7	2008	498	355,7
2009	4.489	878,5	2009	728	1.233,9	2009	461	329,3
2010	4.437	868,3	2010	756	1.281,4	2010	462	330,0
2011	4.563	893,0	2011	909	1.540,7	2011	576	411,4

Korea, Rep.			Russian Federation			Turkey		
Graduation year	Number	2000=100	Graduation year	Number	2000=100	Graduation year	Number	2000=100
2000	410	100,0	2000	338	100,0	2000	419	100,0
2001	425	103,7	2001	418	123,7	2001	405	96,7
2002	399	97,3	2002	470	139,1	2002	460	109,8
2003	467	113,9	2003	575	170,1	2003	452	107,9
2004	508	123,9	2004	717	212,1	2004	542	129,4
2005	553	134,9	2005	938	277,5	2005	728	173,7
2006	526	128,3	2006	1.116	330,2	2006	756	180,4
2007	664	162,0	2007	1.204	356,2	2007	874	208,6
2008	665	162,2	2008	1.308	387,0	2008	856	204,3
2009	727	177,3	2009	1.444	427,2	2009	920	219,6
2010	762	185,9	2010	1.533	453,6	2010	866	206,7
2011	755	184,1	2011	1.661	491,4	2011	972	232,0

Ukraine			Vietnam		
Graduation year	Number	2000=100	Graduation year	Number	2000=100
2000	119	100,0	2000	73	100,0
2001	190	159,7	2001	61	83,6
2002	242	203,4	2002	92	126,0
2003	291	244,5	2003	98	134,2
2004	374	314,3	2004	94	128,8
2005	474	398,3	2005	106	145,2
2006	578	485,7	2006	163	223,3
2007	757	636,1	2007	207	283,6
2008	890	747,9	2008	228	312,3
2009	983	826,1	2009	332	454,8
2010	1.039	873,1	2010	319	437,0
2011	1.038	872,3	2011	421	576,7

Table 5.16 shows the eight most important Asian and related countries of origin of graduated *Bildungsausländer* students, including an overview of the total numbers of university graduates over 12 years. Accordingly, the table shows that in all eight cases the number of graduates has increased over the last 12 years. While in 2000 only 59 Indian *Bildungsausländer* finished successfully their studies, after 12 years an increase of 1,441 per cent could be achieved, meaning that in 2011, 909 Indian stu-

dents could conclude their university studies. Although Chinese student graduations rose only by 793 per cent, the total number of graduates in 2011 was with 4,563 four times higher than in the case of India, whereby significant increases in graduates could be accomplished above all between 2005 and 2011. Therewith is China by far the most important Asian supplier of successful international students since 2000. Also the number of Ukrainian *Bildungsausländer*, who finished their studies successfully, has ascended in the last years. While in 2000 only 119 students graduated, this number climbed by 772 per cent to 1,038 university graduates in 2011. A considerable increase in graduates is also observable in the case of countries within the Russian Federation. This immigrant group achieved an increment of 391 per cent after a period of 12 years. Finally, also Vietnamese students' graduation rose importantly; while in 2000 only 73 students graduated, after 12 years this number rose to 421, representing an increase of 477 per cent.

Table 5.17 Distribution of *Bildungsausländer* students from selected sending and transit countries in federal state, 2012 (absolute numbers and percentages) (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by DAAD/HIS, 2013)

Baden-Wuerttemberg	Number	in % per state
China	3,429	12.5
Russian Federation	1,238	4.5
Turkey	1,010	3.7
India	875	3.2
Ukraine	735	2.7
Korea, Rep.	682	2.5

Bavaria	Number	in % per state
China	2,416	11.0
Russian Federation	1,232	5.6
Ukraine	919	4.2
Turkey	664	3.0
India	624	2.8
Korea, Rep.	468	2.1

Berlin	Number	in % per state
China	1,541	7.6
Russian Federation	1,088	5.4
Turkey	676	3.3
Korea, Rep.	512	2.5
Ukraine	497	2.4
India	358	1.8
Indonesia	338	1.7
Vietnam	290	1.4

Brandenburg	Number	in % per state
Russian Federation	524	10.6
China	318	6.4
Ukraine	199	4.0
Turkey	116	2.3
India	100	2.0
Indonesia	91	1.8
Georgia	79	1.6
Vietnam	62	1.3
Belarus	54	1.1

Bremen	Number	in % per state
China	350	9.5
India	167	4.6
Russian Federation	166	4.5
Turkey	129	3.5
Pakistan	119	3.2
Ukraine	106	2.9
Indonesia	71	1.9
Korea, Rep.	68	1.9
Nepal	64	1.7
Georgia	54	1.5
Vietnam	48	1.3

Hamburg	Number	in % per state
China	669	10.4
Russian Federation	420	6.6
Ukraine	302	4.7
Turkey	249	3.9
India	177	2.8
Korea, Rep.	131	2.0
Vietnam	114	1.8
Indonesia	91	1.4

Hesse	Number	in % per state
China	1,712	9.7
Russian Federation	886	5.0
Ukraine	745	4.2
Turkey	692	3.9
India	572	3.3
Korea, Rep.	301	1.7
Vietnam	266	1.5
Pakistan	251	1.4

Lower Saxony	Number	in % per state
China	2,214	19.0
Russian Federation	612	5.3
Turkey	478	4.1
India	327	2.8
Ukraine	307	2.6
Vietnam	269	2.3
Korea, Rep.	262	2.3
Indonesia	249	2.1
Syria	212	1.8

Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	Number	in % per state
China	208	10.7
Russian Federation	138	7.1
India	100	5.1
Syria	84	4.3
Ukraine	58	3.0
Vietnam	46	2.4
Korea, Rep.	40	2.1
Turkey	36	1.8
Armenia	33	1.7
Japan	31	1.6
Pakistan	28	1.4

Saxony	Number	in % per state
China	1,581	15.3
Russian Federation	556	5.4
Vietnam	319	3.1
India	312	3.0
Ukraine	305	2.9
Korea, Rep.	221	2.1
Syria	151	1.5
Turkey	128	1.2

North Rhine-Westphalia	Number	in % per state
China	5,803	13.2
Russian Federation	2,242	5.1
Turkey	1,912	4.4
India	1,413	3.2
Ukraine	1,165	2.7
Korea, Rep.	1,067	2.4
Indonesia	661	1.5

Rhineland-Palatinate	Number	in % per state
China	716	8.6
Russian Federation	471	5.7
Ukraine	403	4.8
Turkey	206	2.5
India	178	2.1
Korea, Rep.	135	1.6
Belarus	105	1.3
Syria	95	1.1

Saarland	Number	in % per state
China	220	6.9
Russian Federation	108	3.4
India	99	3.1
Korea, Rep.	86	2.7
Turkey	66	2.1
Ukraine	66	2.1
Syria	49	1.5
Georgia	42	1.3
Indonesia	42	1.3

Saxony-Anhalt	Number	in % per state
China	1,667	36.3
Russian Federation	263	5.7
Ukraine	194	4.2
India	187	4.1
Vietnam	134	2.9
Syria	106	2.3
Korea, Rep.	69	1.5
Pakistan	67	1.5
Turkey	57	1.2
Indonesia	46	1.0

Schleswig-Holstein	Number	in % per state
China	311	10.4
Russian Federation	192	6.4
India	115	3.9
Turkey	102	3.4
Ukraine	92	3.1
Syria	83	2.8
Vietnam	58	1.9
Pakistan	53	1.8
Israel	48	1.6
Indonesia	47	1.6

Thuringia	Number	in % per state
China	728	19.9
Russian Federation	265	7.3
India	141	3.9
Syria	117	3.2
Ukraine	107	2.9
Vietnam	100	2.7
Korea, Rep.	95	2.6
Pakistan	68	1.9
Turkey	63	1.7
Georgia	47	1.3

Table 5.17 illustrates the distribution of *Bildungsausländer* students from Asian and other relevant other countries in 2012. Accordingly, in quantitative terms Chinese *Bildungsausländer* are mostly represented in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia with 5,803 students representing 13 per cent of all *Bildungsausländer* in the federal entity, followed by Baden-Wuerttemberg with 3,429 (12.5 per cent), Bavaria with 2,416 equivalent to 11 per cent, by Lower Saxony with 2,214 students (19 per cent) and by Hesse with 1,712 *Bildungsausländer* corresponding to nine per cent. The highest percentage in relation to all *Bildungsausländer* is achieved in Saxony-Anhalt, where 36 per cent of all students are represented by students from China. *Bildungsausländer* from the Russian Federation are mainly concentrated in total numbers in North Rhine-Westphalia with 2,242 persons equal to five per cent, followed by Baden-Wuerttemberg with 1,238 (4.5 per cent) and by Bavaria with 1,232 students equivalent to around six per cent. The highest percentage in relation to all *Bildungsausländer* is reached in Brandenburg, where almost 11 per cent of all students are represented by students from the Russian Federation. Indian *Bildungsausländer* students are mainly represented in North Rhine-Westphalia with 1,413 corresponding to three per cent, followed by Baden-Wuerttemberg with 875 equal to three per cent and by Bavaria with 624, equivalent to around three per cent of all *Bildungsausländer* stu-

dents. The highest percentage in relation to all *Bildungsausländer* is achieved in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where five per cent of all students are represented by students from India. Ukrainian *Bildungsausländer* students are mostly represented in North Rhine-Westphalia with 1,165 equivalent to 2.7 per cent, in the state of Bavaria with 919 (four per cent) and in Hesse with 745 corresponding to four per cent. The highest percentage is reached in Rhineland-Palatinate with 4.8 per cent. Finally, *Bildungsausländer* from Vietnam are highly represented in Saxony with 319 people (three per cent), in Lower Saxony with 269 (two per cent) and in Hesse with 266 equivalent to 1.5 per cent. The highest share among all *Bildungsausländer* is reached in Saxony with three per cent. Turkish and Ukrainian *Bildungsausländer* are in absolute numbers concentrated in North Rhine-Westphalia with 1,912 and 1,165 persons, which is followed by temporal residences in Baden Wuerttemberg in the Turkish case with 1,010 and by temporal residences in Bavaria in the Ukrainian case with 919 students.

It is clear that the total number of *Bildungsausländer* is strongly related to the size of each federal state, meaning that according to the population size also the number of universities is increasing, which should attract more international students. Nonetheless this table gives an idea where certain *Bildungsausländer* are mostly focused in Germany, but also first information about migrant ties, such as in the case of Vietnamese students, who are concentrated in states of East Germany that other foreign student groups not prefer. Most likely this stays in close relation to migrant networks that connect recently entering foreign students with previously immigrated Vietnamese labourers.

While the tables above provide the migrant stock in the category international students from Asia in 2012, the following table and figure highlight the temporariness by showing the annual inflows of university students from Asian countries between 2009 and 2012. More than one quarter of migrants in this category were represented by students from the five most important Asian sending countries China (13 per cent), Turkey (five per cent), India (four per cent), Ukraine (three per cent) and Republic of Korea (two per cent).

5.18 Cumulative inflows of international students from selected Asian countries (2009-2012). Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

China	26,974
India	9,255
Korea, Rep.	5,351
Ukraine	6,264
Turkey	9,671
Total selected	*47,844*
Total (2009-2012)	**204,644**
Percentage of total selected	27%



Figure 5.3 Cumulative inflows of professionals from selected Asian countries (2009-2012), in per cent. Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

Finally, it is important to note that the analytical category of international students (graduates) can shift into other immigrant categories, such as independent job seekers. The discussion will turn back to post-graduate job seekers after addressing student stays beyond university studies.

Language school students

While university students are the most significant student group, there are, as noted above, also other Asian students groups, who enter Germany temporarily in order to obtain a qualification. The following Table 5.19 illustrates an eight year development of students, who arrived in Germany with the objective to study in a language school. The medium-term trends, according to the respective countries of origin, are discussed subsequently.

Table 5.19 Quantity of entrances of foreign language students from selected sending and transit countries, 2005-2012 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a: 90)

Country of origin	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
								Total	Women
China	170	345	465	355	270	415	396	435	234
Japan	155	268	272	248	237	256	293	341	241
Korea, Rep.	104	191	271	209	182	211	213	263	176
Russian Federation	114	127	164	152	144	162	212	255	175
Thailand	105	196	208	168	151	181	158	154	110
Turkey	113	103	116	106	98	102	108	140	57

Table 5.19 shows that the number of language students from China amounted in 2005 to 170 students. After eight years, this number rose by 156 per cent to 435 language students. A peak was reached in 2007, when 465 language students entered the country. The share of gender was as in all Chinese student categories very balanced, observable in the share of females in 2012 that amounted to 54 per cent. Language students from Japan were represented in 2005 by 155 persons. This number rose in 2012 to 341, equivalent to an increase of 120 per cent. In the same year, the share of women was disproportionally high with 71 per cent. Finally, the number of Thai language students was amounting to 105 in 2005. This quantity climbed slightly by 47 per cent to 154 persons. Similar to the case of Japan, the share of women is with 71 per cent very high. It remains clear that language school students embody in contrast to university students a very small immigration group that is represented mostly by short-term temporary immigrants.

Foreign apprentices *(Auszubildende)*

Table 5.20 illustrates an eight year trend of foreigners, who entered Germany with the aim to carry out a vocational training. The medium-term quantitative development of the specific apprentices is addressed in the following sections.

Table 5.20 Quantity of entrances of apprentices from selected sending and transit countries, 2005-2012 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a: 91)

Country of origin	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
								total	women
China	330	631	738	781	549	537	596	447	219
India	111	162	277	346	303	313	389	351	68
Philippines	30	108	110	83	137	136	105	137	7
Russian Federation	273	431	459	515	525	430	260	132	81
Japan	71	103	121	144	121	135	142	118	40
Turkey	124	83	91	169	123	136	108	114	45
Ukraine	129	195	228	147	156	193	158	86	45

Accordingly, the number of Chinese students who accomplished a vocational training amounted in 2005 to 330 persons. This number increased one year later by 91 per cent to 631 Chinese immigrants. In the following year, this number increased again to a total amount of 738 persons. A quantitative peak was reached in 2008 with 781 Chinese trainees, representing an increase of 24 per cent in comparison to 2006. In the subsequent year the total number began to decrease again, reaching only 447 Chinese immigrants in 2012, who entered with the purpose of accomplishing a professional training. In comparison to 2008 this trend signifies a decrease of 43 per cent. The share of women was amounting in the same year to 219, equivalent to 49 per cent, who entered Germany in 2012. In the case of Indian immigrants, who entered the country in order to carry out a vocational training, the medium-term development was progressing in a different way. In 2005, only 111 Indian apprentices arrived in Germany. In the following years, the number increased gradually and reached a peak in 2011 with 389, corresponding to a growth of 250 per cent. In 2012, the quantity declined slightly by ten per cent to a total number of 351. As in any relevant student sub-category, also in the case of Indian trainees, the share of women was significantly low, corresponding to only 19 per cent of the whole quantity in 2012. Also Philippine immigrants play a role in the context of vocational training. Consequently, in 2005 the number of this immigrant group was amounting to only 30 trainees. This number rose over the last year and stabilized by 137 Philippine apprentices in 2012. It is important to highlight the very low share of women in 2012. Accordingly, women were represented by only seven immigrants, equivalent to five per cent of the whole number in the noted year. Turkish apprentices were represented in 2006 by 124 persons. After an up and down motion over the next six years, in 2012 the number of Turkish students amounted to 114 persons in 2012, equivalent to a slight decrease of eight per cent in comparison to 2006. Finally, the number of Ukrainian apprentices was amounting in 2005 to 129 persons. The number increased until 2007 by 177 per cent. Thereafter, the numbers began to decrease again, amounting in 2012 to only 86 immigrants, equivalent to 67 per cent of the total number of 2005. The share of women was moderate in 2012 with 45 female immigrants, which is equivalent to 52 per cent. With the exception of Philippine apprentices, after an initial increase in all cases, the number began to decrease again until the year 2012. Furthermore, the cases of Philippine and Indian apprentices show a very low share of female immigrants. The particular reasons cannot be revealed by the existing quantitative information and need a more profound analysis.

A specific form of vocational training is the formation of nurses, often still in the country of origin, who then migrate to a developed country, including Germany, generally for a limited period of time to work. Temporary, predominantly female, migration from developing countries to Europe for the purpose of care has been organised in different schemes and supported by governments of developing countries, particularly in Asia, in the context of development policies. One example is the government of Sri Lanka, which prepares prospective migrant women with language courses and professional training for their stay in Italy and attends to them while they are abroad. The Philippines organise temporary emigration of women for care work in the context of bilateral agreements with different countries, including Germany. Yet, other countries restrict emigration policies for women; India only allows women above the age of 30 to emigrate for care work, assuming that they will already have a family to remit to and the intention to return after a certain period of time (Kontos, 2010).

Before the reforms related to skilled and high-skilled immigration – due to the shortage of personnel in the care sector – foreign qualified nurses with sufficient language skills could already come to Germany for temporary work under Article 30 (BeschV alt), provided that the German government found an agreement with the labour administration in the country of origin. Since 2013, the immigration of nurses is regulated under the general legislation for immigration of high-skilled workers who have completed vocational training in the country of origin in Article 6, Section 2 (BeschV neu). Since early 2013, the German Federal Employment Agency (*Bundesagentur für Arbeit*) maintains agreements about the temporary placement of care personnel with the Philippines, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Tunisia. There are also negotiations with China about the placement of 150 Chinese working in geriatric care in Germany. Numbers of employees in the care sector, who have migrated to Germany in the context of these schemes, are relatively small. The number of placements decreased between 1996 and 1999 from 398 to 74 persons, and increased again to 358 persons in 2002. In 2011, 100 caregivers came to Germany under this scheme, in 2012 the number increased to 141 (BAMF, 2014a: 70-71).

Au-pair students

Table 5.21 shows an eight year trend of foreigners, who came to Germany with the intention to perform an Au-Pair stay. The medium-term quantitative advance of the specific Au-Pair students is discussed in continuation.

Table 5.21 Numbers of Au-Pair students from selected sending and transit countries, 2006-2012 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data of BAMF (2014a: 72)

Country of origin	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
China	284	354	431	413	425	397	393
Indonesia	132	127	190	194	214	169	190
Georgia	1,444	761	725	721	701	800	792
Madagascar	22	54	86	70	66	106	171
Mongolia	192	120	96	86	89	161	165
Kyrgyzstan	386	545	428	315	287	305	243
Russian Federation	1,610	1,415	1,128	1,058	1,026	863	729
Ukraine	1,855	1,489	1,133	1,118	1,155	1,103	1,067

Consequently, the number of Chinese Au-Pair students amounted in 2006 to 284. After gradually increasing in the subsequent years, a peak was reached in 2008 with 431 Au-Pairs, equivalent to 151 per cent in comparison to the base year 2006. Georgia is also representing a significant country of origin for Au-Pair students. While in 2006 1,444 Au-Pair students arrived in Germany, this high number decreased gradually in the following years and reached only 792 students in 2012, corresponding to 45 per cent of the base year 2006. Finally, the most significant country of origin is represented by Ukraine; those Au-Pair numbers also decreased over the years. While in 2006 the number was amounting to 1,855 students, who entered Germany, this number decreased gradually and reached a low point of 1,067 persons in 2012, equivalent to 43 per cent of the base year 2006.

5.2.1.3 Independent job seekers

Independent job seekers are those skilled or high-skilled foreigners, who enter with the objective to search for an adequate job opportunity. Furthermore, foreign nationals, who conclude university studies in Germany, can be perceived as part of this subcategory. The following legal reforms permit independent job seekers from Asia the entrance to Germany:

According to the German version of the Implementation of the EU-Directive for High-qualified Persons of August 2012, manifested in Article 18c of the Residence Act, third country professionals (with a German university degree, as well as a recognised or equivalent foreign university degree) obtain the permission to enter Germany with the objective to search for an appropriate occupation. The permission is limited for up to six months and the exercise of an occupation is not allowed in this period. Limited residence permission is also awardable for foreign professionals, who already stay in Germany (BAMF, 2013b).

According to Article 16 (5b) of the Residence Act, skilled persons, who completed a vocational training in Germany, obtain the right for a temporal residence permit of one year to search for an appropriate occupation. This group has the right to exercise an occupation in this period.

Moreover, also third country German university graduates have, according to Article 16 (4) of the Residence Act, the right to stay in the country after finishing studies for a period of 18 months (extended in 2012 from 12 to 18 months) to search for an occupation.

Table 5.22 Quantity of residence permits for university graduates of selected sending and transit countries, by sex as constituted on 31 December 2012 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a: 88)

Country of origin	Total	Share of women	
		Quantity	Percentage
China	1,168	588	50.3
Russian Federation	308	242	78.6
India	218	44	20.2
Ukraine	188	145	77.1
Turkey	180	63	35
Korea, Rep.	163	107	65.6
Indonesia	108	53	49.1
Vietnam	97	47	48.5
Pakistan	79	7	8.9
Taiwan	59	43	72.9
Georgia	55	42	76.4
Belarus	54	39	72.2
Japan	54	34	63

Table 5.22 illustrates the quantity of Asian post-graduates, who received a residence permit after finishing university studies. Consequently, coherent with the previous data, Chinese degree holders are with 1,168 persons in 2012 the most significant post-graduate group regarding granted residence permits according to the Article 16 (4) of the Residence Act. The share of women amounted to 50.3 per cent, representing a very balanced gender distribution. Chinese immigrants are followed by those of the Russian Federation with 308 degree holders, whereby more than three out of four are represented by women. Indian post-graduates, who received a residence permit after university studies in order to search for a job, amounted to 218 persons in 2012. Similar to the distribution of quantities of Indian students, the male post-graduate job seekers are dominating with 80 per cent. Turkish graduates, who seek a job after studies amounted to 180 persons, whereby the share of women amounted to only 35 per cent. In the cases of Korean, Taiwanese, Georgian, Belarusian, and Japanese post-graduates the share of women, who received a residence permit was in 2012 disproportionally high. In turn, the share of female post-graduates from Pakistan, who obtained a residence permit, was in the same year extremely low. The table shows that the quantitative trend regarding the numbers of international students and graduates from certain Asian countries of origin are also reflected similarly in the sizes of students, who stay after concluding university studies in order to seek an adequate occupation.

5.2.1.4 Migrant entrepreneurs

The immigration of foreigners for the purpose of establishing a business is regulated by Article 21 of the Residence Act (*Aufenthaltsgesetz*) in the context of the New Foreigner Law (*Neues Zuwanderungsgesetz*). Temporary residence in Germany can be granted under the condition that the business will provide a significant economic contribution. Criteria are a sound business plan, a contribution to innovation and research in Germany, and the necessary experience and capital to establish and manage the proposed business. After three years, and provided that the business has proven to be successful, permanent residence can be granted under certain conditions (BAMF, 2014a). Table 5.23 shows the numbers of visas granted for entrepreneurship in Germany by nationality between 2005 and 2012.

In 2005 and 2006, the largest group of foreigners entering Germany under this scheme were Chinese with 201 and 195 visa applications granted, respectively. Since then, most residence permits were granted to applicants from the USA, followed by Chinese whose number dropped to 125 individuals in 2012, which constitutes 9.2 per cent of all migrants who entered Germany in 2012 under this immigration scheme (BAMF, 2014a: 79). In total, 7,049 third country nationals had been issued a residence permit as entrepreneur between the entry into force of the New Foreigner Law in January 2005 and the end of 2012. Additionally, 957 persons, including 273 women were granted a permanent residence permit according to Article 21 (4), Residence Act.

A survey on the structure and on socio-economic criteria of migrants who entered Germany under Article 21, Residence Act on migrant entrepreneurs shows that 24.5 per cent are engaged in the sector *art, entertainment and recreation*, 21.3 per cent in the sector *commerce*, and 18 per cent in the sector *education*. While US-Americans are mainly engaged in the educational sector, for instance offering language classes, the majority of Chinese entrepreneurs engage in commerce. Russian entrepreneurs are with approximately equal shares engaged in either of the three sectors.

Table 5.23 Visas granted for entrepreneurship in Germany, by nationality, 2005-2012 (Source: BAMF, 2014a:78)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	women
USA	174	138	276	360	337	384	512	540	212
China	201	195	214	214	133	85	120	125	44
Russian Fed.	40	39	50	77	59	77	77	100	33
Canada	32	24	53	46	37	74	73	78	41
Australia	22	35	40	63	59	53	74	77	33
Ukraine	19	20	36	37	71	88	89	72	27
Japan	45	17	28	16	30	32	50	57	31
Israel	9	7	25	12	19	38	30	45	17
Iran	19	13	10	15	17	27	35	30	4
Korea, Rep.	29	12	14	16	11	16	21	25	14
New Zealand	8	6	14	6	15	9	29	20	6
Turkey	25	22	16	23	13	20	26	19	0
Others	109	114	115	354	223	137	212	170	40
TOTAL	**732**	**642**	**891**	**1239**	**1024**	**1040**	**1347**	**1358**	**502**

As table 5.23 reveals, the majority of migrants in this category is male (62 per cent), and with an average age of 40.2 years older than female entrepreneurs with an average age of 36.2 years. Migrant entrepreneurs who entered Germany under Article 21, Residence Act are educated above average, 69.1 per cent hold a university degree and an additional 10.1 per cent a title of master craftsman (*Meistertitel*).

Generally, revenues were in 2009 and 2010 with around € 50,000 per annum relatively low, while entrepreneurs in the sector *commerce* managed to achieve the highest revenues. Nevertheless does the majority of migrants in this category plan to stay in Germany for a longer period of time, often 10 years or longer in Germany are envisaged (Block & Klingert, 2012).

5.2.1.5 Family reunification

Since January 2005, migration to Germany in the context of family reunification is regulated by Article 27-36 of the Residence Act (*Aufenthaltsgesetz*), as part of the New Foreigner Law (*Neues Zuwanderungsgesetz*). The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge – BAMF*), in its annual migration report analyses data from two sources, which can only to some extent be compared because of the different ways, in which the data are generated. The first data source is the visa statistics by the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They show all cases, in which visa applications for the purpose of family reunification are issued by a German embassy abroad. Yet, cases in which people enter Germany for other reasons, such as tourism, education or business, and then apply for a family reunification once they are already in Germany are not included in this statistics (BAMF, 2014a).

Table 5.24 Share of family migration of total migration from selected countries in 2012, in per cent (Source: BAMF, 2014a: 39)

Turkey	37.5
Ukraine	24.2
Russian Federation	22.6
India	21.8
China	10.9
Syria	7.9
Afghanistan	6.1

Since 2005, when the purpose of stay of foreigners in Germany started to be statistically captured in the context of the New Foreigner Law, data is also available from the Central Aliens Register (*Ausländerzentralregiste*r). This data includes cases, in which the title of residence for family reunification was only granted after the applicant had already migrated to Germany (ibid). In 2012, 17.9 per cent of all third country nationals migrating to Germany fell into the category of family migration (BAMF, 2014a). The percentage of family migration among the total number of migrants per nationality varies significantly. Table 5.25 shows the development of the share of migration for family reunification for selected countries in 2012.

While it is still an important category of immigration, the total number of migrants who enter Germany in the context of family reunification had been steadily in decline since 2002 (Kreienbrink & Rühl, 2007). This trend stopped in 2009, when numbers slightly increased again in comparison with 2010, and have remained at a fairly constant level since.

Table 5.25 Visa issued for the purpose of family reunification, 2000-2012, in per cent (Source: Authors' compilation, based on BAMF, 2014a:117)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Wives to foreign husbands	26.2	25.9	25.3	24.2	22.3	24.6	26.2	26.5	28.1	30.1	29.6	28.8	29.5
Husbands to foreign wives	10.1	9.4	9.6	8.6	8.2	7.6	7.4	7.1	7.4	6.8	7.1	7.6	7.3
Wives to German husbands	24.9	25.1	23.8	27.0	31.0	28.1	28.0	27.5	27.2	27.1	28.0	28.2	26.9
Husbands to German wives	15.5	15.7	16.3	16.7	16.6	16.6	17.1	15.8	14.8	13.6	14.0	15.1	14.3
Children under 18	23.3	23.9	25.0	23.5	21.8	23.1	21.3	23.1	22.5	22.4	21.3	20.3	21.3
Others													0.4

Table 5.25 provides an overview of the trend of visas issued for different groups of people in the context of family reunification from 2000 to 2012. It shows that the downward trend in numbers over the past decade can both be observed for family members/spouses joining German and foreign family members or partners in Germany. In absolute numbers, since 2000 immigration to join German spouses exceeds the number of cases in which spouses join their foreign partners with a residence permit in Germany. Yet, in 2012, 29.5 per cent of all family reunification visas were issued for wives to join their foreign husbands, as compared to 26.9 per cent of visa issued to women joining a German husband. In total, women joining their partners in Germany constitute with 56.4 per cent the largest group of persons to whom family reunification visa were issued. The share of husbands joining their wives in Germany was 21.6 per cent in 2012 and the remainder of about 22 per cent were children joining their parents (BAMF, 2014a).

The following Table 5.26 provides an overview of the development of the numbers of visas issues for the purpose of family reunification for immigrants from selected countries between 2005 and 2012.

Table 5.26 Share of selected sending and transit countries of total visas issued for family reunification (total number of family reunification visas issued per year in brackets) (Source: Authors, based on BAMF Migration Reports 2006-2014)

	2005 (total 53,213)	2006 (total 50,300)	2007 (total 42,219)	2008 (total 39,717)	2009 (total 42,756)	2010 (total 40,210)	2011 (total 40,975)	2012 (total 40,843)
Turkey	28,5	23.8	21.9	20.3	18.8	18.5	18.8	15.6
China	n/a	n/a	2.9	3.2	3.3	3.6	4.5	5.0
India	2.7	2.9	4.2	6.1	6.0	6.6	7.1	9.7
Thailand	6.1	5.6	5.3	4.4	4.2	4.3	3.2	2.6
Ukraine	2.9	2.5	2.3	3.2	2.8	3.1	3.7	3.9
Russian Federation	8.6	8.6	7.9	6.6	6.4	6.7	7.5	7.8
Syria	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	5.7	7.3	3.3	n/a
Afghanistan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kazakhstan	3.1	2.5	2.2	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Vietnam	n/a	2.3	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

The largest number of nationals entering Germany in 2012 for the purpose of family reunification was with 15.6 per cent still constituted by Turkish nationals. Yet, both absolute numbers and share of Turkish nationals of the total of family reunification visa have continuously declined since the late 1990s. In 1998, 21,055 visas for family reunification were issued to Turkish nationals, which constituted almost exactly one third of all granted visa applications.

The second largest group of nationals entering Germany with a family reunification visa in 2012 were Indian nationals with a share of 9.7 per cent. Since 2005 this percentage has constantly risen and is dominated by wives joining foreign husbands, which corresponds to the increase of visas issued for highly qualified Indians during the same period of time. On the other hand, the majority of family reunification visa for women from Thailand and the Philippines was issued to join German husbands (BAMF, 2014a). This reflects the high importance of arranged marriage migration from Asian countries, as illustrated by Stelzig-Willutzki (2012). Since 2007, the number of cases of family reunification of Chinese nationals shows an increasing trend from 2.9 per cent to five per cent in 2012 (BAMF, 2014a).

Based on the information provided in the previous table, in the following illustration temporary family member immigration from five selected Asian countries between 2009 and 2012 is illustrated.

Table 5.27 Cumulative inflows of family members from selected Asian countries (2009-2012). Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

China	6,745
India	1,209
Ukraine	5,553
Thailand	5,898
Turkey	29,553
Total selected	*59,839*
Total (2009-2012)	**164,790**
Percentage of total selected	32%



Figure 5.4 Cumulative inflows of family members from selected Asian countries (2009-2012), in per cent. Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

5.2.1.6 Refugees and asylum seekers

After a peak in the early 1990s, the total number of applications for asylum in Germany decreased until 2007 and has slightly risen again since. 1992 was the year with the highest number of asylum applications (438,191) in history, and 2007 the year with the lowest number (19,164). The decline in the second half of the 1990s can to some extent be explained by changes to the way data are captured. Statistics before 1995 provide a combined number of first applications for asylum as well as follow-up applications filed, in case the first application was denied. Since 1995, only first asylum applications have been counted. Data from the first half of the 1990s therefore show an overcount in relation to later statistics (BAMF, 2014a). Yet, the safe-third-country regulation (*Drittstaatenregelung*), which entered into force in 1993 and regulated that foreigners entering from safe third countries cannot enjoy asylum in Germany, also led to a significant decrease of first time asylum applications in Germany. Nevertheless, in the 1990s Germany was the European country, which received the highest number of asylum seekers. This trend stopped in 2002, when the UK became the European country receiving most asylum applications in absolute numbers (IPPR, 2003). Since 2008, the number of asylum applications in Germany has been growing again. In 2012, 64,539 asylum applications were filed in total, which was the highest number since 2002. This trend continued to rise until 2014. During the first quarter of 2014, 37,820 applications for asylum were filed by the BAMF as compared to 21,520 in 2013, which is an increase of more than 75 per cent (BAMF, 2014b).

In 2012, slightly more than a third of all applications were filed by female applicants (38.2 per cent). This signifies a moderate rise of the share of women from 30.1 per cent in 2003. There are significant differences with respect to the gender ratio for asylum applicants from different countries. While the percentage of female applicants from Serbia, Macedonia and Russia was close to 50 per cent in 2012, only 16.4 per cent of applicants from Pakistan were female in 2012. The majority of applicants (71.3 per cent) were younger than 30, and 37.8 per cent were even younger than 18 (BAMF, 2014a).

Refugees from Europe including Turkey and the former USSR/Russian Federation constituted the largest group of asylum seekers until the end of the 1990s. Since the year 2000, the largest group of refugees applying for asylum in Germany are nationals of Asian countries. In 2012, their share of the total number of asylum applications was 51.1 per cent, compared to 34.9 per cent of refugees from Europe and 12.9 per cent from African countries.

Table 5.28 shows the development of asylum applications per continent in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total number of asylum applications between 2005 and 2012. The absolute number of asylum applications by refugees from Asia has almost tripled between 2005 and 2012, interrupted by a decline from 11,310 applications in 2005 to 8,997 applications in 2006. Since then the number of asylum applications by Asian nationals has constantly risen to the highest absolute number so far in 2012 with 32,973 applications.

Table 5.28 Development of asylum applications per continent (numbers and percentages) (Source: Authors' compilation based on BAMF, 2014a: 259-260)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Asia	11,310	8,997	10,262	13,599	17,765	21,591	27,381	32,973
(%)	39.1	42.8	53.5	61.6	64.3	52.2	59.9	51.1
Europe	11,712	7,447	4,930	4,266	4,972	12,279	11,042	22,526
(%)	40.5	35.4	25.7	19.3	18.0	29.7	24.1	34.9
Africa	5,278	3,855	3,486	3,856	4,436	6,826	6,550	8,327
(%)	18.3	18.3	18.2	17.5	16	16.5	14.3	12.9
America, Australia	115	359	122	62	61	59	139	131
(%)	0.4	1.7	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2
Stateless people	499	371	364	302	415	577	629	582
(%)	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	0.9
TOTAL	28,914	21,029	19,164	22,085	27,649	41,332	45,741	65,539

The share of Asia of the total of asylum applications in Germany has followed a somewhat different development. Constantly rising between 2005 and 2009, it reached its peak in 2009 with 64.3 per cent and declined to 52.2 per cent in 2010. Rising to 59.9 per cent in 2011, it declined again to 51.1 per cent in 2012.

In 2012, most asylum applications in Germany were filed by Serbian nationals (8,477 – 13.1 per cent), followed by nationals from Afghanistan (7,498 – 11.6 per cent), and Syria (6,201 – 13.1 per cent). In the same year, other Asian countries among the ten most important sending countries for refugees in Germany were Iraq (8.3 per cent), Iran (6.7 per cent), Pakistan (5.3 per cent) and the Russian Federation (five per cent).

Table 5.29 Development of asylum applications for selected sending and transit countries, absolute numbers (Source: Authors' compilation based on BAMF, 2014a: 259-260)

	2005	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Afghanistan	711	531	338	657	3,375	5,905	7,767	7,498
Armenia	555	303	239	198	264	296	335	570
Azerbaijan	848	483	274	360	652	469	646	547
Bangladesh	92	107	65	45	49	92	143	304
China	633	440	253	299	371	367	339	279
Georgia	493	240	181	232	560	664	471	1,298
India	557	512	413	485	681	810	822	885
Iraq	1,983	2,117	4,327	6,836	6,538	5,555	5,831	5,352
Iran	929	611	631	815	1,170	2,475	3,352	4,348
Lebanon	588	601	592	525	434	324	405	464
Pakistan	551	464	301	320	481	840	2,539	3,412
Sri Lanka	220	170	375	468	531	435	521	430
Syria	933	609	634	775	819	1,490	2,634	6,201
Vietnam	1,222	990	987	1,042	1.115	1,009	758	660
TOTAL ASIA	*11,310*	*8,997*	*10,262*	*13,599*	*17,765*	*21,591*	*27,381*	*32,973*

As table 5.29 shows, there has been a tremendous rise of the number of refugees from these countries coming to Germany between 2005 and 2012. On the other hand, the number of refugees coming to Germany from Vietnam decreased about 50 per cent. Numbers of refugees from China have also decreased by more than 50 per cent. After a low in 2007 of numbers of refugees from India, their number has almost doubled again since that year, reaching 885 people in 2012 (BAMF, 2014a).

Yet, in general, the importance of Asia as origin region for asylum seekers has significantly increased over the past four years. The sum of asylum applications from selected Asian countries between 2009 and 2012 is presented in the following table in relation to all asylum applications in Germany over the same time period.

Table 5.30 Cumulative inflows of asylum applicants from selected Asian countries (2009-2012). Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

Afghanistan	7,498
Syria	6,201
Iraq	5,352
Iran	4,348
Pakistan	3,412
Total (2009-2012)	**65,539**
Total selected	*26,811*
Percentage of total selected	41%



Figure 5.5 Cumulative inflows of asylum applicants from selected Asian countries (2009-2012), in per cent. Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

Afghanistan has the most important share with 11 per cent of all applications, followed by Syria with ten per cent, Iraq with eight per cent, Iran with seven per cent and Pakistan with five per cent. These five Asian countries together already represent 41 per cent of all asylum applications.

In addition to statistics about asylum applications, the BAMF also collects data about the outcomes of asylum procedures. These data are not comparable on an annual basis to the number of visa applications because decisions on visa applications are not necessarily taken in the same year. Between 1990 and 2012, more than 3.1 million asylum applications were processed by the BAMF. On average, over this period, the percentage of applicants for which asylum was granted based on Article 16a was constantly below 10 per cent, since 1997 below six per cent. With 0.8 per cent, the lowest quota was reached in 2006. It has risen again in 2012 to 1.2 per cent. Next to the recognition of asylum applications, the BAMF processes applications for refugee status according to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. In 2012, 13 per cent of the applicants were granted refugee status under this scheme. Also in 2012, 13.5 per cent of asylum seekers were granted protection in the form of a deportation ban (*Abschiebeverbot*). This leads to a total protection quota of 27.7 per cent (17,140 persons) in 2012. 49.9 per cent of all applications were declined, while the remainder of 22.6 per cent were treated by other countries in the context of the Dublin procedure, were cases in which the applicant withdrew the application, or were cases of second applications, which were not processed again (BAMF, 2014a).

Table 5.31 Positive decisions on Asylum for selected sending and transit countries, 2005-2012 (Source: BAMF – 2005-2012)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Syria	223	116	113	115	156	370	429	7,467
Iraq	82	189	5,794	5,794	5,727	3,434	2,877	2,780
Afghanistan	165	244	199	178	952	2,195	2,258	1,813
Iran	381	167	380	320	597	1,472	1,432	1,658
Pakistan	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	158	300
Russian Federation	564	197	225	171	185	334	177	171
Vietnam	19	8	8	4	11	13	n/a	n/a
India	n/a	4	n/a	n/a	4	11	n/a	n/a
Azerbaijan	88	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sri Lanka	n/a	n/a	n/a	228	458	n/a	n/a	n/a

Asylum seekers are geographically unequally distributed within Germany. Once a refugee applies for asylum, either at the border or after entering Germany as an undocumented migrant, he will be allocated to the federal state (*Bundesland*) responsible for his case. The distribution of refugees to the different federal states depends on the current intake capacity of each state, the nationality of the applicant, and an allocation formula, which is calculated every year depending on the number of inhabitants and the income by tax revenues of each state (*Königsteiner Schlüssel*). In 2014, North-Rhine-Westphalia (21 per cent) and Bavaria (15.2 per cent) will receive the largest share of asylum applicants, while the city state of Bremen will host the lowest share with less than one per cent[2].

5.2.2 Migration from Germany to Asia

Asian countries are not among the most important destinations for German migrants in terms of numbers. In 2012, 133,232 Germans left Germany. Out of this number, 54,602 persons (41 per cent) went to another EU member state (EU-26) and 12,803 persons (9.6 per cent) went to the USA. Switzerland was the most important single destination country with 20,826 persons or 15.6 per cent of all German emigrants moving to Switzerland (BAMF, 2014a: 152). Combining the number of Germans and foreigners leaving Germany in 2012, Asia was the destination of 11 per cent of all migrants leaving Germany. This indicates a positive migration balance with 133,673 persons moving from Asia to Germany and 78,253 persons leaving Germany for Asia (BAMF, 2014a). While, for example, numbers of German migrants to the USA have remained relatively stable over the past two decades, numbers of German migrants moving to China have increased more than eleven times from 263 persons in 1991 to 2,928 persons in 2012 (BAMF, 2014a:154). This increase of the volume of German migration to China is part of a global trend, which shows that China has become an increasingly attractive destination for migrants from developing and developed countries in Asia, but also for European countries and the USA (IOM, 2013: 77).

Asia has thus become a more attractive region for German students, professionals and other migrants, including life-style seekers. Accordingly, these categories of migrants will be analysed in the following sections.

5.2.2.1 Professionals: qualified and highly-qualified migrants

Skilled and high-skilled German professionals moving abroad in general do so with a work contract, either as researchers, employees of non-profit organisations (NGOs), or intra-company transferees. There are no statistics available, which centrally capture data on Germans moving abroad for the purpose of doing research or as expatriates. Some research funding agencies collect data about the destinations of the researchers whose stay abroad they finance. Combining these data provides an overview of general trends with respect to total numbers and destinations. Yet, actual numbers of German researchers abroad are likely to be much higher, as individual arrangements between researchers and foreign research institutes are not counted in these statistics (BAMF, 2014a: 157).

According to the available data, the number of all German researchers leaving Germany to work abroad has constantly increased from 4,608 persons in 2005, to 6,291 in 2009. After a peak of 8,083 in 2010, there was a significant decrease again to 7,084 people in 2011 (BAMF, 2014a: 158). This development is to a large extent caused by a decrease of funding opportunities for research stays abroad. German foundations and funding agencies generally decreased the volume of their funding, most importantly the Leibniz Association, which in 2011 supported more than 600 academics less than in 2010. Yet, this trend also concerns other major sources of funding for Germans to participate in research projects abroad, such as the German Academic Exchange Service (*Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst – DAAD*), the German Research Foundation (*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft – DFG*), the Hermann von Helmholtz Association, the Hans Böckler Foundation, the Evangelisches Studienwerk, and the Fulbright Commission (DAAD/HIS, 2013: 212).

The USA have been the most popular destination for German researchers in the period for which

2 http://www.bamf.de/DE/Migration/AsylFluechtlinge/Asylverfahren/Verteilung/verteilung-node.html

data are available, which is since 1999. In 2011, 1,593 persons or about 22 per cent of German researchers moving to a different country to do research went to the USA, followed by the UK (680 persons), France (335 persons), Switzerland (291 persons), and Italy (248 persons). The most important Asian country receiving German researchers in 2011 was Japan with 160 persons. Numbers of German researchers going to Japan have fluctuated since the early 2000s with a peak in 2003 (207 persons) and a low in 2008 (150 persons) to reach 160 persons in 2011. The second largest receiving country of German researchers in Asia is China with 141 persons in 2011. The flow of German researchers to China has developed in a comparable way to the flow to Japan over the last 15 years with a peak in 2010 of 178 persons (BAMF, 2014a: 277).

With respect to flows of German researchers to different world regions, the majority of scientists still go to Europe or North America. Table 5.32 shows that their share has decreased between 2005 and 2011. Yet, this development can to a large extent be explained by the fact that for a growing amount of researchers going abroad no concrete destination could be specified. Asia is the third most important world region receiving German scientists with a share of 11 per cent, which is a slight increase in comparison to 2008. Yet, between 2005 and 2008, the share of Asia as destination region for German researchers had also slightly decreased.

Table 5.32 German researchers abroad by continents 2005, 2008 and 2011, in per cent (Source: DAAD/HIS, 2013: 115)

	2005	2008	2011
Europe	46.2	42.1	35.6
America	34.4	33.5	28.0
Africa	2.5	2.6	3.4
Asia	10.4	9.4	11.0
Australia/Oceania	3.9	3.4	3.1
Unknown destination	2.6	9	18.9

Statistical information on German expatriates or intra-company transferees worldwide is difficult to obtain and numbers are often either dated or limited to the major destinations of expatriates from Germany (Nieberg, 2012). Furthermore, different data sources, depending on the different conceptualisations of expatriates, indicate a wide range of diverse numerical estimates. Those estimates of German intra-company transferees abroad range from 1 million to 10-15 million persons (Nieberg, 2013).

According to a study by the consulting firm KPMG, after Europe, Asia is the most important sending region for German expatriates, followed by North America. The number of German expatriates in Asia has increased significantly over the last years. 80 per cent of the questioned companies indicated that they are sending employees to Asian countries. China is the most important destination country within Asia. Data provided by the Association of Employees Abroad (*Bund der Auslandserwerbstätigen - BDAE*) shows that in 2009, 50 per cent of all German companies active in Asia sent their employees to China. 15 per cent of all German companies are active in Thailand and 12 per cent in Singapore (Altmann, 2010).

5.2.2.2 International students

It can be argued that among university students in Germany the willingness to plan and carry out an educational stay abroad represents an increasing trend. According to the *Federal Statistical Office* (*Statistisches Bundesamt*) the number of international students, who accomplished a stay abroad amounted in 1992 to 36,800 students. These numbers have increased gradually since the early 1990s, and significantlly after 2004. Consequently, in 2005 the quantity increased to 77,100 students, equivalent to a growth of 109 per cent. In 2008, numbers had risen in comparison to 2005 by 37 per cent, and in 2011 the total number amounted to 133,800 persons, corresponding to a rise by 263 per cent in comparision to 1992 (*Federal Statistical Office*, 2013a: 8). According to the DAAD/HIS report (2013) on German student mobility around 23 per cent, corresponding to 30,274 persons of these total amount of international students were representing those, who were accomplishing university stays abroad by the European programme ERASMUS. The rest of the international student exchanges were based on university partnerships and other agreements. The increase of international students from Germany shows that new and more frequent flows are developing over the last years. However, this trend does not provide any information about the concrete direction of flows as shown in the following tables that focus on the geographical distribution of German university students abroad.



Figure 5.6 Most important host country regions of respective flows of international students from Germany in 2013, in per cent (Source: DAAD & BMBF, 2013: 10)

Figure 5.6 shows that Western Europe with 60 per cent of inflows represents the most attractive and significant host region for international university students. The second most attractive host region is represented by America, were 14 per cent of all international university students went in 2013. Around 12 per cent of German nationals decided to carry out tertiary education in an Asian host country. Nearly 11 per cent of international university students decided to study in East European countries, eight per cent in Latin American countries, six per cent in African host countries and around five per cent in Australia or New Zealand (DAAD & BMBF, 2013: 10).

After illustrating the regional preferences of university students from Germany, now selected significant host countries and medium-term developments and trends regarding the entrance and stay will be addressed.

Table 5.33 shows the quantity of international students from Germany, who reside in foreign study countries with the objective to accomplish a semester or a study abroad. Accordingly, the figure shows the number of flows to selected host countries and illustrates the medium-term trend of these flows. Consequently, the most important host country on the American continent for international students from Germany is represented by the United States.

Table 5.33 Quantity of international university students from Germany to selected host countries, medium-term development, 2005-2011 (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by the Federal Statistical Office, 2013b: 29)

Host country	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
America							
USA	8,829	8,656	8,907	9,679	9,548	9,458	9,347
Canada	1,083	1,014	1,077	1,116	1,353	1,434	1,430
Europe							
Austria	10,174	11,961	14,789	20,019	23,706	27,350	30,574
Netherlands	11,896	13,988	16,550	18,972	20,805	23,831	25,028
UK	11,600	12,145	11,670	12,895	13,970	14,950	15,025
Turkey	202	266	389	552	790	1,119	1,337
Asia							
China	2,736	3,090	3,554	4,417	4,239	4,800	5,451
Japan	352	400	439	471	438	557	414
Russian Federation	170	177	172	167	191	189	173
Oceania							
Australia	1,632	1,558	1,845	1,910	1,884	2,044	1,835
New Zealand	970	970	1,040	1,326	1,438	1,458	1,324
Total	***77,100***	***84,100***	***92,200***	***105,600***	***116,200***	***127,900***	***133,800***

Around 11 per cent of all international students abroad, corresponding to 8,829 persons, were located in the United States. With regard to the absolute numbers, this amount rose gradually and reached a peak in 2008 with 9,679 persons, who studied in these countries. This absolute quantity decreased slightly in the following years and reached 9,347 persons in 2011, equivalent to a decrease of 3.4 per cent in comparison to 2008. In relation to the total number of international students from Germany, who study abroad, meaning the relative quantity, it is observable that the share of students from Germany, who studied in the USA, has gradually declined. As noted, while in 2005 the share of those students, who studied in the USA accounted for 11 per cent, the relative numbers decreased and accounted in 2008 for nine per cent and in 2011 for only seven per cent.

The most significant host country for international students from Germany within Europe is represented by Austria. While in 2005 total numbers amounted to 10,174 students from Germany, the quantity rose in 2008 by 97 per cent, equivalent to 20,019 persons. In 2011 absolute numbers reached 30,574, representing an increase by 201 per cent in comparison to the base year 2005. The case of Germany in Turkey also reveals a significant increase in numbers; between 2005 and 2011 there was an increase of over 560 per cent Also Asian countries play a role in the context of educational immigration from Germany. Thereby, China represents the most significant host country. In 2005, the total number of international students from Germany amounted to 2,736, representing only 3.5 per cent of the total of international students from Germany. These numbers began to increase gradually in the following years. In 2008, the total quantity rose to 4,417 persons, corresponding to 4.1 per cent of the total amount of international students. Finally, in 2011 the total number reached 5,451 persons, equivalent to an increase of 99 per cent in comparison to the base year of 2005. Relative to the total quantity of international students from Germany, this means that 4.1 per cent studied in China.

In 2005, around 352 students from Germany studied in Japan. These numbers began to rise in the following years, and amounted to 471 persons in 2008, equivalent to an increase of 33 per cent, and reached a peak in 2010 with 557 students, corresponding to a growth of 58 per cent in comparison to 2005. Thereafter the numbers began to decline, and amounted in 2011 only to 414, which signifies a decrease of 26 per cent.

Table 5.34 German international students abroad according to length of stay, 2007 and 2013, in per cent (Source: & BMBF, 2013: 9)

Length of stay	2007	2013
1-2 months	24	19
3-4 months	12	14
5-6 months	24	30
7-8 months	10	10
9-10 months	13	10
11-12 months	10	9
more than 12 months	7	8

Table 5.34 shows the average duration of stay of international students from Germany, between 2007 and 2013. It indicates that in 2007, 24 per cent of all international students from Germany carried out a stay of one to two months, after seven years the short term stay of one to two years decreased by five per cent. Stays of three to four months were accounting in 2007 to 12 per cent and increased slightly to 14 per cent. Stays of five to six months increased from 24 per cent to 30 per cent in 2013, and stays with a duration of 11 to 12 years decreased from 13 per cent in 2007 to ten per cent in 2013.

5.2.2.3 Other categories of migration

According to the *German Pension Insurance* (*Deutsche Rentenversicherung*) the total number of German overseas pension payments amounted in 2013 to 1.7 million. More than 1 million pension payments were sent to European Union countries (64 per cent), more than 300,000 to European countries, who are not in the European Union, and around 400,000 pension payments were paid to third countries outside of Europe, whereby with 113,000 the USA has the most important share (Deutsche Rentenversicherung, 2013). The institution furthermore argues that around 1,479,000 overseas pension payments, equivalent to 87 per cent, were transferred to persons, who lived previously in Germany and therefore have a pension entitlement. Only 221,000 overseas payments were for German nationals (ibid.).

Table 5.35 Quantity of pensions transferred abroad and of German nationals abroad to selected receiving countries, deadline 31.12.12, by sex (Source: Authors' compilation based on data by Deutsche Rentenversicherung 2013 and BAMF, 2014a: 274)

Relevant countries	**Total**	**Pension annuity**		**German nationals** (aged 65 years and over)	
	2012	***Men***	***Women***	2011	2012
Afghanistan	9	4	0	n/a	n/a
China	401	244	36	29	25
India	491	148	156	n/a	n/a
Indonesia	307	151	42	n/a	n/a
Iraq	18	4	1	n/a	n/a
Iran	169	76	33	n/a	n/a
Israel	45,020	14,530	18,630	n/a	n/a
Japan	823	548	154	n/a	n/a
Jordan	405	117	45	n/a	n/a
Kazakhstan	48	14	10	n/a	n/a
Korea, Rep.	239	112	85	n/a	n/a
Lebanon	134	41	33	n/a	n/a
Pakistan	218	49	20	n/a	n/a
Philippines	1,957	819	158	n/a	n/a
Sri Lanka	217	71	35	n/a	n/a
Syria	116	26	27	n/a	n/a
Thailand	3,931	2,158	240	270	296
Vietnam	115	53	7	n/a	n/a
Total	*55,322*	*19,571*	*19,810*		

Table 5.35 illustrates the quantity of transferred pension payments in 2012. Furthermore, it shows German Nationals, who lived in 2011 and 2012 in China or in Thailand. Accordingly, the most significant Asian country regarding the transfer of pension payments is represented by Israel. Around

81 per cent of all payments were transferred to this country. While 33,160 payments (74 per cent) were pension annuities, 11,860 were other types of pensions. In 2012 men received 14,530 pension annuities, corresponding to 74 per cent of all payment for Asian men. Women in turn received 18,630 in 2012, equivalent to 94 per cent of all disbursements in 2012. Thailand represents the second important country with regard to pension payments. The total number amounts to 3,931 people, equivalent to seven per cent of all payments to Asia. The total number of pension annuities amounted to 2,398, corresponding to 61 per cent of all pensions received. The share of payments for men is with 90 per cent disproportionally high. The share of German nationals aged 65 years and over is with 296 persons in 2012 in comparison very low, it corresponds only to 7.5 per cent, indicating that the main part of the pensioners are representing Thai return migrants. In comparison to 2011 the total number of German nationals, who live in Thailand increased by 26 persons. The Philippines represent the third most relevant country regarding retirement migration. In 2012, 1,957 pensions were received in the country, corresponding to a share of 3.5 per cent of the total quantity transferred to Asia. 977 payments were representing pension annuities. Also, in this case the share of men is with almost 84 per cent very high.

Finally, the total number of pensions transferred to China amounted in 2012 to 401 payments, representing only 0.7 per cent of all payments to Asia. 280 payments were represented by pension annuities. The share of women accounted for only 13 per cent. The share of German nationals represented only 25, indicating that less than ten per cent of the total quantity was represented by German nationals.

5.3 Conclusion

The report has demonstrated that there is a trend towards a growing importance in terms of numbers of temporary migrants from Asia to Germany but also in the opposite direction.

With respect to migration from Asia to Germany, the most relevant categories of migrants are international students, high-skilled professionals, entrepreneurs, family members of migrants, as well as refugees and asylum seekers. These categories of temporary migration have increasingly gained importance in Germany.

Table 5.36 Comparison of permanent and temporary migration according to category (2009-2012). Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

	Total	Asylum seekers	Family members	Professionals	Students	%*
Permanent	5,863,496	31,303	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
TMSA**	N/A	26,811	59,839	23,512	47,844	11,7%
ATM***	1,350,212	65,939	164,790	85,490	204,644	38,6%

Note: *The percentage refers to the sum of all relevant categories in relation to the total of temporary migrants. **Temporay Migration from Selected Asian Countries. ***All Temporary Migrants



Figure 5.7 Temporary migration according to category, total and from selected Asian countries (2009-2012). Source: Authors' compilation based on data by BAMF (2014a)

Table 5.36 shows that 38.6 per cent of all temporary migrants in Germany are represented by persons belonging to the selected categories. This percentage corresponds to a sum of 520,863 migrant entries between 2009 and 2012 (see discussion in the methodology section of this report). With regard to Asian immigration this means that 11.7 per cent, equalling 158,006 persons, originate from the numerically most important Asian countries. With regard to the relation to all temporary migration in the relevant categories, the share of temporary stays from selected Asian countries amounts to about 30 per cent. Given the growing importance of temporary migration and particularly temporary migration of the above discussed categories over the last years and the importance of the share of Asian migrants in these categories, it is likely that the importance of Asian migration to Germany will increase in the future. No confinable data are available with respect to the numbers of permanent migrants for the categories of family members, professionals and students. Information about the number of total migrant stock is not person-related so that it is not possible to distinguish between the different categories.

With regard to flows from Asian countries to Germany, there are several particularly interesting empirical observations, which can be summarised as follows:

- In the context of international student exchange with Germany, China is the most important Asian country. Data show that not only the volume of Asian, and particularly Chinese, students in Germany is increasing, but that these students are also increasingly successful, as indicated by the increased number of graduations.
- Both China and India are also important sending countries for skilled and high-skilled professionals, including researchers, to Germany. The volume of migration of dependents of these students and professionals in the context of family reunification has also increased, particularly for the case of India. This growing importance of migration of Asian professionals and their dependents to Germany in terms of numbers is likely related to the policies described above. These policies were created to facilitate the inflow and settlement of skilled and high-skilled workers and their family members, for instance also by allowing spouses of Blue Card holders to work in Germany.
- Global numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany have significantly increased in 2013 and in the first months of 2014. Since 2007, the countries of origin of more than half of all asylum applicants in Germany are situated in Asia. Yet, refugees and asylum seekers have been excluded from the newly generated public debate about migration from Asia to Germany,

which focuses on students and professionals who voluntarily migrate to Germany. In line with this debate, the regional interest focuses on emerging economies, including China and India, while Asian refugees in Germany particularly originate from Syria, Central Asia, including Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran.

- Regarding migration from Germany to Asia, which includes return migration as well as movements of Germans to Asian countries, the following can be said:
- China represents the most attractive host country for all German students going to study in Asia with a stable increase in absolute numbers since 2005.
- Flows of professionals to Asia have to be distinguished by the nature of their employment. On the one hand, the importance of Asia, and particularly China, as destination for intra-company transferees has significantly increased over the last two decades. This trend is related to global economic transformations and growing foreign direct investment flows towards these countries as well as resulting needs for highly specialised workforce from Germany. On the other hand, in the context of international mobility of German researchers, Asia still plays a marginal role, as the major destinations of German researchers remain EU countries, particularly the UK, as well as the USA.

With reference to transnational characteristics of migration between Asia and Germany and vice versa, there is some qualitative evidence that transnational social formations and social practices have been initiated, which might also be linked to gradually solidifying immigrant communities, influence graduates' decision to stay in Germany for further studies or for employment, to return to their home country, or to move on to another country after graduation. By their nature, the above addressed migrant categories can be perceived as temporal forms of migration. However, these migration types are strongly influenced by legal frameworks; yet also the development of transnational formations is likely to influence the spatial configuration of migrants' movements. These might have consequences on the long-term orientation of temporarily initiated immigration.

However, currently, there is neither conclusive literature nor empirical information available, which addresses the particular characteristics that arise as a consequence of increasing numbers of migrants from Asia. Thus, the societal consequences of the transformation of migration patterns in Germany need to be analysed in-depth in further studies, which have the potential to provide additional insights into specific features that might give signals for an emerging German-Asian transnational space.

References

Altmann, E. (2010). *Vorsicht Fallstricke.* ASIA BRIDGE 6.

AU Pair World. (2014). *Au Pair Students*. Retrieved 12. March 2014 from http://www.aupair-world.net/

Bade, K. (1985). Einführung: Vom Export der sozialen Frage zur importierten sozialen Frage: Deutschland im transnationalen Wanderungsgeschehen seit der Mitte des 19.Jahrhunderts. In K. Bade, *Auswanderer-Wanderarbeiter-Gastarbeiter. Bevölkerung, Arbeitsmarkt und Wanderung in Deutschland seit der Mitte des 19.Jahrhunderts* (S. 9-71). Ostfildern: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag.

Bade, K. J., & Oltmer, J. (2007). Countries: Germany. In K. J. Bade, P. C. Emmer, L. Lucasson, & J. Oltmer, *The Encyclopedia of Migration and Minorities in Europe. From the 17th Century to the present* (S. 65-72). New York: Cambridge University Press.

BAMF (2014a). *Migrationsbericht 2012.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2014b). *Aktuelle Zahlen zu Asyl.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2013a). *Bildung und Beruf.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2013b). *Bundesamt in Zahlen.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2012). *Migrationsbericht 2011.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2011). *Migrationsbericht 2010.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2010). *Migrationsbericht 2009.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2009). *Migrationsbericht 2008.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2008). *Migrationsbericht 2007.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2007). *Migrationsbericht 2006.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

BAMF (2006). *Migrationsbericht 2005.* Nürnberg: Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge.

Block, A., & Klingert, I. (2012). *Zuwanderung von selbständigenund freiberuflichen Migranten aus Drittstaaten nach Deutschland.* Nürnberg: BAMF.

Borkert, M., & Bosswick, W. (2011). The case of Germany. In G. Zincone, P. Rinus, & M. Borkert, *Migration Policymaking in Europe. The dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present* (pp. 95-127). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Christiansen, F., & Xiujing, L. (2007). Chinese restaurants owners in the Netherlands and Germany in the second half of the 20th Century. In K. J. Bade, P. C. Emmer, L. Lucasson, & J. Oltmer, *The Encyclopedia of Migration and Minorities in Europe. From the 17th Century to the present* (S. 289-291). New York: Cambridge University Press.

DAAD & BMBF . (2013). *7. Fachkonferenz "go out! studieren weltweit" zur Auslandsmobilität deutscher Studierender.* Berlin.

DAAD/HIS. (2013). *Wissenschaft weltoffen.* Bonn: DAAD. Retrieved April 28, 2014, from: http://www.wissenschaftweltoffen.de/?lang=en

Deutsche Rentenversicherung. (2013). *Rentenzahlungen ins Ausland.* Retrieved April 2014, 28, from Deutsche Rentenversicherung zahlt 1,7 Millionen Renten ins Ausland: http://www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de/Allgemein/de/Inhalt/4_Presse/ infos_der_pressestelle/02_medieninformationen/01_pressemitteilungen/2013/2013_6_5_rentenzahlung_ins_ausland.html

Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2012, July 23). *Zuwanderungsgesetz*. Retrieved March 30, 2014, from http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/Zuwanderungsrecht_node.html
Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) (2013a). *Bildung und Kultur Studierende an Hochschulen.* Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) (2013b). *Deutsche Studierende im Ausland. Statistischer Überblick 2001 – 2011.* Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
Gruner-Domić, S. (1999). Beschäftigung statt Auswanderung. Ausländische Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen in der DDR (1961-1989. In J. Motte, R. Ohliger, & A. Von Oswald, *50 Jahre Bundesrepublik-50 Jahre Einwanderung. Nachkriegsgeschichte als Migrationsgeschichte* (S. 215-240). Frankfurt am Main; New York: Campus Verlag.
Herbert, U. (1990). *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
IOM (2013). *World Migration Report 2013.* Geneva: IOM.
Isserstedt, W., & Kandulla, M. (2010). *Internationalisierung des Studiums: Ausländische Studierende in Deutschland.Deutsche Studierende im Ausland.Ergebnisse der 19. Sozialerhebung des Deutschen Studentenwerks.* Berlin: BMBF.
Kontos, M. (2010). *Europäische Politiken im Zuge der Globalisierung von Pflegearbeit.* Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung.
Kreienbrink, A., & Mayer, M. M. (2014). *Einführung – Migration aus Ost- und Südostasien, in Kreienbrink, A. (Ed.) (Migration of skilled labour from Asia to Germany.* Nürnberg: BAMF.
Kreienbrink, A., & Rühl, S. (2007). *Familiennachzug in Deutschland, Kleinstudie IV im Rahmen des Europäischen Migrationsnetzwerks.* Nürnberg: BAMF.
Mayer, M. M. (2014). *Deutsche Fachkräftekonzepte und die Zuwanderung,* in Kreienbrink, A. (Ed.) *Fachkräftemigration aus Asien nach Deutschland und Europa/Migration of skilled labour from Asia to Germany.* Nürnberg: BAMF.
Mayer, M. M. (2013). *Gewinnung von hochqualifizierten und qualifizierten Drittstaatsangehörigen. Fokus-Studie der deutschen nationalen Kontaktstelle für das Europäische Migrationsnetzwerk (EMN).* Retrieved March 20, 2014, from http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/EMN/Nationale-Studien-WorkingPaper/emn-wp53-gewinnung-hochqualifizierter-drittstaatsangehoeriger.html
Mayer, M. M., Yamamura, S., Schneider, J., & Müller, A. (2012). *Zuwanderung von internationalen Studierenden aus Drittstaaten. Studie der deutschen nationalen Kontaktstelle für das Europäische Migrationsnetzwerk (EMN).*
Mommsen, W. J. (1993). *Gesamtausgabe Max Weber.* Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
Nieberg, T. (2012). *People beyond the State? - Human Security, Identities and Governance.* University of Queensland: Dissertation.
Nieberg, T. (2013). *Auswanderung deutscher Staatsangehöriger .* Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.
OECD (1978). Migration, Growth and Development. Paris .
OECD (2013). Zuwanderung ausländischer Arbeitskräfte. DEUTSCHLAND, Paris: OECD.
Stelzig-Willutzki, S. (2012). Die internationale Migration von Frauen: Formen selbstständiger Migration und ihre Erforschung. In S. Stelzig-Willutzki, *Soziale Beziehungen im Migrationsverlauf* (S. 29-43). Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Tollenaere, M. (2014). Konzernintern entsandte qualifizierte Fachkräfte aus Asien in Deutschland: Eine vernachlässigte Einwanderungskategorie mit großem Potenzial, in Kreienbrink, A. (Ed.) *Fachkräftemigration aus Asien nach Deutschland und Europa/Migration of skilled labour from Asia to Germany.* Nürnberg: BAMF.
Treibel, A. (2008). *Migration in modernen Gesellschaften. Soziale Folgen von Einwanderung, Gastarbeit und Flucht.* Weinheim and München.

6. ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TEMPORARY TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE CASE OF HUNGARY

Agnes HÁRS

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 Historical background

In the early 20th century Hungary was an emigrant country with strong overseas emigration of poor people, mainly to America. However, 30 percent of the overseas emigrants returned home. The returnees often collected money to take off again. In this sense the real character of that time migration was partly circular, in fact.

The war period has stopped this kind of migration for long. Migration was overwhelmingly refugee-type migration. The post-war turbulence of the population has been followed by the period of communist regime with closed and controlled border crossing and low level of migration. The migration of this time was, by its nature, permanent, and at a large share illegal. Nevertheless, border control has gradually eased during the 1970s and 1980s. Immigration mainly of family reasons like marriage was permanent, while humanitarian purpose of migration or student migration has been rather temporary.

During the democratic transition of Hungary at the turn of the late 1980s and early 1990s immigration turned to be a hot issue with particularly a Diaspora driven migration at sudden. The early drivers of increasing immigration have vanished and immigration begun to stagnate while emigration was moderate and recently, in line with the economic crisis, it had a takeoff.

Hungarian migration of the last decades has been focused on Europe. More particularly, considerable part of immigration has been restricted to the historical ties of the adjoining countries with considerable Hungarian ethnic minorities. The historical ties give a particularly homogeneous character to the Hungarian immigration: the main source of Hungarian immigration origins from the adjacent countries with considerable ethnic Hungarian population. According to Brubaker (1998) the important ethnic peculiarity of Hungarian migration essential in any migration context: "Unlike ethnic Germans, scattered over vast areas far from Germany, ethnic Hungarians are concentrated in states adjoining Hungary, especially in Romania, Slovakia, rump Yugoslavia and Ukraine and, within this states, in territories formerly belonging to Hungary. Large ethnic Hungarian minority across and over the borders of Hungary is an important source of immigration as well as has major influence on migration politics and policy. In case of Hungary, instead of a conceptually "pure" labour migration, ethnicity plays a crucial role in engendering, patterning and regulating immigration flows."

Immigration has changed Hungary into an immigrant country at sudden. Considerable share of the immigrants were permanent, however return vs. transit migration has been also the outcome of the immigration. Anyhow, in addition to the strong European focus there is some important immigration from Asia, particularly from China to Hungary.

Available information is less precise on Hungarian emigration. Although EU is a particularly important destination outnumbering any other directions some migration is relevant with non-EU European countries and some migration can be identified in Transeuropean context, too.

6.1.2 An introduction to the current policies and practices on transnational migration

Connected to the historical past and geopolitical position of the country Hungarian migration policy fits principally into the EU law and partly serves Diaspora policy as an instrument of nation building (Tóth-Sik 2014) Hungarian immigration policy regulation framework has been largely shaped by the harmonization process and transposition of EU Directives and various EU laws. According to Diaspora preferences, however, foreigners who are ethnic Hungarians receive preferential treatment under the law.

Two basic laws shape and regulate migration according to the EU legislations regarding persons with the right of free movement in the EU versus those third country nationals without the right of free mobility in the EU.

Remarkable, Diaspora preferences intercept the scopes of these laws. There have been exceptions and distortions which have continuously formed the characteristics of Hungarian migration regime. While the exceptions had strong preferences and correspondingly support in relation to migrants of ethnic Hungarian origin, those under the scope of the law without the ethnic preference had to face with strong ignorance and intolerance regarding minimum conditions for immigrants.

Corresponding laws outline various types of immigration from third member countries. There are three different levels to enter the country as immigrant in correspondence with the system of Schengen visas for (i) stays of less than three months, (ii) visas and residence permits for longer than three months and (iii) settlement permits.

Visas for stays are (1) *short-stay visas* (for single or multiple entry and stays not exceeding three months in a six month time period); (2) for stay exceeding a three-month period are *seasonal employment visas* (granted for a period of three to six months); (3) *long-term visas* (granted for a maximum period of one year). In correspondence with the ethnic preference of the Diaspora policy there are (4) the *national visas* (issued under international agreements to encourage cultural contacts with the kin-state).

As a general rule, *immigration* to Hungary (for longer than 3 month) involves two steps: 1) a *long-term visa* is issued for a *specific purpose* and, 2) before it expires, the foreigner applies in-country for a *residence permit based on the same grounds*. As a matter of fact, long-term visas may be considered as immigration visas because obtaining a long-term visa is one of the initial steps of the immigration procedure. Visas and resident permits are granted for specific purposes. Entry is allowed for particular purposes: *employmen*t, *seasonal work*, *study*, *research*, *medical treatment*, *official visitors*, *volunteers,* visits (upon letter of invitation), family *unification*, and for *kin-minority* (for the purpose of maintaining ethnic and cultural ties).

Applicants for long-term visas must meet the various strict conditions: possession of a *valid travel document*; *justification of the purpose* of entry and stay; adequate *accommodation* in Hungary; *sufficient means of subsistence*; and *health insurance* coverage *or sufficient financial resources for healthcare* services. In addition, applicants may not be subject to expulsion or a ban on entry, and no alert may have been issued under the SIS system.

Based on the above regulations we try to answer if there is any definition on temporary migration at hand for Hungary? As for the *perception* of temporary migration, not much effort has been done, to differentiate permanent and temporary migration in the Hungarian case; the issues are not even in the focus of regulations. As a consequence, literature is rather limited and problem is less fundamental in general migration debate. By generally acknowledged UN definition migrants staying less than one year long in a foreign country are the temporary immigrants. Nevertheless, according to Hungarian low and regulations, there is no definite border to precisely differentiate immigrants by the follow length of stay.

Regarding foreign citizens, there is a *statistically formal understanding* following the law and regulations connected to various resident permits by reasons. All this are strongly connected to migration policy and related issues. Theoretically, if we decide for a definition following the lengths of stay shorter than one year the definition will be rather formal and important segments will be dropped out. E.g. various settled migrants will not be included in the respective population who are, in fact, mobile in various ways. On the other hand, temporary migrants according to the formal registration may be virtually temporary while waiting for permanent resident permit vs. naturalization (depending on the regulations). *Nevertheless,* research evidences refer to temporary vs. permanent migration of different type (e.g. settled but commuting or circular migration, repeated business purpose migration, etc.).

Regulations differentiate migration by *the length of stay* which is essential from the temporary vs. permanent migration approach. S*hort-term visa* is granted entry, transit or stay in the country for up to three months within a period of six months. A foreigner who is issued a visa for stay is allowed (multiple) entry and stay in the county for up to one year, unless an international treaty regulates otherwise (for example, the validity of the visa would be no more than five years in the case of the 'neighbourhood visa'). A visa for stay is issued for a determined purpose. Upon its expiration, long-term visa holders and national visa holders may apply for a *temporary residence permit* on the same grounds for which their visa was issued. As a general rule, a temporary residence permit is granted for a maximum period of *two years* and may be extended for two further years.

Definition of temporary migration would be difficult using the formal categories. Following *official statistical definition temporary migration would last for less than one year. Considering the given regulations the only exceptional category is seasonal employment that would fit into the category.* Official statistics are based on the above mentioned resident permits, no data on flows, lengths etc on real stay of foreigners available. Resident permits are given for various reasons, however, that may help to identify temporariness more precisely

Based on state-of-the-art knowledge, temporary transnational immigration has been defined in a relatively loose form. Based on state-of–the-art knowledge on migration in Hungary we suggest considering migration temporary if *the foreign person intends to leave the country with the purpose of returning home or to a third country or with the purpose of circular mobility*

6.2 Flows and Patterns of Temporary Transnational Migration and Mobility

6.2.1 Methodology, data sources and data shortages

To discover the suitable data sources describing temporary migration sufficiently is a real challenge. Data are often obscure and unreliable even to describe permanent or total migration (cp. Fassmann et al 2009, for Hungary Hárs-Sik 2009). Available data are hardly appropriate to follow the stocks and flows of temporary migration of any kind of definition.

- From the point of view of the particular country *immigrants will be defined as foreign citizen*s as opposed to foreigners who were born abroad. The latter includes the long-term immigrants and also the naturalized persons; that makes a big difference regarding temporary migration, particularly considering the strong ethnic preference of naturalisation in Hungary.[1] As for (temporary) *emigration the mobility of nationals will be considered*.
- Although traditional UN statistical definition suggests less than one year as temporary migration available statistics are not suitable for such differentiations. The existing migration statistics are based on administrative data of resident permit registers of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). According to visa and resident permit regulations, as discussed

1 There are some exemptions, however: e.g. double citizens (not settled but permanently mobile) or returnees (who are citizens) etc.

previously in the introductory section, permits are not sensitive to the short length of stay. As a general rule, temporary resident permit is given for 2 years upon a stay with long term visa of one year. Consequently, *statistical data are not available by the length of stay, with the only exception of seasonal work*.

- Migration statistics published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) are based on resident permit data.[2] The OIN, the office responsible for the administrative procedure publishes some statistics from the same register. Since visa and resident permits are given for particular purpose like employment and economic activities, family reasons, education or study and other reasons[3] statistics are also available by citizenship and by the purpose of stay and also by age, sex, place of residence. Data on refugees and sheltered persons under subsidiary protection are also published by both sources.[4]
- With the lack of precise statistics on permanent and temporary migration resident permits by purposes of stay can be perceived as a proxy to the temporary or permanent character of migration *accepting the definition of temporariness of migration as the intention to leave*. Some types of resident permits are more likely hinting to the temporary migration while others are not. All in all, basic statistics may serve *as a proxy* of the main structure of immigrants.

Supplementary statistics can be added to complete register data. These statistics may come from various partial registers with the advantage of the focus to particular segments and the deficiencies of fragmented character, quality and availability of data. All these register-based statistics likely underestimate migration (not covering particular groups); and present migrants according to administrative registration with all the deficiencies of registration. Irregular, illegal migrants, various small and atypical forms or lifestyle migration etc. will not covered by statistics. Sporadic information will be collected, however.

Published data are focusing on immigration and reliable statistics on emigration are mostly the mirror statistics, which are data from the receiving countries. According to official publications emigration data are vague; nevertheless sporadic knowledge on emigration is available.

To describe temporary vs. permanent migration and conclude with Asia-Europe (Hungary) temporary migration patterns, in the following sections stock vs. flow data of immigration will be presented to give a general overview.

A farther technical comment and correction is important, however. Flow trends are particularly important from the point of view of the temporary migration. Nevertheless, flow data have some shortages. Only inflow data based on immigration register of resident permits is reliable, in fact, while outflow data published are poor and incorrect since only partial segments of outflow and deregistering has been included and outflow is strongly underestimated. As a consequence, reliable published net migration data are not available. However, outflow data will be estimated below to present real migration flows and trends.

The rough estimation of the outflow of migration has been rather simple: difference of the estimated increase of migrants measured by inflow data and the migration stock of the next year has been compared and difference calculated as estimated outflow:

2 HCSO Demographic yearbook, various years (excel sheet supplements) and HCSO on-line statistics (HCSO Statinfo)gives data on stock or flow of total immigrant population possessing permanent or temporary resident permits.

3 Settlement will not be considered since that can be exclusively the purpose of permanent resident permit.

4 Stock data of the migration statistics of the HCSO are regularly adjusted to a “hypothetical real” outflow of the Census since considerable numbers of those immigrants who are virtually in the register have disappeared, in fact, without being deregistered. Adjustment to the census has taken place in 2001 and also recently, in 2012 with drops in the stock of immigrants each time. The statistics published by the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) who is the administrative data collector has been considerable higher and gradually increasing. The process and reliability of the adjustment of the HCSO data is not clearly demonstrated, nevertheless, the adjustment is important regarding data reliability.

(1. equation): $\mathbf{StI_{y+1} - (StI_y + FlI_y)}$

where
StI - stock of immigrants, (1^{st} Jan.);
FlI - flow of immigrants, (1^{st} Jan.-31^{st} Dec.);
y – year.

For net migration flow data the inflow and the estimated outflow difference has been calculated. As a result of the estimation a proxy to net flow of migration has been constructed. Outflow data comprises various outflow possibilities: leaving for a third country or return to the previous destination vs. home country and various others. Empirical evidence of net migration flow will be presented; identification of these reasons is beyond the possibilities of any statistics and should be subject of qualitative research.

In the following sections first the general migration stock and flow tends will be presented, than the migration stock and flow trend by the main sending regions and more in detail the Asian sending region by the main sending countries. Following the general overview the migration by the main purpose of migration and sending regions will be discussed.

6.2.2 General trends

In spite of an episode of increasing (mainly ethnic) immigration at the beginning of the transition period of the late 1980s and early 1990s coinciding with the immigration of a group of Chinese newcomers migration remained moderate and has modestly been growing.[5] Magnitude has been low based on various data sources. The share of total foreign citizens is 1.4 percent in the population, a higher share (0.9%) is EU citizens, and a lesser share (0.6%) is third country nationals. In the active age group of 15-49 the share of total foreign population is somewhat higher1.8-1.9 percent. Foreigners are largely concentrated: 50 percent of the total foreign population and 60 percent of the third country nationals have settled in Central Hungarian including the Capital City Budapest (Census 2011).

According to Figure 6.1 the stock of foreign citizens is continuously increasing while inflow is stable. The calculated outflow of foreign residents (1. equation) is similarly modest resulting in a modestly positive estimated net migration flow until recently. The characteristic features of the Hungarian immigration are rooting in strong historical ties, as mentioned in the introductory part of the report. Ethno-policy measures influence migration trends. The stock of immigrants has continuously decreased due to naturalisation while recent new regulations considerable changed the process. Ethnic Hungarians are illegible to the so called "*simplified naturalisation*" process without sufficient subsistence or employment or waiting period or even Hungarian residence, according to the law that has been effective since 1st January 2011. Large numbers of immigrants of ethnic Hungarian origin moved from the foreign citizen status to the Hungarian citizenship. Correspondingly, immigration data resulted in a drop of the number of immigrant population of ethnic Hungarians.[6]

5 There has been agreement among researchers about the late 1980s and the early 1990s being evidently a turning point in the history of the Hungarian migration to a net immigration pattern. In the late 1980s, a growing number of people arrived from neighbouring countries. The overwhelming majority of them were ethnic Hungarians fleeing from the still communist Romania. A second large inflow has been caused by the war in the former Yugoslavia. Following the sudden and unexpected large inflow of migrants there was a sizeable outflow, due to their return home or departure for a third country. (Hárs et al 2009)

6 It has to be mentioned that considerable share of irregular (temporary) migrants not covered by the statistics have similarly changed their status of citizenship.



Figure 6.1 Main migration stock and flows of foreign citizens, 2001-2013 (Source: HCSO Statinfo (resident permits total based on OIN data, 1st of January) and own calculations)

6.2.3 Migrants sending regions

As a consequence of the large bulk of migration source of ethnic Hungarian population in the adjoining countries transnational migration from outside Europe is minor comparing to the size of inter-European mobility; nevertheless, relevant both in number and substance. The majority of the immigrant stock came from the EU; partly from the more developed EU-15 countries but mostly from the new EU-12 member countries (mainly from Romania[7] with large ethnic Hungarian population). Migrants originated also from the adjoining third member countries like Ukraine, Serbia (where ethnic Hungarians live also at a considerable share). There is, however, a considerable Asian and much less American and African stock of Transeuropean immigrants. (See Figure 6.2)

Half of the total foreign citizens have been registered in Central Hungary. As of Asian immigrants, the share has been 80 percent on average and in case of the Chinese, Vietnamese or the Syrian community the share was 90 percent, overwhelmingly in Budapest. Transeuropean immigrants are, in fact, concentrated in Budapest (60-90%, stock of 1st January 2013, HCSO Statinfo).

The trend presented by Figure 6.2 shows a clear takeoff of immigration following Hungary's joining the European Union in May 2004. Immigration stock from the EU-12 countries (mainly ethnic Hungarians from Romania) largely outnumbers the others and has increased since 2004.[8] Immigration from the EU-15 as well as from Asia had also a takeoff following enlargement while immigration from other sending regions remained marginal.

7 Although Romania has been joining to the EU in 2007, data are calculated according to the present status quo.
8 Recent drop precisely mirrors the recent "simplified naturalization". Remarkable, with the drop the structure of immigrant population has considerable changed to more balanced picture by sending regions.



Figure 6.2 Changing stock of immigrant foreigners by main sending regions, 2001-2013 (Source: HCSO Statinfo (resident permits total based on OIN data, 1st of January)

Flow data of immigrants are essential to give a realistic picture on (temporary) migration movements. Looking first at the inflow data by various sending regions the immigration trends are even more characteristic. A high inflow from EU-12 (mainly ethnic Hungarians from Romania) has gradually decreased, with some oscillation due to their gradually diversified migration destination possibilities and coinciding with the decreasing strength of pull effects in Hungary.[9] Other sending regions also have got an impetus of immigration following EU enlargement of 2004, particularly from European third countries with some oscillation as well as from Asian countries. (See Figure 6.3) [10]



Figure 6.3 Immigration inflow by main sending regions (Source: HCSO Demographic yearbook various years (resident permits total based on OIN data)

9 Simplified naturalisation mentioned before clearly influence the inflow of corresponding population recently.

10 There is some oddness in the trend of EU-15 and EU-12, due to the changing regulations following EU enlargement. While resident permit has been obligatory prior enlargement of the EU in May 2004 from these regions, Hungary's joining to the EU changed these obligations to a simple registration that has not been much disciplined in administration in the first years. From 1 July 2007, related to the legal harmonization with EU, two new laws on the administration of aliens entered into force. The Act I of 2007 refers to the admission and residence of persons with the right of free movement and residence. According to the law the citizens of EEA are only obliged to registration and they get a certification on that. Those third country citizens who are family members of a Hungarian or an EEA citizen are also have the right of free movement and residence, and they get a residence card. According to Act II of 2007 third country citizens are still entitled to residence permit.

Finally, a proxy to net migration by sending regions will be presented as a result of the estimation (1. equation). Outflow data comprises various outflow possibilities: leaving for a third country or return to the previous destination vs. home country, move to illegal status or other legal status without any obligation to be registered. Naturalisation is also a way of outflow of migrants in statistical term as it has been an important outflow of ethnic Hungarians. After a continuously positive net migration there is a strong negative net migration flow in the more recent years.

To identify the Transeuropean and particularly the Asian-European migratory movements, according to the estimation there is somewhat positive net migration balance with the Asian region. To explain the reasons farther investigations are needed. As for other regions, net migration balance is near to zero (see Figure 6.4).



Figure 6.4 Estimated net migration by main sending regions (Source: own calculations using data of HCSO Demographic yearbook various years (resident permits total based on OIN data)

6.2.3.1 Asian –European immigration trends from Hungarian perspective

While the largest immigrant population comes from Europe (the EU-12 and the EU-15 countries) the third largest immigrant sending region is Asia. The modestly increasing stock of Asian immigration by various Asian sending countries is presented in Chart 5.[11] The large and increasing immigrant population stock from China outnumbers any other groups but other Asian countries are also increasingly present in Hungary. Remarkably, Asian immigrant communities had a sharp increase in stock since 2004 following the EU enlargement and Hungary's joining to the European Union. Chinese and some other communities had a continuously increasing stock since that time while others like the Vietnamese are stagnating. (Figure 6.5)

11 Definition is somewhat broad and fluid including Turkey or Israel as relevant sending countries.



Figure 6.5 Changing stock of Asian immigrants by main sending countries (Source: HCSO Statinfo (resident permits total based on OIN data, 1st of January)

When looking the migration inflow data it shows a more precise picture as regards the temporary mobility. According to flow data Asian immigration had a jump following the enlargement of the EU, particularly from China that has gradually slowed down, and also from other Asian countries with a steady state of immigration flow since that time. There has been, according to the statistics, a sudden inflow of Vietnamese immigrants that has not been continued. At a lesser extent there has been a continuous inflow of Turkish immigrants as well. (Figure 6.6)



Figure 6.6 Immigrant inflow from Asia by main sending countries (Source: HCSO Demographic yearbook various years (resident permits total based on OIN data)

Similarly to the previous estimation (1. equation) the rough number of Asian net migration has been calculated and presented in Figure 6.7. Estimated net migration flow of Asian migrants has been positive in case of Chinese and 'other' Asian migrants while close to zero in other cases. Hint to circular migration is not evident in these cases; drop of Chinese net migration is not clearly explained and needs farther qualitative investigations.[12] The supposed direction of outflow of these migrant groups

12 Adjustment of statistics to census data in 2011 was coinciding with the 'simplified naturalisation' process; both influencing the outflow data. In case of Asian migration the reason is more likely the previous one.

is not clearly identified and needs farther investigations. There is a possible outflow to third countries or return home or may commute or be part of circular migration. The obscure picture needs farther qualitative research.



Figure 6.7 Estimated Asian's net migration by main sending countries (Source: own calculations using data of HCSO Demographic yearbook various years (resident permits total based on OIN data)

6.2.3.2 Temporary character of immigration by purposes

Based on previous research we concluded to a rather loose definition of temporary migration. In the introductory chapter we suggested to consider *migration temporary if the foreign person/employee intends to leave the country with the purpose of circular migration or returning home or to leave for a third country.*

According to research evidences there are characteristic differences among immigrants by sending countries/regions in Hungary. Referring to third country nationals Zatykó-Schumann (2009) proved these differences, based on life path interviews. Immigrants of ethnic Hungarian origin respectively those with good knowledge of Hungarian and having an extensive contact network could get easily integrated while those with poor knowledge of Hungarian or without speaking the language had difficulties. Large share of immigrants of the latter group (without language knowledge) have had family members or friends already upon arrival in Hungary who were helping them. Others, mainly refugees or sheltered persons were lacking these help and remained marginalised. Considerable differing from these patterns, Chinese or Vietnamese immigrants are partially integrated without developing strong contacts to the receiving society. Differences by sending regions are remarkable. European labour migrants (mainly ethnic Hungarian 3rd country nationals from the adjoining countries) are partly short term migrants but a considerable share has the plan to stay over one year while half of this migrants intend to settle for good. Transreuropean migrants (Chinese, Vietnamese, Mongolians, Arabic countries), on the other hand, intend to stay longer, over 1 year but mostly not with the plan to settle for good (about 20-25%).

Characteristic structure of immigration can be statistically outlined by purposes of migration. Resident permits by reasons may serve as basic information to identify statistically the various types of migrants vs. temporary migrants. The permits by purposes are the following: labour & economic (work permit and other economic activity); purpose of education vs. study; family based migration and various others (including health, lifestyle etc migration). International protection is an additional reason to accept immigrants.[13] Resident permits by purposes serve as hints of temporary migration. Some of the purposes are more likely temporary (e.g. employment or study).

Migration is segmented by sending countries and labour market insertion. Research evidences are remarkable when looking the migrants' temporary versus permanent intentions to stay according to their employment. Non-manual administrative or independent workers intend to stay for good at a far larger share than any others (nearly 70% as opposed the 35-40% of the others). Managers intend to stay rather stable mostly for over one year but some for several months only with somewhat lower intentions to settle. Some of the unskilled and semi-skilled labourers expect to stay for short term (likely seasonal or irregular worker from the neighbouring countries). All in all, more than half of the given sample is temporary migrant by the suggested definition. (Juhász et al 2011)

The life path interviews of the above mentioned report revealed the transitory vs. permanent migration expectation of migrants from various backgrounds. According to the suggested definition that migrants with temporary migration intentions are temporary, a considerable share of non-Hungarian speaking immigrants proved to be temporary migrants. Reasons are various. The administrative burden of getting the permanent settlement permit would push those migrants to move on who are unconcerned about the destination country. Some other migrants used Hungary as an entry to EU countries (Zatykó-Schumann 2009)

6.2.4 Migration stock by purposes of immigration

Regarding the immigrant population stock far the most important purpose of immigration is economic: employment or economic activities, entrepreneurship, business, etc. Immigration on family reasons, some other reasons (e.g. lifestyle, health migration, etc.) and education and study are also relevant and each of them show an increasing trend until the more recent change, likely due to the aforementioned naturalisation. (Figure 6.8)



Figure 6.8 Changing stock of immigration of foreigners by main purpose of immigration (Source: HCSO Demographic yearbook various years (resident permits total based on OIN data)

There is a clear difference by sending regions in the purpose of migration. Addressing the types vs. activities of various migrant groups, we can easily identify segments or ethnic niches of migrants or

13 Since foreign citizens residing in Hungary can obtain first residence permit and as a second step a settlement permit; therefore purpose of inflow cannot be 'immigration/settlement' and resident permits data cover all purposes of immigration but immigration/settlement.

sending regions or countries by purposes of migration vs. sending regions or countries. Share of various types of migration in the stock of immigrant groups is presented in chart 9 (based on resent cross section stock data of 1st January 2013).

Labour and other economic activity is far the most important for the EU-12 immigrants (mainly ethnic Hungarians from Romania); nearly two out of three immigrants from the EU-12 region has an EU registration for work vs. other economic activity. For the Asian immigrants labour vs. economic activity is also rather important, nearly 1/4 of all immigrants possess a residence permit for work and economic reason. Immigrants coming from the EU-15 and the non-EU European regions are coming with the purpose of work and economic activity. On the other hand, only a low share of the small immigrant groups from America and Africa are coming with the purpose of economic activity.

For African immigrants the purpose of study is particularly important (1/3rd of total). International protection is predominantly important for Africans and at a much lesser extent for Asian immigrants. Other reasons including health or lifestyle purpose, on the other hand, are relevant for immigration of the EU-15 and American (mainly USA) citizens.

The more likely permanent type family based migration is particularly important for (North) American and African immigrants while the clearly permanent purpose of settlement is frequent purpose of the non-EU Europeans and the Chinese immigrants (over 1/3).



Figure 6.9 Share of various types of migration in the stock of particular immigrant groups by sending regions, in percentage (Source: own calculations using data of HCSO Demographic yearbook 2012 (data referring to 1st January, resident permits total based on OIN data)

Beyond the snapshot of the more recent situation the trend of the purposes of migration by each region will be presented in Figure 6.10. Differences by sending regions are characteristic.

Number of employees and migrants with other economic activities from the EU-12 (mainly ethnic Hungarians from Romania) had a fast increase and outnumber any other regions with a sharp drop in 2011. Migrants from non-EU European regions had a much smaller number of employees, nevertheless numbers have been somewhat decreasing recently (both due to the naturalization process of the ethnic Hungarians). Other immigrant groups show a rather stable character mainly forms the EU-15 and China. The rest were not involved, in fact, in employment or other economic activity. (Figure 6.10 panel a)

Immigrants with the purpose of education or study shape a clearly increasing immigrant group that is likely of temporary character. The takeoff of the educational and student immigration has begun around 2008. The fastest increase in the number of educational and student migrants from the EU-15 came about. Asian migration of this type has increased rather fast as well. The number of American and African citizens with the purpose of education or study has been rather low but increased gradually as well. Migrants from the adjoining countries (EU-12, non-EU European sending regions) had some drop in number of students (which should be connected with the naturalization). (Figure 6.10 panel b)

'Other and unknown' purpose of immigration comprises among others health migration; welfare migration etc. There has been a continuous increase, particularly from the EU-15 countries. Trans-European migration is hardly involved in this type of migration. (Figure 6.10 panel c)

Immigration on family reasons has the character of stable and slow increase from the sending countries with the only exception of the EU-12 and non-EU European migrants (including ethnic Hungarians) where family type migration had a fast increase and recent decrease. (Figure 6.10 panel d)



Figure 6.10 Changing stock of migration by main purpose of immigration and by sending regions* (Source: HCSO Demographic yearbook various years (resident permits total based on OIN data) * Scale of each panel of the chart is different, according to the size of the given migration.

6.2.5 Migration inflow by purposes of immigration

In the following section we present the *inflow* of migrants by main purposes of the issued resident permits and by the corresponding sending regions. In contrast to the stock of immigrants, the inflow data present the more recent trends of (temporary) migration. Similarly to the stock data the main purpose of the inflow of immigrants is economic activity. Remarkable, immigration for education is increasing in number while inflow on other purposes has continuously decreased. (See Figure 6.11)



Figure 6.11 Inflow of migration by main purpose of immigration (Source: HCSO Demographic yearbook various years (resident permits based on OIN data)

Figure 6.12 presents the immigration inflow by purposes according to sending regions. Economic activity and work is the most important reason of labour inflow. More than half of the inflow of the EU-12 citizens is due to economic activity or labour. The share of inflow of labour migrants from the non-EU European countries is about 1/3. Among EU-15 and Asian immigrants purpose of immigration is more diverse, every fourth resident permit for migrants has been given for labour or economic activity. Economic activity and labour is marginally important among other immigrant groups.

The increasing inflow for education and study is the most important reason of migration inflow of African immigrants, over 50 percent of legal immigrant inflow is on the purpose of study. The share is rather high among American, Australian and non-EU European immigrants, one third of immigrant inflows respectively. Education or study has not been a very crucial purpose for Chinese migrants as opposed to other activities but share is still significant over 20 percent. The EU-12 citizens are not interested in education and study at a high share.

Remarkable, inflow of immigrants on family related reasons has been surprisingly balanced with little difference by sending regions. About 15-20 percent of the corresponding migrant flow arrived as family based migrants.

Other reasons' of immigration flows have been clearly segmented. It has been the reason of nearly 40 percent of migrant inflow from the more developed regions: EU-15, America, Australia and also Asia. Less developed European (EU-12 and non-EU Europeans) and non-European (Africa) regions, on the other hand, were not much interested in. All in all, migration of EU neighbouring countries and the other sending countries show a considerable different pattern according to inflow statistics.



Figure 6.12 Share of various types of migration inflows of particular immigrant groups by sending regions, in percentage (Source: own calculations using data of HCSO Demographic yearbook 2012 (data referring to 1st Jan.-31st Dec 2012, resident permits based on OIN data)

Looking the inflow of migrants by various purposes over a longer period the picture is surprisingly stable by sending regions. Except migrants (of ethnic Hungarians) form the EU -12 and non-EU European countries most of the other inflow is steady. There is hardly any big increase or drop in migration inflow.

As for economic activity or employment, inflow of immigrants is slowly decreasing in line with the economic crisis. The moderate number of Chinese immigrants is slightly decreasing since 2008 and EU-12 and non-EU European immigration inflow has significantly dropped. More detailed qualitative research would be useful to prove the causality of the economic crisis and inflow trends, however. (Figure 6.13 panel a)

More characteristic is, in fact, the inflow of migration with the purpose of education or studies. A clear increase of educational immigration came about in 2008 from all sending regions, connected to the introduced regulation of student mobility. There has been a continuously increasing inflow of educational migrants from EU-15 and Africa while other regions have a stagnating number of immigrants with some oscillation. (Figure 6.13 panel b)

There has been some increase in the inflow number of immigration on family reason in 2008 that has stopped. Immigration inflow on family reasons has continuously decreased from the EU-12 and non-EU European regions (ethnic Hungarians) while migrants from other sending regions remained rather unchanged. As for Chinese the pattern has been somewhat diverse with a decreasing number prior 2008 that has turned to stagnate. More detailed understanding of the reasons is not clear. (Figure 6.13 panel c)

Finally, migration on different reasons than those above has sharply decreased from the European regions while inflow remained rather unchanged from outside Europe. Reasons need farther clarifications. (Figure 6.13 panel d)



Figure 6.13 Inflow of migrants by main purpose of immigration and by sending regions* Source: HCSO Demographic yearbook various years (resident permits based on OIN data) *Scale of each panel of the chart is different, according to the size of the given migration.

6.3 Detailed characteristics of different types of (temporary) migration

Official statistics allowed us to map migration by main sending regions and by the types of immigration by sending regions. In the following sections we present detailed knowledge, data and statistics of various potential categories of temporary migration.

6.3.1 Labour migration

Figure 6.14 gives a detailed overview on the number of persons possessing resident permit with the purpose of economic activity by sending countries and regions. Data refer to more recent data (of the beginning of 2013). The picture is rather lucid and asymmetric, correspondingly with the previously presented characteristics of Hungarian immigration. Romanian citizens outnumber any other immigrant group concerning economic activities. Slovakia and Germany in the EU, Ukraine from the non-EU Europe and China as a country part of the Transreuropean migration have relatively sizeable labour migration.



Figure 6.14 Number of labour immigrant stock in Hungary by sending countries, 1st January 2013 Source: calculations based on HCSO Demographic yearbook 2013 – International migration

Although labour migration from Asian countries is rather small, resident permits for work are given for citizens of India, Japan, China, Korea, Mongolia, Iran, Israel, Syria, Vietnam, and some other. Since resident permit for employment and work is the second step of immigration with the purpose of employment, the corresponding population is a more permanent one regarding the length of stay. The total number has been 6400 persons in 2013.

6.3.1.1 Employees

Employees (of third country nationals) are obliged to possess work permits to enter the labour market. The permits given to European (non-EU) citizens have continuously decreased (since 2008 when Romania entered the European Union). The non-European immigration, on the other hand, is on a fast increase. (Figure 6.15)



Figure 6.15 Valid work permits (non-EU citizens) by main source regions (Source: own calculations based on work permit register)

Looking more in detail the labour migration inflow from the non-European sending countries, there is a distinct increase in the number of Chinese labour migrants. Although at a lesser extent, the number of Vietnamese labour migration is also increasing. Other sending countries have a small and balanced number of immigrants, at a large share from various Asian countries like Thailand, India, South-Korea, Japan, Mongolia, etc. The work permit inflow refers to a rather new immigrant population that is more likely temporary, for the time being. The structure is clear and refers to a slowly emerging Asian community. (Figure 6.16)



Figure 6.16 Work permits issued for non European citizens by sending countries (Source: own calculations based on work permit register of the PES)

6.3.1.2 Seasonal workers

Corresponding to the existing policy framework there are seasonal worker in Hungary in the frame of the special agricultural seasonal program. Statistics of seasonal (agricultural) workers are published regularly by the PES. The seasonal work program is not extensive; according to data only a rather limited number of mainly Ukrainian season workers are employed (273 Ukrainians, 7 Serbians during 2013). Seasonal workers are, in practice, ethnic Hungarians from the adjoining countries. In this context is not relevant in Transeuropean context.

Hungarians are involved in seasonal work in Europe, in the EU or EEA countries mainly. Sporadic information on seasonal work in some other countries (e.g. Israel) is available, no data, however.

6.3.1.3 Posted workers and inter-company transferees

Since joining to the EU neither authorisation nor registration applies, nor data is available on workers posted to Hungary; the phenomenon is quite limited. (Eurofound 2010) Hungary is basically an exporter of posted workers. The most important target countries are those which have specific legislation for posted workers: Germany and Austria. (Hárs-Neumann 2010) Estimates indicate that between 17,000 and 18,000 workers are posted annually; the main destination is Germany, mainly in manufacturing (the automotive sector) and the meat processing industry, but also in construction." Some hundreds of posted workers were registered in Romania as well. (Eurofound 2010: 9-10) That is, posted worker are part of Intra-European labour migration but irrelevant in Transeuropean context.

Inter-company transferees as a temporary immigrant group are relevant for Hungary both as emigrants and immigrants most likely in European-Asian relations as well. Nevertheless, only everyday evidences exist. Research evidence or data about the particular group of employees has not been identified yet. Farther clarification is needed.

6.3.1.4 Governmental workers

Statistics on Governmental workers are not published. Diplomats and other governmental workers are not obliged to any registration and data may be collected from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this context both emigration and immigration is relevant, size and data are unknown.

Data on UN staff in Hungary is available. Nationality is unclear due to the nature of the UN agencies. All UN foreign staff (including UNHCR, FAO, ILO, WHO, IMF and other organizations / agencies in UN Security System, EBRD, and IOM) is not too large, about 130 persons. Considering, however, the family members, the total number is nearly 300. That is a temporary migrant population which is not part of the register data.

Interestingly, data let us make estimation on the influence of such a small group in the receiving society. National staff working with the international agencies is nearly 350 in 2011 and increased up to 390 in 2012. Dependants of the national staff have been 261 in 2011. As a summary, the total foreign population and the dependants and national staff are about 635 in 2011 and increased to 685 in 2012. The influence can be estimated rather sufficient in social term. In addition, each of the UN organisations regularly employs practitioners or consultants for a shorter period of 6-18 months. Their number is on average 5-10 persons. Although the population is not too large, 30-60 persons of various backgrounds can be involved. Their status is not clear; some of them have the diplomat status while others are foreign student on practice.

As of emigration, nearly a thousand soldiers from Hungary are taking part in NATO, UN, EU and OSCE operations. According to the law that is the limit of participating staff, mostly in the Balkan region but over 300 persons in peacekeeping operating are in Afghanistan and in the Middle East as well. (nol.hu 2009)

6.3.1.5 Researchers and academics

HCSO regularly publishes data on researchers and research-scholars on scholarship in Hungary by sending regions. The total number of researcher is rather stable, while the number of those on scholarship has considerable diminished between 2008 and 2011. The share of researcher and also the scholars are permanently over 60% from the EU countries. Non European countries have gained some more importance (14 vs. 21%), however on the expense of European third countries. (Table 6.1)

Table 6.1 Researchers with foreign citizenship by sending region (Source: HCSO, Kutatás és fejlesztés (Research and development), 2008, 2011)

	Year	EU	Non-EU Europe	Non Europe	Total
Researchers with foreign citizenship	2008	442	156	100	698
	2011	455	97	151	703
On scholarship with foreign citizenship	2008	250	98	57	405
	2011	146	39	53	238

As a unique international study centre, Central European University (CEU) Faculty and staff is a clearly international section of temporary migration of academics and researcher. The professors of the CEU are involved in circular migration in various respects. Even temporary staff is changeable and professors and researchers are part of international networks embedded in various countries. In addition, connections to national university and academic society are also sizeable. The fellows of the CEU consist of 358 faculty members from 42 countries, of which 184 are permanent faculty members from 29 countries, 174 visiting faculty members from 32 countries, 46 researchers from 18 countries, 482 permanent administrative staff from 26 countries, and 312 other staff with assignment contract from 40 countries. Geographic distribution is not given.[14]

Correspondingly, there are numerous Hungarian researcher (temporarily) abroad, data or detailed presentation is unknown. Returning support programs for top-researcher abroad: (Nemzeti Kiválóság Program 2014, Lendület program 2009) initiated to keep researcher at home or make emigrants return)

6.3.1.6 Undocumented/irregular labour migrants

Knowledge is widespread while research evidence is limited on irregular employment of migrants. While overwhelming majority of irregular (seasonal) labour comes from adjacent countries everyday knowledge and labour inspectorate report widespread irregular employment or economic activity of Asian immigrants. Research evidences are vague. Nevertheless, Asian immigrants are not working as irregular but their activity is partly irregular or they are employing irregular labour. The system works, as follow: „The major part of the informal sector – including irregular labour – operates within formally registered businesses. The reason for this is that it is relatively easy to launch a business in Hungary, while, on the other hand, costs of operation, taxes and common charges are very high. The main priority is to evade taxes. A part of the business visible and pays taxes, while the other is hidden. Irregular employment reduces labour costs, with unregistered or partly registered labour the value of charges is, in fact, extra revenue. Entrepreneurs are often "forced" to go around laws and regulation, at least in their opinion. They argue that there is no alternative without jeopardising their existence. They could not avoid losses and would lose in the competitive environment" Juhász (2008: 11)

A recent comparative European analysis of the attitudes toward undeclared work (Undeclared, 2007) demonstrated that the behaviour of Hungarians is very tolerant towards the informal economy in all its forms. There are currently strong governmental efforts being made to decrease the scope of the informal economy in general and the fight against undeclared work in particular. Hárs-Sik (2008) clarifies the various forms of irregular labour and its causes and consequences. "Irregularity often stems from an employment contract which fails to adhere to formal requirements, or is defective in substance. In other cases, undeclared employment means employment without an employment contract, based on a verbal agreement between the parties concerned. In the latter case, the lack of any formal contract allows for the avoidance of tax payment on wages. At the same time, the employee lacks the security of law, in the former case, only a part of the employment legalized. (Hárs Sik 2008: 93)

6.3.2 Entrepreneurs

Statistical data on entrepreneurs by citizenship is not available. Survey data give a view on the structure of immigrant's activity. Remarkable, while ethnic Hungarians and Ukrainians are mostly employees, Chinese, Vietnamese, Turkish and Arabic migrants are entrepreneurs. (Table 6.2)

14 CEU statistics http://www.ceu.hu/about/facts-figures/teaching-research-faculty-staff

Table 6.2 Immigrant groups by employment status in 2009, in percentages and absolute numbers (Source: Hárs 2013: 60 based on Migrant survey of the ICCR)

	Ethnic Hungarians	Ukrainian	Chinese	Vietnamese	Turkish	Arabic	Total
Entrepreneurs	23	35	66	75	74	62	55
Employee with company	64	53	21	13	23	29	35
Employee with family enterprise	13	11	13	12	3	10	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N (persons)	142	144	131	151	111	73	752

The largest in number and the most important is the Chinese group of entrepreneurs. The Chinese immigrant population is highly concentrated in Budapest (82%, according to CAR registration). Chinese shops can be found in most of the settlements in Hungary. (According to the estimation of the Chinese embassy in 2001, in about 2,000 settlements there was a Chinese shop.) That means a sizeable population: 2-3 Chinese persons per settlement may be found in the countryside. The share of women was high among Chinese immigrants and they are likely active as entrepreneurs. In the early 1990s 1,400 Chinese enterprises were registered. Most of the enterprises were small or micro enterprises. In ten years, the number of Chinese-owned enterprises increased to a number of 10,000 ventures; the capital stock was not increasing, however. Enterprises are partly ghost enterprises that are not functioning. Still, Chinese are entrepreneurs even if they are owners of micro or small enterprises, petty trades of the China markets. (Hárs et al 2009)

Some research made efforts to compare different Asian and other entrepreneurs' economic peculiarities. Várhalmi (2010) compares the choice of entrepreneurship strategies of migrants or their participations in economic activities organized on an ethnic basis. He comes to the result that differences are not necessarily motivated by necessity but rather the exploitation of alternative and exclusive opportunities for mobility. In order to achieve success some of the traditional economic resources may be substituted for what we may define as "migrant resources". These are typical of the entire ethic group or rather group membership guarantees access to such resources. The effective use of migrant resources results in the development of a separate functions and context that differ from what subjects may experience when employed in the primary economy. In spite of the similar activities the research reveals the position of the Vietnamese who can step forward in economic niches the Chinese have left. Várhalmi (2013) exploiting survey database of migrant entrepreneurs compared Chinese, Vietnamese and he much smaller group of Turkish immigrant entrepreneurs. Transnational economic activity has been measured by four indicators: Business contacts in the sending country, last travelling home has been a business travel, supply from the sending country, recruiting labour in the sending county. Vietnamese are fare the weakest in employing this transnational contacts while the other two had similar position. Vietnamese economic position can utilize Chinese transnational supply networks. Similarly, when comparing the transnational and Diaspora entrepreneurs (exploiting transnational vs. Diaspora contacts and networks) the Vietnamese at a high share involved in Diaspora enterprise while Turkish and Chinese are involved at a higher rate rather in transnational enterprises.

Some knowledge has been accumulated on some peculiar groups of migrants mainly in the field of non-medical practitioners, osteopaths etc. from Russia and other post-Soviet countries and also from China. There are also Thai massage practitioners recognisable. In December 2013 the Parliament considered to pass law on recognition of traditional Chinese doctorial education in Hungary that has been finally, following a heated discussion, postponed. Nevertheless, this group of practitioners are also present. No research in this field however.

Investor program enabling wealthy third country nationals to gain residence in one of the EU countries and eventually access the citizenship is a new initiation – mainly to attract business man and particularly additional capital or investments. If the participants of the new initiation will became resident Hungarian citizens or remain temporary migrants is vague. EMN (2013) report summarizes the new program: The Hungarian Parliament decided in December 2012 the launching of the program.[15] Any third-country nationals whose investment in Hungary qualifies the person's entry and stay on the basis of being "in the interest of the economy at large" may receive the resident permit. The government expects about 4000 applicants, i.e. irrational numbers in respect of the previous migration intentions. Mostly Chinese investors have been involved at sudden. Data on applications see in Table 6.3. The opportunity of citizenship has been offered at a relatively low price as compared e.g. Bulgaria about half as much investment has required. Not surprisingly, however, the new bill is not part of a comprehensive and openly discussed migration policy. Instead of the governmental bodies responsible for shaping migration policy and in charge with legislative tasks, the bill was submitted by three MP's of the ruling party only two days before the parliamentary debate took up. (EMN 2013: 7)

Table 6.3 Numbers of investment based resident permit application (Source: OIN online data)

	2013, May-December	2014., January-March
China	429	105
Russia	2	10
Syria	2	2
Egypt	2	
Lebanon	2	
Iran	1	
USA	1	
Ukraine	1	
Yemen		1
Total	440	118

6.3.3 Educational migration

6.3.3.1 Student migration

According to various statistics educational migration is one of the important types of migration with increasing trend in Hungary. Migration with the purpose of study or education is most likely temporary by nature.

Student migration in the communist period has been sizeable with Transeuropean students. Geographic orientation has gradually changed from the orientation of that time. In the academic year of 1985/86 more than half of the students came from outside Europe it has dropped to below 25 percent in 1995/96 and below 20 percent in 2003/2004. The increasing student migration has been fuelled from Europe, at the beginning mainly from the pull of ethnic Hungarian students while size of student migration from outside Europe hardly increased. (Szemerszki 2005: 326) More recent data are diversified.

There is a big variety of countries included in educational migration to Hungary, according to resident permits statistics. The most recent data show a high number of German students following with several European EU and third country nationals. Non-European countries are present in educational migration at a considerable number and there is a high number or Asian student according to the resident permits. (See Figure 6.17)

15 Act CCXX of 2012 amending Act II of 2007 on the Entry and Stay of Third Country Nationals



Figure 6.17 Number of educational immigrant stock in Hungary by sending countries, 1st January 2013 (Source: calculations based on HCSO Demographic yearbook 2013 – International migration)

More detailed statistics on tertiary education shows a gradual increase (4 vs. 7 percent in the last two academic years) with some variations by years and regions. Nevertheless, student migration is on increase from every source regions. Increase in Transeuropean student migration is particularly high. (See Table 6.4)

Table 6.4 The increase of foreign students in higher education by sending regions, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012, in percentage (Source: own calculations, Felsőoktatási statisztika/Statistics on higher education (2011, 2012, 2013)

Country	2011/2010	2012/2011
Africa	125,2	109,9
Asia	109,9	107,7
South-America	104,0	150,0
North-America	111,3	114,6
Europe	101,1	106,3
Australia	118,8	94,7
Total (%)	**103,8**	**107,0**

In spite of the fast increase from outside Europe, European region dominates the size of student migration. Asia has the second positions with one fifth of the foreign students coming from Asian countries. Foreign students mostly obliged paying tuition with the exception of ethnic Hungarian students who get scholarship. (Table 6.5)

Table 6.5 Number and share of foreign students in Hungary by sending regions (Source: own calculations, Felsőoktatási statisztika/Statistics on higher education (2013)

Country	enrolled students			breakdown by regions		
	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12
	academic year			academic year		
Europe	13536	13690	14547	74,6	72,6	72,1
Asia	3548	3899	4200	19,5	20,7	20,8
Africa	524	656	721	2,9	3,5	3,6
North-America	480	534	612	2,6	2,8	3,0
South-America	50	52	78	0,3	0,3	0,4
Australia	16	19	18	0,1	0,1	0,1
Total	18154	18850	20176	100,0	100,0	100,0

More detailed data on Asian migrants are presented in Table 6.6 (Top sending countries sending more than 40 students are listed.) The total numbers of student migrants in Hungary are presented at the bottom of the table. Remarkably, half of all students are enrolled in an “Undivided (5 years)” education, that is, in fact the education of medicine. Masters and PhD courses are not very much preferred while BA courses are popular. Indian and Iranian students are interested in PhD courses while Chinese, Vietnamese and Turks are at a larger share involved in BA courses.

Table 6.6 Number of foreign students and types of study by main Asian sending countries *Sending more than 40 students (Source: own calculations, Felsőoktatási statisztika/Statistics on higher education (2011, 2012, 2013)

Top sending countries*	Total	Univ. level training	BA-	Masters	Undivided (5 years)	PhD, DLA
China	285	3	217	20	38	7
Korea	258	3	16	10	226	2
Vietnam	227	13	102	19	91	2
Japan	215	2	19	16	177	1
Mongolia	55	1	35	7	7	1
Taiwan	55	5	4	3	42	1
India	48	5	14	3	17	9
Afghanistan	40	1	17	13	8	0
Iran	976	97	178	42	635	24
Israel	741	24	32	16	668	1
Turkey	516	16	336	19	136	1
Saudi-Arabia	223	1	75	5	142	0
Total foreign students	17112	598	6273	1607	7933	52

The policy towards foreign students in higher education is not very supportive. Hungary has no special strategy for attracting non-EU students. Without special international agreements or reciprocity third-country nationals are always subject to pay tuition fees for higher education. In general, unlike the practice in other European countries non-EU nationals in Hungary having a residence permit for the purpose of study have to leave the country when their residence permit expires with the graduation. In case they would like to work in Hungary they must apply as all other third-country nationals pursuant to the relevant general rules. (Ács 2010a)

Örkény-Székelyi (2003) surveyed the plans of foreign students and participants of Tempus exchange program in 2003. 58 percent of the students in the survey planned to return home while half of the rest planned to move for a third country. There is a clear association between the length of study and the plan to stay. Berács -Malota (2011) in a more recent survey updated the knowledge on foreign students' expectations regarding remaining in Hungary. Increasing satisfaction has been experienced with everyday services (transport, accommodation, shopping opportunities) and the behaviour they experienced while official treatment had deficiencies. Conclusion of the survey is that a conscious, harmonised national and international strategy is necessary to attract more exchange and full-time students to Hungary.

Expectations of the students are limited; the relatively low tuition fee an lack of affirmative policy give a hint that students use the educational facilities and leave the country upon graduation even in case of those, who are involved in higher level courses, e.g. doctor students, PhD. Educational migration is most likely of temporary character and students do not intend to stay.

A peculiar group of foreign students of temporary character are the CEU students in Budapest. As a unique institution Central European University (CEU) in Budapest founded by G. Soros has to be included in the educational migration section. The independent university with its regular foreign students and continuous international staff and professors/academics is important section of temporary educational migration in Hungary. The system is independent from the Hungarian higher education regime. According to CEU statistics of students in the recent academic year of 2012/2013 1372 students from 92 countries studied full time in Budapest. The level of the study: 750 master's students, 448 doctoral students, 74 undergraduate students, 100 non-degree students. From the point of view of the project the geographic distribution is of particular interest. According to the more recent data, in the 1212/2013 academic year enrolled students in CEU at a high share (40%) came from EU-12 countries, 12 per cent from EU-15, and 15 per cent from the former Soviet Union 13 per cent from the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Trans-European students are numerous as well (20% of total): 3

per cent from Africa, 11 per cent from America, 5 per cent from Asia and 1 per cent from Australia. [16]

Parallel to the student immigration to Hungary there is student emigration emerging recently from Hungary. Participation in short term student programs is increasingly popular, data unknown. More recent reform in national educational system including decreasing number of entrees and introduction of tuition fee induced educational emigration. Expectation of student emigrants at a high share is to stay in the destination country. Size and pattern is vague; nevertheless the character of student migration is still temporary.

6.3.3.2 Secondary level education of foreigners

There are immigrant children (foreign citizens) in various levels of public education: kindergarten, primary and secondary schools. Statistics presents citizens of adjoining countries, and 'others'. There has been a change in the structure of immigrant children with a decrease from adjoining countries in all levels of schools. Numbers of children in primary and secondary school is rather high. Remarkable, children from adjoining countries are at a much lower share in kindergarten. (Table 6.7)

According to research evidences immigrant population covers a big range of people from different social and economic background. From the refugee children who are mostly supported by civil organisations to the elite of the transnational bodies and business finds the gradually mushrooming schools for their need. As a result of transnational migration, a separate group of students has formed – those who study not in local authority schools, but in schools run by the state, international organisations or the private sector. (Vámos 2011)

Table 6.7 Foreign pupils and student in Hungarian education, 2005/2006 vs. 2012/2013 (Source: own calculations, Statistical Yearbook of Education, 2012/2013)

Foreign citizens	Kinder-garden	Primary school	Vocational school	Secondary school	Kinder-garden	Primary school	Vocational school	Secondary school
	Number of persons				Percentage			
	2005-2006							
others	1138	2261	90	1665	68	50	13	32
adjoining	545	2254	627	3487	32	50	87	68
total	1683	4515	717	5152	100	100	100	100
	2012-2013							
others	1907	3990	106	2118	71	63	24	48
adjoining	789	2320	344	2263	29	37	76	52
total	2696	6310	450	4381	100	100	100	100

6.3.4 Other purposes of migration

Figure 6.18 gives a snapshot on the number of persons possessing resident permit with purpose of 'other' by sending countries and regions. Some sorts of lifestyle migration, *health migration* or *residential tourism* are supposed to be part of this category. Correspondingly, more developed countries have been involved, primarily Germany but also Austria, Romania, Slovakia and the USA form oversees. More detailed understanding of the category would be useful.

16 CEU statistics: http://www.ceu.hu/about/facts-figures/students-alumni



Figure 6.18 Number of "other" immigrant stock in Hungary by sending countries, 1st January 2013 (Source: calculations based on HCSO Demographic yearbook 2013 – International migration)

6.3.4.1 Residential tourism, health migrants

Hungary has some sort of residential tourism, overwhelming majority from Europe. Balogi (2010) summarises the research on the phenomenon in Hungary; migration is mainly welfare migration of the lower middle class of the sending countries from Western-Europe.

Hungary has some attractions as pull effect for health tourism and migration like spas and connected facilities. Health tourism and passably also some health migration exist, mainly from Europe or developed non-EU countries (USA, Canada, Israel, etc). There is more fundamental health tourism (as contrast to the welfare tourism) from the adjoining countries as well.

6.3.4.2 Volunteers

Accumulated knowledge of civil work concentrated in the anthropological publication of Udvarhelyi (2007). Although the group of young people involved in short term international mobility is well-known, research is hardly available. Cultural events, brochures for those interested and other practical help are part of part of the activities. Artemissio is one of the influential civil foundations. Based on sporadic research work and corresponding civil and counselling activity has been summarized in the publication based on 30 interviews with young people volunteers abroad about their experiences and understanding. The selected young people were both Hungarians and foreigners, and so the term abroad had two meanings – Hungary and other countries – as well. The core point of the project was to present the intercultural learning during the volunteer work as the main experience of each interviewed with the aim to prepare would-be volunteers for the task.

Hungary signed agreements with New Zealand and recently with the Republic of Korea. Within the framework of the Working Holiday Scheme up to one hundred citizens per year, between the age of 18 and 30 (35) are allowed to stay in the other country for a maximum of one year. Apart from the fact that the primary purpose of the residence must be tourism, the youngsters participating in the programme are also authorised under specified circumstances to take up temporary work in the country concerned. (EMN 2013)

6.3.4.3 Lifestyle emigration, health migration

Although in sporadic form, we find various kinds of Hungarian temporary emigrants in Asia. E.g. irregular seasonal labourers replace their summer destinations in Europe for a cheaper winter stay in Thailand. Students having completed their study or training in China stay there to work for advertisements of companies as 'European'. Alpinist stays in the Himalaya, mainly in Nepal. Particular health tourism exists to China. More rich post-Soviet republics apply trainers, etc.

6.3.5 Humanitarian migration

6.3.5.1 Refugees and asylum seekers in Hungary

Following the intensive period of the 1990s the number of asylum seekers started to decrease rapidly in 2001 and remained rather low with some oscillations. In 2004-2005 the level was approximately 20 percent of the level five years before. This development found the policy makers and stakeholders involved in asylum rather unprepared, as all communications before the EU accession projected a significant increase both in the number of asylum seekers and in the number of those who would be returned to Hungary according to the regulations of the Dublin II Convention. The system slowly started to adjust to the new reality, though there has not been any significant reduction or restructuring due to the much lower number of asylum seekers. With loosing the previous importance international assistance of refugee system has also been reduced (Hárs et al (2009) Asylum seekers largely outnumber recognised refugees. (See Figure 6.19)



Figure 6.19 Number of asylum seekers and recognised refugees, 2003-2014 (Source: calculations based on HCSO Demographic yearbook 2013 – International migration)

Hungary is a country on the front line of the Schengen Area that makes the country attractive for asylum seekers or other foreigners. Yet, the treatment of asylum seekers gradually lost the image of the early 1990s. The Hungarian humanitarian system provided little monetary or housing support for asylum seekers and detained asylum-seekers along with immigrants who crossed Hungarian borders illegally. It has been repeatedly criticised (by the (UNHCR, Amnesty International, etc.). Protests of asylum seekers were alarming on increasing hopelessness for integration prospects in Hungary and the possibility of being placed in homeless shelters and separated from the children once they have to leave the reception centres. (aljazeera.com 2014) The treatment kept the number of asylum seekers rather low. In January 2014, Hungary announced a comprehensive new immigration policy, though things appear to be improving, many concerns remain - especially over the issue of detention.

In 2012, Hungary's detention of asylum seekers was found to be in violation of Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights. Provisory halt of the detention of asylum seekers resulted in a jump from approximately 1,000 to more than 18,000 asylum seekers in 2012-2013 and Hungary reinitiated its detention policy. According to the opinion of the co-chair of the Helsinki Committee the detention of asylum-seekers is legal under a new EU directive but it is meant be used as a last resort. In Hungary 30 percent of asylum-seekers are in detention. The motivation was to deter people from coming here. The asylum regime corresponding with the migration policy of the country prefers the migrants to leave. In this sense asylum seekers but also refugees are temporary in Hungary.

Statistics on humanitarian migration is published on the basis of the persons request for international protection upon arriving in the country and being registered by OIN as asylum seeker. Humanitarian migration has no clear geographic orientation in Hungary. Sum of asylum seekers during 2003-2012 has been presented in Figure 6.20. The main source of asylum seekers came from the nearby countries of the Balkan (Kosovo and Serbia) but humanitarian migration is at large number from Asian regions i.e. Afghanistan but also Vietnam, China, Georgia, from the Middle East and African as well. The rather small numbers of recognised refugees not particularly correspond to the geographic orientation of asylum seekers. In the period of 2003-2012 the outstanding number of recognised refugees arrived from Afghanistan, Iraq Iran, and Somalia.



Figure 6.20 Number of asylum seekers in Hungary by source countries, total number in sum, 2003-2012 (Source: calculations based on HCSO Demographic yearbook 2013 – International migration)

6.3.5.2 The emigration of Roma

The particular temporary emigration of Romas took place in successive waves. The first Hungarian Roma emigration in the late 1990s emerged as asylum migration to Canada having the liberal migration regime and resulted in re-establishing the visa obligation with Hungary in 2001. Then emigration stopped. In the post accession period emigration emerged again following the lifting of visa obligation in 2008. Canada turned to a more restrictive migration policy and launched a Canadian Voluntary Returning and Reintegration Program with the cooperation of IOM. In the frame of the program returnees benefited reintegration assistance from the Canadian government

The case study of Hungarian Roma emigration to Canada has the important lessons of temporary migration of the poorest. The rate of Hungarian refugees was actually the highest from CEE. Unlike other Central Eastern European countries, Hungarian Roma preferred Canada to other, mainly European, destinations. The pilot study of Durst– Vidra (2013) based on fieldwork makes the hypothesis that in the late 2000s a second wave of migration started that was to some extent different in nature from the previous trends. In the early 2000s, mainly better-off people and families were able to make the journey to Canada while in the late 2000s a new group was observed to be among the migrants, the more underprivileged families.

The major social and political changes that created a more desperate situation for poorer Roma in Hungary from the mid-2000s resulted in strong pressure: the subsequent governments introduced various social- welfare measures that had negative impact on the poorest strata of the population and launched public work programs that had the indirect purpose of punishing the most vulnerable; the political climate, the rise of the far-right and the spread of racism were tangible reasons that some Roma decided to leave.

Ranking of the countries according to the refugee status applicant in Canada is presented in Table 6.8. Each year when Hungarian emigrant waves took place Hungarian ranking has been considerable high and gradually reached peak before measures have taken place: in 2001 visa obligation has been replaced, in 2011 voluntary return program has been launched.

Table 6.8 Top 10 source countries in Canada among refugee status determinations – two waves of Hungarian Roma emigration (Source: IRB statistics, Canada)

First wave 1999-2002					Second wave 2009-2011		
1999	2000	2001	2002		2009	2010	2011
Sri Lanka	Pakistan	Hungary	Pakistan		Mexico	Hungary	Hungary
China	Sri Lanka	Pakistan	China		Hungary	China	China
Pakistan	Hungary	Sri Lanka	Colombia		Colombia	Columbia	Colombia
Hungary	China	Zimbabwe	Mexico		Czech Rep.	Mexico	Pakistan
India	Argentina	China	Sri Lanka		China	Sri Lanka	Namibia
Mexico	India	Colombia	Costa Rica		Haiti	Haiti	Mexico
Congo, DR	Mexico	Turkey	India		Sri Lanka	Nigeria	Nigeria
Russia	Colombia	Mexico	Turkey		Nigeria	St Vincent	St Vincent
Iran	Congo, DR	Argentina	Hungary		St Vincent	India	Sri Lanka
Colombia	Turkey	India	Peru		Al Salvador	Pakistan	India

Roma emigration data are presented in Table 6.9. Application as referred to the immigration board has been considerable, accepted cases lagged much below these number. According to data Roma emigration has been a striking development.

Table 6.9 Number of Hungarian Roma's refugee application and status statistics in Canada – two waves of Hungarian Roma emigration (Source: IRB statistics, Canada)

	First wave 1999-2002						Second wave 2009-2011		
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002		2009	2010	2011
Applications	982	1,579	1,929	3,851	1,146		2,426	2,3	4,423
Accepted	153	74	333	217	249		3	22	165
Rejected	38	8	21	12	11		1	2	8
Abandoned	64	378	792	579	886		5	72	738
Withdrawn,	100	146	131	166	307		55	117	249
Pending	83	352	333	829	862		208	967	838
Finalized	400	950	1,589	1,791	2,304		271	3,534	5,975

6.3.6 Irregular migration and human trafficking

Similarly to the case of asylum seekers Hungary has the preferential geopolitical position for irregular migrants to enter the territory of the EU. Hungary is bordering with third member countries with the particular duality of Diaspora policy towards ethnic Hungarians and defence policy and regulations or the EU regarding third member country citizens. Since Romania has joined the EU the core problem has been transferred to Ukraine and Serbia with a much smaller ethnic Hungarian population.

In addition to the irregular migration of adjoining countries' citizens, Hungary is considered to be both a transit and destination country of migration trafficking from more distant countries as well. Hungary has the geopolitical position to be located on the Eastern border of the EU and serves as a first country and defence against trafficking for the EU region. According to US Department of State report from 2006 Hungary is a source, transit and destination country for trafficking in women and girls. Nevertheless, the geographic region is still Europe: form Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, the Balkan countries to Hungary and as a transit country to Western Europe. Due to the lack of data, however, there are hints, assumptions on the size and the relevance of transit migration

Since Hungary is officially not identified as a country of destination there has been no data available about issues when adults or children had to be repatriated and gone through any type of risk assessment. According to IOM information (IOM FIIT 2013), cases at court have never taken place with foreign victims as plaintiffs. Nevertheless, police and NGO's all declare the existence of servitude with victims from China, Vietnam or Mongolia (There was an issue when a marijuana grower group was exposed in 2009. Police reported in the media that the organizers kept some workers in the houses where the marijuana was being grown. Some of these people were not even aware of which country they were in. Still police only mentioned smuggling and not talk too much about human trafficking).

Sex workers from Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria or Romania are also said to be present in Hungary. There is no or only very little evidence regarding the number of alien sex workers working in some parts of the sex sectors. The majority of prostitutes come from the East European countries situated next to the EU borders (Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus), some of them have "Balkan origin", but there are also some cases of prostitutes coming from exotic countries Asia or South Africa. Foreign sex workers can be found mainly next to the highways. Forced prostitution, drugs, the poor communication skills of foreign prostitutes have been revealed as one of the most serious risks in the sex sector.

In cases of children without guardians are 90 percent victims of smuggling. Children are sent to Western Europe very often by their parents. They pay for smugglers about 1000-3000 US$ or 1000-4000 Euro per person. There has been no or very little information is available that these children would have been exploited and were victims of trafficking. According to few available information children were from Africa (when children were leaving their countries they only knew that smugglers were going to take them to Europe. Trough Mogadishu - Dubai–Moscow–Kiev-Hungary); Pakistan or Kosovo (after arriving to Hungary children left in a couple of days most probably with the assistance of smugglers); Afghanistan and Palestine and Sri Lanka (children only got to know where they were when arrived to the shelter). These children are 14-18 years old; most of them (90%) are boys (e.g. there is no chance that girls would be smuggled from Afghanistan.)

There are about 100 children from Afghanistan currently in Hungary as non refugees. They do not want to have refugee status for being afraid of getting arrested. In this case they can be hidden at a child protection institute. They are willing to continue their trips to the West. However, officially, when children arrive they immediately apply for resident permit on humanitarian grounds. Since in every case children have a resident permit, they receive ID and personal documents for 10 years. Their rights become similar to Hungarian citizens except that they cannot vote or be employed in a Governmental authority as a civil servant. However, once they spend 3 years uninterruptedly in Hungary they receive citizenship and have equal rights to Hungarian citizens. Children after the age of 18 are taken care of by the Territorial Child Protection Service. If children continue studying, this authority provides them with accommodation and financial support until the age of 24.

6.3.7 Family-based movers

There is an extensive strand of anthropological and sociological research in Hungary on migrants and migrant families. The qualitative research is mainly based on face-to-face interviews and publications mostly indirectly refer on the migration path and family based migration. (E.g. Barna et al 2012, Guo Xiaojing 2011, Nyíri 2010) There are also hints in various research pieces that family based movers may use various channels for work or setting up enterprise. Nyíri (2010) suggests to deeper investigate the changing purposes of Chinese migrants entering the country. Nevertheless, not much focused research in this field has been done. Resident permits on family purposes correspond to the size of immigration of various sending regions. The main immigrant sending countries have proportionately higher numbers of family migrants: Romania, Ukraine and Germany in Europe, China with its extending immigration position outside Europe. (Figure 6.21)



Figure 6.21 Number of family based immigrant stock in Hungary by sending countries, 1st January 2013 (Source: calculations based on HCSO Demographic yearbook 2013 – International migration)

6.3.8 Return migration

Census 2011 provides statistical data on return migration. Return migration to Hungary mainly originates from Europe. Nevertheless, sizeable return migration occurs from outside Europe, primarily from America and at a much lower numbers from the Asia, Africa as well. Return migration is continuous without strong inflow peeks. Main return originating countries from outside Europe are the main emigrant countries (USA, Canada) but various other countries are also involved in the process. Remarkable, return migration is continuous and with regard to the country of origin where returnees are returning migration and return has likely been temporary due to various reasons.

Retirement migration is connected with pension regulations. In this respect important deficiency of the unchanged pension agreement would influence immigration from less developed non-EU post–communist countries. The old, territorial-principle-based social politic agreement may result in higher pension hunting type migration. Evidences correspond with some research findings. Knowledge on retirement migration has been long restricted to the immigration from the adjacent countries' ethnic Hungarian population (Illés 2004). Illés-Kincses (2008) recognised a group of retirement immigrants from developed countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the USA) who considered it preferable to return to the kin-state as emigrant Hungarians.

The particular type of return migration is that of the Roma who have been emigrated in successive waves in the early and the late 2000s as discussed above. The unique program encouraged voluntary return. The outcomes of such program in case of the very poor have been surveyed in Durst– Vidra (2013). Returnees had different expectations; they did not think that life would be so difficult in Canada, and above all they could not get access to any extra income besides the welfare money that was just enough to live on. In their case return meant they failed to create a better life in Canada or back at home through saving some money. Somewhat surprisingly, understanding was more diverse. "Interestingly another dominant discourse was to refer to their own sickness, or sickness of some relative at home. This latter motivation is similar to what most anthropological studies describe. Often return is not motivated by economic factors but rather by strong family ties. From this respect return is not a financial failure." (Durst– Vidra 2013: 154). There have been two waves and the first-wave migrants came from somewhat better social backgrounds and had better opportunities in Canada. Some were also included into voluntary return program. These families all recounted a "success story": e.g. they managed to acquire some savings that they could spend on buying a house or renovating their old house at home. Later migrants, on the other hand, typically found themselves in much worse situations, at least temporarily. Those who did not deregister and whose family allowance was not suspended had to face criminal persecution charges upon their return. Moreover, returnees are not entitled to social assistance until they register again and it takes time before the administrative procedure is completed. (Durst– Vidra 2013). In addition, next to the negative accounts of their different experiences in Canada, there are a few very positive memories that marked all the migrants. "It is not an exaggeration to say that these were experiences of positive cultural shock. The most striking one told by everyone was the humane atmosphere that they met in Canada." (Durst– Vidra 2013: 154).

6.3.9 Data summary and availibility

Finally we summarise the available data and information on potential temporary vs. permanent migration. Since there is no available data on applicable definition of temporary migration we used the purposes of migration as proxy. 10. Table summarises the statistics presented and help to define the sample of empirical research.

The upper section of the table gives the share of various (regular) purposes of migration, according to most recent migrant statistics. While at least somewhat higher than 20% of total migration is potentially permanent (with the purpose of immigration, settlement), the share of Asian permanent immigration is considerable higher, 35%. There is no farther information regarding the temporary vs. permanent character of other purposes of migration.

The lower section presents the availibilty of various independent data surces discussed above which are not harmonised, however, with other statistics.

Table 6.10 Overview of data availability and main data of temporary migration, 1st January 2013.

	Labour & economic	**Family based migration**	**Education**	**Immigration, settlement**	**International protection**	**Others**	**Irregular**	**Total**
immigrant statistics (HCSO)								
total (%)	30,0	15,8	11,6	21,5	2,3	18,9		100,0
Asia (%)	23,6	15,5	13,7	35,4	6,8	5,0		100,0
statistical data avalibility								
total migrant	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	No	
potential temporary migrant	x	x	x		x	x	No	
potential permanent migrant				x				
independent (not harmonised) sources (various)								
	yes	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes	
Labour migration	Employee							
	Seasonal workers							
	Posted workers & intercom-pany transferee							
	Govern-mental workers							
	Researchers and academics							
Economic migration	Entrepre-neurs						Undocumented/ irregular labour migrants	
Educational migration			Student migration					
			Secondary level education					
Humanitarian migration					Refugees & asylum seekers			
Family-based movers		Family-based movers						
						Residential tourism, health migrants		
Other purposes of migration						Volunteers		
						Lifestyle emigration, health migration		
Irregular migration							Irregular migration & human trafficking	

6.4 Conclusion

The paper has summarized the available data on Transeuropean migration of the recent decade to present the main trends of in and out migration of Hungary with particular focus on temporariness. Both emigration and immigration are moderate in size and have focused primarily to Europe. Migration was significant in the early 20th century when Hungary was an emigrant country with strong overseas emigration of poor people, mainly to America. The war period stopped this kind of migration. The post-war turbulence of the population was followed by four decades of communist regime with closed and controlled border crossing and low level of in and outmigration with the exceptional period of strong emigration as aftermath of the 1956 revolution. During the democratic transition of Hungary at the turn of the late 1980s and early 1990s, immigration turned to be a hot issue with particularly a Diaspora driven migration at sudden.

In spite of an episode of increasing (mainly ethnic) immigration at the beginning of the transition period of the late 1980s and early 1990s coinciding with the immigration of a group of Chinese newcomers, migration remained moderate and has modestly been growing. Outmigration has been similarly modest until the crisis when considerable migration, overwhelmingly to the EU countries has emerged.

The majority of the immigrant stock came from the EU; partly from the more developed EU-15 countries but mostly from the new EU-12 member countries (mainly from Romania with large ethnic Hungarian population). There has emerged a considerable Asian and much less American and African stock of Transeuropean immigrants. Half of the total foreign citizens have been registered in Central Hungary. As of Asian immigrants, the share has been 80 per cent on average, and in case of the Chinese, Vietnamese or the Syrian community, the share was 90 per cent, overwhelmingly in Capital City Budapest. As of Transeuropean, and particularly the Asian-European migratory movements, according to the estimation, there is somewhat positive net migration balance with the Asian region while net migration balance is near to zero with other regions outside Europe.

The largest non-European sending region is Asia. The increasing immigrant population stock from China outnumbers any other groups but other Asian countries are also increasingly present in Hungary. Remarkably, Asian immigrant communities have had a sharp increase in stock since 2004 following the EU enlargement and Hungary's joining to the European Union. Chinese and some other communities had a continuously increasing stock since that time while others like the Vietnamese are stagnating. According to flow data Asian immigration had a jump following the enlargement of the EU, particularly from China that has gradually slowed down, and also from other Asian countries with a steady state of immigration flow since that time.

Resident permits by purposes of stay have been perceived as a proxy to the temporary or permanent character of migration *accepting the definition of temporariness of migration as the intention to leave*. Some types of resident permits are more likely hinting to the temporary migration while others are not. There is a clear difference by sending regions by the purpose of migration. Addressing the types vs. activities of various migrant groups, we can easily identify segments or ethnic niches of migrants or sending regions or countries by purposes of migration vs. sending regions or countries.

For the Asian immigrants labour vs. economic activity is also rather important, nearly 1/4 of all immigrants possess a residence permit for work and economic reason. On the other hand, only a low share of the small immigrant groups from America and Africa are coming with the purpose of economic activity. For African immigrants the purpose of study is particularly important (1/3rd of total). International protection is predominantly important for Africans and at a much lesser extent for Asian immigrants. Other reasons including health or lifestyle purpose are relevant for immigration of the EU-15 and American (mainly USA) citizens.

Immigrants with the purpose of education or study shape a clearly increasing immigrant group of likely temporary character. The takeoff of the educational and student immigration has begun around 2008. The number of American and African citizens with the purpose of education or study has been rather low but increased gradually.

In contrast to the stock of immigrants, the inflow data present the more recent trends of (temporary) migration. Similarly to the stock data the main purpose of the inflow of immigrants is economic activity. Remarkable, however, immigration for education is increasing in number while inflow on other purposes has continuously decreased.

The purpose of immigration of Asian immigrants is diverse; a fourth part of them are involved in economic activities and labour. The increasing inflow for education and study is the most important reason of African immigrants (over 50 per cent); the share is rather high among American, Australian and non-EU European immigrants, (around one third of immigrant inflow). Education or study has not been a very crucial purpose for Chinese migrants as opposed to other activities but share is still significant, over 20 percent. Looking the inflow of migrants by various purposes over a longer period the picture is surprisingly stable by sending regions.

The largest in number and the most important is the Chinese group of entrepreneurs. The Chinese immigrant population is highly concentrated in Budapest. Still, Chinese are entrepreneurs even if they are owners of micro or small enterprises, petty trades of the China markets. More characteristic is, in fact, the inflow of migration with the purpose of education or studies. A clear increase of educational immigration came about in 2008 from all sending regions, connected to the introduced regulation of student mobility. There is also some sort of residential tourism, overwhelming majority from Europe and health tourism and passably also some health migration exists, mainly from Europe or developed non-EU countries (USA, Canada, Israel, etc).

Hungary is a country on the front line of the Schengen Area that makes the country attractive for asylum seekers or other foreigners. Yet, the treatment of asylum seekers gradually lost the image of the early 1990s. The Hungarian humanitarian system provided little monetary or housing support for asylum seekers and detained asylum-seekers along with immigrants who crossed Hungarian borders illegally. The treatment kept the number of asylum seekers rather low.

Hungarian emigration has remained moderate until recently, the increasing outflow has been largely oriented to Europe. Transeuropean (temporary) emigration is marginal in size and data are sporadic. Academic and student migration to developed overseas countries, mainly USA are measurable and some refugee type emigration of the poor (Roma) people to Canada.

Relatively low level of migration is corresponding with the migration policy. The message of immigration policy is principally clearly defensive supposing that immigration is dangerous and threatening. In case of labour migrants the precondition of immigration is strict (self sufficiency considering income, accommodation and healthcare) without considering the advantage of labour or entrepreneurial immigration and encouraging migration. In case of student migrants the short term economic gain (the tuition fee payment obligation without preference to stay) may result in temporariness of students without considering the possibility of fishing highly qualified migrants. In case of humanitarian migration the lack of sufficient treatment plays down the level of asylum seekers

The message of the policy is ignorance with the lack of any support towards migrants. The lack of any affirmation, selectivity policy or concern and personal treatment encourages immigrants to leave, and likely results in temporary character of migration in the sense that migrants' expectation is to leave. For the time being the migration process is limited and the policy is unresponsive due to the limited level of migration. Anyhow, even immigration policy and corresponding regulations hinder the development. As for emigration policy, there has not been any supportive measure to potential temporary emigration including the low level of language training either. All in all, Hungarian migration policy should stop with the defensive attitude towards migration and consider migration as a natural and increasing process and face and even exploit the advantages of migration. Economic, labour market and social policy papers, public discourses and policy discussions are needed in collaboration with the opening government policy approach.

References

Ács, Viktória (2010a) Temporary and Circular Migration: empirical evidence, current policy practice and future options in Hungary, October 2010 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/circular-migration/12._hungary_national_report_circular_migration_version_29oct2010_en.pdf

Ács, Viktória (2010b) Satisfying labour Demand through Migration in Hungary, EMN http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/labour-demand/12a._hungary_national_report_satisfying_labour_demand_thru_migration_version_21july2010_en.pdf

Aljazeera.com (2014) Hungary revamps its refugee support system aljazeera.com, Creede Newton, 07 Mar 2014 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/hungary-revamps-refugee-support-system-20143475745746544.html

Balogi Anna (2010) Jóléti migráció külföldiek Magyarországra telepedése. (Welfare Migration: Foreign Settlers in Hungary) In Hárs-Tóth eds. (2010) pp 245-262

Barna, M, Nguyen Luu Lan Anh, Várhalmi, Z (2012): Az én házam egy keleti háza nyugati világban. Nemi szerepek és beilleszkedés a konfuciánus és muszlim hagyományú országokból származó bevándorlók körében.(My house is an Easterner's house in the Western world. Gender roles and integration of migrants with Confucians and Muslim tradition) ICCR Budapest Alapítvány http://tudastar.menedek.hu/segedanyag/barna-maria-nguyen-luu-lan-anh-varhalmi-zoltan-2012-az-en-hazam-egy-keleti-haz-nyugati

Berács, J-Malota, E (2011): Megéri hozzánk jönni tanulni? (It worth coming here to study) Educatio No. 2. pp. 220–234.

Brubaker, R (1998) Migrations of Ethnic Unmixing in the "New Europe". International Migration Review vol. 32 No. 4 (Winter) pp 1047-1065

Census 2011 – online data source http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_demografia

Durst J – Vidra Zs (2013) Some Hypotheses and Questions on the New Wave of Hungarian Roma Migration to and from Canada. In Vidra Zsuzsa ed. (2013) pp 129-161

EMN (2012) Misuse of the Right to Family Reunification: marriages of convenience and false declarations of parenthood http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/family-reunification/hu_20120606_familyreunification_en_version_final_en.pdf

EMN (2013) Attracting Highly Qualified and Qualified Third-CountryNationals, EMN http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/attracting/12._hungary_national_report_attractinghighlyqualifiedtcns_july2013_final-1_en.pdf

EMN temporary & circular (2011) Temporary and Circular Migration: empirical evidence, current policy practice and future options in EU Member States produced by the European Migration Network September 2011 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/circular-migration/0a_emn_synthesis_report_temporary__circular_migration_publication_oct_2011_en.pdf

Eurofound (2010) Posted workers in the European Union, , Eurofound, Dublin

Fassmann et al eds. (2009) Statistics and Reality Concepts and Measurements of Migration in Europe, Amsterdam Univ. Press.

Felsőoktatási statisztika/Statistics on higher educaton (various years) http://www.oktatas.hu/felsooktatas/felsooktatasi_statisztikak/!DARI_FelsooktStat/oh.php?id=fir_int_stat&fir_stat_ev=2011

Guo Xiaojing (2011) Kínaiak és a magyar állampolgárság. (Chinese and the Hungarian citizenship) In Kováts A (ed.) (2011): Magyarrá válni - bevándorlók honosítási és integrációs stratégiái, Budapest, pp 181-190 http://tudastar.menedek.hu/sites/default/files/guo_xiaojing_kinaiak_es_a_magyar_allampolgarsag.pdf

Hárs, A – Sik, E. (2009) Hungary, in Fassmann et al eds. (2009) pp169-194

Hárs, Á (2010b) Migráció harmadik országokból a statisztikai adatok tükrében (Third country

immigration acceding to statistical data) in Örkény – Székelyi eds. (2010) pp. 15-48
Hárs, Á (2011) Immigrant flows and stocks in Central and Eastern Europe – the Czech, Hungarian and Polish Experience. In Grabowska-Lusinka, I – Drbohlav, D – Hárs, Á eds. (2011) Immigration puzzles. Comparative analysis of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland before and after joining the EU. Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken, 2011
Hárs, Á et al (2009) Immigration countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The Case of Hungary, IDEA WP No. 12, May 2009 http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP12_Hungary.pdf
Hárs, Á- Sik, E (2008) Combating irregular employment of foreigners – an analysis of policy and the law. In Kupiszewski, M-Mattilla, H eds. (2008) Addressing irregular Employment of Immigrants in the European Union: Between Sanctions and Rights pp 92-124
Hárs, Á– Sik, E (2008) Hungary. In Hönekopp-Mattila (eds.) Permanent or circular migration. Argo 2005. IOM Budapest pp 73 – 105
Hárs, Á. (2010a) Migráció és munkaerőpiac Magyarországon (Migration and Labour Markets in Hungary. Facts, Causes and Perspectives) in Hárs, Á – Tóth, J eds. (2010) pp15-53
Hárs, Ágnes – Neumann, László (2010): Hungary: Posted workers. EIRO (European Industrial Relation Observatory) online http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0908038s/hu0908039q.htm
Hárs, Ágnes (2013) Harmadik országbeli migránsok munkaerő-piaci helyzete (Third country nationals labour market position) In Kováts, A ed Bevándorlás és integráció (Immigration and integration) MTA KI Budapest
HCSO Demographical yearbook (various years), HCSO, Budapest
HCSO Statinfo – online data source http://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/themeSelector.jsp?page=2&szst=WNVN
Illés, S (2004) Időskorúak Magyaroszágra vándorlása, Statisztikai Szemle (82) 3 pp 264-279
Illés, S -Kincses, Á (2008) Foreign Retired Migrants in Hungary. Hungarian Statistical Review, Special Number 12 pp 88-111
IOM FIIT (2013) Country report Hungary for 'Evaluation of the effectiveness of measures for the integration of trafficked persons. Foster and Improve Integration of Trafficked Persons' (FIIT Project) IOM, Budapest
IRB statistics (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada) http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/projects/refugee-forum/projects/Statistics.php
Juhász J., Makara P., Makara E. (2011) A munkaerő-piaci integráció kihívásai Magyarországon. A harmadik országbeli munkavállalók beilleszkedésének esélyei és korlátai. Panta Rhei Társadalomkutató Bt., Budapest http://www.migrinfo.hu/user_files/110706tuvdoe733264.pdf
Juhász, J (2008) Migrants and Informal Work in Hungary. International Labour Office, Geneva:
Kováts A ed. (2013): Bevándorlás és integráció – magyarországi adatok, európai indikátorok, MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Kisebbségkutató Intézet, Budapest, 2013 http://tudastar.menedek.hu/sites/default/files/kovats_andras_szerk._2013_bevandorlas_es_integracio_teljes.pdf
Kováts A. ed. (2011): Magyarrá válni - bevándorlók honosítási és integrációs stratégiái, Budapest http://tudastar.menedek.hu/segedanyag/kovats-andras-szerk-2011-magyarra-valni-bevandorlok-honositasi-es-integracios-strategiai
Migration Strategy (2014) Az Európai Unió által a 2014-2020. közötti uniós programozási időszakban létrehozásra kerülő Belső Biztonsági Alaphoz kapcsolódó hétéves szakpolitikai stratégia http://www.solidalapok.hu/index.php?q=node/80505
nol.hu (2009) Tizennégy országban szolgálnak magyar békefenntartók (In 14 countries are Hungarian peacekeepers in service) http://nol.hu/kulfold/20091209-afgan_kikepzok_es_libanoni_terkepeszek-461901
Nyíri P (2010) Kínai migránsok Magyarországon: mai tudásunk és aktuális kérdések (Chinese migrants in Hungary. Our present knowledge and current questions). In Hárs, Á – Tóth J eds. (2010) pp 147-172

Nyíri, P (2010) Kínai migránsok Magyarországon mai tudásunk és aktuális kérdések In Hárs-Tóth eds. (2010) pp 147-172 http://tudastar.menedek.hu/sites/default/files/nyiri_pal_kinai_migransok_magyarorszagon_mai_tudasunk_es_aktualis_kerdesek.pdf
Örkény A.-Székelyi M. (2003) : Magyarországon tanuló külföldi diákok, 2003 unpublished, short summary available: http://archivum.hvg.hu/article/200403Tanulni_Hungary_MAGYARORSZAGON_TANULO_KULFOL.aspx
Örkény, A – Székelyi, M eds. (2010) Az idegen Magyarország. Bevándorlók társadalmi integrációja (The foreign Hungary. The social integration of immigrants), ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest
Örkény, A. (2011) A harmadik országbeli állampolgárok honosítással kapcsolatos vélekedései, és ezek összefüggése a migráció különféle aspektusaival (Third country nationals' opinion on naturalisation in relation to various aspects of migration) In Kováts, A ed. (2011) Magyarrá válni. Bevándorlók honosítási és integrációs stratégiái, MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézete, Budapest, pp 127-180
PES, Work permits statistics http://nfsz.munka.hu/engine.aspx?page=stat_kulf_munkavall_mo-on
Sik, E. –Tóth, J eds. (1997) Migráció és politika (Migration and policy) MTA Politikai Tudományok Intézete, Budapest
Source: HCSO, Kutatás és fejlesztés, various years, http://www.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/tudkut/tudkut08.pdf; http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/tudkut/tudkut11.pdf
Statistical Yearbook of Education, 2012/2013 http://www.kormany.hu/download/c/93/21000/Oktat%C3%A1si_%C3%89vk%C3%B6nyv_2012.pdf
Szemerszki M (2005) Külföldi hallgatók Magyarországon (Foreign students in Hungary), Education 2005 No. 2. pp 320-333
Undeclared work in the European Union (2007) EUROBAROMETER No. 284/67.3, European Commission, Brussels.
Vámos Á (2011) Migránsok iskolái. (Schools of migrants) Education No. 2. pp. 194–207.
Várhalmi, Z (2010) A budapesti kínai és vietnami gazdasági klaszterek néhány jellegzetessége. In Hárs-Tóth eds. (2010) pp 173-190 http://tudastar.menedek.hu/sites/default/files/varhalmi_zoltan_a_budapesti_kinai_es_vietnami_gazdasagi_klaszterek_nehany_jellegzetessege.pdf
Várhalmi, Z (2010) Magyarországi migránsok kapcsolati hálójának típusai, jellegzetességei (Types and characteristics and of contact networks of Hungarian immigrants). In Örkény – Székelyi eds. (2010) pp 169-188
Várhalmi, Z (2013) Vállalkozó migránsok Magyarországon (Migrant entrepreneurs in Hungary). In Kováts, A ed. (2013) pp 89-100
Zámbó, Katalin (2012) National report from Hungary on immigration of international students to the EU, EMN http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/immigration-students/12a._hungary_national_report__international_students_jan2013_en_version_en.pdf
Zatykó J – Schumann R (2009) Beilleszkedési utak és lehetőségek, Ereser Közvéleménykutató, (EU Integrációs Alalp, 'Beilleszkedési utak és lehetőségek' kutatási projekt) Budapest http://www.solidalapok.hu/sites/default/files/ereser_beilleszkedesi_utak.pdf

7. CHARASTERISTICS OF TEMPORARY TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION - INDIA

S. Irudaya RAJAN

7.1 Introduction

Global development was dominated by the movement of goods in the 19th century and by the movement of capital in the 20th century; but in the 21st century development imperatives will be dominated by the movement of people across national borders (Bhagwati 1999).

India receives the highest inward remittance flow in the world and has the second largest diaspora across the globe. From the beginning there has been two distinct emigration flows seen in the Indian context; one semi-skilled emigrant to the Gulf Countries and the other highly skilled emigrants to the developed countries such as Europe and United States.

Though today there is still intensive emigration from India to Gulf Countries there is a paradigm shift in the skill composition and number of emigrants that move across transnational boundaries. Since last decade there has been a phenomenal flow of skilled professionals to high income countries especially US and UK. The IT professionals from these countries have also been substantially flowing to other European Countries over the years which clearly bring out the changing dynamics of the transnational migration.

India with growing population of 1.25 billion with about one fifth of world working age population it's imperative to have some insights in the transnational migration in the globalizing era.

To strengthen the Indo-EU relations, both parties have signed a number of bilateral agreements and Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs), notably a Joint Vision Statement for promoting Co-operation in the field of Information and Communications Technology (2001), Customs Cooperation Agreement (2004), Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Employment and Social Affairs (2006), Horizontal Civil Aviation Agreement (2008), Joint Declaration in the field of Education & Training (2008), Joint Declaration on Multilingualism (2009), Joint Declaration on Culture (2010), Memorandum of Understanding on Statistics (2012) and the Joint Declaration on Research and Innovation Cooperation (2012). In addition, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs has signed several Social Security Agreements to protect the short-term temporary migrants to Europe to receive their share to social security contributions with individual countries such as Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Portugal and Czech Republic. In 2009, a labour mobility partnership was signed with Denmark.

India has the second largest diaspora in the world estimated at around 25 million coming next only to China whose diaspora is estimated at around 50 million. Indian overseas community has presence in about 189 countries across the globe. It is the result of different waves of migration one after another spanning over hundreds of years. Greatest legacy of migration from India comes from colonial era and with the advent of globalisation in recent times has given push to migration from India.

Indian Overseas community truly represents successful economic, social and cultural force in the world. Indian diaspora in itself is a diverse, heterogeneous and eclectic global community that represent different languages, cultures religion and faith. But, above all there is a common thread running across our overseas community, irrespective of any geographical location and any diversity, it the idea of India and with its intrinsic values that are embedded in it which binds it together.

Overseas Indians are amongst the best educated and successful communities in the world. In every part of the world the Indian community is respected and recognized for its hard work, discipline and for successfully integrating with the local communities of the host countries. They have not only made immense contributions to the economies of the host countries but have also contributed significantly to the knowledge and innovation frontier.

Migration of Indians to Europe has been a phenomenon that dates back to centuries, and with it colonial ties with Britain. India has had its opportunities as well. Familiarities with many European languages and English in particular, Indians are still demanded labour force in Europe. Here in this paper we intend to analyse the characteristics of short term migration and migrants from India to Europe, and to understand the various socio-economic and demographic features of this population.

7.1.1 Methodology

India is known for its rich human resource potential, and all of its recent developments are based on the overseas migration of both skilled and unskilled labour. A hefty share of the countries income is derived out of remittances flowing in from different parts of the world. A while ago, the understanding of the Indian connections with the outside world was limited to the Gulf migration scenario, which is not so anymore. Indians are everywhere. Being the largest labour exporting country in the world the necessity to update and upgrade its understanding of the migration dynamics has also increased. In spite of the many attempts made, like the installation of the Research Unit on International Migration at the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), lack of enough data is even today a deep concern facing researchers which needs to be addressed.

The study here has utilised data sources one but many, as discussed in the D 1.1 report.

Government of India's data on labour migration: The Government of India through its office of Protector General of Emigrants (PGE) of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs compiles data on emigrant clearances (those who have not completed ten years of schooling but would like to work at Emigration Clearance Required (ECR) to about 18 countries in the world) and publish it annually along with states of origin as well as the countries of destination. This data just provides some indications of labour flows to about eighteen countries in the world (more details, see Krishna Kumar and Irudaya Rajan, 2014).

The National Sample Survey Organization rounds: The National Sample Survey Organisation/ Office (NSSO) established in 1950 is an organisation under the Department of Statistics which is the largest organisation involved in conducting massive socio-economic surveys across the country. The study here has made use of data available from its 49th and 64th rounds of studies. NSS 49th round (January to June, 1993) included a section on migration and collected some characteristics of households with migrants. Similarly, the situation of employment and migration particulars in India was carried out during NSS 64th round (July, 2007 to June, 2008).

India Human Development Survey: The India Human Development Survey (IHDS) is a nationally representative, multi-topic survey of 41,554 households in 1503 villages and 971 urban neighborhoods across India and also canvassed the question on migrant households. The first round of interviews was completed in 2004-05. IHDS has been jointly organized by researchers from the University of Maryland and the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), New Delhi. Funding for this survey is provided by the National Institutes of Health with additional funding from the Ford Foundation.

Other Published data sources: In addition, we have used extensively the Eurostat Database of the European Commission, OECD database, UNESCO database, India Tourism statistics, European Travel Commission data, Census of India, World Bank database, Reserve Bank of India, Bureau of Immigration, Government of India and UN population division.

However, most of these data sources do not distinguish much between the permanent and temporary migration phenomenon and hence for further analysis of the theme specific field studies need to be done. Here in this report, we have utilised these multiple sources of data to come up with a qualitative analysis of the existing migration scenario of the country. Defining the characteristic features of the migration and migrants of the country calls for a multi-dimensional analysis of the various aspects pertaining to migration. Here we have tried to define both migration and migrants based on their respective characteristics. The statistics on the migrants stocks, the kinds of visa issued, the purpose of visits, the cases of irregular or illegal migration, so on and so forth have been discussed as far as migration as an entity is concerned. As far as migrants are concerned, their gender classifications, age structures, educational attainments, migratory paths, duration of stays etc could be projected. However, a clear deficiency of differentiated approaches to long term and temporary migrations is been revealed. The inability of the POI data in addressing migration studies has been very much felt, which further highlights the relevance of this study. Temporary migration is much different from the long term movements, which being acknowledged is a need of the hour. In this paper however, the general trends have been well exposed using most of the best available data sources.

7.2 Historical Analysis of Indians' Migration to Europe

Though India has the image of a leading sending country to all parts of the world, and its migration ties with the Gulf much discussed, it should still be kept in mind that India's movements to Europe has much historic and economic significance. A strong Indian diaspora that has developed over the years, and the presence of highly skilled labour makes it different from the Gulf migration scenario. Let us analyse the historical aspects of India's migration ties with different European countries.

Netherlands: It has the second largest population of people of Indian origin in Europe coming only next to United Kingdom. Though there is presence of such a large number of People of Indian origin in country, emigration to Netherlands is only a post-World War II phenomenon. There are two distinct groups among the Indian community in the Netherlands - people of Indian origin who originally migrated from India to Suriname as indentured labour. They had migrated from the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar around 130 years ago and later migrated to the Netherlands. Surinamese Hindustani community in Netherlands is estimated around 180,000 that are descendants of the indentured labourers that were sent by Dutch colonisers to Suriname. There is huge concentration of Surinamese Indians in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Hague with Hague alone having around 40,000 Surinamese Indians.

Other distinct stream of emigration can be attributed to those that came directly from India. There has been recent wave of Indian professionals from India that has emigrated to Netherlands. Given the rise of demand for high-skilled labour there has been considerable increase in the number of NRI community in Netherlands from only 10 Indian families in 1960 to present level of 15,000 persons. There are many NRIs that have set up trading companies in the Netherlands. Even some of the universities have also attracted many highly qualified and experienced Indian scientists, educationists and researchers. Thus, many of the highly qualified professionals that came to Netherlands seeking their fortunes and today they occupy many top positions in business, academia, medical and other professions. Most of them occupy many senior positions in organisations.

Surinamese Indians have integrated well in society and are making an immense contribution to the economic and social life of the country. They are found in diverse and in-numerous trade and craft and many have established themselves as musicians, artists, sculptors, sports persons, journalists, actors and singers making huge contribution in the social and cultural spheres.

Portugal: It has around 70,000 people of Indian origin that mostly came from Mozambique, where their ancestors had migrated in colonial times. Following unsettled conditions during Mozambique's independence these emigrants migrated to Portugal and they constitute the bulk of the People of Indian Origin in Portugal. Most of the decedents have Goan root that was Portugal territory during colonial era. They are followed next by Gujarati traders that hail from Daman and Diu which were also Portugal territory during colonial times.

Apart from these emigrants, some Goan also migrated to Portugal at the time of the liberation of Goa. Given their Catholic religion, knowledge of Portuguese language and culture has helped emigrants to easily assimilate in Portuguese society. It is estimated that there are around 15,000 Goans in Portugal.

Indian community in Portugal overall represents a well-to-do community. Though, many of them are engaged in retail or wholesale business, there are also some that serve as skilled worker offering managerial and secretarial services. There are several Indians that are engaged in medical and legal profession, banking services. There are also commercial organisations that are run by Indians including restaurants, supermarkets, hotels etc.

Indian community in Portugal have also been active in government and public services and universities with many of them even attaining high economic position and status. There are also some of the emigrants that are engaged in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs given the fact that in recent times there has been increasing trend of illegal immigration from India to Portugal that arrive mostly via other European destinations.

There are large concentration of People of Indian origin in Lisbon and Porto. Hindus (about 33,000), Muslim (Sunnis) (about 12,000) and Ismailis (about 5,000) form the majority of the ethnic Indian diaspora in Portugal. These groups have adopted Portuguese nationality and language and but they have still maintained their distinct socio-religious and cultural identities in spite of their assimilation to the local life.

France: POI have colonial origin, they had migrated as indentured labourers from India to other French colonies and then moved to France. Most of them come from southern part of India. The Indian community in France is estimated to be around 65,000 and most of them have migrated from the former French colonies in India such as Yamen, Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Chandranagore. Later on Gujaratis from other Francophone areas including Madagascar, Seychelles and Mauritius also migrated to France. There are also significantly large number of PIOs in the Reunion Island (about 250,000), Guadeloupe (about 57000), Martinique (about 6000) and St. Martin (about 300). France and its overseas departments has an Indian community of around 330,000 – 350,000 who arrived from the former French colonies.

Apart from colonial migration, most of the other migrants came to France in 1950's migration wave. In recent times there are number of professionals and academicians that have migrated to France. In recent year's professionals and software specialists, especially IT Professionals have migrated to France from India. Apart from professional or relational reasons, there are also large numbers of students coming to France from India for higher studies. There are 6000 people registered with the Indian embassy in Paris. Emigrants come from various part of country but overwhelmingly large numbers of these emigrants are from State of Punjab.

While most of the members of the Indian community are mainly engaged in private small businesses, there are also many members of Indian community that have taken up government jobs. There are 6,000 members estimated to be employed in army and police force and about 12,000 members in the French Government service, there are also some members of Indian community that are employed in educational institutions. Apart from government services about 9,000 Indians may be working in managerial capacity in French private companies. Indian professionals are employed in well-known scientific, industrial and commercial enterprises. In order to strengthen collaboration in S&T between India and France, an intergovernmental Programme of Cooperation in Science and Technology (POC) was signed in March 2003.

United Kingdom: The colonial factor has played a dominant part in ensuring strong migratory flows between India and United Kingdom at all levels for over two centuries. This has led to development and evolution of an Indian community in Britain which is diverse and unique in its own way.

Gujaratri, Parsi community and the Bengali community were the earliest to arrive in the United

Kingdom from India. They arrived in Britain way back in 18th and 19th centuries as lawyers, doctors and professionals. Parsi Community was first to settle down in the UK followed by British Indian Army soldiers, who were part of the British war effort and choose to settle down in the United Kingdom.

Later on large numbers of workers, most of them being of Punjabi origin went to the United Kingdom for reconstruction efforts in the industrial sectors in the aftermath of World War II. The second major wave of emigration occurred in the 60s and 70s when Indians living in British colonies especially in East Africa migrated to United Kingdom. Most of the emigrants in this second wave were of Gujarati origin and had considerable expertise in business and trade. This second wave brought economic successes and prosperity amongst the Indian community, establishing Indians as the 'shopkeepers in the nation of shopkeepers.' It not only changed the economic life of the Indian community but also impacted the socio-economic life of the UK weaving Indians in the multi-cultural fabric making in diverse and vivid.

Most of the Indian immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s were industrial workers while later immigrants from East Africa were mostly engaged in small and medium-scale business enterprises and some were also in the healthcare sector. A majority of the second generation Indians and current immigrants are professionals working as doctors, engineers, solicitors, chartered accountants, academicians, IT experts, etc.

Persons of Indian origin make up the single largest ethnic immigrant group in Britain. Among Indian immigrants around 45 per cent have origin from the state of Punjab constituting largest immigrant group. Among others Gujaratis, Muslims, Ismailis and Bohras constitute an equally large ethnic group in the United Kingdom. Though immigrants from state of Bengal, Bihar and UP may be numerically small they do constitute major groups in some selected pockets. One of the important aspect non-EU immigration in recent years to the UK is for family reunification and marriage in which the Indian subcontinent accounts for a major share.

Germany: There is significant Indians diaspora in Germany and most of them had migrated emigrated in the 1960s and 70s. Indians though have assimilated in the German society they still have their own culture and identity which is reflected by the fact that there places of worship for the Indian community in almost all major German cities.

It is estimated that there are 110,000 people of Indian origin in Germany and approximately 40 per cent of them are Indian passport holders. Apart from it is also estimated that there are about 6000 registered asylum seekers and around two to three thousand illegal Indian immigrants living on Germany. There are also about 6500 Indian students studying in different institutes and universities in Germany.

The Indian community in Germany primarily comprise of technocrats, businessmen and healthcare professionals. Germany offers high-tech Indian professionals attractive employment opportunities which result in intensive migration of high tech professionals from India.

Austria: There are substantial numbers of Indians in Austria, though Indians represent only 0.15 per cent of the total population, number of Indians is estimated to be around 12,000 which is by far less than other European countries such as United Kingdom. Early Indian immigrants that migrated to Austria were mostly nurses from the state of Kerala. They still have a very strong inter-linkage with their homeland. There is also a small community in Austria that comes from rural Punjab and one of the remarkable features of these communities is that they have now graduated from doing odd jobs to becoming successful businessmen. There were also some of the Indians that settled down in Austria by acquiring Austrian citizenship on ground of refugee status.

Ireland: The Indian community in Ireland is barely 1600 people which constitute a tiny 0.027 per cent of the Irish population even though being lying next to UK where Indian constitute largest immigrant ethnic group. Most of the Indians that arrived before 1960's are self-employed businessmen in the textiles sector. Recently there has been inflow of semi-skilled and skilled workers from India and there has also been spurt in the migration of professionals like doctors and software engineers to Ireland.

Italy: The strength of Indian community in Italy comes next only to United Kingdom. Italian official estimates states that about 150,462 Indian nationals are current residents of Italy. Most of the first generation immigrants were engaged in economic sectors such as agriculture, dairy farming, leather industry, construction works and service sector.

Indian diaspora is concentrated in the Lombardia, Piemonte, Veneto and Emilia Romagna regions (Northern Italy), Florence, Rome (Central Italy) and Campania, Puglia and Calabria (Southern Italy). Most of the Indian immigrants were farm labourers coming from the state of Punjab. Some businessmen run restaurants and jewellery and other shops. Some Indians are working in international organisations, hospitals and churches, the latter mainly hailing from Kerala. However the number of Indians trying to enter Italy has never been significant. From 1990 onwards however, the Italian Government declared a series of amnesties for illegal aliens in view of acute labour shortages. Consequently more Indians started arriving in the country.

Spain: The total Indian community in Spain is estimated to be about 50000. The Indian community forms a very small percentage immigrants living in Spain which is third largest group among the Asian communities after the Chinese and the Pakistanis. Several Sindhi businessmen and traders had migrated to the Canary Islands way back after WWII. Indian Nationals in Spain is estimated around 35000. According to Spanish statistics Indian population in Spain was only 9000 in 2001 but in 2010 it rose to 34000.

Most Indians originally travelled to Spain from Africa, while others came from India and even Japan and Southeast Asia. The Indian community has integrated well in Spanish society with Sindhis and Sikhs forming the majority of the Indian community.

Sweden: People of Indian origin in Sweden are estimated to be 11,000 most of them being Punjabis, Bengalis, Gujaratis and South Indians. Some Indian students who had migrated to Sweden in the 1950s settled down there and became Sweden nationals. Another stream of Indians in Sweden came from Uganda in the 1970s. Some Indians also obtained political asylum after 1984. There has been migration of IT experts from India in recent years to Sweden. The Indian community is culturally very active in Sweden and do maintain close ties with India.

Belgium: The Indian diaspora in Belgium numbers around 20,000 of these 9,500 are Indian citizens. Indian community in Antwerp alone is estimated around 2,500 most of them are from Gujarat and are actively involved in the diamond trade. There are also about 600-800 Indian students studying at various educational institutions in Belgium.

Though per capita income of the Indian community is not available, they mainly belong to professional and prosperous groups. Indians are basically employed in software and diamond business in cities of Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels and Liege. Large number migrants from Palanpur district in Gujarat had migrated to Antwerp to work and eventually started their own diamond business. Indian software firms such as HCL, TCS and Infosys have a strong presence in Belgium and Indian software professionals are always in great demand.

The overseas Indian community thus constitutes a diverse and heterogeneous global community representing different regions, languages, cultures and faiths. The common thread that binds them together is the idea of India and its intrinsic values. Overseas Indians comprise People of Indian Origin and Non Resident Indians and today are amongst the best educated and successful communities in the world. In every part of the world the overseas Indian community is recognised and respected for its hard work, discipline and for successfully integrating with the local community.

7.3 Overview of Emigration from India to the European Union

Countries

Volume: As clearly depicted by the data in the below table, the absolute figure of the inflow of emigrant from India is highest in United Kingdom with 65,426 in 2011, and 39,147 in 2012. This is curious to note because the number has almost halved during the period. As clearly depicted by the data in table, the absolute figure of the inflow of emigrant from India is highest in United Kingdom with 72,079 in 2010, 65,426 in 2011, and 39,147 in 2012. However data shows the declining trends of immigration with a huge decline of 26,279 immigrants in 2012. Italy is second in the list of absolute number of migration from India in recent years, with 13,327 in 2011, and 11,158 in 2012. The trend of emigration to Italy also shows a declining trend with an absolute decline of 2,169. In Spain the absolute migration from India is 3,652 in 2011 and 2,935 in 2012. Absolute migration in Spain from India rises in 2011 and then decline in 2012. Emigration to The Netherland shows a steady rise from 2,532 in 2011 to 2,769 in 2012. Belgium also shows a steady rising trend from 1,867 in 2011, to 1,934 in 2012. Rest of the European Union countries does not account for significant migration from India in recent years.

Percentage share in population: From table 7.1, we can infer that Immigration of Indian Citizen as a Percentage of Total Immigration is relatively lower (less than 1 per cent for some cases) for almost all European union countries except United Kingdom. As seen that in United Kingdom Immigration of Indian Citizen as a Percentage of Total Immigration is 13.42 per cent in 2011 and 9.37 per cent in 2012. However data reveals a declining trend. Similarly for Italy Immigration of Indian Citizen as a Percentage of Total Immigration is 3.76 per cent 2011 and 3.34 per cent in 2012, which reveals a rising and then declining trend. For Sweden shows a declining and then rising trend. Denmark also reveals a rising and declining pattern of Immigration of Indian Citizen as a Percentage of Total Immigration. Rest of the European Union countries doesn't account for significant amount of Immigration of Indian Citizen as a Percentage of Total Immigration with Slovenia at the bottom 0.2 per cent in 2012.

Gender perspective: As it is evident from the above table, women form a considerable share of the Indian population in Europe, with Finland being their top destination followed by Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands. A majority of these women are employed in the health sector, mostly as nurses and the demand for their service has been on constantly high in the Europe.

Table 7.1 An overview of India's migration to Europe (Source: EuroStat Database)

EU Country	Number of persons		Indians' share in population (% terms)		Share of Women(%)
	2011	**2012**	**2011**	**2012**	**2012**
Austria	770	807	-	-	
Belgium	1,867	1,934	1.48	1.49	38.16
Czech Republic	145	328	0.76	1.19	28.05
Denmark	1,073	913	3.1	2.55	41.18
Estonia	20	28	1.19	2.53	25
Finland	573	572	2.84	2.5	42.31
Hungary	356	260	1.6	1.28	30.77
Ireland	876	1,230	2.63	3.25	-
Italy	13,327	11,158	3.76	3.47	33.64
Luxembourg	156	143	0.82	0.74	42.66
Netherlands	2,532	2,769	2.99	3.34	40.3
Spain	3,652	2,935	1.09	1.08	35.5
Sweden	1,691	2,027	2.24	2.46	40.36
United Kingdom	65,426	39,147	13.42	9.37	37

7.3.1 Demographic profile

The age composition of immigrants clearly shows that the major emigration is in between the age group of 20-49. It consists of 95.8 per cent of immigration from India in Slovenia, 89.5 per cent and 89.3 per cent in Bulgaria and in Estonia. In the lowest extreme it consists of 75.7 per cent immigration in Lithuania and 73 per cent immigration in Ireland. The range of emigration of age group 20-49 is 22.8 per cent.

At the segregated level, for the age group 20-29 the range of emigration of males is 23.4 per cent with the highest is in Austria 39.2 per cent and the lowest is in Bulgaria with 15.8 per cent. Similarly for females the range of the age group 20-29 is 16.3 per cent with the highest in Finland 24 per cent and lowest in Croatia with 7.7 per cent. For the age group 30-39 the range of emigration of males is 31.3 per cent with the highest is in Bulgaria 42.1 per cent and the lowest is in Lithuania 10.8 per cent. Similarly for the age group 30-39 of females the range is 14.1 per cent with highest is in Romania and lowest is in Croatia and Slovenia with 0 per cent each. Finally for the age group 40-49, the range of emigration among the males is 22.7 per cent with the highest is in Croatia 23.1 per cent and the lowest is in Luxembourg 0.7 per cent. Similarly for females the range is 8.3 per cent with the highest is in Slovenia 8.3 per cent and lowest in Estonia and Luxembourg with 0% each.

Table 7.2 Age composition of emigrants from India to selected EU countries, 2012 (Source: EuroStat Database)

	Male immigrants			Female Immigrants			All
	20-29	30-39	40-49	20-29	30-39	40-49	20-49
Belgium	25.3	22.6	3.6	17.7	9.8	2.1	81.2
Bulgaria	15.8	42.1	10.5	15.8	5.3	0	89.5
Czech Republic	29.6	28	5.8	13.1	8.5	1.5	86.6
Denmark	22.3	24.3	2.5	18.7	13.3	1	82.1
Estonia	35.7	28.6	3.6	17.9	3.6	0	89.3
Ireland	23.3	20	2.6	18.3	7.3	1.5	73
Spain	30.3	16.1	4.2	15.7	7.3	2.9	76.6
Italy	22	23.8	8.2	13	8.2	3.3	78.5
Luxembourg	24.5	24.5	0.7	19.6	14	0	83.2
Hungary	23.8	27.7	4.6	13.1	6.9	1.9	78.1
Netherlands	27.8	21.4	2.7	21	10.3	0.9	84.2
Austria	39.2	20.6	6.6	12.3	4	1.5	84
Finland	28.8	19.6	2.4	24	10	1	85.8
Sweden	25.9	21.9	2.9	19.6	11.3	1.1	82.6

It is evident from the data that the proportion of migration from India for the age group 20-29 is higher for both males and females for majority of the countries, except Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania for males and except Romania for females. Next age group with significant proportion of emigration to European Union is 30-39 for both males and females. Finally the least proportion of immigration is from the age group 40-49 for both males and females.

7.3.2 Occupational profile

Table 7.3 shows a profile of Indian nationals in European Union countries. In Austria the leading sector for employment of Indian nationals is elementary with 26.6 per cent, followed by shops with 25.5 per cent and skilled agricultural employment the least with 0.2 per cent. In Denmark the leading sector for employing Indian nationals is elementary, shops and clerks with 16.6 per cent, 16.7 per cent and 9.1 per cent respectively. For Finland, the largest employing sector of Indian migrant is shops with 32.2 per cent and technical 22.1 per cent, the least employing sector in Finland is skilled agriculture with 0.9 per cent. Similarly in Greece, elementary employs 53.7 per cent of Indian nationals. In Hungary and Ireland 40.6 per cent and 49.1 per cent of Indian are employed as professional, the largest by any sector. In Poland the largest employing sectors is also professional with 43.5 per cent, followed by official with 27.4 per cent and the least employing sector is elementary and plant and machinery with 1.6 per cent each. In Portugal elementary employment is the largest with 20.8 per cent. Similarly for Spain and Sweden shops employment is highest with 26.6 per cent and 29.1 per cent. In Switzerland technical employment is the largest with 19.4%. Finally for United Kingdom professional employment is highest with 19.6 per cent.

Table 7.3 Occupation/sector of Indian nationals working in the selected EU countries (%), 2001 (Source: OECD Database)

	Plant	Skilled Agriculture	Professionals	Technical	Official	Trade	Elementary	Shops	Clerk
Austria	5.7	0.2	4.2	18.1	7.5	5.0	26.6	25.5	6.9
Denmark	7.1	0.3	10.1	9.4	0.9	3.4	16.6	16.7	9.1
Finland	10.6	0.9	14.2	22.1	2.7	1.8	6.2	32.7	1.8
France	9.3	0.9	10.4	12.7	6.7	8.3	20.8	14.7	14.3
Greece	6.1	20.0	0.8	0.5	0.8	10.8	53.7	3.2	0.7
Hungary	0.9		40.6	17.0	21.7	0.9	2.8	14.2	
Ireland	2.9	0.9	49.1	5.3	14.0	4.9	2.4	11.4	3.1
Poland	1.6		43.5	11.3	27.4		1.6	11.3	3.2
Portugal	2.5	0.5	15.1	9.8	9.1	16.1	20.8	13.0	12.4
Spain	5.4	1.5	5.3	6.7	20.4	11.4	17.7	26.6	4.9
Sweden	8.3	0.5	12.5	12.9	2.2	3.0	10.4	29.1	9.4
Switzerland	1.6	0.3	18.2	19.4	7.0	3.7	1.4	9.5	6.7
United Kingdom	14.8	0.1	19.6	7.5	16.2	6.4	12.9	11.4	10.9

7.3.3 Working profile of the skilled emigrants from India to European Union

The available data show the Sector of employment for skilled migrants (IECD 5 and 6 Tertiary Level). In Austria 25 per cent of skilled migrant are employed in social sciences, 11 per cent are employed in sciences, 9 per cent are employed in engineering and the least is employed in agriculture with only 1 per cent. For Canada 31 per cent are employed in social sciences, 18 per cent are employed in engineering, 15 per cent is employed in arts, and the least is employed in agriculture with only 1 per cent (Table 7.4).. Czech Republic employed highest skilled migrant in social sciences, and lowest in agriculture with only 2 per cent. Hungary employs highest skilled migrant in social sciences with 34 per cent. Ireland and Norway employs highest skilled migrant in health with 21 per cent and 23 per cent each. Spain employs 43 per cent in social sciences and 22 per cent in engineering. Finally Sweden which employs 21 per cent of skilled migrant in social sciences and only 1 per cent of skilled migrant in agriculture. It is evident from the data that social sciences account for largest employment of skilled migrant in the European Union countries.

Table 7.4 Sector of employment of skilled migrants from India to EU (education level IECD 5 and 6: tertiary level) in percentage terms, 2001 (Source: OECD Database)

	Social Science	Health	Engineering	Education	Science	Services	Agriculture	Arts
Austria	25	7	9	5	11	3	1	15
Canada	31	9	18	6	17	2	1	15
Czech Republic	36	8	16	5	16	3	2	7
Denmark	7	6	2	15	21		23	16
Finland	27	13	26	5	12	3	1	9
Greece	32	6	18	3	9	4	1	18
Hungary	34	14	11	14	11	2		11
Ireland	7	21	10	2	19	3	1	6
Norway	16	23	4	8	11	1	1	12
Spain	43	8	22	11		3		11
Sweden	21	16	15	15	12	2	1	9

7.3.4 Labour force status of the immigrants from India to the select European Union

Table 7.5 shows the information regarding the employment status of Indian labour force for selected European countries. In Austria 70.8 per cent Indian emigrants are employed, 12.5 per cent are unemployed and the rest is economically inactive. Similarly for Greece 85.5 per cent of Indian emigrant is employed, 5.1 per cent of the labour force is unemployed and the rest 10.2 per cent is economically inactive. Similarly for Italy 56.4 per cent of Indian emigrant are employed 7.9 per cent in unemployed and the rest 39.1 per cent is economically inactive. Finally for United Kingdom 54.7 per cent is employed, 7.3 per cent is unemployed and the rest 41.3 per cent is economically inactive. It is evident form, the data that there is higher share of economically inactive population for majority of the European countries.

Table 7.5 Employment status of the Indian nationals in EU countries, 2001 (Source: OECD Database)

	Employed	Unemployed	Inactive
Austria	70.8	12.5	20.4
Denmark	59.9	7.1	35.8
Finland	55.7	15.2	35.8
France	48.5	25.5	39.1
Greece	85.5	5.1	10.2
Ireland	56.7	10.2	37.5
Italy	56.4	7.9	39.1
Norway	59.1	5.5	37.7
Poland	69.2	7.9	25.3
Portugal	54.1	6.7	42.3
Spain	53.0	17.5	37.8
Sweden	49.5	7.1	46.9
United Kingdom	54.7	7.3	41.3

7.3.5 Temporary migration vs. long term migration

Table 7.6 shows the resident permit given to Indian citizens in the European Union countries. United Kingdom topped the list of countries giving resident permit to Indian citizens with 1,270,753 permits in 2010, 1,19,192 in 2011, and 1,05,851. However the number for permit given to Indian citizen in United Kingdom shows a declining trend in recent years. Italy is second in the list of countries giving resident permit to Indian citizens with 37,985 permits in 2010, 18,208 in 2011, and 11,629 in 2012. Numbers for Italy also shows a declining trend. However the difference between United Kingdom and Italy is very high and stands at 94,222 in 2012. Next in the list of countries giving resident permit to Indian citizens is Germany with 9,837 permits in 2012, followed by Sweden with 5,296 permits, Netherlands with 4,285 permits, France with 3,765 permits, Spain with 3,363 permits, Denmark with 2821 permits, and Belgium with 2,227 permits in 2012. Rest of the European Union countries does not have significant share in the number of resident permit given to Indian citizens in the recent years with; Bulgaria is at the bottom of the list of countries with only 35 resident permits given to Indian nationals in 2012.

Table 7.6 Number of first time residence permit given to Indian migrants in EU countries (Source: EuroStat Database)

GEO/TIME	2010	2011	2012
Belgium	2,192	1,839	2,227
Bulgaria	28	27	35
Denmark	3,208	2,834	2,821
Germany	5,962	6,449	9,837
Ireland	1,258	1,380	1,872
Greece	591	767	66
Spain	3,622	4,147	3,362
France	3,442	3,531	3,765
Italy	37,985	18,208	11,629
Cyprus	1,238	1,130	1,015
Luxembourg	91	144	176
Hungary	396	468	443
Netherlands	3,870	4,309	4,285
Austria	565	631	743
Poland	860	:	974
Portugal	940	1,190	1,042
Romania	142	151	129
Finland	1,410	1,433	1,119
Sweden	4,547	4,375	5,296
United Kingdom	1,27,753	1,19,192	1,05,851

There are significant differences between the duration of resident permit given by European countries to Indian citizens. For example in United Kingdom there is an significant increase off permit for 3-5 month in 2012 from 0 per cent in 2010-11 to 11.1 per cent in 2012, also there is significant increase of the permit for 6-11 month duration in 2012 from 0 per cent in 2010-11 to 17.3 per cent in 2012. The increase in share of 3-5 months, 6-11month duration permit comes at the expense of significant decline in permit of 12 or more months, which decline from 100 per cent in 2010-11 to 71.6 per cent in 2012. Scrutinizing the data carefully reveals that there is no pattern in the resident permit given to Indian citizen for overall European Union countries. For some countries the trend shows a rising share of 3-5 months or 6-11 months resident permit, for example: United Kingdom, Hungary and for some countries trend shows a rising share of 12 or more months permit, for example in Czech Republic. Unfortunately for majority of the countries there is no clear trend.

Table 7.7 Residence permits given to the Indian citizens in selected EU countries by duration in percentage terms (Source: EuroStat Database)

GEO/TIME	3-5 Months			6-11 Months			12 or more Months		
	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Belgium	10.4	18.2	10.7	63.2	65.6	13.5	26.4	16.2	75.8
Bulgaria	3.6	14.8	14.3	10.7	66.7	51.4	85.7	18.5	34.3
Czech Republic	9.8	13.6	30.2	45.1	30	16	45.1	56.4	53.8
Denmark		11.5	11.7		23.9	24.5	100	64.6	63.8
Germany	8.5	12.8	9.5	42.4	41.6	36.6	49.2	45.6	53.8
Ireland	6.8	5.8	6	35.6	32.4	40.1	57.6	61.8	53.8
Greece		0	0	0	0	0	100	100	100
Spain	17.5	15.3	16.9	18.6	9	8.2	63.8	75.7	74.9
France	7.3	6.4	4.4	13.3	13	10.5	79.4	80.6	85
Italy	2.8	3.6	0.8	51.8	54.7	62.8	45.4	41.7	36.5
Luxembourg	7.7	6.3	2.3	60.4	63.2	46	31.9	30.6	51.7
Hungary	8.3	6.8	10.4	28.5	27.4	39.5	63.1	65.8	50.1
Netherlands	0		0	99.9	99.8	100	0.1	0.2	0
Austria	4.2	4.6	11.8	75.8	35.2	59.5	20	60.2	28.7
Poland	17.1		7.6	68		43.6	14.9		48.8
Portugal	0.1	0.7	1.2	11.7	11.4	15	88.2	87.9	83.9
Finland	8.4	11.1	11.3	28.4	23.4	27.7	63.3	65.5	60.9
Sweden	9.6	10.2	8.1	29.9	32.2	27.1	60.5	57.6	64.8
United Kingdom	0	0	11.1	0	0	17.3	100	100	71.6

7.3.6 Emigration for remunerated activities

As evident from above table 7.8, United Kingdom topped the list of European Union countries giving residence permit given to Indian citizen for remunerated activity reason; with absolute number of immigration is 29,870 in 2010, 25,678 in 2011 and 24,786 in 2012. However data clearly reveals a declining trend. Not very from United Kingdom is Italy with immigration for remuneration purpose is 28,136 in 2010; however during the following it shows a sharp decline with 11,226 in 2011 and 4,817 in 2012. Sweden does have a steady and rising trend for immigration for remuneration purpose with absolute number of immigrants are 2,906. Netherlands does have fairly stable immigration for remuneration purpose in recent years. Denmark shows a declining trend with 1,784 in 2012. Rest of European Union countries does not account for significant number of residence permit given to Indian citizen for remunerated activity reason with bottom at the list is Czech Republic with only 21 resident permits for remuneration based reasons in 2012.

Table 7.8 Number of first time residence permits given to Indian migrants for remunerated activity reason

COUNTRY	2011	2012	COUNTRY	2011	2012
Belgium	738	889	Luxembourg	62	60
Czech Republic	7	195	Hungary	164	205
Denmark	1,822	1,784	Netherlands	2,192	2,080
Germany	2,645	3,567	Austria	155	213
Ireland	580	781	Poland		595
Greece	61	24	Portugal	361	277
Spain	1,456	1,135	Finland	799	534
France	1,072	1,196	Sweden	2,431	2,906
Italy	11,226	4,817	United Kingdom	25,678	24,786
Cyprus	793	650			

Table 7.9 Duration of residence permit given to Indian citizen for remunerated activity reason in percentage terms (Source: EuroStat Database)

	3-5 Months			6-11 Months			12 or More Months		
GEO/TIME	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012	2010	2011	2012
Belgium	9.2	12.3	6.2	63.7	72.8	18.3	27.1	14.9	75.5
Czech Republic	4.8	0	27.2	42.9	42.9	15.9	52.4	57.1	56.9
Denmark		13.5	14.5		26.7	27.7	100	59.8	57.8
Germany	11.3	15.7	11.5	45.8	44.6	38.9	42.9	39.7	49.6
Ireland	6	4	6.5	25.8	20.2	32	68.2	75.9	61.5
Greece			0	0		0	100	100	100
Spain	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.4	99.1	99.3	98.9
France	1.1	0.8	2.5	17.8	17.2	12	81.1	82	85.5
Italy	3.2	5.2	0.8	52.4	56.1	74.9	44.5	38.7	24.2
Cyprus	18.5	17.4	19.4	44.9	35.4	29.4	36.6	47.2	51.2
Luxembourg	8.9	4.8	1.7	60	56.5	53.3	31.1	38.7	45
Hungary	4	1.8	8.3	24.2	30.5	50.2	71.8	67.7	41.5
Netherlands			0	100	100	100			0
Austria	0.7	0.6	0	62.2	35.5	80.3	37	63.9	19.7
Poland	2.7		3.5	97.1		37.8	0.2		58.7
Portugal			0	2	3.6	2.2	98	96.4	97.8
Finland	6.2	9.6	10.3	20	19	28.5	73.8	71.3	61.2
Sweden	12.6	10.2	8.1	38.1	34.3	27.7	49.4	55.5	64.2
United Kingdom			16.1			38.4	100	100	45.6

Data also reveals that the duration of resident permit for remuneration based activities shows a biased for 6-11 months and 12 or more months. There is much to be explained by studying the individual countries experience except for some countries, where there is steep increase or steep decrease (Table 7.9). Moreover emigration from India is clearly shown to be of long duration with maximum number of individuals given residence permit for 12 or more months. In case of UK the resident permits came for long duration of 12 or more months has come down steeply whereas for Poland it has increased from insignificant to more than half of resident permits being given for long duration.

Table 7.10 Number of first permits issued for high skilled migrants from India (Source: EuroStat Database)

GEO/TIME	2010	2011	2012
Belgium	52	50	38
Denmark	2,087	1,729	1,694
Germany	6	18	26
Ireland	332	449	0
Spain	90	45	36
France	446	589	661
Italy	190	163	212
Luxembourg	10	13	3
Netherlands	1,902	2,021	1,870
Austria	30	33	55
Poland	0	:	5
Portugal	61	38	46
Finland	:	607	386
Sweden	1,680	2,090	2,471
United Kingdom	5,615	4,120	2,232

Table 7.10 shows the first permit issues to highly skilled worker. Again United Kingdom has topped the list with absolute number of permits issued is 5,615 in 2010, 4,120 in 2011, and 2,232 in 2012. Data reveals a declining trend. United Kingdom is followed by Netherlands with 1,870 permits issued in 2012. Rest of the European Union countries does account for significant amount of permits issued. France and Italy have some significant numbers of permits issued. Standing in the bottom of the list of countries are Poland and Ireland for the year 2012.

Data reveals that there is a vast difference in high skilled emigration as per duration in European Union countries. For example, in Luxembourg, 12 or more months section is showing a full 100 per cent in 2012, 92.3 per cent in 2011, 100 per cent in 2010 whereas under 6-11 months it shows 0.0 in 2012, 7.7 in 2011. Same is the case with Germany and United Kingdom. Netherland reveals opposite case.

The two special class of skilled emigrant that emigrate from India to Europe are health professionals and IT professionals. India remains one of the largest exporters of the health professionals in the world. Large number of health professionals from India migrates to USA, UK, Europe and the Gulf Countries apart from other developed countries. Given the lack of opportunity at home these young professionals seek emigration as a means to avail economic opportunity.

For health professionals, proficiency in English language and good training health education systems has for long been the facilitating factors for emigration to the many English-speaking countries such as UK, USA Canada and Australia. Apart from these factors, social network also does play a significant facilitating factor in enhancing emigration. Presence friends and family in the destination country would have a strong bearing on the migration decision of the potential migrants.

Table 7.11 Resident permits given to high skilled migrants from India in percentage terms (Source: EuroStat Database)

	3-5 Months			6-11 Months			12 or More Months		
GEO/TIME	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Belgium	7.7	22	7.9	73.1	70	15.8	19.2	8	76.3
Denmark		13.2	14.2		27.4	28.4	100	59.4	57.4
Germany							100	100	100
Ireland	4.5	3.3		22.6	16.9		72.9	79.7	
Spain						5.6	100	100	94.4
France	0.4	0.3	0.2	17.5	6.8	4.2	82.1	92.9	95.6
Italy		1.2	1.4	36.8	56.4	64.2	63.2	42.3	34.4
Luxembourg					7.7		100	92.3	100
Netherlands				100	100	100			
Austria				16.7	27.3	94.5	83.3	72.7	5.5
Poland						20			80
Portugal				9.8	5.3	4.3	90.2	94.7	95.7
Finland		7.6	8.3		20.1	29.8		72.3	61.9
Sweden	12.4	10.1	7.6	40.7	35	26	47	54.9	66.5
United Kingdom							100	100	100

Salt and Millar (2006) reviewing the work permits granted by UK to Indian nationals between 2000 and 2004, showed that majority of these permits were granted to the category of professional occupations especially relating to the science and technology professionals. Since last decade there has been phenomenal flow of skilled professionals to high income countries especially US and UK, today IT professionals there has also been substantial flow to other European countries over the years.

Italian Federation of Nurses points out that 28.4 per cent of all nurses in Italy are from other countries. There are 1,511 nurses from India working in Italy which do form significant portion of the overall pool of foreign nurses. Most of these nurses come from the state of Kerala and indeed Kerala sends out the highest number of nursing professionals from India. Kerala Nursing Council estimates that of all the nurses that emigrated out from Kerala, 38 per cent of them are in the United States and 30 per cent in the United Kingdom alone.

Most of the Indians that migrated to Germany from India can be placed in the highly skilled labour category though it is not revealed in the above analysis. Majority of the Indian Nationals residing in Germany on a temporary residence permit have high skill levels. More than one third of all the immigrants to Germany from India came in pursuit of working opportunity and was having high skill endowment. Indians have the highest share of IT professionals that were granted work opportunities in Germany.

7.3.7 Remunerated activities researchers and seasonal workers

Table 7.12 shows the trends' of Seasonal workers and Researcher migration to different countries though the data have its own limitations in terms of availability. The highest absolute number of emigration is in Italy among seasonal workers in 2012 with 1898 in figures, 3270 in 2011 and 3470 in 2010. Trends of European countries are showing insignificant absolute figures among seasonal workers.

Table 7.12 Number of first permits issued for remunerated activities researchers and seasonal workers (Source: EuroStat Database)

	Researcher			Seasonal Workers		
GEO/TIME	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Belgium	17	25	42	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	41	:	:	0
Denmark	83	61	55	:	:	0
Germany	18	20	33	:	0	:
Ireland	18	18	33	:	0	0
Greece	2	5	1	0	:	:
Spain	46	51	50	:	:	0
France	216	209	279	0	0	1
Italy	59	54	69	3,470	3,270	1,898
Cyprus	0	:	0	129	:	0
Netherlands	86	73	68	:	:	0
Austria	30	27	26	:	:	0
Poland	1	:	6	116	:	0
Finland	:	77	71	:	:	:
Sweden	110	116	137	:	:	1
United Kingdom	:	:	902	:	:	0

As data reveals France has got decent numbers of emigrants (279 in 2012, 209 in 2011, 216 in 2010) for research purpose as compared with rest of the countries in data. It is followed by Sweden, Denmark. Czech Republic has shown improvement as the data reveals from 0 immigrants in 2010, 2011 it increased to 41.

Table 7.13 Number of change in permits from other categories to remunerated activity (Source: EuroStat Database)

	All Permit Change	**Education to Remuneration Activity**	**Family to Remuneration Activity**	**Others to Remuneration Activity**
Czech Republic	61	11	1	1
Denmark	41	32	1	0
Germany	1,182	428	42	28
Ireland	664	60	0	181
Greece	1,736	:	3	31
Spain	1,716	10	28	13
France	675	144	8	23
Italy	80	1	30	4
Hungary	18	5	2	1
Malta	30	1	1	6
Poland	469	38	102	23
Portugal	327	0	0	7
Finland	171	51	11	77
Sweden	39	13	13	0
United Kingdom	12,680	11,369	26	5

It is also equally important to look in the change of permits since it may directly contribute to change in the number of emigrants working in the host country for remunerative activity reason. From the data above we can infer that United Kingdom has the highest number of changes in permit in 2012 with 12,680 permit changes. (Table 7.13) UK is followed by Greece with 1736 permit changes, Spain with 1716 permit changes, Germany with 1182 permit changes. Permit changes occur when an individual who goes abroad for an activity ends up pursuing other activity afterwards. It is evident from the data that United Kingdom has huge number of permit changes by student going for education and finally ending up in remuneration activity. There was change in 428 permits from education to remuneration activity in Germany and 144 permit changes in France. Family to remuneration activity permit changes in Poland is highest, followed by Germany (42), Italy (28), and United Kingdom (26). Rest of European Union countries showed insignificant changes in permit. From other activity to remuneration permit changes is highest in Ireland (181) followed by Finland (77), Greece (31), and Germany (28). It must also be taken in account that there is also some change from remunerative activity reason to other category, but since it does not form a substantial portion of the net change it is not shown above.

7.3.9 Emigration for family reason/unification

Again, the Table 7.14 reveals that United Kingdom topped the list of countries giving Residence Permit to Indian Citizen for Family Reason which absolute figure of 27,593 in 2010, 25,493 in 2011, and 19,371 in 2012. Again there is declining trend in data in the recent year. Next in the list is Italy with 8,012 permits in 2010, 5,462 permits in 2011, and 5,409 permits in 2012 for family reasons. Italy is followed by Germany with 3,527 permits in 2012, Sweden with 1,927 permits in 2012, Spain with 1,736 permits in 2012 and Netherlands with 1,732 permits in 2012 for family reasons. Rest of the European Union countries account for very insignificant amount of resident permit for family reasons with Bulgaria is at the bottom of the list with only 13 permits in 2012.

Table 7.14 Number of first time residence permit given to Indian citizen for family reason (Source: EuroStat Database)

GEO/TIME	2010	2011	2012
Belgium	829	748	1,018
Bulgaria	24	17	13
Czech Republic	128	120	128
Denmark	859	856	883
Germany	2,156	2,306	3,527
Ireland	43	43	33
Greece	417	685	9
Spain	1,947	2,238	1,736
France	860	908	893
Italy	8,012	5,462	5,409
Luxembourg	32	58	100
Hungary	102	185	134
Netherlands	1,340	1,650	1,732
Austria	348	325	292
Poland	87	82	86
Portugal	441	725	614
Finland	412	498	462
Sweden	1,203	1,500	1,927
United Kingdom	27,593	25,493	19,371

Table 7.15 Residence permits given to Indian citizen for family reason by duration (%) (Source: EuroStat Database)

	3-5 Months			6-11 Months			12 or More		
GEO/TIME	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Belgium	9.3	21	14.4	62.8	61.8	9.5	27.9	17.2	76
Bulgaria		23.5	23.1		58.8	61.5	100	17.6	15.4
Czech Republic	13.3	16.7	30.5	44.5	35.8	7.8	42.2	47.5	61.7
Denmark		3.9	4.5		18	18	100	78.2	77.5
Germany	3.9	5.4	4.5	38.5	39.2	35.6	57.6	55.4	59.9
Ireland	0	11.6	3	20.9	16.3	18.2	79.1	72.1	78.8
Greece		0	0	0	0	0	100	100	100
Spain	31.9	27.5	31.3	20.3	9.9	8.5	47.7	62.6	60.1
France	1.4	0.9	0.4	5.2	4.4	5.7	93.4	94.7	93.8
Italy	0	0	0	47.9	49.2	51.7	52.1	50.8	48.3
Luxembourg	6.3	3.4	1	59.4	74.1	44	34.4	22.4	55
Hungary	2.9	3.8	12.7	14.7	20	28.4	82.4	76.2	59
Netherlands	0		0	100	100	100	0		0
Austria	6.3	4.9	26.4	83.3	35.1	24	10.3	60	49.7
Poland	1.1	1.2	0	23	1.2	11.6	75.9	97.6	88.4
Portugal	0.2	1.1	2	8.2	6.8	8.5	91.6	92.1	89.6
Finland	10	12.7	12.8	40	36.3	33.5	50	51	53.7
Sweden	8.2	6.7	5.1	31.7	32	27.3	60.1	61.3	67.6
United Kingdom	0	0	6.1	0	0	25.2	100	100	68.6

Table 7.15 shows the duration of permits to Indian resident for family reason. Data does not reveal any clear trend of duration of resident permit given for family reasons. For example, In United Kingdom share of 3-5 months and 6-11 months duration permit increases to 6.1 per cent and 25.2 per cent respectively in 2011. For Netherlands, the shares remain static in recent year with resident permit is only given for 6-11 months. Therefore the duration of residence permits to Indian citizen for family reason in European Union countries varies from country to country but its share is the highest in the 12 months or more in most of the European Union countries.

7.3.10 Student migration from India to European Union

The main source countries for international students are China, India and Korea which cumulatively sourced over 25 percent of all international students in 2009. India in particular has grown into a leading player in the international students market and is the second most important sending country after China.

Flows of Indian students are intensely concentrated in English-speaking regions and attracted over 80 percent of all internationally mobile Indian students. US have been the prime destination for the majority of Indian students.

Within the European Union (EU), Indian students remain concentrated in the UK, which receives around 80 percent of all Indian students in Europe. Germany and France are countries which attract the remaining Indian students.



Figure 7.1 Student migration: International student mobility in tertiary education from India (Source: UNESO Database)

As evident from the Figure 7.1, there is a steady and rising trend for International student mobility in tertiary education from India. There is steep rise from the year 2000 to 2005, followed by a decline in 2006. However there is a continuous rising trend in International student mobility in tertiary education from India from the year 2007 to the year 2010. Post 2010 there is continues decline for the two consecutive years 2011 and 2012.

Table 7.16 International student mobility in tertiary education from India (Source: UNESO Database)

Year	Number	Percentage increase previous Year
2001	74501	--
2002	100522	35
2003	119157	19
2004	134082	13
2005	146267	9
2006	145772	0
2007	161741	11
2008	183910	14
2009	203496	11
2010	209017	3
2011	204249	-2
2012	189472	-7

Table 7.16 shows the absolute numbers and percentage changes in the international mobility in tertiary sector education from India. There is a 35 per cent increase in the international student mobility for the year 2002, however percentage rate of change declines and reaches approximately 0 for the year 2006 (though rate of change remains positive, mathematically it means second derivative of slope is less than zero/negative). However from 2007 onward the percentage rate of change starts increasing and reaches 11 per cent in 2007, but it again follows a falling trend and eventually becomes negative for the year 2011 and 2012 with 2 per cent and 7 per cent respectively.

Table 7.17 International student mobility in tertiary education from India to EU (Source: UNESO Database)

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Austria	78	75	80	..	124	170	305	358	377	354	313
Belgium	137	178	..	123	123	200	..	133	409	493	553
Finland	55	71	132	165	..	197	236	300	392	497	557
France	309	625	494	502	717	891	1038	1252	1444	1701	1955
Georgia	29	1	6	2	15	..	109	129	248	408	585
Germany	2196	3429	4237	4339	3585	3421	3257	3273	3867	3522	4312
Hungary	64	57	48	47	45	42	42	36	48	57	40
Italy	138	228	273	295	386	589	627	727	446	928	942
Netherlands	53	76	20	45	53	54	65	62	58	487	805
Norway	114	128	145	141	143	158	175	189	235	293	299
Sweden	122	301	42	35	52	51	687	937	1596	2182	1551
United Kingdom	6016	10422	14625	16685	19204	23833	25901	34065	38205	38677	29713

Table 7.17 shows the long term trend for International student mobility in tertiary education from India. For United Kingdom there is a continuously rising trend from the year 2002 to the year 2011, but there is a decline in the more recent year of 2012. For Norway there is a clear constant trend but the number is insignificantly small. For Germany there is rising trend till year 2005, in the year 2006 there is a decline in the trend which continued till the year 2009, post 2009 there is rising trend in International student mobility in tertiary education from India. Rest of the European Union countries do not account for significant amount of International student mobility in tertiary education from India.

Indian students are gradually exploring other countries within the EU such as Sweden, Italy, Ireland and Denmark where education is considerably cheaper and part-time jobs are easier to secure.

Table 7.18 Number of first time residence permit given to Indian citizen for educational reasons (Source: EuroStat Database)

GEO/TIME	2010	2011	2012
Belgium	204	112	199
Czech Republic	53	65	79
Denmark	140	152	149
Germany	1,727	1,386	2,398
Ireland	275	344	546
Spain	274	332	341
France	1,329	1,300	1,421
Italy	740	643	659
Cyprus	296	253	229
Netherlands	440	443	451
Austria	30	50	79
Poland	177	93	134
Portugal	33	25	56
Romania	33	45	23
Finland	148	135	121
Sweden	1,214	346	353
United Kingdom	44,181	29,957	16,077

Table 7.18 shows the number of residence permit given to Indian citizen for educational reasons. Again as evident from the data United Kingdom topped the list with 44,181 permit in 2010, 29,957 permits in 2011, and 16,077 permits in 2012 for educational purpose. However there is a significant absolute decline in number of educational permit in United Kingdom given to Indian citizens in the recent years. Germany is second in the list with a rise in number of permit given for education purpose in 2012 to 2,398. Germany is followed by France in which there is a rise in educational resident permit to 1,421 in 2012. Rest of the European Union countries does not account for significant number of permits for educational purposes. Malta and Greece is at the bottom of the list of countries giving residence permit to Indian Citizen for educational reasons with 2 and 1 permit respectively in 2012.

Table 7.19 First time residential permits given to Indian emigrants for educational reason by duration (%) (Source: EuroStat Database)

	3-5 Months			6-11 Months			12 or More Months		
GEO/TIME	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Belgium	23	30.4	7	48.5	55.4	14.6	14.6	14.3	78.4
Czech Republic	3.8	15.4	32.9	64.2	30.8	31.6	31.6	53.8	35.4
Denmark		30.3	20.8		25	24.8	24.8	44.7	54.4
Germany	10.2	18.8	13.7	43.3	39.5	36	36	41.6	50.3
Ireland	4	4.4	3.3	53.5	59	56.8	56.8	36.6	39.9
Spain	2.2	3.3	3.2	71.5	38	32.6	32.6	58.7	64.2
France	17	15.5	9.2	16.5	16.8	12.7	12.7	67.7	78.1
Italy	12.3	5.4	2	86.4	94.1	97.7	97.7	0.5	0.3
Luxembourg	0	11.1	0	63.6	33.3	20	20	55.6	80
Hungary	22.1	27.1	12.2	46.5	29.2	26.5	26.5	43.8	61.2
Austria	0	0	0	100	40	93.7	93.7	60	6.3
Poland	7.3	9.7	12.7	58.2	80.6	50	50	9.7	37.3
Portugal	0	0	0	24.2	12	23.2	23.2	88	76.8
Romania	3	0	0	97	95.6	47.8	47.8	4.4	52.2
Finland	4.7	14.1	10.7	7.4	1.5	2.5	2.5	84.4	86.8
Sweden	4.6	19.4	16.1	11.9	14.7	16.7	16.7	65.9	67.1
United Kingdom			0.5			6.4	6.4	100	93

Table 7.19 shows the duration of resident permits granted to Indian citizen for educational purposes. As expected data shows a clear and rising trend of share of 12 or more month resident permit for educational purpose for majority of the countries except few such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Austria which saw a declining trend. In Slovenia there is only 3-5 month and 6-11 month duration resident permit for education. On the other hand, in United Kingdom there are majority of resident permit for education is only for 12 or more month, with 93.0 per cent in 2012.

Increase in the number of students emigrating out of the country can be attributed to the prevalent perception in India that foreign degree is more valuable that Indian degree. There is also obvious perception of better employability prospects which fuel the demand of the foreign education in India even among the middle income class groups that aspires to study abroad.

7.3.11 Emigration and travel

There is a steady and rising trend in number of Indian national departure from India (Figure 7.2). The rate of increase in departure is slow for the year 2001 to 2003 followed by a steep rise from the year 2004 to 2008, in 2009 there a some slowdown in the rate of increase in departure (though increase in absolute numbers), however in 2010 there is rapid increase followed by modest increase in year 2011 also.



Figure 7.2 Number of Indian national departure from India, cumulative 1991-2011 (Source: India Tourism Statistics 2011)

Table 7.20 Original number of national departure from India (Source: India Tourism Statistics 2011)

Year	Change over Previous Year
2001	--
2002	8.2
2003	8.3
2004	16.1
2005	15.6
2006	16.1
2007	17.3
2008	11.1
2009	1.8
2010	17.4
2011	7.7

Clearly visible in the data, there is a steady and rising trend of absolute number of departures of Indian nationals. The rate of changes is approximately equal to 8 per cent for the year 2001 to 2003; the rate of change over the previous period saw a dramatic rise of 16.1 per cent in the year 2004 and remain steady till 2007; however there is a decline in percentage rate of change in the year 2008 to 11.1 per cent and further to 1.8 per cent which is a dramatic decline. However in 2010 it again picks up to 17.4 per cent and in 2011 the percentage rate of change of departure of Indian decline to 7.7 per cent (a decline of approximately 10 percentage point).

Table 7.21 Outbound departure from India to selected European countries (Source: India Tourism Statistics 2011)

EU Country	2008	2009	2010
Belgium	53951	34711	40447
Bulgaria	4605	4106	3696
Finland	32000	23000	25000
Italy	135517	139094	182552
Latvia	4329	3737	7147
Poland	15000	10000	15000
Slovakia	1380	1290	1495
Switzerland	132107	136322	16599
UK	359237	272754	371000

Table 7.21 shows the absolute number of outbound departure from India to select European country. For the year 2008, United Kingdom topped the list with 359,237 departures of Indian nationals, followed by Italy with 135,517 departures of Indian nationals and Switzerland with 132,107 departures of Indian nationals. Bottom in the list for 2008 is Bulgaria with 4,605 departures, Latvia with 4,329 departures and Slovakia 1380 departures of Indian nationals in 2008. Similarly for year 2009 the top three position are attained by last year toppers namely United Kingdom with 272,754 departures, Italy with 139,094 departures and Switzerland with 139,094 departures of Indian nationals. Bottom countries are also same as last year bottom countries namely Bulgaria with 4,106 departures, Latvia with 3,737 departures and Slovakia with 1,290 departures of Indian nationals in 2009. Finally for the year 2010 trend remains the same namely United Kingdom with 371, 000 departures, Italy with 182, 552 departures. Bulgaria and Latvia are in bottom of list of departures of Indian national for 2010 with 3,696 and 1,495 departures respectively.

Table 7.22 India's share in the outbound departure from EU countries (Source: India Tourism Statistics 2011)

	2009	2010
UK	1.3	1.4
Austria	0.3	0.3
Belgium	0.3	0.4
Finland	0.4	0.4
France	0.9	1
Germany	0.3	
Italy	0.3	0.3
Netherlands	0.4	0.4
Poland	0.3	0.4
Slovenia	0.1	0.1
Spain	0.5	0.6
Sweden	0.4	0.3

Table 7.22 provides a trend on India's share in the outbound departure from the select European Union countries. Evidently enough from the data that India's share in the departure from the selected European countries in not very significant (relatively very low). The range for the year 2009 is 1.2 with the highest is United Kingdom 1.3 and the lowest is Slovenia 0.1. Similarly for the year 2010 the range is 1.3 with the highest is United Kingdom 1.4 and the lowest is Slovenia 0.1. The shares remain fairly stable for both the years. There is no available information for Germany in the year 2010.

Table 7.23 Outbound travel to European destinations from India (Source: European Travel Commission 2009)

EU Country	2005	2006	EU Country	2005	2006
Austria	39,204	49,684	Italy	2,37,315	2,58,195
Belgium	20,624	22,589	Netherlands	34,200	37,000
Finland	5,245	8,339	Poland	8,702	9,893
Georgia	1,335	3,088	Switzerland	93,472	1,15,055
Germany		79,500	UK	2,69,000	3,66,745
Hungary	6,417	6,903			

There is a rising trends for all the selected European Union countries in terms of outbound travel to European destinations (Table 7.23). For the year 2005 United Kingdom is the most preferred European destination with 269,000 travels, followed by Italy with 237,315 travels, Switzerland with 93,472 travels and Austria with 39,204 travel by Indians. Poland, Finland and Georgia are the least preferred destination with 8,702, 5,245, and 1,335 travels by Indian citizens respectively in 2005. Similarly for the year 2006 again United Kingdom is the most preferred destination with 366,745 travels, Italy with 258,195 travels and Switzerland with 115,055 travels. The least preferred nation for the year 2006 are also similar namely Poland, Finland and Georgian with 9,893, 8,339 and 3,088 travels by Indian citizens (see also Figure 7.3).



Figure 7.3 Outbound travel to European destinations from India (Source: European Travel Commission 2009)

Table 7.24 Travel trade respondents' perceptions of main European tourism destinations (Source: European Travel Commission 2009)

Image dimensions	UK	Switzerland	France	Italy	Germany
Safe and secure holiday environment	Fair	Excellent	Fair	Fair	Good
Variety of things to see and do	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Good
Image of holiday destination	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Fair
Tourist facilities and infrastructure	Excellent	Fair	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Visa formalities and ease of visa process	Fair	Fair	Poor	Poor	Poor
Cost of holiday	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair
Good weather	Fair	Good	Fair	Good	Fair
Suitable for multi-country vacations	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Availability of holiday packages	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Recommended by family and friends	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Fair
Availability of Indian/vegetarian food	Excellent	Good	Good	Fair	Poor

Table 7.24 shows the survey outcomes on Travel Trade Respondents' Perceptions of Main European Tourism Destinations. Respondent's perception ranges from fair to excellent for United Kingdom and Switzerland. However it varies from poor to fair to excellent for France, Italy and Germany. With Visa formalities and ease of visa process is poor in all France, Italy and Germany, may be because of stringent norm regarding visa in these countries. Also Germany stands poor in terms of availability of Indian/vegetarian food.

Table 7.25 First Time residence permits given to Indian emigrants for other reasons (Source: EuroStat Database)

Country/Year	2010	2011	2012
Belgium	318	241	121
Czech Republic	22	28	42
Germany	122	112	345
Ireland	487	413	512
Spain	133	121	150
France	247	251	255
Italy	1,097	877	744
Cyprus	41	22	49
Hungary	59	71	55
Netherlands	24	24	22
Austria	52	101	159
Poland	120	:	159
Portugal	67	79	95
Sweden	155	98	110
United Kingdom	26,109	38,064	45,617

The residence permit given to Indian citizen for other reasons is provided in Table 7.25.These include all other purposes not included in the earlier sections. As expected United Kingdom topped the list with absolute number of immigration is 26,109 in 2010, 38,064 in 2011, and 45,617 in 2012. Data reveals a rising trend. United Kingdom is followed by Italy with 1,097 immigrants in 2010, 877 in 2011 and 744 in 2012. However data reveals a declining trend for Italy. Rest of the European Union countries does account for significant amount of immigration from India. Bottom in the list are Hungary, Austria, Cyprus, Netherlands and Czech Republic with 59, 52, 41, 24 and 22 resident permit is issued for the year 2010.

7.3.12 Inflow of remittances to India

Clearly visible from the trends line that remittance received by India a rising over the period of time, a fact that is revealed by various data sources (MOIA = ministry of oversees affairs, RBI = Reserve Bank of India, Central Bank of India, W.B. = World Bank).



Figure 7.4 Remittances received by India, figures in USB (Source: MOIA, RBI, World Bank)

Table 7.26 Estimates of total remittance received by India (USM) 2012 (Source: RBI)

	Gulf	N America	S America	Europe	Africa	E Asia	Others	Total
2009-10	16431	15934	2197	10446	1731	2250	4647	53636
2010-11	20506	19097	1449	6794	1618	3734	2421	55618
2011-12	24382	22706	1723	8078	1923	4440	2878	66129
2012-13	24934	23220	1762	8260	1967	4440	2943	67627

Above table show the remittance received from world (in numbers, USM), for the year 2009-10 the total remittance is 53,636 out of which Gulf account for 16,431, N. America account for 15,934, S. America account for 2,197, European countries combine account for 10,446, Africa account for 1,731, E. Asia account for 2,250, and all others countries account for 4,647. For the year 2010-2011 total remittance received rises to 55,618 out of which 20,506 is coming from Gulf, 19,097 is coming from N. America, 1,449 is coming from S. America, 6,794 is coming from European countries combined, Africa account for 1,618, E. Asia account for 3,734, and all other countries account for 2,421. Finally for the year 2012-13 total remittance increased to 67,627 out of which gulf account for 24934, N. America accounts for 23,220, S. America accounts for 1,762, Europe accounts for 8,260, Africa account for 1,967, E. Asia account for 4,440 and all other countries combine is 2,943. Data clearly reveals a rising trend in remittance received and rising Gulf and North America share.

Table 7.27 Estimate of total remittance received from Europe vis a vis other parts of the world (%) (Source: RBI, 2013)

	Gulf	N. America	S. America	Europe	Africa	E. Asia	Aus/NZ	Total
2012-13	37	34	3	12	3	7	4	100
2009-10	27	38	6	18	4	5	2	100
2006-07	24	44	6	13	2	8	3	100

Table 7.27 examines the share of total remittances received by various countries in percentages. For the year 2006-07 share of Gulf countries is 24 per cent, N. America is 44 per cent, S. America is 6 per cent, Europe's share is 13 per cent, Africa share is 2 per cent, E. Asia share is 8 per cent and Australian continent combined share is 3 per cent. Finally for the year 2012-13 Gulf share is 37 percent, the highest followed by North America with 34 per cent and Europe with 12 per cent.

Table 7.28 Estimate of remittance by India (USM) from EU countries and India's share in the Total outward remittance of selected EU countries, 2012, (Source: World Bank 2012)

EU Country	Remittance to India	Remittance Share of India	EU Country	Remittance to India	Remittance Share of India
United Kingdom	4,267	18.1	Denmark	39	2.3
Italy	631	5.2	Greece	33	2.3
Germany	457	2.2	Finland	21	4.5
France	229	1.2	Cyprus	15	4.4
Spain	203	1.1	Jamaica	5	18
Sweden	105	3.3	Luxembourg	4	0.4
Netherlands	103	2.2	Poland	2	0.1
Belgium	98	1.9	Latvia	2	0.6
Ireland	88	3.1	Czech Republic	1	0.1
Austria	73	1.5	Hungary	1	0.2
Switzerland	69	1.3	Slovak Republic	1	0.2
Portugal	54	2	Lithuania	0	0.1

From United Kingdom, India receives 4,267 USM as remittance which account for 18.1 per cent remittance share of India (Table 28). Similarly from Italy received 631 USM which is 5.2 per cent of the remittance share of India. Next in the list are Germany, France and Spain with 457, 229, and 203 USM received by India, and the share to India of remittance received from these countries are 2.2 per cent, 1.1 per cent, and 1.2 per cent respectively. Bottom in the list is Lithuania with 0 remittance transfer.

7.3.13 Return migration

Table 7.29 examines the trends in outflow of Indian nationals (number in thousands) from the select European Union countries in the recent years. United Kingdom topped the list of the outflow with 15 Indian nationals in 2009, 14 in 2010 and 22 in 2011, back to their native country India. Germany is second on the list with absolute outflow of 10.37 Indian national in 2009, 9.98 in 2010, and 9.82 in 2011. Next in the list is Spain with 3.16 outflows, followed by Netherlands with 2.05 outflow and Belgium with 1.44 outflow of Indian national in 2011. Rest of European nation does account for very significant amount of Indian national in recent years. Hungary, Luxembourg and Slovak Republic bottom the list with 0.02, 0.03 and 0.03 number of outflow of Indians from European Union countries in 2011.

Table 7.29 Outflow of Indian migrants from selected EU countries (Source: OECD Database)

	Outflow of Indian Emigrants in Thousand			Outflow of Indian Emigrants as a Percentage of Total Outflow of Foreign Nationals		
EU Country	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
Austria	0.81	0.85	0.73	1.2	1.3	1
Belgium	1.29	1.33	1.44	2.6	2.6	2.5
Denmark	1.03	0.99	1.22	3.9	3.7	4.6
Finland	0.2	0.17	0.24	5	5.3	7.2
Germany	10.37	9.98	9.82	1.8	1.9	1.8
Hungary	0.06	0.04	0.05	1	0.7	1.7
Luxembourg	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.5	0.5	0.4
Netherlands	1.81	1.9	2.05	5.1	4.7	4.3
Norway	0.49	0.6	0.57	2.7	2.6	2.5
Slovak Republic	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.8	1	1.4
Spain	2.47	3.15	3.16	0.9	0.9	1
Sweden	0.6	0.67	0.92	3.2	3.1	3.9
United Kingdom	15	14	22	6.6	6.9	10.9

Similarly the right hand side of table shows the outflow of Indian nationals as a percentage of total outflows of foreign nationals from the select European Union countries. United Kingdom topped the list of countries with 6.6 per cent of Indians in 2009, 6.9 per cent of Indians in 2010, and 10.9 per cent of Indians in 2011. U.K. is followed by Finland with 7.2 per cent of Indians in 2011.Next in the list is Denmark with 4.6 per cent of Indians outflow in 2011. Denmark is followed by Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Belgium respectively. Bottom in the list is Spain and Austria with 1 per cent on Indians outflow.

Table 7.30 Outflow of Indian migrants as a percentage of inflow of Indian nationals in selected EU countries (Source: OECD Database)

	2009	**2010**	**2011**
Austria	81.8	88.7	68.2
Belgium	72.2	58.2	63.4
Denmark	126.7	108.4	113.7
Finland	32.7	35.0	41.9
Germany	86.4	75.7	64.0
Hungary	27.5	12.6	14.0
Luxembourg	41.2	31.5	19.2
Netherlands	59.0	59.9	54.2
Norway	63.4	73.9	48.8
Slovak Republic	52.6	29.1	76.9
Spain	41.5	66.2	62.9
Sweden	33.4	31.2	54.4
United Kingdom	23.4	20.6	36.1

Denmark topped the list of outflow Indians as percentage of inflow of Indians with 126.7 per cent in 2009, 108.4 per cent in 2010 and 113.7 per cent in 2011. Slovak Republic is the second on the list with 76.6 per cent, followed by Austria with 68.2 per cent, Germany with 64 per cent, Belgium with 63.4 per cent, Spain with 62.9 per cent, Sweden with 54.4 per cent and Netherlands with 54.2 per cent of outflow of Indian nationals as a percentage of inflow of Indian nationals in 2011. Bottom in the list is Luxembourg and Hungary with outflow as a percentage of inflow of Indian nationals is 19.2 and 14.0 per cent respectively.

Data shows a fluctuating trend in the recent years of outflow of Indian National as a Percentage of Inflow of Indian Nationals in the Select European Countries. There is no clear pattern to be drawn from the data for entire European Union countries. However there is more to revealing by studying individual countries.

7.3.14 Indian diaspora

The share of Indian born national in the population of host country is highest in the United Kingdom for the year 2010 with 1.21 per cent, Ireland is second on the list is only 0.47 per cent, followed by Italy and Sweden both with 0.21 per cent each Indian born nationals in the population (Table 7.31). The bottom in the list is Finland, Czech Republic and Slovenia with 0.07 per cent, 0.01 per cent and 0 per cent respectively as having Indian in their pop per cent. Finally for the year 2013 once again U.K. again leading the list with 1.34 per cent, an unchanged share as compared to last year. Second in the list is Ireland with 0.58 per cent, followed by Sweden with 0.24 per cent and Italy with only 0.23 per cent of Indian born national as compare to their total population. Bottom in the list are Hungary and Slovenia with only 0.01 per cent each of Indian born nationals in total native population.

Table 7.31 Indian born nationals as the percentage of the population of the host country (Source: OECD Database)

GEO/TIME	2010	2011	2012	2013
Belgium	0.16	0.18	0.19	0.2
Czech Republic	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Denmark	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.18
Ireland	0.47	0.5	0.5	0.58
Spain	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Italy	0.21	0.2	0.21	0.23
Hungary			0.01	0.01
Netherlands	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.14
Slovenia	0	0.01	0.01	0.01
Finland	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.09
Sweden	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.24
United Kingdom	1.21	1.28	1.34	1.34



Figure 7.5 Number of total valid permits at the end of the year Indian held by Indian emigrants for all categories (2012) (Source: Eurostat Database)

United Kingdom, Italy and France Spain and Germany have some significant (relatively to other European Union countries) amount of total permit issued to Indians that are existent at the end of the year 2012 (Table 7.32). Also clearly visible from the Figure, the rest of the European Union countries do not account for very significant numbers in term of permit issued to Indians.

Table 7.32 All valid permits at the end of the year 2012 as percentage distribution across category (Source: Eurostat Database)

GEO/TIME	Family	Education	Remunerated Activity	Refugee Status	Subsidiary Protection	Other Reasons
Belgium	52	5.5	29.6	0.1	0	12.9
Bulgaria	33.3	49.6	12.6	0	0	4.4
Czech Republic	31.9	10.4	34.7	0.2	0	22.9
Germany	42	12.9	23.1	0.1	0.2	21.8
Estonia	26.2	10.5	42.4	0	0	20.9
Ireland	5.3	13.1	47.3	0	0	34.2
Greece	37.9	0.2	14.4			47.4
Spain	26.7	1.3	16	0	0	55.9
France	44.1	10.6	18.3	2	0	25
Italy	39.5	0.7	56	0	0	3.7
Luxembourg	57.4	3.7	32.9	0	0	6.1
Hungary	31.2	7	41.4	0.1	0	20.3
Netherlands	42.5	6.9	47.1	0	0	3.5
Poland	18.6	10.9	66.4	0	0	4
Portugal	13.6	0.8	9.3	0	0	76.2
Finland	50.8	4.1	43			2
Sweden	36.8	13.5	45.3	0	0.4	4
United Kingdom	37.1	21.5	40.2	0	0	1.1

United Kingdom has the highest percentage in 2012 for remuneration activities. For Italy also remuneration activity account for highest share of 56 per cent in 2012. Similarly for France and Germany it is the family reason which account for highest of 44.1 per cent and 42 per cent each in 2012. Similarly for Spain and Greece other reasons account for the highest share of 55.9 per cent and 47.4 per cent each in 2012. For Belgium it the family reason with 52 per cent which account for most valid permit 2012. Similarly for Bulgaria it is education with account for 49.6 per cent of total valid permits.

Table 7.33 Estimate of Indian diaspora, 2012 (Source: MOIA 2012)

EU Country	Overseas Indian	NRI Assumed
Austria	23000	12000
Belgium	18000	7000
Cyprus	3220	3200
Czech Republic	450	400
Denmark	7381	4889
Finland	4200	3500
France	65000	10000
Germany	70500	42500
Greece	12013	12000
Ireland	19365	18018
Italy	99127	97719
Netherlands	215000	20000
Poland	2000	1800
Portugal	80000	11272
Romania	948	878
Spain	30000	15000
Sweden	18000	4000
United Kingdom	1500000	1500000

As evident from the Table 7.33, that the highest number of immigration of Indian to European Union countries is in the United Kingdom with 1,500,000 immigrant, with all having NRI status. Netherlands stand second in the list of immigration of Indian with 215,000 migrant, a figure much lesser than United Kingdom, with only 20,000 as having NRI status. Netherland is followed by Italy with 99,127 immigrants (97,719 as having the NRI status), Portugal with 80,000 immigrants (11,272 as having the NRI status), Germany with 70,500 immigrants (42,500 as having the NRI status), and France with 65,000 immigrants (10,000 having as the NRI status). Rest of the European Union countries does not account for the significant immigration from India. Immigration in Sweden, Belgium, Austria, and Spain ranges from 18,000 to 30,000. Slovenia, Latvia and Croatia are the countries having least number of immigrants from India with 46, 40, and 38 respectively.

7.3.15 Irregular migration

Though the primary motive of the irregular migrants is economic it does exerts some pressure on the local economy. Majority of these irregular migrants are of semi-skilled or medium skilled people and it is estimated that there are around half a million irregular immigrants that enter the EU every year. Tackling this situation has been the important focus of the EU's common immigration Policy since its inception.

Table 7.34 Number of Indian nationals living as irregular in selected EU countries (Source: EuroStat Database)

Country/Year	2011	2012	2013
Belgium	385	385	350
Cyprus	735	680	f590
Czech Republic	10	15	45
Denmark	20	20	10
Finland	30	35	45
France	1,185	1,030	975
Germany	1,590	1,730	1,735
Hungary	10	5	15
Ireland	40	45	55
Italy	425	470	270
Portugal	385	580	205
Spain	635	580	470
Sweden	35	40	25
United Kingdom	6,790	7,635	8,480

Table 7.35 Indian nationals living as irregular migrants as a percentage of total stock of Indian nationals in selected EU countries (Source: EuroStat Database)

Country/Year	2011	2012	2013
Belgium	4.8	4.4	3.8
Bulgaria	0.0	7.4	3.5
Czech Republic	1.0	1.6	4.0
Ireland	0.4	0.4	0.2
Germany	3.1	3.0	2.7
Ireland	0.2	0.3	0.3
Spain	1.9	1.7	1.4
Italy	0.4	0.4	0.2
Hungary	1.2	0.6	1.7
Poland	6.6	9.4	f6.5
Portugal	7.3	10.8	3.6
Slovenia	0.0	7.0	0.0
Slovakia	2.2	0.0	4.3
Finland	0.9	0.9	1.1
Sweden	0.5	0.5	0.3
United Kingdom	2.0	2.2	2.4

Table 7.34 gives us a trend of Indian nationals living in select European Union countries irregularly. Not surprisingly United Kingdom is again top in the list with 6,790 in 2011, 7,635 in 2011 and 8,480 in 2013. Data reveals an increasing trend. United Kingdom is followed by Germany with 1,590 in 2011, 1,730 in 2012 and 1,735 in 2013. Germany is followed by France with 975 irregular Indian migrants in 2013, there is a clear declining trend in case of France. Other European Union countries does account for significant amount of influx of irregular migration from India, with bottom in the list is Ireland with 55, Finland with 45 , Czech Republic with 45, Sweden with 25, Hungary with 15, and Denmark with 10 in 2013.

In 2013 the list is topped by Poland with 6.5 per cent, followed by Slovakia with 4.3 per cent, Czech Republic with 4.0 per cent, Belgium with 3.8 per cent, Portugal with 3.6 per cent and Bulgaria with 3.5 per cent. Bottom in the list for the year 2013 is Ireland and Sweden with 0.3 per cent, Ireland and Italy with 0.2 per cent and Slovenia with 0 per cent.

Country wise there is no clear pattern or trend, Denmark topped the list for 2011, 2012 but its percentage share decline for the year 2013. Similarly Bulgaria and Slovenia saw a sudden increase from year 2011 to year 2012.On the whole for entire European countries there is very less to infer Indian nationals living as irregular migrants as a percentage of total stock of Indian nationals in the select European Union countries.

Table 7.36 Indian nationals refused entry in EU countries (Source: EuroStat Database)

	Absolute Number			Percentage Change	
Country/Year	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2012/2011**	**2013/2012**
Belgium	35	55	25	57	-55
Germany	80	130	85	63	-35
Ireland	55	60	30	9	-50
Spain	35	35	45	0	29
France	155	130	155	-16	19
Italy	95	65	65	-32	0
Netherlands	80	80	75	0	-6
Poland	10	5	10	-50	100
Romania	25	40	25	60	-38
Finland	5	5	5	0	0
Sweden	0	0	5		
United Kingdom	880	685	680	-22	-1

Table 7.36 shows the trends of Indian citizens refused entry in various European Union countries. United Kingdom topped the list of countries with 880 in 2011, 685 in 2012 and 680 in 2013. Trend of data for three show a declining phase. U.K. is followed by France (155 in 2011, 130 in 2012, 155 in 2013), Germany (80 in 2011, 130 in 2012, 85 in 2013). Data reveals that France has a decline and after that an increase, while Germany has a rise and then decline. Italy shows a declining trend from 85 in 2011 to 65 in 2012 and remaining constant at 65 in 2013. Bottom in the list is Romania and Belgium with 25 individuals, Poland with 10 individuals and Finland and Sweden with 5 individual each, who have been refused entry.

In term percentage change United Kingdom saw a clear decline of 22 per cent in 2012/2011 and 1 per cent in 2013/2013. In France there is a decline of 16 per cent in 2012/2011 and rise of 19 per cent on 2013/2012. Italy and Poland also saw a declining and a rising trend for 2012/2011 and 2013/2012 respectively. Belgium saw a rise of 57 per cent in 2012/2011 and a decline of 55 per cent. In Ireland also there is rise of 9 per cent and decline of 50 per cent in 2012/2011 and 2013/2011 respectively. In Finland there is neither a decline nor a rise.

Table 7.37 Indian citizens ordered to leave by various EU countries (Source: EuroStat Database)

	Absolute Number			Percentage Change	
Country/Year	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2012/2011**	**2013/2012**
Belgium	920	955	745	4	-22
Bulgaria	0	10	5		-50
Czech Republic	5	5	20	0	300
Denmark	45	50	45	11	-10
Germany	820	675	:	-18	
Ireland	20	10	55	-50	450
Spain	905	725	295	-20	-59
Italy	425	470	270	11	-43
Hungary	65	45	50	-31	11
Poland	20	40	20	100	-50
Portugal	350	515	205	47	-60
Slovenia	0	5	0		-100
Slovakia	5	0	5	-100	
Finland	35	20	20	-43	0
Sweden	75	130	115	73	-12
United Kingdom	6,790	7,635	8,480	12	11

There is an increasing trend of Indian Citizen ordered to leave from United Kingdom (6,790 in 2011, 7,635 in 2012, and 8,480 in 2013). U.K is followed by Belgium with 920, Spain with 905, and Germany with 820 Indian citizens whom these ordered to leave. Bottom in the list for the year 2011 is Slovakia and Czech Republic with 5 Indian citizens and Slovenia and Bulgaria with none. The same trend exists for 2013 too.

Moving form absolute numbers to percentage changes, there is a rise of 100 per cent in Poland for the year 2012/2011 and a decline of 50 per cent for the year 2013/2012. Similarly for Slovakia there is a decline of 100 per cent for the year 2012/2011. In United Kingdom there is a rise of 12 per cent and 11 per cent for the year 2012/2011 and 2013/2012 respectively. For Spain there is a continuous decline of 20 per cent and 59 per cent. In Ireland there is a decline of 50 per cent in 2012/2011 but in 2013/2012 there is tragic rise of 450 per cent. Similarly for Czech Republic there is a tragic rise of 300 per cent in 2013/2012. However the inference from the percentages changes will not be appropriate because there is wide difference between the bases i.e. absolute number of individual countries.

Table 7.38 New asylum applicants by Indian migrants in selected EU countries (Source: EuroStat Database)

	Absolute Number			Percentage Change	
GEO/TIME	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2012/2011**	**2013/2012**
Belgium	150	90	45	-40	-50
Denmark	30	35	25	17	-29
Germany	820	885	1,220	8	38
Ireland	10	5	10	-50	100
France	40	40	35	0	-13
Italy	35	65	30	86	-54
Netherlands	20	15	15	-25	0
Slovenia	5	0	0	-100	
Slovakia	0	0	0		
Finland		10	5		-50
Sweden	45	55	40	22	-27
United Kingdom	615	1,195	1,085	94	-9

For the year 2011 Germany received highest number of application for asylum with 820 applications. Germany is followed by United Kingdom with 615 applications, Belgium with 150 applications and France with only 40 applications for asylum. Bottom in the list is Slovenia and Slovakia with 5 and 0 applications for asylum respectively. Similar trends exist for 2013 too.

Table 7.39 Indian migrants acquiring foreign citizenship (Source: EuroStat Database)

	Absolute Number			Percentage Change	
GEO/TIME	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2011/2010**	**2012/2011**
Belgium	450	377	519	-16	38
Denmark	99	116	127	17	9
Germany	3,052	2,730	2,464	-11	-10
Ireland	31	30	156	-3	420
Spain	83	74	48	-11	-35
France	471	378	329	-20	-13
Italy	367	257	284	-30	11
Hungary	14	7	14	-50	100
Netherlands	217	281	544	29	94
Austria	111	138	168	24	22
Finland	137	145	451	6	211
Sweden	967	1,028	1,418	6	38
United Kingdom	2,587	5,539	4,135	114	-25

We can infer from Table 7.39, Indian citizens are getting highest number the citizenship from United Kingdom (2,587 in 2010, 5,539 in 2011, and 4,135 in 2012). Though the trend is declining, in term absolute numbers it is the highest in the European Union countries. United Kingdom is followed by Germany (3,052 in 2010, 2,730 in 2011, and 2,464 in 2012). Rest of the European Union countries does not account for very significant number in term of giving citizenship to Indian citizens. In term of absolute number Hungary stand bottom in the list with 14 citizenships in 2010 and 14 citizenships in 2012.

Moving from absolute numbers to percentages United Kingdom saw a rise of 114 per cent in 2011/2010 and a decline of 25 per cent in 2012/2011. Finland saw a rise of 6 per cent and a tragic 211 per cent in the year 2011/2010 and 2012/2011 respectively. However inference from percentages is not very reliable because the bases (absolute number of citizenships given by the countries) in various European Union countries are significantly different.

Saha [2009] states that over 20,000 individuals from the state of Punjab and Haryana try to emigrate irregularly and almost half of them are bound to Europe [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009]. Though on an average 27 per cent of these irregular migrants directly aims for UK. Italy has been second most European destination for the irregular migrants.

Saha (2009) also points out that there are various transit routes that Indians opts to enter the chosen EU country irregularly. Indian travel to Georgia from where they can obtain multiple entry visas and proceed to Turkey since there is free visa travel between Turkey and Georgia. In their final lap they easily gain access to Greek given ineffective border control measures on the Turkey Greek boarder. There are also various other transit routes such as from Russia to Italy trough Ukraine or Slovakia or Hungary. There is indeed one other route from other African Countries to Morocco and then to Spain.

7.3.16 India EU future economic prospects and transnational migration



Figure 7.6 Skills forecast: Job opportunities by occupation (figures in thousands), 2013-2025 (Source: CEDEFOP 2014)

The histogram figure 7.6 shows the forecast of skill based jobs in European Union for the upcoming years i.e., 2013-2025. There will be rising demand for professionals, however it will be coming from replacement demand and very less will be coming from expansion of demand for the sector as a whole. Demand for managers will also rise and major chunk of the rise will because of replacement demand but not expansionary demand. Demand for technical and associate professionals will be rising for near future but similar as the case of mangers and professional it will coming via replacement demand but expansionary demand. For service and sales workers approximately all the demand for skill based job is coming through replacement demand. Expansionary demand for clerical support workers are negative i.e. there will be shrinking of the sector; however will be positive replacement demand for sector as a whole. Similar is the case with skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers and plant and machine operators, and assemblers with having a negative expansionary demand implies the shrinking of sectors employing these labours , however is positive replacement demand for sector as a whole. Finally demand for Elementary operator rise via both replacement demand and expansionary demand.



Figure 7.7 Skills forecast: Job opportunities by sector, 2013-2025, (Source: CEDEFOP 2014)

The vertical histogram figure 7.7 shows the skills based job generation in European Union countries in coming years (2013-2025). There will be a decline in expansionary demand for primary sector and utilities this implies the contraction of the sector, however there will be a rise in replacement demand of existing workforce. Similarly manufacturing also saw decline in expansionary demand implies the contraction of the sector, however there will be positive demand for the sector as whole because replacement demand will be positive. A negative expansionary demand will definitely be a worrisome problem. In construction also there will be net increase in the demand of skill persons, because replacement demand is positive. In distribution and transport section there will be an emergence of expansionary as well as replacement demand. Business and other services will be highest job creating sector, with both a rise in expansionary as well replacement demand. Finally for non-marketed sector there will be positive demand for expansionary as well replacement jobs.

Table 7.40 EU requirements and projected total supply of manpower in India (Source: India Centre of Migration: India-EU Labour Market Assessment Report)

	EU Requirements		**Projected Total Supply in India (Millions) Annual**	
Occupations	Growth (%) 2006-2015	Projected Numbers by 2015(M)	2009-10	2014-15
Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers	1.5	4	3.47	3.99
Professionals (Engineers, Physicians, Architects, Etc.)	1.4	9.5	12.99	14.94
Technicians and Associate Professionals	1.5	11.6	7.15	8.22
Clerks (Office Clerks, Computing Machine Operators, Etc.)	-0.6	4.5	13.3	15.29
Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers	0.9	10.6	54.11	62.21
Production Workers I: Metal Processors, Machine Operators, Etc.	0.3	4.6	18.25	20.98
Production Workers II: Artisans and Other Precision Workers	-0.6	6.1	16.09	18.25

Table 7.40 shows the projected demand by European Union countries by 2015, and projected total supply in India (expected demand and supply analysis). For legislators, senior officials and managers the expected growth rate will be 1.5 per cent for 2006-2015, with projected demand by EU by 2015 will be 4 million and the projected supply by India will be 3.99 million. For professionals (engineers, physicians and managers) the expected growth rate will be 1.4 per cent for 2006-2015, with expected future demand

by EU by 2015 will be 9.5 million and the projected supply by India will be 14.94 million. Similarly, for technicians and associate professionals the expected growth rate will be 1.5 per cent. With projected demand from EU by 2015 will be 11.6 million and projected supply from India will be 8.22 million, this implies a shortage of potential supply by India. For clerks (office clerks, computing machine operators, etc.) the expected future growth rate will be negative 0.6 for 2006-2015, this implies a shrinking of the sectors which employ these labours. The projected demand form EU will be 4.5 million by 2015 and expected demand from India will be 15.29 million for clerks (office clerks, computing machine operators, etc.) this implies a clear excess supply situation. For Service workers and shop and market sales workers the expected growth rate will be 0.9 per cent for year 2006-2015. EU is projected to demand 10.6 million workers for service workers and shop and market sales workers and India is expected to supply 62.21 million workers for service workers and shop and market sales workers, as clearly seen there is huge difference between expected demand and expected supply. Similarly for production workers I: metal processors, machine operators, etc. the expected growth rate is 0.3 per cent for 2006-2015. EU is expected to demand 6.1 million workers for Production workers I: metal processors, machine operators, etc. By 2015 and Indian is projected to supply 20.98 million workers for production workers I: metal processors, machine operators, etc., this clearly implies a surplus of labourers from supply side. Finally for Production workers II: artisans and other precision workers the expected growth rate for 2006-2015 is negative 0.6 per cent meaning a contraction of sectors which employs these workers. EU will be expected to demand 6.1 million workers for production workers II: artisans and other precision workers and India will be expected to supply 18.25 million workers for production workers II: artisans and other precision workers. We again found a gap between expected and expected supply.

7.3.17 Development of diaspora and facilitating international migration

India's engagement with its Diaspora is symbiotic, the strands of both sides of the relationship equally important to create a resilient and robust bond. To engage with the international Migration in a sustainable and mutually rewarding manner across the economic, social and cultural space is at the heart of the policy of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. It seeks to create conditions, partnerships and institutions that will enable India to connect with its diaspora comprehensibly.

The Ministry proposes to sign MOUs with important receiving countries of the Central and Eastern Europe to forge bilateral partnerships to expand the overseas employment market for Indian workers particularly for the skilled category. MOUs will be pursued with some other labour receiving countries in Europe.

India-EU relations date to the early 1960s, with India being amongst the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community. A cooperation agreement signed in 1994 took the bilateral relationship beyond trade and economic cooperation.

Over the years, India and the EU have signed a number of bilateral agreements and MoUs, notably a Joint Vision Statement for promoting Cooperation in the field of Information and Communications Technology (2001), Customs Cooperation Agreement (2004), Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Employment and Social Affairs (2006), Joint Declaration in the field of Education & Training (2008), Joint Declaration on Multilingualism (2009), Joint Declaration on Culture (2010), and Joint Declaration on Research and Innovation Cooperation (2012).

7.3.18 India bilateral relations and agreements

Table 7.41 India's bilateral agreements with EU countries

EU Country	Agreement	Year signed
Austria	Memorandum of Understanding between CII and WKO	1996
	Bilateral Economic Relations and Economic, Industrial, Technical and Technological Cooperation	1999
	Memorandum of Understanding between FICCI and Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (WKO)	2003
	MoU for Infrastructure Cooperation in the Health Sector	2005
	Agreement on Cooperation in the fields of Science and Technology	2007
Belgium	MoU between the National Bank of Belgium and Reserve Bank of India concerning Mutual Cooperation signed in Brussels	2013
	Social Security Agreement(came into force in September 2009)	2006
	Agreement on cooperation in the field of Science & Technology	2006
Denmark	MOU for cooperation between CII and Confederation of Danish Industries	1995
	Protocol on Foreign Office Consultation	1995
	Joint Business Council Agreement between FICCI and the Danish Industry (DI)	2002
	Agreement for establishment of a Bilateral Joint Commission for Cooperation –	2008
	Arrangement on Gainful Employment for Family Members of the Diplomatic Mission or Consular Posts	2008
	MOU on Labour Mobility Partnership	2009
	Social Security Agreement	2010
France	Agreement on Mutual Exemption for Short Stay Visas for Diplomatic Passport Holders	2013
Germany	MoUs were signed during the Second IGC in the fields of agriculture, higher education, science & technology and renewable energy. Ten MoUs in the field of vocational education and training, railways, S&T and renewable energy were signed on the side lines of Second IGC.	2013
Lexembourgh	Cultural agreement	1996
	Social Security Agreement (entered into force on 1 June 2011)	2009
Netherlands	Joint Trade and Investment Committee (JTIC) at Additional Secretary level.	
	MoU on Cultural Cooperation	2007
	MoU on Cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovation	2008
	Social Security Agreement	2009
	MoU in the field of Spatial Planning, Water Management and Mobility Management	2013
Spain	MoU on cooperation in Tourism	2009
Sweden	Social Security Agreement	2012

7.4 Trends in migration from Europe to India

The Eurostat data released by the European Commission provide detailed information on immigration from European countries to India. These data have been taken to study the recent trends and patterns of European immigrants to India and their characteristics. Having tracked Foreign Tourist arrivals from Europe to India as defined by the Bureau of Immigration, Government of India, the

European Commission's data on immigration to India gives details not just on the frequency of foreigners' arrival into India irrespective of who is arriving, but the immigration data provide details on the number of visas issued to immigrants coming into India from European countries.

Table 7.42 Trends in migration from Europe to India, 2012 (Source: Eurostat)

Country	Number of Immigrants	Percentage Change (2012/2011)	Female Percentage
Belgium	951	-14.3	34
Bulgaria	32		28
Denmark	1,328	1.8	36
Ireland	1,305	-2.7	44
Spain	3,099	1.6	22
Croatia	11	120.0	27
Italy	1,336	21.9	41
Lithuania	64	-34.7	41
Netherlands	1,758		34
Austria			100
Slovenia	28	64.7	46
Slovakia	1	0.0	100
Finland	214	-1.8	38
Sweden	1,148	32.9	32
United Kingdom	18,440	-24.9	25
Norway	263	1.9	32

As can be seen clearly from Table 7.42, the largest numbers of immigrants to India from Europe were from the UK. However, the number of immigrants from UK to India decreased to 18440 in 2012, showing a decline of 24.9 per cent. UK however still remains the European country with the largest number of immigrants coming to India over the past few years. Spain emerged as the European country with the second largest number of immigrants coming to India in 2012 with 3099 immigrants, showing an increase of 16 per cent. Other European countries showing significant numbers of immigrants to India include Ireland, Italy, Belgium and Denmark. Sufficient data are not available for countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Netherlands and Austria. Subsequently, the European countries which seem to send the least number of immigrants to India include Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Finland, and the growth in the number of immigrants to India from these European countries is also not significantly rising.

The gender composition of immigrants from European countries into India over the last three years for most countries is skewed more in favour of male immigrants rather than female immigrants. With the given data availability, the countries with the largest disparity between genders in immigration to India over the last few years are Spain and Slovakia, with more than 80 per cent immigrants to India on an average being male and the remaining 20 per cent being female. Somewhat similar trends though a little less unequal are seen for European countries such as Lithuania, Austria and the UK. The European countries showing the least gender disparity among immigrants to India are Ireland and Italy, where in fact around 42 per cent of immigrants to India are males and the remaining 58 per cent are females, showing a reversal of the trend as compared to other European countries. It is also important to note at this juncture that these trends seem to have remained similar over the three years with no major increases or decreases in the gender composition of immigrants to India from different European countries. The patterns have more or less remained the same.

Table 7.43 Age composition of immigrants, 2012 (Source: Eurostat data: European Commission)

GEO/AGE	0-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	>= 50
Belgium	15	26	44	9	6
Bulgaria	3	47	44	3	3
Denmark	14	33	46	5	2
Ireland	23	41	29	4	4
Spain	14	30	34	15	7
Croatia	9	9	36	27	18
Italy	24	19	32	13	11
Lithuania	3	56	25	6	9
Netherlands	15	32	40	9	4
Slovenia	21	29	29	14	7
Finland	19	24	50	5	2
Sweden	16	35	39	7	3
Norway	12	31	42	11	5

The maximum share of immigrants from European countries to India in 2012 were found to be in the age-groups 20-29 and 30-39 for most European countries. The average share of immigrants to India from all the European countries together in the age-groups 20-29 and 30-39 were approximately 35 per cent and 45 per cent respectively. However, in the case of Italy, 24 per cent of the immigrants belonged to the age-group 0-19, while only 19 per cent immigrants came from the 20-29 age-group. Around 32 per cent immigrants were from the 30-39 age-group.

On the other hand, for Ireland, although similar to Italy, the share of immigrants to India from the age-group 0-19 years was 23 per cent, as high as 41 per cent immigrants came from the 20-29 age-group and only 29 per cent were from the 30-39 age-group. In Lithuania on the other hand, as many as 56 per cent of immigrants to India belonged to the age-group 20-29 years. Those belonging to 50 years of age or above have quite a low share (on an average, 5 per cent) of immigrants to India in the year 2012 (Table 3.43)

7.4.1 Types of visas issued by the Indian government to European nationals

The Bureau of Immigration, Government of India provides data regarding the different kinds of visa issued to European nationals for their visits and stay for various purposes in India. As a country with great foreign investments with several MNCs and software hubs in various parts of the country, many European nationals visit India on Employment and Business visas. UK, Germany France, Netherlands etc have sent most citizens to India on these visas (Table 7.44). Though considerably low, India also attracts international students. It is interesting to note that India has received 86 students from UK in 2012, when these is a mad rush of India students to migrate to UK. 66 students from France have also come to India during the same year. Quantum of student immigration from other EU countries are not worth considering. As mentioned earlier, India has strong diplomatic relations with the EU nations and has entered into many bilateral agreements with these nations over the years. In 2013 UK has received the maximum number of diplomat visas followed by France and Italy. No doubt India is a favourite holiday destination for Europeans and most foreign nationals enter the country in tourist visas. In 2013 India has received as high as 295519 tourists from UK alone.

Table 7.44 Types of visas issues to European nationals by the government of India, 2013 (Source: Bureau of Immigration, Government of India)

Country/ visa/ year	Employment visa (2013)	Business visa (2013)	Student visa (2012)	Diplomatic visa (2013)	Tourist visa (2013)
UK	1856	56609	86	459	295519
Belgium	143	5842	3	12	18847
Denmark	64	5452	4	35	9966
Finland	72	3397	3	71	10863
France	0	17946	66	160	123748
Germany	3954	41694	18	15	108000
Ireland	78	2375	-	12	7501
Italy	326	15218	12	90	46753
Netherlands	588	11274	8	65	25147
Norway	141	2407	-	56	10369
Poland	-	-	8	-	
Portugal	-	-	13	-	
Spain	0	6162	14	0	27081
Sweden	214	7509	-	77	24992

7.4.2 Irregular immigrants

Foreign nationals coming to India from many countries are also found to overstay in India. The data for this is issued by the Bureau of Immigration, Government of India and is provided in Table 7.45. These data are in numbers of foreign nationals living irregularly nd numbers of foreign nationals who were deported.

Table 7.45 Foreign nationals overstaying in India, 2011 (Source: Bureau of Immigration, Government of India)

Country/ year	Foreign Nationals Living Irregularly	Foreign Nationals Deported
	2011	2011
Canada	627	2
China	633	9
France	611	2
Germany	647	6
Italy	152	4
Sweden	103	0
U.S.A.	2168	9
U.K.	1094	6
Singapore	230	5
Spain	135	0
Russia	343	16
Netherlands	118	1

Table 7.45 shows that the major countries from which immigrants are found to overstay in India are Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, USA, UK, Singapore, Spain, Russia and Netherlands. Of these, foreign nationals from USA living in India were found to be the largest proportion of immigrants overstaying in India, with the numbers 2168 in 2011, closely followed by immigrants from UK. A similar case is found to exist for deported foreign nationals from USA and UK who overstay in India.

7.4.3 Outward Remittance Flow from India to Europe

The remittances (in US million dollars) sent by European immigrants in India are shown for the years 2010 and 2013. In the year 2010, French immigrants in India sent back \$ 11 million as remittances, which increased to \$ 13 million in 2013. Germany and UK recorded similar figures and these immigrants sent \$ 8 million as remittances each in 2010, which increased to \$ 9 million each in 2013.



Figure 7.8 Outward remittance from India to selected EU countries Source: World Bank

7.5 Conclusion

Migration of Indians to Europe has been a phenomenon that dates back to centuries, and with it colonial ties with Britain. India has had its opportunities as well. Familiarities with many European languages, and English in particular, Indians are still demanded labour force in Europe. In this paper, we intend to analyse the characteristics of short term migration and migrants from India to Europe, and to understand the various socio-economic and demographic features of this population.

India has the second largest diaspora in the world estimated at around 25 million coming next only to China whose diaspora is estimated at around 50 million. Indian overseas community has presence in about 189 countries across the globe. It is the result of different waves of migration one after another spanning over hundreds of years. Greatest legacy of migration from India comes from colonial era and with the advent of globalisation in recent times has given push to migration from India. Towards the later half of the 20th century, the character of migration has changed and two distinct streams of emigration has emerged, one led by high skilled professionals that move to the western world and the other being semi-skilled contract workers that migrate mainly to the Gulf countries and to some extent other South East Asian economies. The overseas Indian community thus constitutes a diverse and heterogeneous global community representing different regions, languages, cultures and faiths. The common thread that binds them together is the idea of India and its intrinsic values. Overseas Indians comprise People of Indian Origin and Non Resident Indians and today are amongst the best educated and successful communities in the world. In every part of the world the overseas Indian community is recognised and respected for its hard work, discipline and for successfully integrating with the local community.

To strengthen the Indo-EU relations, both parties have signed a number of bilateral agreements and Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs), notably a Joint Vision Statement for promoting Cooperation in the field of Information and Communications Technology (2001), Customs Cooperation Agreement (2004), Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Employment and Social Affairs (2006), Horizontal Civil Aviation Agreement (2008), Joint Declaration in the field of Education and Training (2008), Joint Declaration on Multilingualism (2009), Joint Declaration on Culture (2010), Memorandum of Understanding on Statistics (2012) and the Joint Declaration on Research and Innovation Cooperation (2012). In addition, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs has signed several Social Security Agreements to protect the short-term temporary migrants to Europe to receive their share to social security contributions with individual countries such as Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Portugal and Czech Republic. In 2009, a labour mobility partnership was signed with Denmark.

Immigration of Indian citizen as a percentage of total immigration is relatively lower (less than 1 per cent for some cases) for almost all European Union countries except United Kingdom. According to the latest Eurostat data, the highest number of emigrants in Europe is enumerated in the United Kingdom, followed by Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Sweden. However, the migration trends in absolute figures are declining in the high concentration countries such as United Kingdom and Italy. But the share of women in total number of emigrants from India to United Kingdom shows a marginal increase from 33 per cent in 2010 to 37 per cent in 2012.

Data also reveals that the duration of resident permit for remuneration based activities shows a biased for 6-11 months and 12 or more months. There is much to be explained by studying the individual countries experience except for some countries, where there is steep increase or steep decrease. Moreover emigration from India is clearly shown to be of long duration with maximum number of individuals given residence permit for 12 or more months. In case of UK the resident permits came for long duration of 12 or more months has come down steeply whereas for Poland it has increased from insignificant to more than half of resident permits being given for long duration.

The main source countries for international students to the EU are China, India and Korea which cumulatively sourced over 25 percent of all international students in 2009. India in particular has grown into a leading player in the international students market and is the second most important sending country after China. Flows of Indian students are intensely concentrated in English-speaking regions and attracted over 80 percent of all internationally mobile Indian students. United States of America have been the prime destination for the majority of Indian students. Within the European Union (EU), Indian students remain concentrated in the UK, which receives around 80 percent of all Indian students in Europe. Germany and France are countries which attract the remaining Indian students. However there is a continuous rising trend in International student mobility in tertiary education from India from the year 2007 to the year 2010. Post 2010 there is continues decline for the two consecutive years 2011 and 2012.

India's engagement with its diaspora is symbiotic, the strands of both sides of the relationship equally important to create a resilient and robust bond. To engage with the international Migration in a sustainable and mutually rewarding manner across the economic, social and cultural space is at the heart of the policy of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. It seeks to create conditions, partnerships and institutions that will enable India to connect with its diaspora comprehensibly.

With the exceptions of UK and European Union as a whole has to go a long way to build strong migration ties with India to boost the prospect of future emigration from India given that there are many economic opportunities that lie ahead in the European region which can be beneficial to both the countries. India can be potential source of quality manpower for not only IT sector but many other sector including healthcare, construction, research and development and services sector. Thus building a harmonious relation between EU and India and making temporary and short-term migration to EU would go a long way to make win-win situation for all and would eventually go a long way in building cultural and social relation that ought to transcend through time and space.

As India continues to grow as a technology hub with huge foreign investments and with very strong bilateral ties, the inward flow of foreign nationals to the country are also on a rise. As professionals, entrepreneurs, diplomats and students many European nationals reach India every year. More importantly India is a favourite holiday spot for them as well. India receives a hefty number of tourists from the EU nations. At the same time, the number of illegal immigrants and deported cases are also on a high. So the notion of only the citizens of poor nations disappearing into the rich to make fortunes isn't true anymore. We should also understand the dynamics of immigration to the third world countries and policies should be formulated so as to make sure that the less stringent immigration policies of these nations are not taken for granted and exploited for wrong reasons. This calls for further studies into the area of immigration into the developing and under developed nations.

7.6 Discussion

There are several push and pull factors working simultaneously in migration process. Push factors can be attributed to low salaries, poor working conditions along with excessive workload, whereas pull factors can be attributed to the desire for good lifestyle and economic prospect along with professional growth. There are some training and learning opportunities and professional work environments that can play an instrumental role in pulling migration to the destination countries. Indian returnee migrants describe their experiences in destination countries as extremely satisfying. Though there are certain barriers and complications in the emigration process including procedural delays and lack of information access, there are not deterrent conditions. Other concerns may range from the costs of living to problems in cultural integration and other security concerns.

Considering the potential expected demand for high skilled and semi-skilled professionals, EU countries should introduce measures to facilitate greater labour mobility between EU and other developing countries including India. India is recognised across the globe for its skills in the Information Technology sector. India has also been one of the largest countries exporting IT professionals. As expected demand for high skilled professionals in IT sector across Europe is expected to increase in given time, it could open many frontiers for both individuals and firms in India. Given the projected labour supply in IT sector is also expected to grow, it would benefit both the destination home countries. Indian IT firms have established substantial business overseas and are providing opportunities to Indian nationals back at home.

It is not only the IT sector that has huge migration potential from India; market for semi -skilled and medium skilled worker remain untapped in India from migration perspective. These semi-skilled labours have array of employability in EU given there the shortage of labour in the EU countries. Employment potential of these workers can be harnessed through training and education to meet the demand in the EU labour market.

As far as short term or temporary migration is concerned, India has huge migration potential with respect to EU given the shortage of manpower for both skilled and low skilled jobs are concerned. Though better policy initiatives and training these can yield benefit for both the destination and home country. However, the data that we have in hand is insufficient to comment on the exact temporary migrants' stock of the country in different parts of the world. As we have mentioned earlier, the border between permanent and temporary migration is very thin and not much of an attempt has so far been made in distinguishing them on quantitative terms. The study has beyond doubts highlighted the need and necessity for the Government to actually start building a database on the temporary migration from the country. The below table gives a rough idea of the various statistics owing to the stock of permanent and temporary migrants during 2012.

Table 7.46: Approximate permanent and temporary migrant stock for the year 2012

EU Country	Overseas Indians	NRI Assumed	Irregular migrants	First time Residence Permit to Indians for Remunerated Activities	First time Residence Permit to Indians for Education	All permit changes to remunerated activities
Austria	23000	12,000			79	
Belgium	18000	7,000	350	889	199	
Cyprus	3220	3,200	590	793	229	
Czech Republic	450	400	45	7	79	61
Denmark	7381	4,889	10	1,822	149	41
Finland	4200	3,500	45	534	121	
France	65000	10,000	975	1,072	1,421	675
Germany	70500	42,500	1,735	2,645	2,398	1,182
Greece	12013	12,000		61		1,736
Ireland	19365	18,018	55	580	546	664
Italy	99127	97,719	270	11,226	659	80
Netherlands	215000	20,000		2,080	451	
Poland	2000	1,800		595	134	469
Portugal	80000	11,272	205	277	56	327
Romania	948	878			23	
Spain	30000	15,000	470	1,456	341	
Sweden	18000	4,000	25	2,906	353	39
United Kingdom	1500000	15,00,000	8,480	24,786	16,077	12,680
Total	2,168,204	1,764,176	13,300	51729	23236	17954

There is apparent need of the government of India to take steps in building ties with European Union countries to facilitate labour mobility. Many steps have been taken in the past in this arena and many are still underway in building up strong ties between EU and India through various MoU's .

With the exceptions of UK, the European Union as a whole has to go a long way to build strong migration ties with India to boost the prospect of future emigration from India, given that there are many economic opportunities that lie ahead in the European region which can be beneficial to both sending and receiving countries. India can be potential source of quality manpower for not only IT sector but many other sector including healthcare, construction, research and development and services sector. Thus building a harmonious relation between EU and India and making migration to EU would go a long way to make win-win situation for all, and would eventually build cultural and social relation that ought to transcend through time and space.

Though the migration of Indians to foreign nations for occupational and educational purposes are much emphasised and many studies conducted on those grounds, immigration to India is an area that needs our attention as well. India, having very strong bilateral ties with the nations in EU, receive many European nationals every year, as tourists, diplomats, professionals, entrepreneurs and students. Many European nationals also stay in India with no proper documents or permits. India, as a growing economy also sends remittances to the Europe, as much as 13 Million USD to France for example. In short, while we over emphasise India's hefty migration trends, the growing immigration scenario should not be neglected either.

References

Alberto Neidhardt, Highly Skilled Indian migrants in Europe: Italy, CARIM-India RR 2013/130,Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

Alina Ostling, An overview of highly skilled labour migration in Denmark with a focus on Indian nationals, CARIM-India Research Report 2013/43, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

Alina Ostling, An overview of Highly-Skilled Labour Migration in Sweden with a Special Focus on Indian Nationals, CARIM-India RR 2013/35, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013

Ana López-Sala, From Traders to Workers: Indian Immigration in Spain, CARIM-India Research Report 2013/02, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

Basant Kumar Potnuru and Vishishta Sam, India-EU Engagement and International Migration: Challenges and Policy Imperatives, CARIM-India RR2012/26, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012.

Bhagawati, Jagadish, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration, and Democracy. Oxford University Press. 1999

Carolina V. Zuccotti, Highly-Skilled Indian Migrants in the United Kingdom, CARIM-India RR2013/34, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

CEDEFOP.Skills Supply and Demand in Europe: Medium-Term Forecast Up to 2020. European Center for the Development of Vocational Training. 2010

Christine Moliner, Indian Migrants in France: Country Report, CARIM-India Research Report 2012/11, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012.

Conor Talbot, Highly Skilled Indian migrants in Ireland, CARIM-India RR 2013/36, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013

Danai Angeli, Policy Framework on Highly Skilled Workers in Greece: Recent and Current, CARIMIndia RR 2013/41, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

Dr. M. K. Gautam, Indian Diaspora: Ethnicity and Diasporic Identity, CARIM-India RR 2013/29,Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

Ellen Bal, Country Report: Indian migration to the Netherlands, CARIM-India Research Report 2012/07, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012.

Geir Tore Brenne, Helge Hiram Jensen, An overview of highly-skilled labour migration to Norway – with a focus on India as country of origin, CARIM-India RR2013/46, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

Geir Tore Brenne, Helge Hiram Jensen, An overview of highly-skilled labour migration to Norway – with a focus on India as country of origin, CARIM-India RR2013/46, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

Germán Gómez Ventura, Highly Skilled Indian Migrant Population in Spain, CARIM-India RR2013/39, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

Johanna Gereke, Highly-Skilled Indian Migrants in Germany, CARIM-India RR 2013/32, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

K.C. Saha, Irregular migration from India to the EU: Punjab & Haryana Case Study, CARIM-India RR 2012/28, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012.
Kathryn Lum, India´s Engagement with its Diaspora in Comparative Perspective with China, CARIM India AS2012/01, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012.
Kathryn Lum, Indian Diversities in Italy: Italian Case Study, CARIM-India Research Report 2012/02, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012.
Khadria, B, Shifting Paradigm of Globalisation: The Twenty-first Century Transition towards Generics in Skilled Migration from India. International Migration.Vol.39 (5).Pp. 45-71. 2001
Kristina Myrvold, Swedish Case Study Indian Migration and Population in Sweden, CARIM-India Research Report 2012/06, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012.
Leila Hadj-Abdou, High Skilled Policy & Indian High Skilled Migrants on the Austrian Labor Market, CARIM-India RR 2013/40, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.
Leonard Williams, Indians in France: an increasingly diverse population, CARIM-India RR 2013/30,Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.
Nadina Christopoulou, The Indian Community in Greece, CARIM-India RR 2013/44, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.
Praveena Kodoth, Tina Kuriakose Jacob, International Mobility of Nurses from Kerala (India) to the EU: Prospects and Challenges with special reference to the Netherlands and Denmark, CARIM-India RR 2013/19, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.
Puja Guha, India-EU Mobility: Building Bonds through Remittances and Philanthropy, CARIM-India RR 2013/22, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.
S.K. Sasikumar, RakkeeThimothy, Migration of Low Skilled Workers from India to the European Union, CARIM-India RR 2012/15, CARIM-India RR2012/26, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012.
Sara Cosemans - IdesbaldGoddeeris, Indian Migration to Belgium, CARIM-India RR 2013/45,Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.
Shahana Mkherjee , RupaChanda, Indian Student Mobility to European Countries: An Overview, CARIM-India RR 2012/12, CARIM-India RR2012/26, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2012.
Tanu M. Goyal, Arpita Mukherjee, Movement of Engineers and Architects between India and the EU, CARIM-India RR2013/20, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.
Weronika Kloc-Nowak, Highly Skilled Indian migrants in Poland, CARIM-India RR 2013/38, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute, 2013.

8. CHARACTERISTICS OF TEMPORARY TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE NETHERLANDS

Natasja RESLOW

8.1 Introduction

This report will identify the characteristics of temporary migration to and from the Netherlands, by focusing on four main aspects of this migration: its duration, in order to determine temporariness; the country of origin of temporary immigrants/the country of destination of temporary emigrants; the purpose of migration; and the numbers of such migrants. This is a report by the Netherlands country team to the EURA-NET project. The report is structured as follows: first it considers the opportunities and limitations of using Eurostat data; then it presents data on temporary immigration to the Netherlands, temporary emigration from the Netherlands, and illegal migration to the Netherlands. The conclusion includes policy recommendations.

In order to proceed, it is important to begin with a definition of 'temporary migration'. In the academic literature, this has been defined as "any form of territorial movement which does not represent a permanent, or lasting, change of usual residence" (Bell and Ward, 2000: 88). The Netherlands does not have a clear legal definition of the concept of temporary migration (European Migration Network, 2011: 13). For the purposes of the study on temporary migration, the Dutch government adopted the European Migration Network's definition of temporary migration: temporary migration is "migration for a specific motivation and/or purpose with the intention that afterwards there will be a return to the country of origin, or onward movement to another country" (European Migration Network, 2010: 14). According to the European Migration Network online glossary, this term is related to the definition for a short-term migrant: "A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least three months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage" (European Migration Network, n.d.). This implies that temporary migration includes migration for a period of between three and 12 months, except when the purpose of this is leisure, business or medical treatment. In the Netherlands, a temporary residence permit is granted for a maximum period of five successive years (European Migration Network, 2010: 14), which the European Migration Network highlights is considerably longer than the time limits in some other member states (European Migration Network, 2011: 14). After this time, the foreign national may apply for long-term residence status. A work permit is granted for a maximum period of five years, because after having held a work permit for a continuous period of five years the foreign national has free access to the Dutch labour market (article 4 of the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act).[1] In its 2009 report on temporary labour migration, the Advisory Committee on Aliens Affairs defined temporary labour migration as a form of migration whereby migrants from non-EU countries have the opportunity to come to the Netherlands to work for a maximum period of four years. At the end of this period, migrants return to their country of origin, or depart for another country (ACVZ, 2009: 10).

Temporary migration should be delineated from the concept of circular migration. In Dutch policy, circular migration is "a form of migration in which the positive development effects on both the country of origin and the country of destination could be combined" (European Migration Network, 2010: 13). It is "migration in which the migrant resides in one country after another, including his or

1 In the report on temporary and circular migration in the Netherlands by the European Migration Network, it is stated that foreign nationals have free access to the Dutch labour market after three years (European Migration Network, 2010: 14). However, the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act was amended as of 1 January 2014, and this period was extended to five years.

her country of origin, for a longer period of time" (ibid.). This second aspect is the definition developed in the 2008 policy memorandum on international migration and development (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice, 2008: 9). At the European level, the European Migration Network relies on the definition of circular migration contained in a 2007 communication from the European Commission. That communication defined circular migration as "a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries" (European Commission, 2007: 8). The European Migration Network thus notes that, "on the basis of these definitions, and with regard to the differences between these two terms, *temporary migration* is taken to refer more to a single movement and then *limited* stay in the EU, whilst *circular migration* may be considered in the context of a *back-and-forth movement* between the EU and the country of origin… Depending on the definitions of these two terms developed in the member state, these may or may not include references to a (minimum or maximum) duration of time" (European Migration Network, 2011: 13).

Just as its sister report on Dutch policy on temporary migration, this report adopts the definition of temporary migration handled by the European Migration Network:

> *Temporary migration is migration for a period of at least three months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage.*

It is important to note that 'temporary migration to the Netherlands' in this report refers to the movement of non-EU nationals. EU nationals have the right to free movement throughout the territory of the EU. National and EU migration policies therefore target "third country nationals": citizens of a non-EU country. The section on temporary emigration from the Netherlands *will* include EU destination countries.

In order to provide some background, the remainder of this introduction explains the history of temporary migration movements to the Netherlands (particularly of 'guest workers' in the 1960s and 1970s) and Dutch policy on temporary migration, based on the other report by the country team to the EURA-NET project. In order to provide a reference point for temporary migration, it also estimates permanent immigration to the Netherlands by purpose and country of origin. Section 3 then quantifies the extent of temporary migration in the Netherlands.

8.1.1 Dutch experience with 'guest workers'

Immigration to the Netherlands in the post-WWII period is marked by the arrival of three different types of migrants: 'guest workers' who were recruited for unskilled jobs, and later their family members; immigrants from former colonies; and refugees (Zorlu and Hartog, 2001). When considering temporary migration, it is particularly the first group of migrants that is interesting, because they were supposed to come to the Netherlands temporarily to fill gaps in the labour market, and then return to their countries of origin. However, they became permanent immigrants, and this first wave of migration was followed by a wave of family migration that continues to define migration flows to the Netherlands: to this date, family migration is the most common reason for non-Western migrants to immigrate to the Netherlands (European Migration Network, 2012a: 27). In the 1960s, the Netherlands signed guest worker agreements with Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia (Geddes, 2003: 105). Between 1963 and 1983, 415,800 migrants from these countries arrived in the Netherlands (van Eijl, 2009: 29).

Although the guest worker agreements were terminated with the onset of economic recession in 1973, migrants did not return to their countries of origin. Indeed, the tightening of European migration policies in the wake of the oil crisis meant the end of circulation: migrants chose to remain in Europe, fearing that, if they did leave, they would not be able to return (Siegel and van der Vorst, 2012: 12). So not only did temporary migrants become permanent immigrants, but immigration from guest worker countries actually continued in the form of family reunification. These migration flows have therefore shaped the immigrant population in the Netherlands today. Van Eijl calculates that, of the 415,800 migrants who arrived between 1963 and 1983, almost 175,000 were still present in the Netherlands in 2003. The percentage of guest workers who remained in the Netherlands varies according to the country of origin (see Table 8.1 below), although across all countries of origin a higher percentage of those arriving between 1973 and 1983 were still present in 2003.

Table 8.1 Immigration from guest worker countries 1963-1983 (Source: van Eijl, 2009)

Country of origin	Arrival 1963-1973	Still present 2003 (%)	Arrival 1973-1983	Still present 2003 (%)
Morocco	27,500	53	65,200	71
Tunisia	800	42	1900	44
Turkey	50,000	36	109,600	59
Portugal	8,000	29	5,400	35
Yugoslavia	19,100	23	9,800	42
Greece	5,800	22	2,500	30
Italy	18,100	19	11,000	22
Spain	65,800	8	15,300	21

This is reflected in the stock of immigrant populations in the Netherlands today (see Table 8.2 below). Of the top 10 countries of citizenship of non-EU nationals present in the Netherlands in 2012, the first two are countries of former guest worker agreements. Indeed, these two groups together represent more than 40 per cent of all non-EU immigrants in the Netherlands. The table shows that immigration to the Netherlands is also shaped by Dutch colonial history.

Table 8.2 Top 10 countries of origin (citizenship) present in the Netherlands in 2012. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of citizenship	Number of immigrants in the Netherlands in 2012
Turkey	84,830
Morocco	56,595
China	23,900
United States	15,348
Indonesia	11,766
India	10,776
Suriname	6,438
Thailand	5,887
Brazil	5,750
Russia	5,609
Total immigrants (non-EU 27)	336,894

8.1.2 Dutch policy on temporary migration

The sister report to this report is entitled ‘State-of-the-art knowledge on temporary migration: The Netherlands’, and examines existing research on temporary migration in the Netherlands as well as Dutch policies and legislation on temporary migration. This section briefly summarises the results of that report.

In the past, immigration and integration were not highly politicised issues in the Netherlands, but today these are some of the hottest political topics, with political parties taking clear and diverging stances. Right-wing political parties have entered the political arena and achieved electoral success. This has changed the nature of political debate on issues such as migration, and has also changed the policies and strategies adopted by the mainstream political parties. This is reflected in Dutch migration policy, which has become very restrictive: the age and income requirements for family reunification have been raised, integration exams must be taken abroad before migrants arrive, illegal migrants may be detained, and dual nationality is in most cases not permitted.

Dutch policy is also affected by membership of the EU and adherence to EU migration policy. Several EU directives form the basis for temporary migration to the Netherlands, for example for students and researchers. However, these directives also tend to leave leeway for member states in implementing EU rules; for example, the Blue Card directive allows member states to simultaneously maintain and apply their own national schemes for highly skilled migrants.

There is no research on temporary migration in the Netherlands as such, but the vast body of literature on immigration and integration is shaped by the experience with guest workers in the Netherlands. Scholars argue that the Netherlands was for a long time a reluctant country of immigration, with various linguistic tools devised to obscure the presence of long-term immigrants (e.g. referring to 'repatriates' and 'minorities' instead of immigrants). Despite this official discourse of denial, immigration from the former guest worker countries has shaped Dutch society today: of the top 10 countries of citizenship of non-EU nationals present in the Netherlands in 2012, the first two are countries of former guest worker agreements.

Dutch policy on temporary migration is made and shaped by a number of different institutional actors. Broadly speaking, the Ministry of Security and Justice has overall responsibility for migration policy. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), which falls under the Ministry of Security and Justice, takes decisions on applications for residence permits. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has responsibility for the admission of foreigners to the Dutch labour market. The Employees Insurance Agency (UWV), which acts on instructions from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, grants work permits, although this task will be transferred to the IND with the introduction of the Single Permit (combined residence and work permit) in 2014. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for visa policy.

Several principles underpinning Dutch temporary migration policy can be derived from policy documents. Temporary migration concerns medium- and low-skilled workers, as high-skilled workers are encouraged to settle permanently in the Netherlands. Temporary migration is not seen as a tool for addressing shortages in the Dutch labour market; this should rather be achieved through the activation of groups in the population that are currently under- or unemployed. Indeed, given the economic crisis in Europe, policy documents question whether temporary migration is actually desirable for the Netherlands. Under any circumstances, there is a focus in Dutch policy on ensuring that temporary migrants return to their country of origin when their residence permit expires. Temporary migration can contribute to the development of migrants' countries of origin and prevent brain drain. Finally, in contrast to migrants whose stay in the Netherlands is more permanent, temporary migrants are not obliged to fulfil integration requirements. Understandings of temporary migration in the Netherlands were put to the test with a circular migration pilot project that was implemented in 2010-2011. However, the project failed, partly due to a lack of political support.

Dutch policy and legislation identifies 12 different purposes of temporary migration:

- Residence as a family member
- Self-employment
- Highly-skilled migration and the EU Blue Card scheme
- Seasonal worker
- Labour migrant
- Cross-border service provider
- Scientific researcher
- Intern
- Study
- Searching for employment
- Cultural exchange

Whilst some of these categories of temporary migration are strictly temporary (including seasonal workers and cross-border service providers), others may lead the way to permanent settlement in the Netherlands if the migrant concerned amasses a five-year period of residence through renewals of the initial residence permits.

The conclusion advocates for more research and debate on the topic of temporary migration. Currently, there is very little explicit discussion on temporary migration; rather, Dutch migration policy as a whole is coloured by the past experience with migration that was intended to be temporary but ended up being permanent. As a result of this lack of debate, Dutch temporary migration policy is contradictory, and friction between different ministries only becomes clear too late in the process of implementing a new policy (as was the case with the circular migration pilot scheme). In particular, more knowledge and debate is needed along three lines: patterns of return migration and effectiveness of various incentives to encourage return; the security of migrants' status and the connections between temporariness of migration status and migrants' well-being; and the overall place of temporary migration in Dutch migration policy.

8.1.3 Permanent immigration to the Netherlands

The EURA-NET project aims to quantify and categorise temporary migration, as distinct from more permanent forms of migration. In order to determine if temporary migration to the Netherlands is qualitatively or quantitatively different from permanent migration, some data on permanent migration is needed. This report is operating with a definition of temporary migration as being migration for a period of more than 12 months. This sub-section therefore presents data on the residence permits in force on 31 December 2012, valid for more than 12 months.

Table 8.3 below shows the top 10 countries of origin (plus the EURA-NET countries) for all migration, as well as according to the purposes of migration which will be considered for temporary migration as well (see section 3.1 below). On 31 December 2012, 185,521 residence permits for 12 months or more were valid; of these, 109,031 were issued for family members, 113 were issued for education purposes, 17,215 were issued for employment purposes, and 22,278 were issued for other reasons. The significant overlap between the two left-hand columns shows that most residence permits valid for more than 12 months are issued to family members. Residence permits for students are not often issued for more than 12 months; section 8.2.2 below will show that instead these permits are issued for 6-11 months, and must be renewed each year. In contrast to the overall picture, residence permits for employment are more often issued to citizens of Japan, Russia, Canada, South Africa, Australia and South Korea. The 'other' category of the Eurostat data captures rather varying purposes of migration, and therefore varying countries of origin; this will be discussed in detail in section 8.2.2 below.

Table 8.3 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries for residence permits valid for more than 12 months, as of 31 December 2012 (source: Eurostat). Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted.

All	Family	Education	Remunerated activities	Other
1. Turkey (29,427)	1. Turkey (24,380)	1. India (21)	1. China (3,469)	1. Turkey (4,113)
2. Morocco (23,042)	2. Morocco (19,688)	2. Ethiopia (10)	2. India (2,900)	2. Morocco (3,639)
3. China (9,925)	3. China (4,655)	3. Indonesia (8)	3. United States (1,979)	3. China (1,386)
4. United States (6,909)	4. United States (4,189)	4. China (7)	4. Japan (1,242)	4. United States (735)
5. India (5,917)	5. Thailand (3,281)	5. Bangladesh (6)	5. Turkey (849)	5. Ghana (656)
6. Iraq (4,889)	6. Suriname (3,105)	6. United States (5)	6. Russia (638)	6. Suriname (632)
7. Somalia (4,050)	7. Indonesia (2,980)	7= Nigeria (4)	7. Canada (432)	7. Indonesia (515)
8. Suriname (3,838)	8. Brazil (2,950)	7= Colombia (4)	8. South Africa (389)	8. Brazil (394)
9. Indonesia (3,822)	9. India (2,752)	7= South Korea (4)	9. Australia (385)	9. Thailand (385)
10. Thailand (3,731)	10. Ghana (2,339)	7= Nepal (4)	10. South Korea (351)	10. Iran (359)
17. Philippines (2,382)	12. Philippines (1,924)	7= Taiwan (4)	13. Philippines (293)	13. India (243)
18. Ukraine (1,695)	15. Ukraine (1,253)	15= Philippines (2)	15. Ukraine (254)	18. Ukraine (180)
		15= Turkey (2)	34. Thailand (60)	22. Philippines (159)
		21= Thailand (1)		

8.2 Flows and Patterns of Temporary Transnational Migration and Mobility

The report by the Dutch government for the European Migration Network acknowledges that there are problems with collecting statistical data on temporary immigration because “data systems in the Netherlands have not been designed to monitor the temporary nature of, and circularity of, migration” (European Migration Network, 2010: 48): the IND registers the duration for which a residence permit has been granted, but the fact that a residence permit has lapsed is no guarantee that the migrant has left the country; municipalities register migrants arriving or leaving, but they do not record the purpose for which the migrant has come to the Netherlands, and they cannot be sure that all migrants deregister when leaving; and the UWV registers the period for which a work permit has been granted, but this does not necessarily correspond to the migrant’s residence period. It is possible that the situation will improve with the recent introduction of the combined residence and work permit, which will be issued by the IND. However, this permit will not be applicable to all temporary migrants coming to the Netherlands, and a significant number will continue to need separate residence and work permits (IND, 2014a). This report will use Eurostat data on residence permits issued because, despite its limitations (which will be examined in the following sub-section), it is the most useful and complete data-set for determining the scope of temporary migration to the Netherlands, and it allows for a comparison to be made with other EU member states. Eurostat data also informs section 3.4 on illegal migration to the Netherlands. Section 3.3 will discuss the difficulties with quantifying temporary emigration from the Netherlands, and therefore relies additionally on data by Statistics Netherlands and secondary literature.

8.2.1 Methodology: definitions, opportunities and limitations of Eurostat data

Section 8.2.2 presents statistics on temporary migration to the Netherlands. The report on Dutch policy and practices on temporary migration, on which this report is based, categorises temporary migration according to the purposes for which a residence permit is issued, as not all temporary migrants will necessarily require a work permit (see section 8.1.2 above). Section 8.2.2 therefore relies on data on the number of temporary residence permits issued by the Dutch authorities. This data comes first and foremost from Eurostat. Beginning in 2008, EU member states are obliged to supply to Eurostat data on migration. This obligation is laid down in Regulation (EC) No. 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community Statistics on migration and international protection. The aim is to harmonise statistics on migration, and thereby have a solid empirical foundation for EU migration policy (IND, 2013a: 11). Data is collected, amongst others, on the number of residence permits issued according to category of migration, length of validity of the residence permit, and nationality of the migrant.[2] In terms of the categories of migration, data is collected under four main headings: family reasons; education reasons; remunerated activities reasons; and other reasons. Each heading is further subdivided. For instance, under family reasons it is possible to distinguish between which family member is joining a migrant in the EU member state. Under education reasons, it is possible to distinguish between study and other educational purposes. Under remunerated activities, a distinction is made between highly skilled workers, researchers, seasonal workers, and others. Finally, 'other reasons' covers migrants with refugee status, unaccompanied minors, and victims of trafficking. Based on the definitions and methodological concepts applied by Eurostat (Eurostat, 2013a), the categories of temporary migrants to the Netherlands and the headings and sub-headings applied by Eurostat can be matched in the following way:

Table 8.4 Link between categories of temporary migrant and Eurostat definitions

Category of temporary migrant	Eurostat heading or sub-heading
Family reunification	Family reasons
Self-employment	Remunerated activities > Others
Highly-skilled migrant	Remunerated activities > Highly skilled workers
EU Blue Card	*Not used
Seasonal worker	Remunerated activities > Seasonal workers
Labour migrant	Remunerated activities > Others
Cross-border service provider	Remunerated activities > Others
Scientific researcher	Remunerated activities > Researcher
Interns	Remunerated activities > Others
Study	Education reasons > Study
Searching for employment	Remunerated activities > Others
Exchange: •Au pair •European Voluntary Service scheme •Secondary school exchange programme •Working holiday •Cultural exchange programme	*Depends on exact purpose of exchange: Remunerated activities > Others Other reasons > Other Other reasons > Other Other reasons > Other Other reasons > Other

From Table 8.4 it becomes clear that there is no perfect match between the categories of temporary migration recognised in Dutch policy and the definitions applied by Eurostat. Most individual categories of temporary migrant to the Netherlands do map neatly and precisely onto one of the headings or sub-headings applied by Eurostat, but each Eurostat heading therefore captures several different categories of temporary migrant. The biggest problem is with the 'residual' category in the Eurostat

2 The data is accessed from the Eurostat website: Population > International Migration and Asylum > Residence permits > Residence permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship > First permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship OR First permits issued for family reasons by reason, length of validity and citizenship OR First permits issued for education reasons by reason, length of validity and citizenship OR First permits issued for remunerated activities by reason, length of validity and citizenship OR First permits issued for other reasons by reason, length of validity and citizenship.

data, namely the category ‘Other reasons > Other’. This covers people coming to the Netherlands on most types of exchanges, however this category “includes all other reasons for which first residence permits may be issued” (Eurostat, 2013a: 7). It is therefore at best an imperfect estimate for the number of people coming to the Netherlands for exchange, as it captures other types of migration as well. The category ‘Remunerated activities > Others’ captures several types of labour migration, including au pairs, self-employed persons, and cross-border service providers. In order to overcome these deficiencies, the Eurostat data presented below will, where necessary, be complemented with national data provided by the IND Information and Analysis Centre (INDIAC).

Data on EU Blue Cards issued in the Netherlands is not available through Eurostat, but national data received from the IND shows that the EU Blue Card is hardly used, due to the existence of the more favourable national Highly Skilled Migrant Scheme. In 2011, no Blue Cards were issued at all, and in 2012, one Blue Card was issued.[3] By contrast, the Highly Skilled Migrant Scheme, which was established in 2004, had already attracted approximately 8,800 migrants by 2007 (Wiesbrock, 2010: 51).

A further problem with Eurostat data on residence permits is that it is only available beginning from 2008. The Dutch report to the European Migration Network on temporary migration does give some statistics on the phenomenon going back to 2005 (European Migration Network, 2010), but these are not as detailed as the statistics available for 2008 onwards. For instance, in order to give an indication of how temporary migration is, the report details how many of the migrants who took up residence in the Netherlands between 2005 and 2009 had left again by 1 January 2010. The data show that

> *68% of the labour migrants who came to the Netherlands from outside the EU in 2005 had left the country on 1 January 2010… The majority of this group of temporary labour migrants resided in the Netherlands for a period of 1 to 3 years… Out of the number of labour migrants from outside the EU who came to the Netherlands in 2006, 42% has, in the meantime, left the country… Nearly an equal percentage of labour migrants who came to the Netherlands in 2007 left again (44%). A quarter of the labour migrants who came to the Netherlands in 2008 stayed for a period shorter than two years (2010: 41).*

However, the report acknowledges the weaknesses of this data, in particular that the grouping ‘labour migrants’ cannot be broken down according to specific types of labour migration (ibid). The remainder of the report focuses on which countries are amongst the top 5 being granted residence permits for the period 2005-2009 (see Table 8.5 below). Whilst this is useful in gaining a picture of the main countries of origin of migrants in the Netherlands, the data is not able to show the duration of the residence permits being granted. The Eurostat data, although available only from 2008 onwards, has the advantage that it reveals both the purpose of migration, the country of origin of the migrants, and the duration of the residence permit issued.

3 Personal communication, 31 March 2014

Table 8.5 Top 5 countries of origin of migrants by migration purpose, 2005-2009. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: European Migration Network, 2010: 43-45)

Work as an employee	China (2,827)	United States (2,139)	Japan (1,315)	India (710)	Turkey (554)
Highly-skilled migrants	India (6,429)	United States (3,089)	Japan (1,166)	China (1,139)	Turkey (1,091)
Scientific researcher	China (910)	Indonesia (201)	Brazil (191)	Pakistan (190)	Iran (188)
Trainee/ apprentice	Indonesia (531)	Thailand (173)	Brazil (123)	China (117)	India (110)
Self-employed	United States (203)	Bulgaria (105)	Romania (38)	Turkey (16)	Japan (14)
Au pair	Philippines (1,423)	South Africa (1,031)	Peru (402)	Brazil (246)	Indonesia (240)
Exchange	Australia (1,542)	Canada (967)	New Zealand (475)	Brazil (199)	United States (120)
Higher education	China (6,116)	United States (4,426)	Indonesia (2,564)	Turkey (2,412)	India (1,360)

The Dutch Employees Insurance Agency (UWV) is responsible for issuing work permits, and also keeps statistical records of work permits. In a memorandum to the Dutch Senate in 2013, the government relied on statistics from UWV about the numbers of work permits issued between 2008 and 2012 (Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2013: 3). However, the statistics are not broken down according to the type of labour migration or the duration of the work permit issued; rather, a distinction is made according to whether or not a full labour market test was applied before a permit was issued (Table 8.6 below). This shows that the number of work permits issued annually decreased by around 5,000 between 2008 and 2012, and also that the vast majority of work permits are subject to some sort of labour market test. Data is also available on the nationalities of migrants who received a work permit in 2012, but this is not linked to specific category of labour migration or the duration of validity of the work permit (see Table 8.7).

Table 8.6 Work permits issued 2008-2012 (Source: Eerste Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2013)[4]

Type of labour market test	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
None	670	623	490	455	373
Limited	8,200	6,862	6,995	7,262	7,771
Full	6,504	6,193	6,274	4,098	2,430
Unknown	0	0	0	141	18
Total	15,374	13,678	13,759	11,972	10,592

4 Article 8(1) of the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act lists the conditions which together form the full labour market test. Only if these conditions are fulfilled will a work permit be issued: there are no Dutch or EU nationals available to fill the vacancy; the employer registered the vacancy with the UWV for five weeks before applying for a work permit; the employer has made proven efforts to recruit from the Netherlands or the EU; the vacancy complies with standard terms of employment and working conditions of the relevant sector; the foreign national is in possession of a valid residence permit; the foreign national will receive a wage at least equal to the minimum wage; it is in the interest of the Netherlands to allow foreign nationals to work in this category of activities; if the limit on work permits for foreign nationals for this category of activities has not yet been reached. The limited labour market test consists of the same conditions, except the requirement that there are no Dutch or EU nationals available to fill the vacancy. The limited labour market test applies for interns, student, and intra-corporate transferees (Eerste Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2013: 3).

Table 8.7 Top 10 countries of origin of migrants who received a work permit in 2012. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eerste Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2013)

Country of origin	Number of work permits issued in 2012
India	1,841
China	1,792
United States	844
Japan	687
Bulgaria	533
Romania	508
Russia	264
Turkey	239
South Korea	231
Indonesia	206

Despite these various shortcomings of the Eurostat data, it is nevertheless applied in this report because it has two major advantages: firstly, it is very specific in terms of the length of validity of residence permits issued and the country of origin of migrants. Secondly, using Eurostat data allows for comparability across the other EU member states taking part in the EURA-NET project.

Section 8.2.3 presents statistics on temporary emigration from the Netherlands. Here, Eurostat data is less useful. Although Eurostat collects data on emigration of Dutch and non-Dutch nationals from the Netherlands, this data cannot be broken down by country of destination or purpose of emigration. It also concerns emigration for at least twelve months, but cannot be further differentiated between temporary and more permanent forms of migration. In other words, of the four main aspects of temporary migration that this report seeks to address (duration; country of destination of emigrants; purpose of emigration; and numbers of emigrants), Eurostat data can only shed light on the numbers of emigrants. This data is therefore applied as a starting point for section 8.2.3 (due to the advantages of comparability with the other EU member states taking part in the EURA-NET project, as mentioned above), but is complemented by national data from Statistics Netherlands, as well as secondary literature. Nevertheless, section 8.2.3 will conclude that serious obstacles remain to our objective of a comprehensive understanding of temporary migration from the Netherlands.

Section 8.2.4 considers illegal migration to the Netherlands. This is an inherently difficult migration flow to quantify, due to its clandestine nature. Data weaknesses are thus not related to specific data sources, but rather due to the object of study. Again, Eurostat data provides the basis for section 8.2.4, in order to maximise comparability to the other EU member states participating in the EURA-NET project.

8.2.2 Temporary migration to the Netherlands

This section presents data on the scope and nature of temporary migration to the Netherlands. The data concerns first residence permits issued from 2008 to 2012, according to the purpose of residence, and is taken from the Eurostat database (complemented where necessary with data by the IND). Before presenting this data, one point should be noted: this report defines temporary migration as migration for a period of at least three months but less than a year (12 months). Eurostat data on residence permits falls into three different categories according to duration of validity of the permit: 3-5 months, 6-11 months, and 12 months or over. According to the definition of temporary migration adopted in this report, the first two categories are the relevant ones. However, when examining the Eurostat data, it becomes clear that the category 3-5 months is, for all types of migration, empty; it seems that residence permits in the Netherlands are never issued for less than 6 months. This section therefore concerns the residence permits issued for 6-11 months. It is structured according to two main questions: which are the most important categories of temporary migration to the Netherlands, and which nationalities are most represented among temporary migrants coming to the Netherlands?

Firstly, in order to establish the importance of the different categories of temporary migration to the Netherlands, Table 8.8 below shows the first permits issued for the years 2008-2012 broken down by purpose (but not by country of origin of migrants)[5]. Table 8.8 shows that the total number of permits issued per year is quite steady across the period 2008-2012, and also that the number of permits issued in the categories 'Family reasons', 'Education reasons > Study', 'Remunerated activities > Highly skilled workers', and 'Remunerated activities > Others' is quite steady. Table 8.9 shows the same data converted to percentages, in order to show the relative weight of each category of temporary migration. This shows that, for each year from 2008 to 2012, family migration is by far the most important category of temporary migration. Each year, more than 40 per cent of temporary migrants to the Netherlands are joining a family member. Both studying and taking up employment at a researcher are becoming more important reasons for migrants to move temporarily to the Netherlands. In 2008, 15.7 per cent of all temporary residence permits were issued for study reasons; by 2012, this had increased to 24 per cent. In 2008, only 1.5 per cent of temporary residence permits were issued to scientific researchers; by 2012 this had increased slightly to 3.8 per cent. The percentages of residence permits issued to highly-skilled workers and other labour migrants ('Remunerated activities > Other') remained steady. The problematic category 'Other reasons > Other', which captures migrants coming to the Netherlands for working holidays and cultural exchange programmes, but also undoubtedly a host of other kinds of migration, decreases in importance throughout the period 2008 to 2012.

Table 8.8 Residence permits issued for 6-11 months, 2008-2012 (Source: Eurostat)

Category	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Family reasons	24,092	23,077	21,560	22,327	21,160
Education > Study	8,850	9,944	10,510	10,701	10,747
Remunerated > Highly skilled	6,411	4,895	5,531	5,594	5,514
Remunerated > Researcher	864	1,305	1,485	1,616	1,689
Remunerated > Seasonal worker	0	0	0	0	0
Remunerated > Others	4,338	4,233	3,432	3,751	3,717
Other > Other	11,896	4,115	2,413	1,882	2,042
Total	56,451	47,569	44,931	45,871	44,869

Table 8.9 Relative weight of each category of temporary migration (%) (Source: Eurostat)

Category	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Family reasons	42.7	48.5	48	48.7	47.2
Education > Study	15.7	21	23.4	23.3	24
Remunerated > Highly skilled	11.4	10.3	12.3	12.2	12.3
Remunerated > Researcher	1.5	2.7	3.3	3.5	3.8
Remunerated > Seasonal worker	0	0	0	0	0
Remunerated > Other	7.7	8.9	7.6	8.2	8.3
Other > Other	21.1	8.7	5.4	4.1	4.6

The category 'Educations reasons > Study' captures several types of migration: students following secondary or applied education; students taking preparatory courses before entering into higher education; and students following higher education. The Eurostat data does not differentiate between these categories, but national data from IND for 2008-2011 shows that higher education is by far the most important of these categories (Table 8.10). This reflects the extra criteria required for residence permits for secondary/higher education to be granted (see report to EURA-NET on Dutch policy on temporary migration).

Table 8.10 Study-related migration in detail, in absolute numbers and percentages (Source: IND, 2013a: 25)

	2008	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
Total permits granted	8,850	9,944	10,510	10,701
Higher education (%)	7,909 (89.4)	8,792 (88.4)	9,585 (91.2)	9,788 (91.5)
Preparatory courses (%)	921 (10.4)	1,141 (11.5)	880 (8.4)	873 (8.2)
Secondary/applied education (%)	20 (0.2)	11 (0.1)	45 (0.4)	40 (0.4)

As pointed out in section 8.2.1 above, the Eurostat data category 'Remunerated activities > Other'

5 The full data table (including breakdown by country of origin of migrants) is available from the author upon request

captures several types of labour migration, including au pairs, self-employed persons, cross-border service providers, interns, and 'regular' labour migrants who come to the Netherlands to work for an employer. National data and a report from the IND makes it possible to break this category down slightly, by differentiating between work as an employee, au pairs, and other labour migration. This data presents a more nuanced picture than the Eurostat data, and is presented in Table 8.11. The table shows that work as an employee and au pairs together account for the vast majority of labour migration to the Netherlands. For employees, the top countries of origin are China, the United States, Japan, Turkey and the Philippines. For au pairs, the top countries of origin are the Philippines, South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia and Peru (IND, 2013a: 33). The Philippines accounts for around one third of au pair migration to the Netherlands. Table 8.12 below shows that immigration to the Netherlands from these countries is indeed dominated by women.

Table 8.11 Labour migration in detail, in absolute numbers and percentages (Source: IND, 2013a: 32)

	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total permits granted	4,338	4,233	3,432	3,751
Work as an employee (%)	2,380 (54.9)	2,382 (56.3)	1,534 (44.7)	2,025 (54)
Au pair (%)	1,508 (34.8)	1,321 (31.2)	1,376 (40.1)	1,157 (30.9)
Other labour migration (%)	450 (10.4)	530 (12.5)	522 (15.2)	569 (15.2)

Table 8.12 Proportion of women immigrants to the Netherlands from select countries. Average for 2003-2012 (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Women immigrants (%)
South Africa	64
Brazil	67.2
Peru	74.7
Indonesia	62.3
Philippines	80.2

After consulting both Eurostat data and the report by the IND, questions remain regarding the category 'Remunerated activities > Other'. Specifically, this publically available data does not reveal anything about the numbers or countries of origin of migrants coming to the Netherlands for self-employment, as cross-border service providers, as interns, or to search for employment after graduation. Therefore this section now presents data provided by the IND Information and Analysis Centre (INDIAC) on this category of 'other labour migration'. Table 8.13 shows the number of each type of permit issued in the period 2009-2013.[6] The most important type of 'other' labour migration is young people coming to the Netherlands for an internship. The absolute numbers of permits issued for the purposes of self-employment has increased significantly in the period 2009-2013. Not much use is made of the government scheme allowing graduates to spend one year searching for highly-skilled employment in the Netherlands; for 2009-2013, only 160 migrants were issued with such a residence permits. IND analysis shows that, for 2008-2011, 18 per cent of these graduates went on to highly-skilled employment in the Netherlands (IND, 2013b: 61).

Table 8.13 Other labour migration in detail (Source: INDIAC)

Type	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Self-employment	72	153	167	276	244
Cross-border service providers	7	9	99	32	19
Interns	468	347	423	408	349
Searching for employment	16	40	31	28	45

As outlined in section 8.2.1 above, Eurostat data on residence permits contains a 'residual' category ('Other > Other'), which captures migrants coming to the Netherlands for the purposes of working holidays and cultural exchanges, but also a host of other reasons. Data provided by INDIAC sheds light on this category of the Eurostat data. Table 8.14 presents the number of residence permits issued

6 The full data table (including breakdown by country of origin of migrants) is available from the author upon request.

for 2008-2012 for cultural exchange purposes, including working holidays and the European Voluntary Service scheme. It contrasts this with the data from Eurostat, in order to show the proportion of the 'Other > Other' category actually made up by cultural exchange. The number of permits issued for cultural exchanges is relatively steady across 2008-2011, so fluctuations in the Eurostat data is due to varying numbers of residence permits issued for other reasons. For 2011, for instance, half of all permits in the residual category can be accounted for by cultural exchanges; for 2008, on the other hand, a huge number of residence permits was issued for 'other' reasons, and less than 10% can be accounted for by cultural exchange. This demonstrates the problems with translating data from the national level to Eurostat, when different categorisations of migration are utilised.

Table 8.14 Cultural exchange migration to the Netherlands Other labour migration in detail (Source: INDIAC)

	2008	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**
'Other > Other'	11,896	4,115	2,413	1,882
Cultural exchange	887	828	1,047	956

Interestingly, the data in Tables 8.8 and 8.9 above shows that there were no residence permits issued to seasonal workers at all in the period 2008-2012. This implies that seasonal workers coming to the Netherlands are staying for less than three months; this would exempt them from the requirement for a residence permit, although they still require a work permit. This technically excludes them from the definition of temporary migration adopted in this approach, namely migration for a period of between three and 12 months; however, it would be illogical to ignore a group of temporary migrants who have played such an important role in Dutch migration history (see section 8.1.1 above on the 1960s guest worker agreements). Table 8.15 therefore presents data on the number of work permits granted to seasonal workers in the period 2008-2011. A breakdown by country of origin of seasonal workers is, however, not possible. Comparing Table 8.8 to Table 8.15 shows that seasonal work is a rather limited aspect of temporary migration to the Netherlands as a whole: fewer work permits were issued in this category for 2008-2011 than residence permits for any of the other categories of temporary migration, except scientific researchers.

Table 8.15 Number of work permits issued for seasonal work (Source: Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice)

Year	**Number of permits issued**
2008	3,247
2009	3,558
2010	3,008
2011	1,143

The second question to be addressed in this section concerns the representation of different nationalities amongst all temporary migrants coming to the Netherlands[7]. In this section, the data is summarised. Table 8.16 shows the top 10 countries of origin of temporary migrants to the Netherlands in the period 2008-2012, based on residence permits issued for 6-11 months, for the following Eurostat categories: 'Family reasons', 'Education reasons > Study', 'Remunerated activities > Highly skilled workers', 'Remunerated activities > Researchers', 'Remunerated Activities > Other', and 'Other > Other'. In addition, the table shows that the EURA-NET countries all appear in the top 20 countries of origin, and therefore also contribute significant flows of temporary migrants to the Netherlands. This table shows the total number of residence permits granted for each country of origin. Table 8.17 extends on this information by showing, for each of the countries in Table 8.16, the percentages of work permits accorded in each of the categories for the period 2008-2012. This makes it possible to determine, for each of the main countries of origin, the most important reasons to migrate temporarily to the Netherlands.

7 The full data table (including breakdown by country of origin of migrants) is available from the author upon request

Table 8.16 Top 10 countries of origin of temporary migrants to the Netherlands + EURA-NET countries. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Number of residence permits	Percentage of all permits
1. China	27,267	11.4
2. United States	21,333	8.9
3. Turkey	21,171	8.8
4. India	19,822	8.3
5. Morocco	10,710	4.5
6. Indonesia	6,688	2.8
7. Japan	6,185	2.6
8. Brazil	6,058	2.5
9. Russia	5,916	2.5
10. Suriname	5,640	2.4
11. Philippines	5,297	2.2
15. Thailand	3,893	1.6
19. Ukraine	2,784	1.2

Table 8.17 Purposes of temporary migration for top countries of origin. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Total number of residence permits	Family reasons (%)	Education > Study (%)	Remunerated > Highly skilled (%)	Remunerated > Researcher (%)	Remunerated > Other (%)	Other > Other (%)
China	27,267	21.4	41.4	6.3	7	17	6.9
United States	21,333	37.5	30.1	18.6	1.8	9	3
Turkey	21,171	68.4	14.4	6.6	1.2	3.3	6.1
India	19,822	36.6	10.2	47.9	1.7	2.9	0.8
Morocco	10,710	88.5	2.1	0.6	0.1	2.1	6.6
Indonesia	6,688	35.8	43.6	3.3	6.1	9.3	1.9
Japan	6,185	47.6	10	27.6	3.5	10.5	0.8
Brazil	6,058	55.1	16	7.9	6.5	10.7	3.7
Russia	5,916	46.6	25.3	15.1	2.4	5.8	4.8
Suriname	5,640	81.4	12.1	1.1	0.5	1.7	3.2
Philippines	5,297	38.4	4	5.4	0.6	48.6	3.1
Thailand	3,893	75.7	10.9	2	2.8	4.9	3.6
Ukraine	2,784	53.1	19.4	11.7	2.2	10.3	3.3

In total, for the period 2008-2012, the Netherlands issued 239,691 temporary residence permits (valid for 6-11 months) for the categories ‘Family reasons’, ‘Education reasons > Study’, ‘Remunerated activities > Highly skilled workers’, ‘Remunerated activities > Researchers’, ‘Remunerated Activities > Other’, and ‘Other > Other’. Table 8.16 shows that the top 5 countries of origin (China, the United States, Turkey, India and Morocco) accounted for more than 40 per cent of these residence permits. Below this, each country of origin accounts for less than 3 per cent of the temporary residence permits issued. Indeed, countries outside of the top 20 each account for less than 1 per cent of the temporary residence permits issued.

Table 8.17 shows the importance of each category of temporary migration for citizens from the top countries of origin. Moroccan, Surinamese and Thai nationals overwhelmingly come to the Netherlands for family reasons, and to a lesser degree so do Turkish and Ukrainian nationals. Family is the most important reason for temporary migration for all the countries of origin, except China, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. For Chinese and Indonesian nationals, the most important reason to migrate temporarily to the Netherlands is for study purposes. For several other countries this is also an important category, being the second most important reason (United States, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, Suriname, Thailand, and Ukraine). India is the only country of origin for which highly-skilled employment is the most important reason for temporary migration to the Netherlands, although it is the second most important reason for Japanese nationals. Scientific researchers make up only a small proportion of temporary migrants from any of the countries of origin. Indeed, the biggest percentage is for Chinese nationals: 7 per cent of temporary residence permits for the Netherlands granted to

Chinese are for the purposes of scientific research. For the Philippines labour migration (not highly skilled, and not related to scientific research) is by far the most important reason for temporary migration to the Netherlands. No clear picture emerges from the residual ‘Other > Other’ category: no country of origin dominates this category of residence permits, and it is not a particularly significant reason for temporary migration to the Netherlands for any of the countries of origin. Table 8.23 below sheds further light on this category, by showing the countries of origin which *are* well-represented in this category. Table 8.28 shows the top countries of origin of migrants coming to the Netherlands for cultural exchange, based on INDIAC data.

Tables 8.18-8.23 show the top 10 countries of origin of temporary migrants to the Netherlands for each category of migration. This thus provides a more nuanced picture than Tables 8.16 and 8.17, because a different top 10 may emerge according to the category of migration. Each table shows the combined total number of residence permits issued in the period 2008-2012 with a validity of 6-11 months. In addition, each table includes the countries participating in the EURA-NET project, where these are not already featured in the top 10. The tables also show, for each country of origin, their share (in percentage) of the total number of residence permits granted in that category. This will show whether each category of temporary migration is dominated by a small number of countries of origin, or whether there is a more even distribution. Tables 8.18-8.23 are based on Eurostat data. However, given that Eurostat data on labour migration (the category ‘Remunerated activities > Other’) cannot be broken down to specific purposes of migration, Tables 8.24-8.27 expand on the data presented in Table 8.20 by complementing this with data from INDIAC. Given also the problems with the residual ‘Other > Other’ category of the Eurostat data, which captures cultural exchanges and working holidays but also a host of other types of migration, Table 8.28 presents INDIAC data on the country of origin of migrants coming to the Netherlands on cultural exchange programmes.

Table 8.18 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries ‘Family reasons’. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Number of residence permits	% of total residence permits
1. Turkey	14,475	12.9
2. Morocco	9,481	8.4
3. United States	8,010	7.1
4. India	7,254	6.5
5. China	5,835	5.2
6. Suriname	4,593	4.1
7. Brazil	3,338	3
8. Thailand	2,948	2.6
9. Japan	2,943	2.6
10. Russia	2,758	2.5
13. Philippines	2,033	1.8
17. Ukraine	1,479	1.3

Table 8.19 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries ‘Education reasons > Study’. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Number of residence permits	% of total residence permits
1. China	11,290	22.2
2. United States	6,420	12.6
3. Turkey	3,054	6
4. Indonesia	2,913	5.7
5. India	2,029	4
6. South Korea	1,697	3.3
7. Russia	1,495	3
8. Canada	1,145	2.3
9. Mexico	1,062	2.1
10. Brazil	971	1.9
20. Ukraine	540	1.1
25. Thailand	426	0.8
40. Philippines	209	0.4

Table 8.20 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries 'Remunerated activities > Highly skilled workers'. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Number of residence permits	% of total residence permits
1. India	9,493	34
2. United States	3,958	14.2
3. China	1,712	6.1
4. Japan	1,706	6.1
5. Turkey	1,399	5
6. Russia	895	3.2
7. South Africa	718	2.6
8. Canada	713	2.6
9. Australia	681	2.4
10. South Korea	489	1.7
15. Ukraine	325	1.2
16. Philippines	284	1
33. Thailand	79	0.3

Table 8.21 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries 'Remunerated activities > Researchers'. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Number of residence permits	% of total residence permits
1. China	1,922	27.6
2. Iran	497	7.1
3. Indonesia	405	5.8
4. Brazil	395	5.7
5. United States	384	5.5
6. India	328	4.7
7. Turkey	257	3.7
8. Japan	219	3.1
9. Ethiopia	144	2.1
10. Russia	140	2
13. Thailand	109	1.6
25. Ukraine	60	0.9
34. Philippines	31	0.4

Table 8.22 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries 'Remunerated Activities > Other'. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Number of residence permits	% of total residence permits
1. China	4,634	23.8
2. Philippines	2,574	13.2
3. United States	1,929	9.9
4. South Africa	1,490	7.7
5. Turkey	702	3.6
6. Brazil	648	3.3
7. Japan	648	3.3
8. Indonesia	625	3.2
9. India	567	2.9
10. Bosnia and Herzegovina	423	2.2
15. Ukraine	288	1.5
18. Thailand	190	1

Table 8.23 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries 'Other > Other'.Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Number of residence permits	% of total residence permits
1. Australia	1,992	8.9
2. China	1,874	8.4
3. Canada	1,432	6.4
4. Turkey	1,284	5.7
5. Sudan	940	4.2
6. Sierra Leone	812	3.6
7. Morocco	702	3.1
8. Iraq	686	3.1
9. United States	632	2.8
10. Afghanistan	625	2.8
30. Philippines	166	0.7
31. India	151	0.7
32. Thailand	141	0.6
39. Ukraine	92	0.4

Table 8.24 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries 'Self-employment'. Cumulative totals for 2009-2013. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: INDIAC)

Country of origin	Permits issued	Percentage of all permits issued
1. United States	436	47.8
2. Turkey	154	16.9
3. Morocco	67	7.3
4. Japan	56	6.1
5. China	50	5.5
6. Egypt	48	5.3
7. Pakistan	29	3.2
8. India	12	1.3
9. Canada	6	0.7
10. Ukraine	5	0.5
33. Thailand	1	0.1

Table 8.25 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries 'Cross-border service providers'. Cumulative totals for 2009-2013. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: INDIAC)

Country of origin	Permits issued	Percentage of all permits issued
1. Bosnia and Herzegovina	100	60.2
2. Russia	17	10.2
3. India	11	6.6
4. United States	7	4.2
5. Serbia	6	3.6
6. Turkey	6	3.6
7. Ukraine	5	3
8. Canada	3	1.8
9. Australia	2	1.2
10. China	1	0.6
11. Philippines	1	0.6

Table 8.26 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries 'Interns'. Cumulative totals for 2009-2013. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: INDIAC)

Country of origin	Permits issued	Percentage of all permits issued
1. Brazil	212	10.7
2. China	204	10.3
3. India	185	9.3
4. United States	174	8.8
5. South Korea	138	7
6. Indonesia	101	5.1
7. Philippines	97	4.9
8. Russia	91	4.6
9. Japan	84	4.2
10. Vietnam	81	4.1
11. Ukraine	75	3.8
15. Turkey	35	1.8
23. Thailand	16	0.8

Table 8.27 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries 'Searching for employment'. Cumulative totals for 2009-2013. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: INDIAC)

Country of origin	Permits issued	Percentage of all permits issued
1. China	26	16.4
2. United States	21	13.2
3. India	18	11.3
4. Indonesia	12	7.5
5. Russia	9	5.7
6. Taiwan	7	4.4
7. Nigeria	5	3.1
8. Peru	5	3.1
9. Turkey	5	3.1
10. Australia	4	2.5
20. Ukraine	2	1.3
34. Thailand	1	0.6

Table 8.28 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries 'Cultural exchange'. Cumulative totals for 2009-2013. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: INDIAC)

Country of origin	Permits issued	Percentage of all permits issued
1. Australia	2239	20
2. Philippines	1854	16.5
3. Canada	1686	15
4. South Africa	1260	11.2
5. New Zealand	647	5.8
6. Brazil	420	3.7
7. United States	408	3.6
8. Colombia	308	2.7
9. Indonesia	295	2.6
10. Thailand	209	1.9
12. China	167	1.5
14. Ukraine	158	1.4
20. Turkey	59	0.5
34. India	15	0.1

Tables 8.18-8.23 show that, with the exception of the 'Other > Other' category, each category of temporary migration is to some extent dominated by one country of origin. The top country of origin in each category is granted more residence permits than any other country, although the gap between the two top countries varies from 4.5 percentage points (for family migration) to 20.5 percentage points (for scientific researchers). For all categories (except the residual 'Other > Other'), the top 5 countries of origin account for over 40 per cent of residence permits, with a range from 40.1 per cent (for family migration) to 65.4 per cent (for highly-skilled migration). This means that temporary migration to the Netherlands for family reasons is actually rather diverse in terms of countries of origin, at least compared to the other categories of temporary migration. This is an interesting outcome, in light of the overwhelming importance for some countries of origin, such as Morocco and Suriname, of family migration (see table 18 above). Highly-skilled migration to the Netherlands is dominated by one country of origin: China, for students and scientific researchers; and India, for highly-skilled employees.

According to the Eurostat data, 'other' labour migration to the Netherlands is mainly made up of Chinese nationals (see Table 8.22). However, data from INDIAC can break down this category to give a more nuanced picture (see Tables 8.24-8.27). It becomes clear, for instance, that China is one of the top 5 countries of origin of migrants coming to the Netherlands for self-employment, an internship, or to look for employment after graduation, but not for cross-border service provision; this latter category is instead dominated by Bosnians. The United States and India are amongst the top 10 countries of origin across the different categories of 'other' labour migration.

Table 8.23 shows the problems with the residual 'Other > Other' category in the Eurostat data: although it does seem to be capturing Australian and New Zealand nationals coming to the Netherlands for working holidays, the fact that Sudan, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan are also represented in the top 10 implies that migrants seeking some kind of international protection are also captured in this category. A more accurate picture of temporary migration to the Netherlands for cultural exchange is provided by Table 8.28, based on INDIAC data.

Table 8.29 below presents the data from Tables 8.18-8.23 in a comparative fashion. This enables an overview of the differences between the various types of temporary migration in terms of countries of origin. Table 8.29 shows the ‘mix’ of migrants coming to the Netherlands (Wiesbrock, 2010: 21): colonial migrants (from Suriname and Indonesia), migrants from former guest worker countries (Turkey and Morocco), and knowledge migrants coming for education, highly-skilled employment, or to work as scientific researchers (from China, the United States, India, Turkey and Russia). Interestingly, these countries of origin of highly-skilled migrants, and in addition Morocco, are important countries of origin of family migrants too. Therefore, with the exception of the ‘Remunerated > Other’ and ‘Other > Other’ categories, there is not a huge amount of variation in terms of countries of origin: temporary migrants to the Netherlands tend to come from the same small group of countries. In the category ‘Remunerated > Other’, the Philippines and South Africa additionally come to the fore. Data from IND shows that this is because migrants from these countries of origin serve as au pairs in the Netherlands (au pair migration being one of the types captured in the category) (IND, 2013a; see also above).

Finally, Table 8.30 summarises the information presented in this section. It shows Eurostat data on the number of residence permits (valid for 6-11 months) issued per category of temporary migration for the period 2008-2012, unless otherwise indicated. However, it also shows that data on temporary migration to the Netherlands is far from perfect, and that an accurate and comprehensive picture of this phenomenon remains elusive.

Table 8.29 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries per category of temporary migration. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Family reasons	Education reasons > Study	Remunerated > Highly skilled	Remunerated > Researcher	Remunerated > Other	Other > Other
1. Turkey	1. China	1. India	1. China	1. China	1. Australia
2. Morocco	2. United States	2. United States	2. Iran	2. Philippines	2. China
3. United States	3. Turkey	3. China	3. Indonesia	3. United States	3. Canada
4. India	4. Indonesia	4. Japan	4. Brazil	4. South Africa	4. Turkey
5. China	5. India	5. Turkey	5. United States	5. Turkey	5. Sudan
6. Suriname	6. South Korea	6. Russia	6. India	6. Brazil	6. Sierra Leone
7. Brazil	7. Russia	7. South Africa	7. Turkey	7. Japan	7. Morocco
8. Thailand	8. Canada	8. Canada	8. Japan	8. Indonesia	8. Iraq
9. Japan	9. Mexico	9. Australia	9. Ethiopia	9. India	9. United States
10. Russia	10. Brazil	10. South Korea	10. Russia	10. Bosnia and Herzegovina	10. Afghanistan
13. Philippines	20. Ukraine	15. Ukraine	13. Thailand	15. Ukraine	30. Philippines
17. Ukraine	25. Thailand	16. Philippines	25. Ukraine	18. Thailand	31. India
	40. Philippines	33. Thailand	34. Philippines		32. Thailand
					39. Ukraine

Table 8.30 Overview of temporary migration to the Netherlands, 2008-2012[8]

Category	Residence permits issued	Top 5 countries of origin
Family reunification	112,216	Turkey, Morocco, United States, India, China
Self-employment	912	United States, Turkey, Morocco, Japan, China
Highly-skilled migrant	27,945	India, United States, China, Japan, Turkey
EU Blue Card	N/A	N/A
Seasonal worker	10,956	*Data not available*
Labour migrant	8,321	China, United States, Japan, Turkey, Philippines
Cross-border service provider	166	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, India, United States, Serbia
Interns	1984	Brazil, China, India, United States, South Korea
Scientific researcher	6,959	China, Iran, Indonesia, Brazil, United States
Study	50,752	China, United States, Turkey, Indonesia, India
Searching for employment	159	China, United States, India, Indonesia, Russia
Au pairs	5,362	Philippines, South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia, Peru
Cultural exchange programmes	11,221	Australia, Philippines, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand

8.2.3 Temporary emigration from the Netherlands

The previous section analysed temporary migration to the Netherlands in terms of the length of residence permits granted to foreign nationals, the purpose of residence, and the country of origin. This section will attempt to quantify temporary migration *from* the Netherlands. It focuses on Dutch nationals because, as van Dalen and Henkens (2007) show for the period 1990-2005, for Western European countries the outflow of nationals is larger than the inflow of nationals, and the reverse is the case for non-nationals. Indeed, van Dalen and Henkens argue that the data shows a "strong emigration trend" for Dutch nationals from the Netherlands (2007: 40). Dutch nationals are also the focus of secondary literature on emigration from the Netherlands (see below). Nevertheless, data will be presented on emigration of non-Dutch nationals as well. Due to the free movement rights enjoyed by EU citizens, these migrants were not included in the analysis of temporary migration to the Netherlands as they do not need a residence permit and therefore do not show up in statistics; however, they will be included in the analysis of temporary migration from the Netherlands.

This section will highlight several problems of capturing and measuring emigration. First and foremost is the problem that receiving countries, through the act of issuing a residence permit, capture the length and purpose of stay of migrants. The right to enter and stay in another country depends on that country's policies and practices. National border control authorities will record that their citizens are leaving the country, but not necessarily how long they plan to stay abroad or what the purpose of their

8 *Self-employment*: Number of residence permits issued 2009-2013 (source: INDIAC)
Highly-skilled migrant: Number of work permits issued for 2008-2011 (source: Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice)
Seasonal worker: Number of residence permits issued for 2008-2011 (source: IND, 2013a)
Labour migrant: Number of residence permits issued 2009-2013 (source: INDIAC)
Cross-border service provider: Number of residence permits issued 2009-2013 (source: INDIAC)
Interns: Number of residence permits issued 2009-2013 (source: INDIAC)
Searching for employment: Number of residence permits issued 2008-2011 (source: IND, 2013a)
Au pairs: Number of residence permits issued 2009-2013 (source: INDIAC)

travel is. Additionally, in practice, many emigrants may not inform their municipality that they are leaving (van Dalen and Henkens, 2007: 40). Thus, after presenting some data relating to temporary emigration from the Netherlands, this section will turn to secondary literature in order to provide a more complete picture of this phenomenon.

Eurostat provides data on emigration from the EU member states. Table 31 below presents the numbers of Dutch and other nationals emigrating per year for the years 2003-2012. Figure 8.1 shows the same data as a line chart, in order to show that, whereas previously many more Dutch than other nationals were leaving the Netherlands each year, by 2012 the numbers of Dutch and other nationals emigrating are almost the same. Emigration is defined as “the action by which a person, having previously been usually resident in the territory of a Member State, ceases to have his or her usual residence in that Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of *at least 12 months*” (Eurostat, 2013b; emphasis added). Thus the data is capturing migration of a more permanent nature, which actually falls outside the definition of temporary migration adopted for this report (migration for a period of up to 12 months). It also does not reveal the country of destination or the purpose of emigration. Eurostat does have data on emigration from the Netherlands broken down by the country of next residence (not including other EU member states); this is presented in table 32. However, within this category a differentiation according to nationality of the person concerned is not possible. The data in Table 8.32 therefore concerns both Dutch and other nationals leaving the Netherlands.

Table 8.31 Emigration from the Netherlands (Source: Eurostat)

Year	Dutch nationals	Other nationals
2003	47,015	21,870
2004	51,500	23,549
2005	59,415	23,984
2006	64,552	26,476
2007	62,250	29,037
2008	59,364	30,703
2009	52,817	40,008
2010	51,872	44,098
2011	57,155	47,046
2012	56,181	54,250



Figure 8.1 Emigration from the Netherlands (Source: Eurostat)

Table 8.32 Top 10 countries of destination + EURA-NET countries of persons emigrating from the Netherlands. Cumulative totals for 2003-2012, but no data available for 2009-2011. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of destination	No. of persons
1. Former Netherlands Antilles	34,509
2. United States	33,778
3. Turkey	16,168
4. Australia	15,313
5. China	11,163
6. Canada	10,051
7. Aruba	9,346
8. Suriname	9,035
9. Japan	7,369
10. Indonesia	6,184
11. India	6,148
15. Thailand	4,798
25. Philippines	1,805
41. Ukraine	889

It is clear that Eurostat data alone does not provide the answers sought with relation to temporary emigration from the Netherlands: the emigration captured is for a period of more than 12 months; nothing is revealed regarding the purpose of emigration; and it is not possible to link emigrants to their country of destination because the data on country of destination cannot be broken down by nationality of the migrants concerned. Migration data from Statistics Netherlands can serve to complement the Eurostat data, because Statistics Netherlands has data on emigration broken down by country of destination (see Table 8.33 below). This data can be further broken down according to whether the migrant was born in or outside the Netherlands. Statistics Netherlands defines a person as having ‘emigrated’ when they have deregistered from the municipal population registers because they plan to stay abroad for a period of at least eight months. Table 8.33 presents the top 10 countries of destination of emigrants from the Netherlands (based on cumulative totals for 2000-2013)[9]. For each of these countries, it further shows the numbers of Dutch and non-Dutch nationals emigrating.

The table shows that emigrants from the Netherlands are overwhelmingly choosing developed countries, particularly other EU countries, but also the United States, Australia, Switzerland and Canada. There is also significant emigration to the former Dutch colonies in the Antilles and to Turkey. Significantly more Dutch than non-Dutch nationals depart for each country of destination. There are, however, two problems with the data availability. Firstly, it registers those emigrating for *at least* eight months, but cannot differentiate further within this group. It is therefore impossible to determine how much of this migration is temporary in nature (defined in this report as migration for up to 12 months) and how much is more permanent. Secondly, this particular set of data cannot be further broken down according to nationality or origin of emigrants; the only distinction possible is between those born in the Netherlands and those born in another country. In a separate set of migration statistics, Statistics Netherlands does have data on emigration according to nationality, although this is only broken down for select nationalities.[10] In addition, this data is only broken down by some countries of destination of emigrants.[11] Nevertheless, in order to give a more nuanced picture of the nationalities emigrating from the Netherlands, this data is presented in Table 8.34 below. It shows, for each of the top 10 countries from Table 8.33, the numbers of select nationalities emigrating to that country from the Netherlands. Data on emigrants moving to Australia and Switzerland is not available.

9 the full data tables are available from the author upon request (persons born in the Netherlands and persons born in another country).

10 The data covers native Dutch (which is defined by Statistics Netherlands as someone whose parents were both born in the Netherlands) as well as nationals of Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Germany, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Morocco, Former Netherlands Antilles, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Somalia, Spain, Suriname, Turkey, United States, and United Kingdom.

11 The data covers emigration to Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, France, India, Italy, Morocco, Former Netherlands Antilles, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Suriname, Turkey, United States, and United Kingdom.

Table 8.33 Top 10 countries of destination + EURA-NET countries for emigration from the Netherlands. Cumulative totals for 2000-2013. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Centraal Bureau Statistiek)

Country of destination	No. of Dutch nationals	No. of non-Dutch nationals
1. Belgium	96,954	27,692
2. Germany	82,480	21,598
3. United Kingdom	46,617	38,697
4. United States	32,976	14,732
5. Former Netherlands Antilles	35,696	5,034
6. Spain	30,316	8,773
7. France	29,076	9,247
8. Australia	17,283	4,642
9. Switzerland	11,109	4,743
10. Canada	11,547	3,660
11. Turkey	12,357	967
15. China	7,106	2,977
23. Thailand	5,349	888
27. Greece	3,076	1,311
33. India	2,152	813
34. Hungary	2,195	631
43. Finland	1,301	586
45. Philippines	1,433	257
73. Ukraine	436	160

Table 8.34 Numbers of migrants emigrating from the Netherlands to top countries of destination. Cumulative totals for 2000-2011 (Source: Centraal Bureau Statistiek)

Nationality	Destination							
	Belgium	Germany	United Kingdom	United States	Former Netherlands Antilles	Spain	France	Canada
Native Dutch	66,600	60,500	21,700	22,900	20,700	21,700	21,000	9,200
Belgium	14,400	1,100	200	100	0	0	700	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
China	900	200	0	100	0	0	0	0
Germany	2,900	41,000	1,400	1,200	0	1,200	1,200	0
France	1,200	300	400	0	0	0	10,400	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	0	0	900	300	0	0	0	0
Indonesia	2,400	2,200	1,200	1,300	1,200	1,300	1,200	0
Iraq	400	600	2,100	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	100	400	200	0	0	0	0	0
Morocco	8,500	800	0	0	0	900	1,500	0
Former Netherlands Antilles	800	0	0	0	38,400	200	0	0
Poland	700	1,700	400	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	0	0	14,700	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	100	0	0	0	11,800	0	0
Suriname	1,900	600	700	500	1,700	500	0	0
Turkey	4,600	3,000	0	0	0	0	100	0
United States	100	500	1,300	18,900	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	1,200	1,200	19,800	1,400	0	800	1,200	0
Other	13,200	11,000	25,400	11,200	4,200	5,200	5,500	7,600

Table 8.34 shows that emigration from the Netherlands is mainly made up of Dutch nationals and nationals of the destination country. For the period covered in table 33, 2000-2011, 483,432 Dutch nationals emigrated[12]. 244,500, or 50%, of these emigrated to one of the top 10 countries of destination (those in Table 8.34). Besides Dutch nationals and nationals of the destination country, there are significant flows of migrants with other nationalities, but unfortunately this data from Statistics Netherlands cannot be broken down further to determine which these nationalities are. Some anomalies in the table are noteworthy,

12 Full data tables available from the author upon request

such as the large number of Somalis moving from the Netherlands to the UK. In addition, some nationalities overwhelmingly move to some destination countries but not others – Moroccans, for instance, move from the Netherlands to Belgium or France, but hardly to any of the other top countries of destination.

The Statistics Netherlands data displayed in Tables 8.33 and 8.34 reveals nothing as regards the purpose of migration. Data on the purpose and duration of migration is collected by the country of destination. Statistics Netherlands does collect data on the socio-economic status of emigrants leaving the Netherlands, and this is presented below. The socio-economic status is determined by the person's source of income in the preceding year. Table 8.35 shows, for the same countries of destination as Table 8.34, the socio-economic status of emigrants. Table 8.36 presents the same data as percentages, in order to give a comparative overview. It shows that approximately 40 per cent of Dutch emigrants are economically active, apart from those moving to Spain and France. For these two countries there is a high proportion of welfare recipients (which, according to Statistics Netherlands definitions, includes pensioners) and others with no income, perhaps suggesting retirement migration to warmer climates (see also section below on secondary literature concerning Dutch emigration). Non-Dutch nationals are less likely to have been economically active in the year preceding emigration from the Netherlands; for the countries of destination in Tables 8.35 and 8.36, 20-30 per cent of non-Dutch emigrants are economically active. The group of non-Dutch emigrants is also made up of more children.

Table 8.35 Socio-economic status of emigrants from the Netherlands. Cumulative totals for 2000-2011 (Source: Centraal Bureau Statistiek)

		Destination							
Socio-economic status	**Dutch/ Non-Dutch**	**Belgium**	**Germany**	**United Kingdom**	**United States**	**Former Netherlands Antilles**	**Spain**	**France**	**Canada**
Economically active	Dutch	32,900	28,500	8,200	9,600	9,800	6,300	6,400	3,300
	Non-Dutch	16,900	17,800	15,400	9,200	11,500	5,700	6,200	2,100
Welfare recipient	Dutch	6,900	7,700	1,200	1,200	1,200	4,200	4,200	400
	Non-Dutch	5,100	4,500	7,600	1,200	7,300	3,800	1,900	800
Pre-schooler, pupil or student	Dutch	14,600	12,000	4,700	5,500	4,900	3,700	3,700	2,700
	Non-Dutch	16,300	17,200	25,200	9,700	16,600	3,900	5,700	2,000
Others without income	Dutch	12,700	12,100	7,500	6,700	4,400	7,300	6,500	2,500
	Non-Dutch	14,600	25,300	20,400	15,300	10,900	8,900	8,200	3,200
Total	Dutch	67,100	60,300	21,600	23,000	20,300	21,500	20,800	8,900
	Non-Dutch	52,900	64,800	68,600	35,400	46,300	22,300	22,000	8,100

Table 8.36 Socio-economic status of emigrants from the Netherlands as percentages. Cumulative totals for 2000-2011 (Source: Centraal Bureau Statistiek)

	Socio-economic status	Destination							
		Belgium	Germany	United Kingdom	United States	Former Netherlands Antilles	Spain	France	Canada
Dutch	Economically active (%)	49	47.3	38	41.7	48.3	29.3	30.8	37.1
	Welfare recipient (%)	10.3	12.8	5.6	5.2	5.9	19.5	20.2	4.5
	Pre-schooler, pupil or student (%)	21.8	19.9	21.8	23.9	24.1	17.2	17.8	30.3
	Others without income (%)	18.9	20.1	34.7	29.1	21.7	34	31.3	28.1
Non-Dutch	Economically active (%)	31.9	27.5	22.4	26	24.8	25.6	28.2	25.9
	Welfare recipient (%)	9.6	6.9	11.1	3.4	15.8	17	8.6	9.9
	Pre-schooler, pupil or student (%)	30.8	26.5	36.7	27.4	35.9	17.5	25.9	24.7
	Others without income (%)	27.6	39	29.7	43.2	23.5	39.9	37.3	39.5

Tables 8.35 and 8.36 provide some information about the types of people emigrating from the Netherlands. However, this still not does reveal the purpose of migration: the socio-economic status of a person at their time of emigration is at best an imperfect representation of the purpose of migration. For instance, an economically active person might be moving to take up employment in another country, or they may be moving for family reasons and become economically inactive in the country of destination. This section therefore now turns to the secondary literature emigration from the Netherlands in order to determine the purposes of emigration.

After the Second World War, the Dutch government specifically encouraged emigration (van Dalen and Henkens, 2007: 41), and between 1946 and 1969 nearly 500,000 Dutch nationals emigrated to destinations such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Brazil and South Africa (Engbersen et al., 2007: 394). Also in recent times Dutch nationals have a negative net migration rate to the Netherlands, meaning that more Dutch nationals emigrate from the Netherlands each year than those arriving/returning. Van Dalen and Henkens (2007) find that this is due to dissatisfaction with the welfare state institutions in the Netherlands (healthcare, education, social security and pensions), perceived societal problems (crime, pollution and ethnic diversity), and longing for improved environmental conditions (more nature and lower population density and noise pollution). Economic considerations are therefore not the dominant factor behind emigration. Potential emigrants are young, well-educated, high earners, and have family and/or friends abroad.

The literature on Dutch emigration can be sub-divided into those scholars focusing on the 'traditional' countries of destinations such as Australia, Canada and the United States; those scholars focusing on intra-EU or intra-European migration of Dutch nationals; and those focussing on specific purposes of emigration.

In the first group of literature, authors focus on Dutch migration to traditional countries of destination. However, some of this literature focuses largely on nineteenth-century migration (e.g. Swierenga, 1982), rather than post-WWII migratory patterns. Even those authors who focus on more recent migration do not always provide elaborate data on the purpose and length of residence of Dutch nationals emigrating. Peters (2011), for example, in her article on Dutch post-war migration to Australia, emphasises that the Australian government actively sought Dutch nationals for immigration, partly because their large families would contribute to the Australian labour force. She explains the hardship these migrants suffered on arrival in Australia, and the strategy of assimilation and conformity to their new society that they adopted. However, her primary concern is how these migrants *experienced* migration, not to discern the numbers and purposes of migration (beyond 'labour' in general). Wolleswinkel and Weersink (2001) study the reasons why Dutch farmers emigrate to Canada (specifically Ontario) in order to take up farming there. By the end of the 1990s, 50 Dutch farmers (and their families) were making this decision every year, based on the fact that herd sizes and productivity levels in the two countries are similar, but that the price of assets are higher and environmental regulations more burdensome in the Netherlands. Hartog and Winkelmann (2003) argue that Dutch emigration to New Zealand can be explained by higher expected earnings, and proceed to assess whether Dutch nationals who moved to New Zealand were really better off. They present data showing that, between 1947 and 1997 some 41,000 Dutch nationals emigrated to New Zealand. They also cite other research on the occupations of Dutch nationals in New Zealand, although occupation after migration is not necessarily the same as the initial reason for the migration. Nevertheless, Dutch immigrants in New Zealand have been over-represented in the manufacturing and construction industries (2003: 685).

The second strand of literature on Dutch emigration concerns migration to EU and other European countries. Firstly, Eimermann et al. (2012) and Eimermann (2013) study the migration of Dutch nationals to rural Sweden. They argue that such migration between wealthy states must be considered to be rather non-economic in nature. Instead, this is 'lifestyle migration', whereby migrants are motivated by seeking a better quality of life (Eimermann, 2013). A problem with studying intra-EU migration is that EU nationals have the right to free movement and therefore do not need a work or residence permit, making their purpose and duration of stay difficult to determine. Based on survey data, Eimermann et al. (2012) show that Dutch migrants in rural Sweden are mostly between 26 and 45 years of age, almost half are members of a family with children under 18, and almost 40% have completed at least three years of higher education. 60% of Dutch migrants in rural Sweden work in either the private service sector (e.g. running hotels and restaurants) or in public administration, education or healthcare.

Finally, there is an emerging body of literature on Dutch retirement emigration. Böcker and Balkir's (2012) study of older migrants moving from the Netherlands to Turkey is interesting because it concerns both Dutch nationals choosing to spend their retirement in Turkey and Turkish labour migrants returning to Turkey, and in addition it addresses the transnational lives of some of these migrants in that some of their sample spend the whole year in Turkey, whilst others split their time between Turkey and the Netherlands. Dutch and Turkish nationals have different reasons for moving to Turkey: whilst Dutch nationals go for the better climate and lower costs of living, Turkish nationals return to Turkey due to unemployment, health problems, divorce, and/or financial problems. Gehring (2013) discusses the problems that Dutch nationals face with accessing long-term care after retiring to the Costa Blanca in Spain.

Although this secondary literature does contribute something to our understanding of emigration from the Netherlands, still some gaps remain. Apart from the literature on retirement migration, most authors focus on a country of destination, on Dutch nationals only, and do not go into detail about the purpose of migration. In addition, not much is revealed regarding the duration of stay; indeed, much of this emigration is probably more permanent in nature, and therefore falls outside of the scope of this report. 92 per cent of the farmers interviewed by Wolleswinkel and Weersink (2001: 204), for example, would never consider going back to the Netherlands. There are some exceptions and references to more temporary migration. Eimermann (2013), for instance, stresses the willingness of the families in his sample to move on to other destinations. Hartog and Winkelmann (2003: 686) cite other research that finds that around one third of the 1970 and 1975 cohorts of Dutch emigrants to New Zealand had returned by 1980, although this is still not very precise and probably still leaves some of this migration beyond the definition of temporary migration applied in this report (up to 12 months).

Böcker and Balkir (2012: 21-23) discuss the methodological difficulties in accurately estimating retirement migration from the Netherlands to Turkey: Dutch nationals who share their time between Turkey and the Netherlands remain registered in the Netherlands so long as they are not abroad for more than eight months at a time; and data from Statistics Netherlands does not tell us how many Dutch nationals of the age group concerned (retirement age) moved to Turkey specifically. Gehring (2013) also notes that Dutch retirement migrants in Spain live a transnational lifestyle, with many either not registering officially in Spain or not deregistering in the Netherlands. However, she does not quantify the scope of this emigration to Spain. One exception in the literature is the study by van Dalen and Henkens (2009), which does quantify retirement migration. They find that, in 2008, 3,019 people aged 65 or over departed from the Netherlands, of which 48% were native Dutch (meaning they were born in the Netherlands). Of those native Dutch, the most popular retirement destinations are Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, the United States, Portugal, the Netherlands Antilles, Thailand, Australia and Canada.

In sum, temporary emigration from the Netherlands remains a very elusive phenomenon for two main reasons: firstly, destination countries register the purpose and duration of stay through the act of issuing residence permits; secondly, even so emigrants may not be counted if they fail to deregister in the Netherlands, or move to an EU country where they do not need a residence permit. In sum, the four main aspects that this report set out to cover (duration of migration, country of destination, purpose of migration, and numbers of migrants) cannot be determined in any systematic, comprehensive fashion for temporary emigration from the Netherlands.

8.2.4 Illegal migration to the Netherlands

This sub-section presents data on illegal migration to the Netherlands. The clandestine nature of this type of migration makes it naturally very difficult to quantify. The data presented here also displays clearly that migrants' status may change: 'permanent' migrants who lose their right of residence in the Netherlands find that their stay suddenly acquires a 'temporary' nature. The line between 'temporary' and 'permanent' migration is not fixed. This sub-section presents three different kinds of data, in order to get a measure of the scope of illegal migration to the Netherlands: data on third country nationals refused entry at the borders (i.e. attempting to immigrate in an irregular way), data on third country nationals found to be illegally present in the Netherlands (who may have immigrated either in a regular or irregular way), and data on third country nationals ordered to leave the Netherlands (so migrants whose status may have suddenly changed). These categories cannot be combined: a foreign national is only counted once within each category (e.g. if a person receives multiple orders to leave the Netherlands, the person is still only counted once in the category 'ordered to leave'), but there is clearly overlap across the categories. A foreign national will, for instance, first be found to be illegally present in the Netherlands, and will then be ordered to leave. The categories therefore cannot be added together to get an estimate of the total number of illegal migrants in the Netherlands.

Table 8.37 below shows that, between 2008 and 2013, 2,000-3,500 migrants were refused entry to the Netherlands each year. These are the total numbers from land, sea and air borders; however, given the location of the Netherlands, having land borders only with Schengen countries, all migrants refused entry try to enter via sea or air. Table 8.38 differentiates this data by showing the top 10 countries of origin of these migrants (totals for 2008-2013)[13]. The numbers of refusals presented here are based on Annex V of the Schengen Border Code (Eurostat, 2013c). This document recognises nine reasons for migrants to be refused entry to the Schengen zone: the foreign national has no valid travel document; the foreign national has a counterfeit travel document; the foreign national has no valid visa or residence permit; the foreign national has a counterfeit visa or residence permit; the foreign

13 The full data table is available from the author upon request.

national has no documentation justifying the purpose of the stay; the foreign national has already stayed in EU member states for three months in a six-month period; the foreign national does not have sufficient means of subsistence; the foreign national has an alert issued against their name for the purposes of refusing entry; or the foreign national is considered a threat to public security.[14]

Table 8.37 Number of migrants refused entry to the Netherlands (Source: Eurostat)

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
No. of migrants	3,160	2,500	2,935	3,500	2,560	1,990

Table 8.38 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries refused entry to the Netherlands. Cumulative totals for 2008-2013. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted

Country of origin	Number of migrants refused	% of all refusals
1. Suriname	1,440	8.7
2. Nigeria	1,075	6.5
3. China	990	6
4. Brazil	870	5.2
5. Turkey	645	3.9
6. Honduras	580	3.5
7. Russia	570	3.4
8. Nicaragua	510	3.1
9. Philippines	480	2.9
10. India	455	2.7
14. Ukraine	340	2
49. Thailand	70	0.4

Table 8.39 below shows the number of third country nationals found to be illegally present in the Netherlands each year. Table 8.40 differentiates this data by showing the top 10 countries of origin of these migrants (totals for 2008-2011). This data naturally only captures those illegal migrants who come to the attention of the authorities, and not the total number of foreign nationals present on an unauthorised basis (Eurostat, 2013c). The numbers include foreign nationals who have entered the Netherlands illegally and those who have entered legally but subsequently overstayed (ibid.).

Table 8.39 Number of migrants illegally present in the Netherlands. No data available for 2012-2013 (Source: Eurostat)

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011
No. of migrants	7,505	7,565	7,580	6,145

Table 8.40 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries illegally present in the Netherlands. Cumulative totals for 2008-2011. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Number of migrants illegally present	% of all migrants illegally present
1. Iraq	2,385	8.3
2. Somalia	2,295	8
3. Morocco	1,900	6.6
4. China	1,435	5
5. Turkey	1,390	4.8
6. Afghanistan	1,200	4.2
7. Nigeria	960	3.3
8. Algeria	885	3.1
9. Suriname	820	2.8
10. India	750	2.6
15. Ukraine	470	1.6
48. Philippines	95	0.3
75. Thailand	35	0.1

Table 8.41 below shows the number of third country nationals ordered to leave the Netherlands per year for the years 2008-2013. Table 8.42 differentiates this data according to the country of origin of migrants (cumulative totals for 2008-2013). These numbers concern foreign nationals "found to be illegally present who are subject to an administrative or judicial decision or act stating that their stay is illegal and imposing an obligation to leave the territory of the Member State" (Eurostat, 2013c). In

14 Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Border Code).

the Netherlands, an order to leave the territory (‘terugkeerbesluit’) is issued both to migrants whose right to residence is expiring as well as to migrants who are discovered to be illegally present (Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek, n.d.). In this order, migrants whose right to residence is expiring are given 28 days to leave the Netherlands, and migrants who are found to be illegally present are ordered to leave the Netherlands immediately (IND, n.d.). The fact that both these groups of foreign nationals are included explains the high numbers of such orders issued – much higher than the number of migrants found to be illegally present each year, as a comparison of Tables 8.38 and 8.40 shows.

Table 8.41 Number of migrants ordered to leave the Netherlands (Source: Eurostat)

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
No. of migrants	33,200	35,575	29,870	29,500	27,265	32,435

Table 8.42 Top 10 countries of origin + EURA-NET countries ordered to leave the Netherlands. Cumulative totals for 2008-2013. Countries participating in the EURA-NET project are highlighted (Source: Eurostat)

Country of origin	Number of migrants ordered to leave	% of all migrants ordered to leave
1. Turkey	19,310	10.3
2. Iraq	14,515	7.7
3. Somalia	13,720	7.3
4. Morocco	10,735	5.7
5. Afghanistan	9,450	5
6. China	8,055	4.3
7. Suriname	5,535	3
8. Iran	5,465	2.9
9. Nigeria	5,380	2.9
10. India	4,370	2.3
30. Philippines	1,365	0.7
36. Thailand	1,080	0.6
40. Ukraine	985	0.5

Finally, some scholars have attempted to estimate the total number of illegal migrants present in the Netherlands. Based on police reports and interviews, a group of researchers in 2002 estimated that there were between 112,000 and 163,000 illegal migrants in the Netherlands (ter Wal, 2007: 254). A more recent research project estimated that there were 88,116 non-Europeans illegally present in the Netherlands in the period 1 April 2005 – 1 April 2006 (van der Heijden et al., 2006). The European Migration Network estimates that the population of irregular migrants present in the Netherlands was 97,145 in 2009 (European Migration Network, 2012: 83), although this estimate includes Europeans. Estimates thus vary widely, from the low of 88,000 to the high of 163,000.

8.3 Conclusion

This report has examined the characteristics of temporary migration in the Netherlands. It did so by addressing four central aspects of migratory flows: duration (in order to determine temporariness); country of origin/destination of migrants; the purpose of migration; and the numbers of such migrants. There is no official definition of ‘temporary migration’ in Dutch policy or legislation, so this report adopted the definition used by the European Migration Network, namely that temporary migration is “migration for a period of at least three months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage”. Data came mainly from the Eurostat database.

In the period 2008-2012, the Dutch immigration service issued 239,691 temporary residence permits (valid for 6-11 months) for the purposes of family reunification, study, employment, and cultural exchange. Family migration is by far the most important category of temporary migration to the Netherlands: each year, more than 40 per cent of temporary migrants are joining a family member. Of the temporary migrants coming to the Netherlands for study, around 90% are coming to follow a course of higher education; this reflects the strict requirements for residence permits to be granted for secondary education. Temporary labour migration to the Netherlands is mainly made up of migrants arriving to work for an employer, and au pairs. To date, not much use had been made of a government scheme allowing recent university graduates to spend one year in the Netherlands searching for highly-skilled employment. Each year, between 2,000-2,500 residence permits are issued for cultural exchange, including the European Voluntary Service scheme and working holidays. The most important countries of origin depend on the category of temporary migration. Overall, the five most important countries of origin are China, the United States, Turkey, India and Morocco. However, closer examination of the data reveals that Indonesia joins the top five for the category of students; Japan is an important country of origin of highly-skilled migrants; scientific researchers come mainly from China, Iran, Indonesia, Brazil and the United States; au pairs come mainly from the Philippines, South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia and Peru; and the working holiday schemes in place with Canada, Australia and New Zealand mean that these countries come to the fore in the category cultural exchange.

Temporary emigration from the Netherlands has long been dominated by Dutch nationals, although for 2012 the number of non-Dutch and Dutch nationals leaving the Netherlands is almost the same. For the years 2003-2012, the number of Dutch emigrants is between 47,000 and 64,000 per year. The most important countries of destination of Dutch nationals are Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Former Netherlands Antilles. Due to the fact that residence permits are issued by the country of destination, little can be said about the purpose of migration or length of duration of migration. Secondary literature exists on labour migration to traditional countries of immigration (Canada, New Zealand and Australia) and lifestyle migration to other European countries, including retirement migration to southern Europe. However, quantifying temporary emigration remains problematic.

Illegal migration is by its very nature difficult to measure. Different indicators of illegal migration can be adopted including the number of migrants refused entry at the borders, the number of migrants found to be illegally present, and the number of migrants ordered to leave the country. However, these categories neither perfectly overlap, nor are they entirely distinct and separate, therefore an estimate of the total number of illegal migrants in the Netherlands is difficult to make. Researchers disagree on this, estimating between 88,000 and 163,000 for the years 2002-2009.

Four conclusions regarding temporary migration in the Netherlands as such are worth pointing out. Firstly, family migration remains the most important category of temporary migration to the Netherlands, even though Dutch policy over the last decade has aimed at restricting this form of migration, for instance by raising the age requirements of both the sponsor and spouse, raising the income requirements of the sponsor, and imposing integration abroad requirements on the spouse (Dutch Ministry of Justice, 2006: 25; see also the 'sister report' to this report, on Dutch policy and practice on temporary migration). The Dutch government acknowledges that family migration is significant for the Netherlands and can contribute to social-cultural stability, but also emphasises that Dutch policy on family migration is shaped (read: limited) by international obligations (ibid.).

Secondly, seasonal workers are (on paper) staying less than 3 months and therefore not acquiring residence permits in the Netherlands. This risks putting these migrants in a precarious position, because they become 'invisible' to the IND, the organisation that deals with immigrants in the Netherlands. However, these migrants must still have work permits, and they (or their employers) are therefore in touch with the UWV. Enhanced cooperation between the UWV and the IND would ensure that seasonal workers do not slip off the radar during their stay in the Netherlands. It is to be hoped that the introduction of the single residence and work permit in 2014 will encourage such cooperation.

Thirdly, the EU Blue Card is hardly used in the Netherlands, with only one Blue Card being issued by the end of 2012. This shows that the intention of EU policy and legislation can be undermined by the co-existence of competing national schemes. Indeed, the Dutch national Highly Skilled Migrants

Scheme is more favourable than the EU Blue Card because there is no qualification requirement and the salary threshold is lower. Thus, instead of pooling their resources in order to make Europe a truly attractive destination for highly skilled migrants, EU member states continue to apply national schemes and thereby compete with each other for the most desirable migrants. At the European level, a dialogue on the future of EU migration policy and an exchange of national best practices for attracting highly-skilled migrants would be options for moving towards convergence in this highly sensitive policy field.

Fourthly, the data presented in this report shows that temporary migration to the Netherlands comes from countries that are relevant for the EURA-NET project. In particular, China and India emerged as important countries of origin of highly skilled migrants (students, scientific researchers, and highly skilled employees), Turkey is an important country of origin of family migrants, and the Philippines came to the fore in the 'general' labour migration category, because of au pair migration. The next steps in the EURA-NET project can focus on the linkages between the Netherlands and the participating non-EU countries, and thus provide valuable insights into temporary migration in the European-Asian context.

The central conclusion of this report relates to the serious data problems uncovered during the research process. This report set out to assess the duration of migration, the country of origin/destination of migrants, the purpose of migration, and the numbers of such migrants. Due to data weaknesses, these four aspects of temporary migration could not all be uncovered. Significantly, this makes it difficult to differentiate temporary from permanent migration, and therefore to get an accurate picture of the phenomenon of temporary migration.

This report adopted a definition of temporary migration as being migration for a period of between three and 12 months, implying that migration for a period of more than 12 months has a more permanent nature. Table 8.43 below lists the number of residence permits issued in 2012 with a validity of less than 12 months, and the number of residence permits valid for more than 12 months as at 31 December 2012, based on Eurostat data. Eurostat data is quite detailed regarding the purpose of migration for which temporary residence permits are issued, but it is not possible to know whether the temporary residence permits referred to in table 8.43 were extended or not, or whether migrants actually left when their residence permit expired. Most problematic is that the categories of data collected by Eurostat do not match exactly the categories of temporary migration according to Dutch policy and legislation: particularly the categories 'Remunerated activities > Other' and 'Other > Other' capture several types of temporary migration, including labour migration, au pairs, and cultural exchange programmes. Prior to 2008, data was collected at the national level, but is rather patchy. Furthermore, competence is divided between the IND, which collects data on residence permits issued, the UWV, which collects data on work permits issued, and the municipalities, which are responsible for registering migrants arriving in/departing from the Netherlands (but do not register the purpose of migration).

Table 8.43 Permanent vs. temporary migration to the Netherlands in 2012 (source: Eurostat).

	Residence permits 6-11 months issued in 2012		**Residence permits 12 months+ valid as of 31 December 2012**	
Type of migration	All citizens	EURA-NET countries	All citizens	EURA-NET countries
Family	21,160	6,579 (31.1%)	109,031	38,245 (35%)
Education	10,747	3,806 (35.4%)	113	33 (29.2%)
Employment	10,921	5,205 (47.7%)	17,215	7,825 (45.5%)
Other	2,413	391 (16.2%)	22,278	6,466 (29%)
Total	45,241	15,981 (35.3%)	185,521	53,077 (28.6%)

Temporary migration from the Netherlands proved to be even more difficult to quantify, as table 8.44 below (and the many blank cells in it) show. Eurostat data captures emigration for a period of more than 12 months, which hence falls outside of the definition of 'temporary migration' adopted for this report; does not reveal the purpose of emigration; and cannot link emigrants to their country of destination. This section therefore had to be complemented with national data, which undermines the main advantage of Eurostat data, namely the comparability between EU member states. However, the data from Statistics Netherlands also has several flaws: it only captures emigration for a period of more than 8 months; and it still reveals nothing regarding the purpose of emigration. No data is available concerning emigration for a period of less than 8 months. Given these serious methodological challenges, the quality of Eurostat data urgently needs to be improved, for example by creating more nuanced and detailed categories in the data. Given that Eurostat data is comparable across member states, this would allow for more well-founded empirical research into migration in Europe, and between Europe and Asia.

Table 8.44 Permanent vs. temporary emigration from the Netherlands in 2012 (source: Eurostat and Statistics Netherlands)

	Emigration for 0-8 months		**Emigration for 8 months+**		**Emigration for 12 months+**	
Type of migration	Dutch	Non-Dutch	Born in NL	Not born in NL	Dutch citizens	Non-Dutch citizens
Family	--		--	--	--	--
Education	--		--	--	--	--
Employment	--		--	--	--	--
Other	--		--	--	--	--
Total	--		40,409	18,180	56,181	54,250
To EURA-NET countries	--		8,666(1)	3,394(2)	10,380(3)	

Note: (1) Includes the EU EURA-NET countries. (2) Includes the EU EURA-NET countries. (3) Only non-EU EURA-NET countries; no distinction by nationality of emigrant possible.

References

ACVZ (2009) *Tijdelijke arbeidsmigratie 2015-2035.* Available at: http://www.acvz.org/publicaties/Advies-ACVZ-NR29-2009.pdf

Bell, M. and Ward, G. (2000) Comparing temporary mobility with permanent migration, *Tourism Geographies, 2(1):* 87-107.

Böcker, A. and Balkir, C. (2012) *Migration in Later Life. Residence, social security and citizenship strategies of Turkish return migrants and Dutch retirement migrants in Turkey.* Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers 2012/02. Available at: http://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/99154/99154.pdf?sequence=1

Dalen, H. van and Henkens, K. (2009) Pensioenmigranten op zoek naar het Zwitserleven, *Demos, 25(4):* 11-12.

Dalen, H. van and Henkens, K. (2007) Longing for the Good Life: Understanding Emigration from a High-Income Country, *Population and Development Review, 33(1):* 37-65.

Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek (n.d.). *Terugkeer en Vertrek.* Available at: http://www.dienstterugkeerenvertrek.nl/Terugkeer_en_vertrek/

Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice (2008) *Internationale Migratie en Ontwikkeling.* Policy memorandum. Available at: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/notas/2008/10/01/internationale-migratie-en-ontwikkeling.html

Dutch Ministry of Justice (2006) *Naar een modern migratiebeleid.* Policy memorandum. Available at: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/notas/2007/07/09/naar-een-modern-migratiebeleid.html

Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2013) *Herziening van de Wet arbeid vreemdelingen.* Vergaderjaar 2012-2013, 33 475, C. Available at: http://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20130624/memorie_van_antwoord_2/document3/f=/vjaqclfkpew7.pdf

Eijl, C. van (2009) Migranten in Nederland, 1948-2000. Een kwantitatieve analyse van sekseverschillen, *Tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis, 6(2):* 3-33.

Eimermann, M. (2013) Lifestyle Migration to the North: Dutch Families and the Decision to Move to Rural Sweden, *Population, Space and Place, early view.*

Eimermann, M., Lundmark, M. and Müller, D. K. (2012) Exploring Dutch Migration to Rural Sweden: International Counterurbanisation in the EU, *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 103(3)*: 330-346.

Engbersen, G., van der Leun. J and de Boom, J. (2007) The Fragmentation of Migration and Crime in the Netherlands, *Crime and Justice, 35(1):* 389-452.

European Commission (2007) *Communication on circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries.* COM (2007) 248. Brussels: European Commission.

European Migration Network (2012a) *The organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies in the Netherlands.* Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/migration-policies/19a.netherlands_national_report_organisation_of_asylum_and_migration_policies_final_en_august2012.pdf

European Migration Network (2012) *Practical Measures for Reducing Irregular Migration in the Netherlands.* Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/irregular-migration/nl_20120424_irregularmigration_en_version_final_en.pdf

European Migration Network (2011) *Temporary and Circular Migration: empirical evidence, current policy practice and future options in EU Member States.* Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/circular-migration/0a_emn_synthesis_report_temporary__circular_migration_publication_oct_2011_en.pdf

European Migration Network (2010) *Temporary and Circular Migration. Empirical Evidence,*

Current Policy Practice and Future Options in the Netherlands. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/circular-migration/19a._netherlands_national_report_circular_migration_final_version_15dec2010_en.pdf
European Migration Network (n.d.) *EMN Glossary and Thesaurus.* Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary/index_a_en.htm
Eurostat (2013a) *Statistics on Residence Permits. The main definitions and methodological concepts.* Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/migr_res_esms_an2.pdf
Eurostat (2013b). *International migration flows (migr_flow).* Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/migr_flow_esms.htm
Eurostat (2013c). *Enforcement of immigration legislation.* Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/migr_eil_esms.htm
Geddes, A. (2003) *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe.* London: Sage.
Gehring, A. (2013) Seeking Access to Long-Term Care: Legal Consciousness of Dutch Retirement Migrants on the Costa Blanca, *Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 3(6):* 1023-1040.
Hartog, J. and Winkelmann, R. (2003) Comparing migrants to non-migrants: The case of Dutch migration to New Zealand, *Journal of Population Economics, 16(4):* 683-705.
Heijden, H. van der, Gils, G. van, Cruijff, M. and Hessen, D. (2006) *Een schatting van het aantal in Nederland verblijvende illegale vreemdelingen in 2005.* Available at: http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/images/schatting_van_illegale_vreenmdelingen_in_2005.pdf
IND (2014a) *Een gecombineerde vergunning voor verblijf en arbeid (GVVA).* Available at: https://ind.nl/Documents/GVVA_NED.pdf
IND (2013a) *Reguliere migratietrends 2008-2011. De reguliere migratie van onderdanen van derde landen naar Nederland en de EU in beeld.* Available at: https://www.ind.nl/Documents/Reguliere%20Migratietrends%202008-2011.pdf
IND (2013b) *Monitor kennismigranten. Kwantitatieve analyse.* Available at: https://www.ind.nl/Documents/2013%20Monitor%20Kennismigranten,%20Kwantitatieve%20analyse.pdf
IND (n.d.) *Klantdienstwijzer.* Available at: https://kdw.ind.nl/
Siegel, M. and Vorst, V. van der (2012) *Evaluation of the 'Blue Birds' Circular Migration Pilot in the Netherlands.* Maastricht: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. Available at: http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1344262652.pdf
Swierenga, R. P. (1982) Exodus Netherlands, Promised Land America. Dutch Immigration and Settlement in the United States, *Low Countries Historical Review, 97(3):* 517-537.
Wiesbrock, A. (2010) *Legal migration to the European Union.* Ph.D. thesis: Maastricht University.
Wolleswinkel, A. and Weersink, A. (2001) Farmer emigration: the case of Dutch dairy farmers moving to Ontario, *Livestock Production Science, 69:* 197-205.
Zorlu, A. and Hartog, J. (2001) *Migration and Immigrants: The Case of the Netherlands.* Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 01-042/3. Available at: https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/85952/1/01042.pdf

9. FLOWS AND PATTERNS OF TEMPORARY TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE PHILIPPINE CASE

Maruja M.B. ASIS and Graziano BATTISTELLA

9.1 Introduction

International migration has made an indelible mark in the Philippines in the last forty years. As a primary source country of international migrants, international migration has inevitably given a transnational layer to the country's economic, social, political and cultural landscape. This can be easily appreciated when we consider the magnitude, diversity and distribution of the overseas Filipino population. As of December 2012, the stock estimate of overseas Filipinos stood at 10.5 million, of which permanent settlers number 4.9 million, temporary migrants, 4.2 million, and irregular migrants, 1.3 million (Table 9.1).[1] Since the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) started producing the stock estimate in 2000, the population of overseas Filipinos roughly accounts for 10 percent of the national population.[2] The presence of Filipinos throughout most of the world's countries has come about largely because of temporary labour migration. Unlike permanent migration which is limited to the traditional settlement countries—the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (some countries had also become settlement countries by virtue of the marriage of Filipinos to their nationals), temporary labour migration is more global. International migration from the Philippines used to mean the United States; its venture in temporary labour migration has expanded the country's ties to 200 countries and territories where Filipinos have found employment.

Table 9.1 Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos as of December 2012 (Source: CFO).

Region	Permanent	Temporary	Irregular	TOTAL
World	4,925,797	4,221,041	1,342,790	10,489,628
Africa	4,641	47,992	8,240	60,873
Asia, East & Southeast	286,627	798,510	514,215	1,599,352
Asia, West	7,478	2,449,583	378,475	2,835,536
Americas & Trust Terr.	3,875,930	240,827	279,595	4,396,352
Europe	392,195	219,816	156,315	768,326
Oceania	358,926	97,448	5,950	462324
Sea-based workers		366,865		366,865

How the Philippines became a major origin country of international migrants can be traced to the congruence of external and internal factors. The demand side obviously has the upper hand in making migration possible; no amount of emigration pressures or facilitative measures undertaken by origin countries can actualise migration. The participation of Filipinos in permanent settlement accelerated from the 1970s when settlement countries dismantled policies favouring immigration from European countries. More opportunities for international migration emerged with the demand for workers, initially in the Gulf countries and later in the global labour market. The migration regime that developed in the Gulf region and the rest of Asia rests on three conditions: the admission of migrant workers for a limited period of time (the usual contract is for two years, which is renewable), restricting the transfer of jobs or employers, and prohibiting family reunification. These conditions apply to migrant workers in less skilled occupations; more skilled and professional migrants have less restrictions, i.e., they can bring their family members and in some countries, they may acquire residence and citizenship. Unlike the government-to-government arrangement in the guest-worker programme in Europe,

1 The stock estimate has limitations (*see* IOM and SMC,2013); for now, it is the only existing stock estimate on the overseas Filipino population.

2 http://www.cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1340:stock-estimate-of-overseas-filipinos&-catid=134:statisticsstock-estimate&Itemid=814

the recruitment of migrant workers in the Gulf region and Asia is in the hands of private recruitment agencies. On the one hand, these agencies contributed to the expansion of international labour migration as they assiduously searched for new labour markets; on the other hand, their profit-orientation and the ensuing competition among a growing number of players compromised the protection of migrant workers.

When the Philippines started overseas employment, it was intended to be a temporary intervention. As the demand for Filipino workers grew, so did the institutions that were involved in overseas employment. Moreover, as temporary labour migration accelerated, irregularities also increased (e.g., overcharging of placement fees is very common), requiring government attention. Over the years, the institutions, policies and programmes governing the deployment and protection of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) grew. The key government agencies directly involved with overseas employment are the Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Two attached agencies under the DFO have a leading role in overseas employment: the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), which is responsible for the processing of employment contracts, licensing of private recruitment agencies, and regulating the deployment of OFWs; and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), which administers a welfare fund to support programmes promoting the welfare of OFWs and their families. The promotion of the protection of overseas Filipinos is one of the three pillars of the Philippines' foreign policy. The Office of the Undersecretary of Migrant Workers' Affairs (OUMWA) is specifically tasked with providing assistance to overseas Filipinos with legal problems. With regard to permanent migrants, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, under the Office of the President, is mandated to develop policies and programmes for this population of overseas Filipinos. These key agencies are also the main sources of data on international migration (for more details, see IOM and SMC, 2013).The governance of international migration, thus, involves many agencies and offices, which requires coordination. The initiatives of the government are not limited in the national context; the Philippines has also actively engaged in bilateral and multilateral actions in the area of international migration.

As the Philippines became savvier in dealing with temporary labour migration, it became difficult to put end the programme. In the economic front, the rising remittances were vital to an otherwise precarious economy. In 1974, remittances amounted to US$118 million; by 2012, the amount climbed to US$21.3 billion. During the period 2000-2012, remittances accounted for 8-10 percent of the country's gross domestic product (IOM and SMC, 2013: 114, 118). The economic contributions of OFWs are duly acknowledged by the Philippine government. President Corazon Aquino called them as the country's new heroes (*bagong bayani*), a term that has generated varying discourses among the different stakeholders. Migrants and civil society organisations effectively use this course to advocate for better protection of and better services to migrant workers and their families. The passage of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 8042) established a comprehensive approach to promote the protection of migrant workers at all stages of migration – before they leave the country, while they are working abroad, and upon their return to the Philippines. This was recently amended by Republic Act No. 10022 for the purpose of strengthening the protective measures. Other migration-related laws were enacted to further the protection of overseas Filipinos (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003; later this was amended into the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2013), to enable them to participate in the political process (the Absentee Voting Act of 2003 – this was amended by the Overseas Voting Act of 2013), and to allow Filipinos who had taken a foreign citizenship to retain or reacquire their Filipino citizenship. The next steps for the Philippines are to integrate migration policies with development policies, and to promote more coordination and harmonisation of national policies with local policies (Asis and Roma, 2010).

This report provides an overview of the Philippines' experience with temporary transnational migration and presents data on flows and trends from the 1970s. The discussion draws from and builds on a 2013 published work, the *Country Migration Report: The Philippines* (CMR), which did a comprehensive review of the international migration data, laws, institutions, policies and practices that developed in the Philippines to keep pace with the country's ongoing experience with international migration. The report is referred to here as CMR or cited as a publication of the International Organization for Migration and the Scalabrini Migration Center (IOM and SMC, 2013). The section on Filipinos in Europe entailed a review of relevant literature; due to language limitations, the review was confined to English-language publications. Online sources, e.g., websites of Filipino organisations, were searched for further information on Filipinos in European countries. The paucity of resources on Europeans in the Philippines was a challenge in writing the section on European transnational migration to the Philippines. Initial information presented here was gathered from the websites of embassies of European countries.

9.2 Flows and Patterns of Temporary Transnational Migration and Mobility

9.2.1 Definitions

Before presenting data on the flows and patterns of transnational migration from the Philippines, a brief discussion on the definitions of temporary migrants and related terms is in order. Given the significance and iconic status of temporary migrant workers in the Philippine landscape, the definition and measurement of international migration revolves around this group. The following terms are defined in the implementing rules and guidelines of Republic Act No. 10022 (also known as RA 10022), the most recent amendment to Republic Act No. 8042 (also known as RA 8042) or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995:[3]

- Overseas Filipinos – refer to migrant workers, other Filipino nationals and their dependents abroad.
- Overseas Filipino Worker or Migrant Worker – refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a citizen or on board a vessel navigating the foreign seas other than a government ship used for military or non-commercial purposes, or on an installation located offshore or on the high seas. A "person to be engaged in a remunerated activity" refers to an applicant worker who has been promised or assured employment overseas."
- Regular or Documented Filipino Migrant Workers – refer to the following:
  (1) Those who possess valid passports and appropriate visas or permits to stay and work in the receiving country; and
  (2) Those whose contracts of employment have been processed by the POEA, or subsequently verified and registered on-site by the POLO [Philippine Overseas Labour Office][4], if required by law or regulation.
- Irregular/Undocumented Filipino Migrant Workers – refer to the following:
  (1) Those who acquired their passports through fraud or misrepresentation;
  (2) Those who possess expired visas or permits to stay;

3 The full title of Republic Act No. 10022 is "An act amending Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended further improving the standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes." This lapsed into law on 8 March 2010.

4 The POLO is under the Office of the Secretary of Labour. It acts as the operating arm of DOLE for the administration and enforcement of its policies and programs concerning OFWs. It operates under the One-Country Team Approach wherein all officers, representatives, and personnel of the Philippine Government posted abroad shall, in each host country, act as one-country team under the leadership of the Ambassador.

(3) Those who have no travel document whatsoever;

(4) Those who have valid or inappropriate visas; or

(5) Those whose employment contracts were not processed by the POEA or subsequently verified and registered on-site by the POLO, if required by law or regulation.

In addition, there are several terms which are part of the lexicon of international labour migration in the Philippines – land-based workers, sea-based workers (or seafarers), new hires and rehires – and which are reflected in migration statistics. Data on labour migration from the Philippines include workers in the land-based and sea-based sectors. This is unique to the Philippines; other countries of origin of migrant workers in Asia only collect and report workers the land-based sector. About 25-30 percent of the world's international seafarers come from the Philippines. Traditionally, seafarers refer to those working on merchant vessels. Reflecting new realities, the implementing rules and guidelines of RA 10022 define a seafarer as referring to "any person who is employed or engaged in overseas employment in any capacity on board a ship other than a government ship used for military or non-commercial purposes. <u>The definition shall include fishermen, cruise personnel and those serving on mobile offshore and drilling units in the high seas</u>" (underscoring added). The definitions of new hires and rehires in relation to land-based workers are also important details to appreciate migration statistics in the Philippines. The terms new hires and rehires are important to clarify since these are among the statistics reported by the POEA. The former refers to "a land-based worker being contracted for overseas employment for the first time by a foreign employer through a duly licensed placement agency" (IOM and CMR, 2013: 263). A new hire, thus, does not necessarily mean a first-time migrant worker. Rehires, on the other hand, are defined in RA 10022 as "land-based workers who renewed their employment contract with the same foreign principal."

9.2.2 Data sources

The emergence of institutions addressing different facets of international migration developed hand-in-hand with statistical information to monitor flows, patterns and trends of international migration. Being primarily an out-migration country, migration data generated in the Philippines are mostly about outflows; by comparison, data and migration information systems concerning international migration to the Philippines (including return migration) are less developed. As a result, data on international migration to the Philippines are not as widely available and/or reported. Data-related issues on international migration are discussed in some detail in the CMR (IOM and SMC, 2013).

The data presented in this report come from various sources, which reflect the involvement of different government agencies in international migration. First, we will discuss data sources pertaining to Section 9.2.3, "Temporary Transnational Mobility from the Philippines: Global Trends." In general, the POEA and CFO are the main sources of international migration in the Philippines. Most of the data presented in this section are flow data on the departure of different types of international migrants. The POEA is the primary source of information on the deployment of migrant workers. Legally deployed migrant workers have to go through POEA for the processing of their documents and contracts. This enables the POEA to collect data on the characteristics of departing OFWs, their destinations and their occupations overseas. Data on au pairs were drawn from the CFO. Starting in 2012, the CFO was tasked with implementing the pre-departure orientation seminar for au pairs; the seminar aims to provide key information to help the au pairs adjust in the destination countries. Concerning international student migration from the Philippines, there is no government agency that manages this migration – as such, there is no government agency which collects data and keeps track of student migration. For this type of migration, the report relied on data collected by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Commission (UNESCO). Flow data on irregular migration and human trafficking are not available. For these types of migration, data are mostly estimates. In the case of irregular migration, the stock estimate reported by CFO is the most-often cited figure; it is part of the stock estimate of the overseas Filipino population, a regular undertaking coordinated by CFO which involves other migration-related agencies, including POEA. Data on trafficking cases are not only difficult to obtain, but where some data are reported, the quality of the data may be difficult to ascertain. Human trafficking data on the website of Inter-Agency Against Trafficking (IACAT), a body created in 2003 to coordinate and monitor the implementation of Republic Act 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, are limited to convictions from 2005 (the latest update is as of 4 December 2014). Data from the National Recovery and Reintegration Database, under the Department of Social Welfare and Development, has collated data on 1,665 trafficking cases from 1 January 2000 to 21 February 2013 (IOM and SMC, 2013: 81). The report also cites data from the US Department of State *Trafficking in Persons Report*; it provides information on the ranking of the Philippines in terms of its anti-trafficking efforts.

Turning to Section 9.2.4, "Transnational Migration from the Philippines and Europe," as the title suggests, this section focuses on the Philippines-Europe migration system. Most of the data cited here were also from the CFO and POEA. The stock estimate of overseas Filipinos (as of December 2012) reported by CFO is useful because it presents information on the distribution of Filipinos by destination country and by type of international migrant (which consists of three categories: permanent migrants, temporary migrants – largely OFWs, and migrants in an irregular situation). Flow data on the migration of workers to Europe were sourced from the POEA. Supplemental information were drawn Eurostat. Philippine sources and the Eurostat provide different estimates, with the former tending to report larger counts compared with the latter, similar observations were also noted in the CMR (IOM and SMC, 2013). The need to reconcile data sources from origin and destination sources is one area that calls for further dialogue and cooperation.

Section 9.3, "Flows and Trends of Transnational Migration to the Philippines," employed data mostly from Philippine government sources. The exceptions are data on international students to the Philippines, which were sourced from UNESCO. In general, it was not easy to find data on international migration to the Philippines. The data deficit on return migration has been noted elsewhere (e.g., IOM and SMC, 2013); the need to address this gap has been a point of advocacy by the academic community and other stakeholders in the Philippines. Available data on international migrants to the Philippines were collated from different sources. Census data (as of 1 May 2010) provided counts and source countries of foreign citizens in the Philippines; data on foreign workers came from the Department of Labour and Employment based on the Alien Employment Permits. Data on international arrivals are also presented to provide some indication of transnational mobility to the Philippines. As noted below, additional data on Europeans in the country were supplemented by information posted on the websites of embassies.

9.2.3 Transnational temporary migration from the Philippines: global trends

Transnational temporary migrants originating from the Philippines are not diverse. Mostly they are engaged in temporary labour migration; some participate in student mobility and au pair migration. While many go through legal channels, irregular migration and trafficking in persons are not unknown. These are the categories that are discussed in this section.

9.2.3.1 Migrant workers

The participation of the Philippines in international labour migration started in the 1970s when it responded to the call for workers by the oil-rich Gulf countries. The petro-dollars generated by the sharp increase in the price of oil in 1973 fuelled the Gulf countries' massive infrastructure development. They had money but lacked workers. On the other hand, the Philippines, like the rest of the world, was badly hurt by the oil crisis. Thus, when employment opportunities opened up in the Middle East, overseas employment provided an answer to unemployment and the growing balance of payments problems. The passage of the Labour Code of the Philippines in 1974, which includes provisions concerning overseas employment, was helpful in providing overall directions on how to manage this phenomenon. The Philippine government envisioned overseas employment as a temporary measure. With economic development, it was hoped that there would be no need for Filipinos to work overseas.

As it turned out, the economy went on a boom-and-bust pattern through the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and the early part of the 2000s. Apart from economic troubles, the country also had its share of political turmoil. It was under martial law between 1972 and 1981. The assassination of opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, Jr in 1983 stirred massive protests. Corazon Aquino became president in 1986 and democracy was restored. However, several coup attempts derailed economic recovery efforts. It also did not help that major disasters happened one after the other. Some measure of economic growth and investor confidence followed in 1992 to 1998 under the presidency of Fidel Ramos. His successor, Joseph Estrada, did not last long as he was ousted in 2001. He was succeeded by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo whose presidency was later plagued by charges of corruption and election rigging. Through these instabilities, overseas employment was a constant. The economic and political conditions may have bred "push factors" that led to outmigration. Just as important was the unceasing demand for Filipino workers in the global labour market. By the 1980s, the construction projects wrapped up and the needs of the labour market in the Gulf region expanded to other sectors; during the same period, the rise of newly industrialised countries in East and Southeast Asia required workers that cannot be sourced locally; and by the 1990s, the need for highly skilled workers in developed countries in other regions accelerated. The push factors in the Philippines and the need for workers by the more developed regions combined to keep labour migration going. Over the years, the institutionalization of the temporary labour migration programme and the development of a culture of migration in Philippine society had their own contribution in sustaining labour migration (IOM and SMC, 2013).

The transformation of temporary labour migration into a major phenomenon in the Philippines is evident in Table 9.2. When labour migration started in 1975, 36,035 contracts were processed.[5] The succeeding years saw the deployment level progressively increasing, reaching 1,802,301 workers in 2012 and 1,836,435 in 2013. While deployment levels are constantly rising, it should be noted that the numbers include rehires, i.e., workers who have renewed their contract with the same employer or destination. As revealed in Table 9.2, the share of rehires is larger than the new hires, suggesting the tendency of workers as well as employers to extend the contract. In this way, temporary labour migration is maintained although it is becoming extended, evoking Martin's (2001) observation that "there is nothing more permanent than temporary migration."

Table 9.2 Annual Deployment of OFWs by Category and Per Cent of Rehires, 1975-2013 (Source: POEA (as presented in Table 15 in IOM and SMC, 2013: 59); data for 2013 are from the POEA Compendium of Statistics, 2013 (n.d.)

Year	Land-based	Sea-based	Total Deployed	No. (% Rehires)*
1975	12,501	23,534	36,035	-
1980	157,394	57,196	214,590	-
1985	320,494	52,290	372,784	159,679 (49.8)
1990	334,883	111,212	446,095	164,883 (49.2)
2000	643,304	198,324	841,628	398,886 (60.6)
2006	788,070	274,497	1,062,567	470,390 (59.7)
2007	811,070	266,553	1,077,623	497,810 (61.4)
2008	974,399	261,614	1,236,013	597,426 (61.3)
2009	1,092,162	330,424	1,422,586	742,447 (68.0)
2010	1,123,676	347,150	1,470,826	781,710 (79.6)
2011	1,318,727	369,104	1,687,831	881,007 (66.8)
2012	1,435,166	366,865	1,802,031	976,591 (68.0)
2013	1,469,179	367,166	1,836,345	1.004,291 (68.4)

*Data on new hires and rehires pertain to land-based workers only.

5 From 1975 to 1983, data on overseas contract workers (as OFWs were called in the early years) refer to contracts processed; from 1983, the POEA started to report data on contracts processed and number of workers deployed overseas.

The growing significance of temporary labour migration is not only about numbers but also increasing diversity. Initially, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to the Gulf countries were mostly men who worked on construction projects or oil companies. By the 1980s, when most infrastructure projects had been completed, job opportunities in other sectors came up which opened the doors for women migrants. In particular, the demand for foreign domestic workers fuelled the migration of women, contributing to the highly feminised migration from the Philippines. Since 1992, women comprised the majority of new hires and land-based workers leaving the country for overseas employment. There was a temporary male predominance 2007 and 2008, when there more men than women, on account of the reforms implemented by the Philippine government to better protect domestic workers.[6] In East and Southeast Asia, female migration is mainly domestic worker migration.[7] The demand for foreign domestic workers in East and Southeast Asia was linked to the rising share of local women in paid work in the course of their industrialisation whereas in the Middle East, the recruitment of foreign domestic workers was related to the lifestyle needs of affluent families. As indicated in Table 9.3, household service workers (the official name used by the POEA to refer to domestic workers) comprise the single largest occupational category of yearly deployment between 2007 and 2012. The low numbers in 2007 and 2008 reflect the dampening effect of the Household Service Workers Reform Package introduced in 2006 and implemented from 2007. However, by 2009, the deployment of domestic workers has increased again. Up until 2004, the demand for entertainers, mostly in Japan, significantly contributed to increasing the participation of women in migration. In 2004, Japan introduced more restrictive policies in the recruitment of entertainers in response to criticisms that entertainer migration is tantamount to the trafficking of women. Being the primary destination of entertainers from the Philippines, the policy change practically ended the large-scale deployment of entertainers. Nurse migration also contributes to the feminisation of migration from the Philippines. In the 2000s, there was a surge in the demand for nurses in various countries. Changes in policies in destination countries, such as the United Kingdom in the mid-2000s, reduced the outflow of nurses outside of Asia. Nurse migration continues to other destinations, notably the Gulf countries, but in a reduced scale. The ageing of the population in the developed countries and the increased demand for health care services may increase nurse migration in the near future. It would be interesting to monitor the actual experience of the bilateral agreement signed between the Philippines and Germany in 2013 (the Agreement on Triple Win Migration) as a point of reference in nurse migration in the coming years.

6 The reform package included the following: setting the minimum age at 23 years old, prohibiting the charging of placement fees, increasing the monthly salary to US$400, and requiring departing domestic workers to undergo training and cultural orientation. For details about the reform package and its impact, see Battistella and Asis (2011).

7 Japan and South Korea do not recruit foreign domestic workers. Japan maintains a policy of not recruiting foreign workers in less skilled occupations. The foreign domestic workers in Japan are those working for the diplomatic community. South Korea recruits foreign workers under the Employer Permit System introduced in 2004. South Korean families employ foreign domestic workers, most of who are ethnic Koreans from China.

Table 9.3 Number of Deployed Landbased Overseas Filipino Workers by Top Ten Occupational (Source: POEA (presented in Table 21 in IOM and SMC, 2013: 67); data for 2012 and 2013 are from the POEA Compendium of Statistics, 2013 (n.d.)

Occupational Category	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
All Occupational Categories- Total	**306,383**	**338,266**	**349,715**	**341,966**	**437,720**	**458,575**	**464,888**
1. Household Service Workers	47,878	50,082	71,557	96,583	142,689	155,831	164,396
2. Nurses Professional	9,178	11,495	13,014	12,082	17,236	15,655	16,404
3. Waiters, Bartenders and Related Workers	9,276	13,911	11,977	8,789	12,238	14,892	14,823
4. Wiremen and Electrical Workers	6,980	8,893	9,752	8,606	9,826	10,575	9,539
5. Charworkers, Cleaners and Related Workers	6,300	11,620	10,056	12,133	6,847	10,493	12,082
6. Laborers/Helpers General	7,317	9,711	8,099	7,833	7,010	9,987	11,892
7. Plumbers and Pipe Fitters	9,187	9,664	7,722	8,407	9,177	9,657	8,594
8. Caregivers and Caretakers	14,399	10,109	9,228	5,059	8,026	8,213	7,767
9. Welders and Flame-Cutters	6,140	6,777	5,910	5,059	8,026	8,213	7,767
10. Cooks and Related Workers	5,124	5,791	5,028	4,399	5,287	6,344	7,090
11. Others	184,604	200,213	197,372	168,782	209,283	207,800	205,835

9.2.3.2 Au pairs

Filipinos have figured in au pair migration beginning in the 1980s or 1990s, mostly to European countries. Unlike temporary labour migration, the migration of au pairs was not a government programme; rather, their migration was organised by migrants themselves, often with the assistance of family networks, or through au pair agencies. The Philippine government intervened when reports of abuses against au pairs surfaced, resulting in the government imposing a ban on Filipinos leaving as au pairs in 1997. The ban was in place until it was lifted in 2010. The USA is also a destination for au pairs, but most of statistics point to countries in Europe as the primary destination.[8]

As of 2013, a total of 2,861 au pairs registered with the CFO, up from 2,348 in 2012 (Table 9.4). The top three destination countries are Denmark (1,177), Norway (1,153) and the Netherlands (315). CFO data suggest that au pair participants were mostly females (94.1 percent in 2012; 97.1 percent in 2013), half were in the ages 20-24 and another half were in the ages 25-29. Most were college graduates; and most were unemployed or did not report any occupation prior to their migration. Relatives (more than half), the Internet (a fifth), and recruitment agencies (cited by about 10 percent) were the top three sources of information concerning the programme. Based on 2012 data, three-fourths claimed their host family funded their expenses and another 23 per cent said they used their own funds (CFO, 2013). In focus group discussions with departing au pairs conducted by the Scalabrini Migration Center (ca. 2011), participants also mentioned the role of family networks in providing information and resources that enabled them to migrate as au pairs. Interestingly, while they were aware that they could only stay in the destination countries for a limited period of time, they also expressed the hope that they could find ways to stay longer and work. For those who had completed nursing education, they saw being an au pair as a stepping stone to land a nursing job. A study on Filipino au pairs by Kjaer (2013) revealed conditions of vulnerabilities for au pairs even under the current arrangement. An important aspect that clouds the issue is the framework of au pair as cultural exchange when it is actually an employment arrangement sans worker protection. There is also the

8 Thanks to Jennifer Arais Hagan, Visiting Researcher at the Scalabrini Migration Center (April-October 2014), for sharing the information about Filipino au pairs in the US.

possibility of au pair migration turning into extended migration when at the end of the contract or when conditions become unbearable, au pairs will move on to another employer or destination, or stay in Europe in an irregular situation. More details about au pair migration and policy challenges can be found in Appendix 9.1.

Table 9.4 Registered Au Pair Participants by Country of Destination, 2012 and 2013 (Source: CFO)

Country	2012	2013
Denmark	1,015	1,177
Norway	978	1,153
Netherlands	229	315
Switzerland	66	111
Germany	39	59
Iceland	7	4
Belgium	7	16
Sweden	4	15
Italy	2	
Austria	1	8
Finland		1
France		1
Luxembourg		1
TOTAL	2,348	2,861

9.2.3.3. Tertiary level students

The outflow of tertiary level students comprises a small share of international migration from the Philippines. The lack of data on student mobility in national statistics was noted in the CMR (IOM and SMC, 2013). The data cited here are from the UNESCO International Statistics. The most recently available data from this source shows that as of 2012, there were 11,668 internationally mobile students originating from the Philippines. The five major destinations of these students were the United States (which had the lion's share – 3,535, or 30.3 per cent of the total), Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan and New Zealand. Altogether, these top five destination countries accounted for 72.2 per cent of all international students from the Philippines. As Table 9.5 suggests, the large concentrations of Filipino students are in English-speaking countries. Of the top 20 destinations of Filipino students, eight are European countries. In addition to the United Kingdom (which is ranked third, with 1,738 students), the following countries also host Filipino students: Italy, Germany, France, Norway, Belgium, Spain and Austria (UIS, 2014).

In the near future, the Philippines will continue to be a source country of international students. Unlike scholarship programmes that usually stipulate a condition to return to the Philippines (e.g., the exchange programmes between the Philippines and the United States require grantees to return to the Philippines for some time); self-financed students are not bound to this requirement. Student migration, thus, may be a prelude to other types of migration – residence and permanent migration in the host country or re-migration to another country (e.g., taking up a post-doctoral offer in another country following completion of the study programme). The possibility of student migration turning into brain drain is not remote in the context of the competition for highly skilled professionals in advanced countries.

Table 9.5 Top Destination Countries of International Students from the Philippines, 2012. (Source: UIS (2014)

Country	Number
1. United States	3,535
2. Australia	2,098
3. United Kingdom	1,738
4. Japan	635
5. New Zealand	426
6. South Korea	354
7. Italy	336
8. Canada	303
9. Malaysia	267
10. Saudi Arabia	255
11. Thailand	192
12. Germany	167
13. United Arab Emirates	166
14. France	149
15. Norway	110
16. Belgium	80
17. Spain	71
18. Jordan	86
19. Austria	58
20. Finland	56

9.2.3.4. Irregular migration and trafficking in persons

Due to its hidden and clandestine nature, estimates on irregular migration and trafficking are imprecise. Data on Filipinos in an irregular situation are part of the stock estimate produced by CFO and related agencies. A review of the stock estimate over the years indicates that for the most part, most international migrants – either permanent or temporary migrants – leave the country as documented migrants. In part, this is due to the established institutional framework of international migration in the Philippines. Between 2005 and 2012, the share of migrants in an irregular situation is relatively small; on average, it is around 10 per cent of the total. In 2012, however, the share increased to 13 per cent. Table 9.6 below indicates countries where there are at least 10,000 Filipinos in an irregular situation, based on the stock estimate as of December 2011 and December 2012. By far, the major destination of such migrants is neighbouring Malaysia, particularly East Malaysia (Sabah), with which the Philippines has a long history of people exchange (the Philippine claim to Sabah is a point of friction with Malaysia). In the 1970s, the conflict between the government and Muslim separatists in Mindanao led to refugee migration to Sabah, particularly following the burning of Jolo, Sulu in 1974. Following the ceasefire signed between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front in 1976, later arrivals in Sabah were no longer regarded as political refugees but as "illegal migrants." Later migrants also included Filipinos from regions other than Western Mindanao, giving rise to concerns in Sabah about the growing presence of irregular migrants from the Philippines. [9]

Although geographically distant, the United States has large numbers of Filipinos in an irregular situation. Among the top destinations, three are in Europe – France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The profile of Filipinos in France is quite unique because the population of Filipinos in an irregular situation eclipses that of legal migrants. As of 2012, for example, of the 51,785 Filipinos in France, 42,090 are in an irregular situation, i.e., eight in 10 Filipinos in France are irregular migrants (CFO).

Comparing 2011 and 2012, the change in the rankings of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Singapore are remarkable. Saudi Arabia and the UAE not only advanced in the rankings but also the population of irregular migrants increased five-fold and ten-fold, respectively. Saudi Arabia cracked down on irregular migrants in the kingdom in 2012 (which was implemented full-scale in 2013); this may explain the sharp increase in the number of Filipinos in an irregular situation. The big jump in the UAE needs to be taken with caution. Between 2011 and 2012, there was a very

9 Filipino migration to Sabah is a complex issue which cannot be treated adequately in this report. For more details, *see* Battistella, Asis and Abubakar (1997) and Asis (2004, 2005).

sizeable growth in the overseas Filipino population, from 679.819 to 931,562. The UAE government also announced a two-month amnesty programme in December 2012 providing an opportunity for unauthorised migrants to regularise their status or to leave the country without penalties (Malit and Youha, 2013). Considering the date, this should not have a major bearing on the upsurge of irregular migrants in 2012. Singapore also registered a marked change, from 49,400 in 2011 to 21,450 in 2012. Again, the reasons for the change are not known.

Table 9.6 Countries with at Least 10,000 Filipinos in an Irregular Situation, Stock Estimate 2011 and 2012 (Source: CFO10)

Country	2011	Country	2012
1. Malaysia	447,590	Malaysia	447,590
2. United States	260,335	United States	271,000
3. Singapore	49,400	UAE	207,230
4. France	41,415	Saudi Arabia	107,670
5. Italy	34,820	France	42,090
6. UK	25,000	Italy	34,820
7. Saudi Arabia	20,000	Qatar	28,000
8. UAE	19,760	UK	25,000
9. Syria	13,600	Singapore	21,450
10. Qatar	13,000	South Korea	13,615
11. South Korea	11,860	Jordan	12,770
12. Jordan	11,750	--	--
Subtotal	948,530	Subtotal	1.211.235
	(88.3% of total)		(90.2% of total)

Data on trafficking from the Philippines are even more difficult to ascertain, mainly because trafficking data in general are "fuzzy." Although the 2000 Trafficking Protocol defines what trafficking is, oftentimes data on trafficked persons overlap with estimates on irregular migration, smuggling or both. Some indication on how the Philippines performs and compares with other countries are suggested by the tier placement of the country in the annual US Trafficking in Persons Report that has been produced by the US Department of State since 2001.[11] The Philippines has been placed between Tier 2 and Tier 2 Watchlist since the report became available (Table 9.7). Tier 2 countries are those which have shown efforts in curbing trafficking, but do not yet fully comply with the minimum standards to eliminate trafficking. The descent of the Philippines to Tier 2 Watchlist in some years is due to the poor record in the prosecution of traffickers. The signing into law of the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012 (RA 10364) in 2013 is expected to strengthen anti-trafficking activities and outcomes. The institutional support and resources provided to the Inter-Agency Council against Trafficking in Persons (IACAT) under the expanded law has been noted as a significant step in anti-trafficking efforts by the 2014 TIP Report.

Table 9.7 Tier Placement of the Philippines, US TIP Report, 2001-2013 (Source: US TIP Report, 2001-2014)

Year	Tier Placement
2001	2
2002	2
2003	2
2004	2 (Watchlist)
2005	2 (Watchlist)
2006	2
2007	2
2008	2
2009	2 (Watchlist)
2010	2 (Watchlist)
2011	2
2012	2
2013	2

10 http://www.cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1340:stock-estimate-of-overseas-filipinos&-catid=134:statisticsstock-estimate&Itemid=814

11 The TIP Report is not without controversy or criticism. It is cited here as a source of comparative information on the trafficking situation in different countries.

9.2.4 Transnational migration from the Philippines to Europe

8.2.4.1. Background of Filipino migration to Europe

The migration of Filipinos to Europe in contemporary times evokes memories of the migration of the *ilustrados* (the enlightened ones) to Europe in the mid-19th century. It was a migration involving mostly men from affluent families who went to Europe to pursue further studies and to lobby for reforms in Spanish rule in the Philippines. A century later, Filipinos migrated to Europe to seek economic opportunities in the hopes of securing a better life for their families.

Data from the Philippines indicate a stock estimate of close to 800,000 Filipinos in Europe as of December 2012, with the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany as the top three destination countries. Although the Philippines was a colony of Spain for more than 300 years, Filipino migration to Spain is smaller compared to other destinations in Europe. As a former colony, qualified Filipinos can acquire citizenship in Spain after a two-year residence. Although the Philippines was a colony of Spain for more than 300 years, Filipino migration to Spain is smaller compared to other destinations in Europe. As a former colony, qualified Filipinos can acquire citizenship in Spain after a two-year residence. The data suggest a sizable number of temporary migrants in Europe, as well as a considerable share of irregular migrants, some 20 percent of the total (Table 9.8).

Table 9.8 Stock Estimate of Overseas Filipinos in Europe, 2012 (Source: CFO12)

Country	Permanent	Temporary	Irregular	Total
United Kingdom	160,881	32,896	25,000	218,777
Italy	53,819	83,509	34,820	172,148
Germany	46,790	8,116	2,080	56,986
Greece	121	26,167	26,000	52,288
France	8,687	1,008	42,090	51,785
Spain	21,380	8,969	2,925	33,274
Cyprus	2,707	18,816	2,100	23,623
Norway	18,379	4,997	0	23,376
Netherlands	16,076	3,000	1,500	20,576
Switzerland	13,177	4,810	2,085	20,072
Austria	12,930	2,496	2,000	17,426
Ireland	5,301	5,813	3,000	14,114
Sweden	10,556	13	2,030	12,599
Belgium	6,840	384	5,000	12,224
Denmark	7,130	3,979	0	11,109
Others	7,421	14,843	5,685	27,949
TOTAL	**392,195**	**219,816**	**156,315**	**768,326**

Data from Eurostat point to some differences with the CFO estimate. For one, the Eurostat reports a smaller population of Filipinos in Europe – 303, 765 – which is less than half of the CFO estimate (Table 9.9). It is limited to Filipino citizens and it should be mentioned that data are missing for some countries in the Eurostat figure, which helps explain the smaller count. Another difference is the ranking of countries. In the CFO estimate, the United Kingdom is the top destination of Filipino migrants whereas in the Eurostat data, Italy holds the top spot. As noted in the CMR, in general, CFO estimates tend to be higher than the data generated by host governments (IOM and SMC, 2013). As will be noted in later section, estimates produced by Filipino communities also report a larger population than that reported by government sources in the countries of destination.

12 http://www.cfo.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1340:stock-estimate-of-overseas-filipinos&-catid=134:statisticsstock-estimate&Itemid=814

Table 9.9 Stock of Filipino Citizens in Europe, 2013 (Source: Eurostat, 2013)

Country		Male	Female	Total
1.	Italy	58,296	81,510	139,806
2.	United Kingdom	28,489	41,048	69,537
3.	Spain	12,607	18,647	31,254
4.	Germany	3,658	17,069	20,727
5.	Ireland	5,544	8,035	13,579
	Sub total	108,594	166,309	274,903
	Other	7,188	21,674	28,862
	Total	115,782	187,953	303,735

Note: Of 31 countries, data are missing for 8 countries, including France and Greece.

Substantial Filipino migration to Europe also has its beginnings in the 1970s. Unlike the organised, state-supported labour migration to the Gulf countries, Filipino migration to Europe was largely an individual undertaking. Some of the exceptions were nurses who were recruited in groups, such as the recruitment strategy of Germany and Austria. The recruitment of seamstresses in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s also involved recruitment by groups. The pioneers also included temporary migrants, e.g., tourists or students, who ended up staying because they found employment or got married. Also among the pioneers were former seafarers, including those who jumped ship and stayed on. Marriage migration was also a significant factor in increasing the Filipino presence in Europe; this migration, however, is not temporary. This migration invited much comment in the wake of media reports in the 1980s about mail-order brides, whose marriage was brokered by commercial companies.[13] Female migration increased when Filipino women ventured to Southern European countries – Italy, Spain and Greece. Again, their departure was not visible to the Philippine state because they left as tourists and found employment as domestic workers.[14] Many stayed in these countries as irregular migrants but because of regularisation programmes in Italy, Spain and Greece, they were able to regularise their status which enabled them to bring their family members. The arrival of family members contributed to reducing the female predominance of Filipino communities in these destination countries from about the 1990s.

The stock estimate provides information on the population of Filipinos in Europe at a point in time. To appreciate migration in progress, we turn to flow statistics. From the Philippine end, data are available only for those leaving the country as documented workers. There is no mechanism in place to record the departure of temporary migrants leaving the country for other purposes, e.g., for studies, intra-company transfers, and those with pre-arranged employment who bypass the POEA.[15] The data reported here are unpublished data on new hires made available by the POEA. As may be recalled, new hires pertain only to land-based workers. Table 9.10 shows that for the period 2009-2013, Italy (except for the big drop in 2013) and Cyprus are the primary destinations of OFWs. Both countries have a long history of bringing in domestic workers from the Philippines. The spike in the number of new hires in Italy in 2011 may be due to the allocation of work visas to Filipino migrants as part of an agreement between Italy and the Philippines to facilitate legal migration and curb irregular migration. Norway and Denmark also register a steep rise in 2011, a sudden drop in 2012, and further decline in 2013. These patterns reflect the deployment of au pairs in 2011, after the ban was lifted in 2010, and

13 Concerns about the commercialization of marriage, the role of syndicates and potential links to prostitution, and violence committed against women were generalized to so-called mail-order brides and to intercultural marriages in general. In the Philippines, these concerns led to the passage of a law, Republic Act No. 6955, the Anti-Mail Order Bride Law, which prohibits the matching of Filipino women to foreign nationals through the mail-order bride system, including the advertisement and distribution of materials matching Filipino women with foreign men. The attention to the issue, however, has led to the stigmatisation of intercultural marriages. In the Netherlands, for example, Filipino women married to Dutch were stereotyped as mail-order brides and Dutch men married to Filipino women were stigmatised as well (Maas, 2011). According to Muizenberg (2003), the mail-order bride phenomenon was not as big in the Netherlands as it was in Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium.

14 Filipino entertainers, men and alike, have also made their way to Europe. Some women entertainers may have been working in the sex sector.

15 During the launch of the EURA-NET project in the Philippines held on 18 June 2014, several participants commented on Filipinos who get jobs in Europe and other countries without going through the POEA process.

the drop is due to the transfer of the management of au pair migration from POEA to CFO (*see* Appendix 9.1). Although the United Kingdom still counts among the top ten destinations of OFWs, the numbers involved are scaled down compared to the pre-2005 levels. The number of OFWs deployed to Spain declined after 2009 and has not rebounded to its previous level. The inclusion of Russia, Romania, Malta and the Czech Republic in the top 10 countries is significant not so much in terms of numbers but the expansion of the Filipino presence to other regions in the continent. With this latest development, the geographical distribution of Filipinos in Europe is diversifying, starting with Western Europe, and then expanding to Southern Europe, the Nordic countries, and more recently Eastern Europe.

The sex ratio of new hires who were deployed to Europe in 2009-2013 continues to be dominated by female migrants, although in 2013, it was less skewed compared to the earlier years (Table 9.11). Female predominance is driven by the continuing demand for domestic workers. The demand for nurses is also an important factor, but unlike domestic work, recruitment policies of foreign nurses have been deeply affected by public discourses and debates which have resulted in restricting or reducing recruitment. In the Netherlands, exposes of the unfair treatment of Filipino nurses and irregularities practiced by a recruitment company halted the plans of Dutch hospital to bring in nurses from the Philippines (Maas, 2011). A policy change in the recruitment of foreign nurses by the United Kingdom in 2005 also put an end to the large influx of foreign nurses, as described below. The age distribution of new hires is concentrated in the prime working ages of 25 to 44 (Table 9.12). In terms of their province of origin, all the new hires came from Luzon (Table 9.13). It is possible though that those who were reported as coming from Metro Manila may have actually come from other provinces and regions and they had come to the metropolis to process their papers.

Table 9.10 Top Ten European Countries of Destination of New hire-OFWs, 2009-2013 (Source: Unpublished data, POEA)

Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Italy	1,946	1,303	4,796	1,461	226
Cyprus	1,466	1,619	2,181	1,872	973
United Kingdom	361	536	369	351	427
Spain	655	135	318	182	130
Norway	78	196	861	208	52
Denmark	6	51	939	145	6
Russia	189	129	150	137	141
Romania	93	141	234	85	105
Malta	15	11	134	170	241
Czech Republic	169	74	60	34	19
Total	5,653	4,627	10,677	5,146	3,088

Note: Data from Regional Processing Offices are not included.

Table 9.11 New hire-OFWs Deployed to Europe by Gender, 2011-2013 (Source: Unpublished data, POEA)

	Male	Female	Ratio M/F
2011	2,588	8,087	32
2012	1,391	3,755	37
2013	1,119	1,966	56

Note: In 2009, information on gender was not stated for two cases; in 2013, three were not stated.

Table 9.12 New hire-OFWs Deployed to Europe by Age Group, 2009-2013 (Source: Unpublished data, POEA)

	Frequency	Percent
Below 20	10	0.0
20-24	1,101	4.0
25-29	6,029	21.6
30-34	6,782	24.3
35-39	5,548	19.9
40-44	4,420	15.9
45-49	2,541	9.1
50-54	979	3.5
55-59	352	1.3
60 and above	92	0.3
Total	27,854	100.0

Note: Information was missing for 1,337 cases.

Table 9.13 New hire-OFWs Deployed to Europe by Province of Origin 2009-2013 (Source: Unpublished data, POEA)

	Frequency	Percent
Metro Manila	3,974	15.7
Batangas	3,585	14.1
Laguna	1,323	5.2
Pangasinan	1,158	4.6
Cavite	1,012	4.0
Bulacan	800	3.2
Pampanga	773	3.1
Tarlac	746	2.9
Rizal	708	2.8
Ilocos Sur	704	2.8
Total	25,340	100.0

Note: Information was missing for 3,851 cases.

Turning to Eurostat data on the immigration of Filipino citizens to Europe, this time, European data record more Filipinos immigrating to Europe compared to the deployment data from the POEA (Table 9.14). The reason for this is the wider coverage of the Eurostat data whereas the POEA data covered only deployed workers. Those immigrating to Europe for non-work purposes – e.g., joining their families or for studies – are included in Eurostat data. Thus, even when the migration of workers may have stopped or declined, immigration numbers will remain high because of the arrival of other immigrants. This is evident in the United Kingdom. Its recruitment of nurses in the 2000s increased the Filipino population. In 2005, the Department of Health stopped actively recruiting nurses in countries receiving UK aid, thereby cutting down the yearly influx of foreign nurses from 10,000-16,000 to 2,000-2,500. As Table 9.15 shows, after 2005, the immigration of Filipino citizens continued in more or less the same scale, but this already reflects immigration for purposes other than work, including family reunification.[16] Citing Dutch sources, Maas (2011) reports that more recent Filipino immigration to the Netherlands is accounted for by family reunification.

9.2.4.2. Transformations in Filipino migration to Europe

Based on the previous discussion, a timeline of how Filipino migration to Europe evolved through the decades is summed up in Table 9.15. Some migration was already underway in the 1960s; it was in the 1970s when migration took off. By and large, Filipino migration to Europe was pioneered by women, whose migration chances had been shaped by the demand for domestic workers or nurses and marriage migration. The employment of Filipino seafarers in shipping companies owned by European-based companies or their stopovers in European ports facilitated their transition from a life at sea to a life on land. Those who jumped ship found other jobs; for the others, marriage to citizens sealed

16 The National Health Service drew up a list of developing countries which should not be targeted for the recruitment of health care professionals; this is in keeping with the WHO Code of Practice. In the case of the Philippines, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United Kingdom and the Philippines in health care cooperation, signed on 30 July 2003. The MoU enables the United Kingdom to recruit registered nurses and other health care professionals from the Philippines. Like India and China, the Philippines is considered as producing surplus nurses.

the decision to stay in Europe.

Table 9.14 Immigration of Filipino Citizens to Europe, Selected Countries, 2003-2012 (Source: Eurostat, 2013)

Country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Denmark	256	458	558	835	1,390	1,691	1,800	1,850	1,651	1,432
Germany	3,364	3,189	4,955	4,651	4,842	5,609	-	-	-	-
Spain	2,153	2,400	2,332	3,556	4,660	4,848	3,123	2,134	2,488	2,142
Italy	6,922	8,143	5,546	4,428	3,951	7,849	9,995	10,745	10,351	9,893
Netherlands	566	483	525	564	612	1,017	713	645	616	624
Sweden	361	383	386	461	486	560	632	588	580	662
United Kingdom	10,576	11,894	9,926	11,808	-	13,720	12,749	10,112	-	-
Norway	627	613	835	1,057	1,615	1,683	1,562	2,084	2,393	2,341
Switzerland	522	586	444	473	504	555	620	554	406	420

As a destination for Filipino migrants, Europe is situated between two migration regimes: permanent migration on the one hand (which operates for traditional settlement countries: the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and temporary labour migration on the other (the system in place in the Gulf countries and East and Southeast Asia). Although migrants may be initially admitted as workers, European countries offer the possibility of long-term residence and eventually citizenship to those who meet the requirements. In addition, by availing of regularisation programmes, migrants in an irregular situation were able to secure legal status. These conditions contributed to significant transformations in Filipino migration to Europe: from unauthorised migration to legal migration, from temporary migration to long-term settlement, and from highly feminised towards a more balanced gender composition. Fundamentally, these transformations also signal shifts in the concerns of Filipino communities in the continent, from labour issues to issues of integration, generational concerns and transnational interests. The most recent flows of different types of Filipino migrants to Europe, based on Philippine sources and Eurostat, are summarized in Table 9.16. The current profile of Filipinos in Europe reflects the continuation of past patterns and intimates at emerging and new developments.

Table 9.15 Phases of Filipino Migration to Europe, 1960s-2000s

Period	Profiles	Destinations
1960s	Nurses, practical nurses, midwives, seamstresses, chambermaids	Western Europe: Austria, Germany, Netherlands, UK
1970s	Domestic workers	Southern Europe: Italy, Spain, Greece
1980s	Marriage migrants, au pairs	Western Europe
1990s	Family-based migrants (the Philippine government banned au pair migration in 1997)	Southern Europe
2000s	Nurses Au pair migration resumed (the Philippine government lifted the ban in 2010)	UK, Nordic countries, Germany

Table 9.16 Overview of Filipino Migration to Europe by Type of Migration, Most Recent Year

Destination country	Immigrants (Eurostat) 2012	Permanent migrants (CFO) 2013	Temporary migrant workers (New hire OFWs) (POEA) 2013	Student migrants (UIS) 2012	Au pairs (CFO) 2013
EU COUNTRIES					
Austria					8
Belgium	632			58	16
Bulgaria	10			80	
Croatia	15				
Cyprus			973		
Czech Republic	101		19		
Denmark	1,432		6		1,177
Estonia	2				
Finland	:			56	1
France	2,142			149	1
Germany	:	609		167	59
Greece	15				
Hungary	48				
Ireland	533				
Italy	9,893	4526	226	336	
Latvia					
Lithuania	18				
Luxembourg	18				1
Malta	:		241		
Netherlands	624				315
Poland	215				
Portugal	:				
Romania	136		105		
Slovakia	1				
Slovenia	10				
Spain	2,142	868	130	71	
Sweden	290				15
United Kingdom	662	829	427	1738	
SELECTED NON-EU COUNTRIES					
Iceland					4
Norway					1,153
Switzerland					111

Notes: * Includes permanent and temporary migrants. - indicates no data or no occurrence.

8.2.3.3. Research findings about Filipinos

To elaborate on Filipino migration and settlement experience in Europe, a review of the literature was conducted. In general, the literature on Filipino migration (especially English-language literature) is not extensive. One useful reference is a volume providing an overview of the origins, developments, conditions and prospects of Filipinos in Europe, written by Filipino migrants themselves (Hoegsholm, ed., 2007). Supplemental data will be drawn from online sources. The online search led to the websites of Filipino organisations which usually present information on the history of Filipino migration, the profile of the Filipino community, and aims and activities of the organisation. Based on available information, some observations can be made about specific aspects of Filipino communities in Europe.

<u>The usual suspects</u> – As had been discussed, the story of temporary migration to Europe involves women protagonists who came as workers – domestic workers, nurses, au pairs – and stayed. The first cohorts of nurses who were recruited in Germany, Austria and Netherlands in the 1960s and early 1970s remained in these countries. Other pioneers, such as the more than 300 seamstresses who were recruited in the Berghaus ready-made textile factories in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s, were also supposed to return home after completing their contract, but the women had other ideas.

In February 1974, 48 workers were about to be repatriated to the Philippines after completing their three-year contract. However, they did not wish to return home; the Philippines was then under martial law. They were able to achieve their goal by staging a strike and a sit-in in a church in Amsterdam. The 48 were permitted to leave for Montreal, Canada; two married in the Netherlands; five proceeded to the United States; and 25 returned to the Philippines (Muizenberg, 2003: 356). The more recent recruitment of nurses by the United Kingdom, ca 2000-2005, also did not end with a return migration to the Philippines. The nurses were allowed to bring their immediate family members after a certain period of time, and thus, this big group of workers also became settlers. In 2013, the Philippines and Germany forged a bilateral agreement on the recruitment of Filipino nurses to Germany; the agreement is considered as a triple win for the Philippines, Germany and the nurses.[17] As of March 2014, 17 nurses (out of the initial target of 500) have left for Germany. It remains to be seen how this agreement will turn out.

Whereas nurse recruitment has its highs and lows, domestic worker recruitment proceeds in a more even keel. In Spain, before the introduction of the Immigration Law in 1985, Filipinos were not required to present a visa. Thus, it was easy to enter Spain as a tourist and to land a job as a domestic worker (Villaroya, 2010). Earlier, in the 1960s, some domestic workers started arriving in Spain, accompanying their employers. In Italy, Filipinos started arriving in the 1970s, either as direct hires or as tourists. Catholic missionaries or Filipino religious institutions had a hand in linking Filipino workers with Italian families in need of domestic workers (Pallida, 2000, as cited in Osteria et al., 2013: 423). Another vital role played by the Catholic Church is providing a gathering place for Filipinos and developing pastoral programmes to support them (Cominelli, as cited in Osteria et al., 2013: 423). Up until the 1980s, it is said that Filipino women saw Italy as a transit point to the United States. But from the mid-1980s, with changes in the payment system (from full-time to hourly pay) and with economic conditions at home becoming increasingly difficult, Filipinos started to consider long-term settlement in Italy. Between 1980 and 1990, family reunification stepped up, made possible by regularization programmes; the arrival of men and children helped reduce the gender imbalance of the Filipino community in Italy. In France, the first domestic workers were those who accompanied their Lebanese employers when Lebanon plunged into war in 1975. Other waves of domestic workers arrived in France following the revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980; during these times, they arrived in France with their Iranian employers. Later, the pioneers facilitated the immigration of other family members, at times using illegal channels and spending a huge amount to bring family members over.

The concentration of Filipinos in domestic work extends to the men as well. The men who joined their wives, mothers, or sisters also went into domestic work or household-related occupation, e.g., as gardeners. The entry of young Filipinos in domestic work has also been observed, suggesting the passing on of this occupation to the young generation. The research in Italy and Spain explored Filipino migrants' perceptions of the occupational prospects for the young Filipinos. In both countries, majority of respondents expected (or hoped?) for non-domestic work for their children. To achieve this, they mentioned the importance of mastering the language and university education as critical factors in moving out of the domestic work sector (Zanfrini and Sarli, 2010; Villaroya, 2010).

The economic incorporation of Filipinos in the domestic sector has affected their integration process. Filipinos tend to form close-knit communities, which promotes group solidarity on the one hand, but also distances them from other groups. Except for their employers, they have minimal contact with Italians or other immigrant groups. As a result, their Italian language is limited, despite having stayed in Italy for many years (Zanfrini and Sarli, 2010). Language limitations can also present barriers in engaging with Italian institutions. For example, one of the reasons Filipinos do not avail of the

17 For details, *see* Agreement Concerning the Placement of Filipino Health Professionals in Employment Positions in the Federal Republic of Germany in www.poea.gov.ph.

health care system in Italy or Spain is due to language differences. For illness that requires hospitalisation, instead of availing of the health care system in their host countries, Filipinos opt to travel back to the Philippines and pay for medical services. For minor illnesses, Filipinos tend to self-medicate, relying on well-known medicines in the Philippines which they have with them (Osteria, Carillo and Sarli, 2013).

Occupational mobility has been limited so far. Those who have moved out of domestic work tend to land alternative jobs in the service sector – such as hotels and restaurants or as building cleaners. In Spain, the transition from working in private households to establishments, such as hotels and restaurants, is underway (Villaroya, 2010). Their facility in English gives them an edge in landing jobs in these establishments, especially in dealing with English-speaking tourists.

Filipino organisations – Overseas Filipinos show a propensity for forming organisations and overarching or umbrella organisations and about the same propensity to disband and regroup. The joke – "where there are two Filipinos, there are three organisations" – somewhat captures these fluid organising, disbanding and reorganising tendencies.

A pioneering organisation which focused on the promotion of the rights of Filipino migrant workers is the Commission on Filipino Migrant Workers (CFMW), established in the Netherlands in 1979. In 1980, CFMW registered as an international foundation, with the following objectives (http://www.cfmw.org/about-us/strategies.html):

- *to establish, support and counsel autonomous organisations of Filipino migrant workers in order to protect and promote their rights*
- *to promote, develop and maintain the Filipino cultural identity*
- *to promote a sense of responsibility for and participation in the social struggle and development taking place in the Philippines.*

CFMW set up offices in different cities in Europe, organised Europe-wide conferences and consultations, established the Philippine Women's Network-Babaylan, and built alliances with migrants' organisations. It is a founding member of RESPECT Network, launched in 1998, to campaign for the promotion and protection of the rights of migrant domestic workers.

Most of the associations formed by Filipinos were of the social-cultural variety. From old Filipino communities, such as those in Italy, Spain and England, to more recent ones, such as those in Ireland, some commonalities can be observed across these contexts. Organisations are frequently formed along regional locations in the host country, region/province/community of origin in the Philippines, occupational groupings, religious or church-inspired, or cultural (e.g., Zanfrini and Sarli, 2010; Villaroya, 2010; Llangco, 2013; Arguillas, 2010). Several organisations may also band together to form an umbrella organisation or federation.

The registration of Filipino organisations is one of the tasks undertaken by Philippine Foreign Service Posts. These registered organisations become partners of the Philippine Embassy or Consulate in the implementation of programmes and services for the larger Filipino community. The annual celebration of Philippine Independence Day is a key event which involves the post and the Filipino community. Of the numerous Filipino organisations, only a few Filipino organisations have registered with the local authorities in their host countries. In the research and capacity-building of migrants' associations in Italy and Spain, this was one of the recommendations presented to the organisations. If they are not registered, they are cut off from information and resources offered by local or international institutions that their organisations can avail of.

In 2012, the Philippine Embassy in Rome and the CFO organised the Diaspora-2-Dialogue (D2D) conference in Rome, which was attended by representatives of Filipino organisations from fifteen countries in Europe. The conference concluded with the "Rome Declaration" and the formation of the European Network of the Filipino Diaspora (ENFID). The Rome Declaration is “a framework to strengthen the Fil-Euro Diaspora’s capacity to (a) interact/work with multi-sectors of both host and home countries; and (b) encourage participation, and empower the migrants, in the integration/reintegration process of both host and home countries” (*see* http://enfid.org/). The statement of Gene Alcantara, Chairperson of ENFID, which appears on its website, reflects a transnational perspective which alludes to the European and Filipino identities of Filipinos in the continent and their developmental role in the global context.

> *We the Filipinos of Europe, 800,000 and rising, are beginning to speak with one voice, A voice that we want heard. Linked by the European Network of Filipino Diaspora From the frozen Norwegian tundras in the north Down to the craggy shores of Valetta in the south From the sandy shores of Cascais in the west To the Russian Ural Mountains in the east. North, south, west, east and central. We work, we serve, We laugh, we cry. We are new Europeans. We are here to stay Sure of our role as glocal agents of change, A growing political, social and economic force. Forever Filipinos. With annual remittances of US$ 3.35 billion We support our families, our nation. Heed us: we are partners For development, For the future.*

Filipino entrepreneurs - Entrepreneurship is a mode of incorporation where Filipinos are largely invisible either in traditional settlement countries or in the European context. In Italy, out of 200 Filipino respondents in Rome and Milan, only 5.3 percent were engaged in business (Zanfrini and Sarli, 2010: 168). In Spain, of the 113 Filipinos who were economically active, 13.3 percent were self-employed (Villaroya, 2010: 272). At least two studies have interrogated Filipino immigrant businesses in Europe: Fresnoza-Flot and Pecoud’s research on Filipino businesses in Paris (2007), Maas’ (2011, 2007) inquiry of Filipino entrepreneurs in the Netherlands, and Arguillas’ (2011) discussion of Filipino-run businesses in Ireland. Across the three studies, the emergence of business ventures went hand in hand with the growing Filipino population. In part, this association underscores the focus of these businesses in responding to the needs and interests of co-ethnics. The *balikbayan* box or door-to-door business,[18] Filipino restaurants/catering business, the selling of phone cards (i.e., before mobile phones became ubiquitous), and dealing in real estate properties in the Philippines are common business ventures.

Focusing on the businesses of 27 Filipino entrepreneurs in Paris, Fresnoza-Flot and Pecoud (2007) highlight four characteristics which are departures from typical immigrant businesses:

- the businesses are not concentrated in immigrant neighborhoods; they are more dispersed geographically;
- women are more visible as entrepreneurs, which is atypical since women usually figure as unpaid workers in male-run businesses; in part, this is a function of the highly feminised composition of the Filipino population in Paris;
- gay-run businesses, particularly in the beauty and hairdressing line, were uncovered by the study; and
- the Catholic Church (St. Bernadette Catholic Church, in particular) was seen as playing an important role in the organisation and development of Filipino businesses by providing a meeting point where Filipinos meet and exchange information.

Maas (2011) did an in-depth study of 29 Filipino entrepreneurs in the Netherlands. Their businesses are distributed as follows: eight door-to-door, five catering (restaurant, bed and breakfast), four travel agencies; 10 trade; and two migration brokers (au pairs, nurses). Except for those in the bed

18 *Balikbayan* (literally, returnee to the homeland) boxes are boxes filled with gifts that are sent by overseas Filipinos to their families and friends in the Philippines. The advantages of this service are the payment of a fixed fee per box, regardless of the weight, the delivery to the doorstep of the recipient (hence, “door-to-door business”). These are shopped, thus, delivery time would range from 1-3 months. Companies that are in this business may also offer door-to-door delivery of remittances, especially during the times when sending remittances through the banks ori money transfer operators were not widely available or were exorbitant.

and breakfast line of business, the rest of the businesses were mostly directed to a Filipino clientele. Incidentally, these businesses were run by gay men. Her work contributed to filling the gap about Filipinos in the Netherlands and making visible the participation of Filipinos in entrepreneurship. Her use of the transnational lens in explaining immigrant entrepreneurship is another value-added contribution. The gay men who run the bed and breakfast businesses were the least involved in nurturing transnational links to the Philippines; for them, leaving the Philippines liberated them from what they saw as confining social environment. Nonetheless, as Maas (2011) points out, their businesses deploy Filipino cultural symbols and artefacts. A key conclusion of the study is that Filipino immigrant businesses are "beyond business." She found that entrepreneurs invest social and emotional meaning to their ventures – engaging in business was a way to maintain and develop their work skills, self-confidence and to contribute as active members of society.[19]

Political exiles – The crackdown on dissent during the martial law period compelled the flight of activists, journalists, religious and cultural workers. The Netherlands, particularly Utrecht, was a favoured place of refuge for those fleeing the politically untenable situation in the Philippines. Utrecht was a logical choice for political exiles because of the concentration of Dutch volunteers who have spent years of working with the poor in the Philippines, an engagement that enjoined some of them to become members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). The National Democratic Front (NDF), a coalition of progressive organisations, also chose Utrecht as the site of its central office in Europe. The restoration of democracy in 1986 under Corazon City did not put an end to the departure of political exiles. The breakdown of the peace talks between the Philippine government and the NDF triggered more political exiles seeking asylum in the Netherlands. After 1986, it became difficult to be recognised as a political refugee in the Netherlands; this is highlighted in the case of Jose Maria Sison, one of the founders of the CPP, who was not granted status as a political refugee (Maglipon, 1999). The community of political exiles in is an atypical group of Filipino migrants in Europe and Utrecht as a distinct place of refuge.

Generational issues – The transformation of Filipino communities into settler communities implies the emergence of generational issues. Presently, Filipino communities comprise members spanning different phases of the life cycle: children, youth/young adults, adults, mid-lifers and the elderly. Young Filipinos in Europe may belong to either the 1.5 or the second-generation. The former are children who were born in the Philippines, had lived in the Philippines and migrated to Europe before reaching 18 years old, while the latter are children born to at least one Filipino parent (i.e., foreign-born) in the host country. This division, however, is not that straightforward. Children of Filipino immigrants who were born in the host country may be "sent home" by their parents to be raised and schooled in the Philippines and would be reunited with their parents at a later time. Similarly, the 1.5 generation, while being born and raised in the Philippines, may spend some time in the host country of their immigrant parents (*see* Zanfrini and Asis, 2006 for a discussion of the children of Filipinos in Italy; Llangco, 2013 for a discussion of the children of Filipinos in England). The issue of the young generation should also consider children in divorced/separated families, international marriages, including those who are living or reuniting with their parent and step-families.

Although they may be ethnically Filipino, the 1.5 and second generations are far from monolithic (e.g., *see* Ignacio, 2004 for a discussion on the divide between the 1.5 and second generation Filipino-Americans). Overall, the 1.5 generation of Filipinos encounter more difficulties in integrating in the countries of destination (e.g., Liamzon, 2007; Zanfrini and Asis, 2006; Fresnoza-Flot, 2009). Not knowing the language of the destination country has far reaching effects on the self-esteem, school performance, job prospects and general well-being of young Filipinos.

Concerns over the young generation have been aired in community fora. To ensure that they do not

19 "Beyond business" also means the business provides support to the home community in the Philippines, a small-scale expression of corporate social responsibility (*see* Maas, 2011, 2006).

forget their Filipino heritage, organisations offer Filipino language lessons and involve them in cultural presentations. These interventions do contribute to the young generation's awareness and claim of Filipino identity (e.g., *see* Llangco, 2013). Problems between parents and children arise because of different expectations. Filipino parents expect their children to behave like Filipinos, which the children may not be able to live up to because of their exposure to the host environment. The long hours parents spend at work to earn more money for the family can be counterproductive because they prevent families to spend time together and to be aware of each other's concerns.

While attention has been given to issues concerning the generation, what has been less recognised and less discussed is the ageing of the Filipinos in Europe. Retirement plans, pensions, and return migration to the Philippines will likely loom in the research, policy and advocacy activities in the near future.

<u>Transnational links with the Philippines</u> – The primary links of Filipinos to the homeland are their families in the Philippines. These are articulated by the sending of remittances, sending of gifts, regular communications, and visits to the Philippines (e.g., Zanfrini and Sarli, 2010; Villaroya, 2010; Fresnoza-Flot, 2009). As may be recalled, these are the lines of business of Filipino entrepreneurs. The research on Filipinos in Italy and Spain points to the frequent and regular visits to their home communities. Those in an irregular situation are constrained to visit their families in the Philippines for fear that once they leave, they would be unable to return. In France, where many are in an irregular situation, mothers would resort to having their children over for vacation (Fresnoza-Flot, 2009). Another expression of the continuing links with their home communities is the interest to be updated with events. Despite the multiple sources of information that are available, the topmost source of information are family and friends in the Philippines, and aspects of Philippine life that are of interest to overseas Filipinos are family matters and hometown news and events (Villaroya, 2010; Zanfrini and Sarli, 2010).

Overseas Filipinos based in Europe also evince an interest in supporting development projects in the Philippines. Data from the long-running *Lingkod sa Kapwa Pilipino* (Service to Fellow Filipinos), also known as the Link to Philippine Development Programme of the CFO, show substantial contributions from Europe-based Filipinos. Of the total donations coursed through CFO for the years 1990-2012, the largest chunk, close to 90 percent, come from Filipinos in the United States. Nonetheless, four countries in Europe – Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden – are among the top ten source countries of donations (CFO, 2013: 70). Examples of Europe-based Filipino associations partnering with Philippine institutions to support development programmes in the Philippines are featured in *Transnational Bridges: Migration, Development and Solidarity in the Philippines* (Asis et al., eds., 2010).

The interest to support or contribute to the development of the home country, particularly, their hometowns, has been expressed by overseas Filipinos in Italy and Spain. More than 40 percent of Filipinos in both countries had supported at least one development project, and more than half mentioned wanting to support such an endeavor in the future (Zanfrini and Sarli, 2010; Villaroya, 2010). Concerns about corruption and general distrust of government institutions are reasons for approaching family or non-government entities (particularly the Catholic Church) as partners or cooperators in the Philippines (Baggio and Asis, 2006).

9.3 Flows And Trends Of Transnational Migration To The Philippines

8.3.1 Return migration to the Philippines

The Philippines is a minor player as a destination of international migrants. This status is reflected in the minimal data on migrant inflows, including the lack of data on return migration, and the stymied efforts in updating the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The dearth of data on return migration contrasts with the attention given to recording and monitoring migrant outflows. To date, there is no official estimate of how many Filipino migrant workers have returned to the country. What is known is the tendency of OFWs to extend their employment overseas, as indicated by the high percentage of rehires in the yearly deployment of OFWs. Other than small-scale studies on specific groups of return migrants (e.g., women migrants, distressed migrants), there is no readily available information on the profile of returnees. By adding data on new hires and subtracting the current stock estimate of overseas Filipino workers, approximately 3.5-4.5 million migrant workers (i.e., considering the double counting of new hires and the limitations of the stock estimate) may have returned to the Philippines since the overseas employment programme started in the mid-1970s (IOM and SMC, 2013: 134). As to whether their return is permanent or for good cannot be ascertained. They may have left their countries of employment, but it is possible that they could have re-migrated to other destinations. A study examining re-migration (also known as secondary migration or two-step migration) shows that migration is not just limited to one destination (Takenaka, 2007). Using visa and census data as of 2000, the study found that about 12.7 percent of immigrants to the United States came from countries other than where they were born. Interestingly, among the top three countries who have re-migrated to the United States, the Philippines ranks third to India and China. Prior to migrating to the United States, re-migrants had been in Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and Israel. The Filipino migrants' propensity to re-migrate hold also true for migrant workers, as suggested by some studies (e.g., Asis, 2001). However, systematic data on these onward movements are very much lacking, hence findings to date are tentative.

The return migration of Filipino workers from Europe is a big question mark. Interviews with Filipinos in Italy and Spain reveal intentions of returning to the Philippines someday (Zanfrini and Sarli, 2010; Villaroya, 2010; Baggio and Asis, 2006). However, concrete plans of returning to the Philippines tend to be flimsy. The fact that immediate family members have already joined them or that the younger generation may have other plans are factors that could change return migration intentions. Some retirees the United Kingdom had made their way back home but returned to the United Kingdom, which they realised have become their home (Alcantara, 2007).

Eurostat data on emigration from Europe by Filipino citizens may hint at some return migration to the Philippines. The Eurostat database defines emigration as "the action by which a person, having previously been usually resident in the territory of a Member State, ceases to have his or her usual residence in that Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months." Based on this definition, the data encompass both temporary and permanent emigration. Emigration from Europe, however, does not mean solely return migration (temporary or permanent) to the Philippines. Filipino citizens emigrating from Europe may re-migrate to a destination other than the home country. Another caveat that must be kept in mind is that the data are missing for countries such as Germany, France, Greece and the United Kingdom where there is a significant presence of Filipinos. In 2012, a total of 5,329 Filipino citizens emigrated from Europe, of which the largest outflows are from Spain, Denmark and Norway (Table 9.17).

Table 9.17 Emigration of Filipino Citizens by Sex, 2012 (Source: Eurostat)

Source Country	Males	Females	Total
1. Spain	549	911	1,460
2. Denmark	67	987	1,054
3. Norway	50	803	853
4. Ireland	398	272	670
5. Italy	200	239	439
6. Switzerland	83	187	270
7. Netherlands	40	198	238
Subtotal	1,387	3,597	4,984
Other countries	87	218	305
Total	**1,474**	**3,815**	**5,289**

Note: Data are missing for major destinations of Filipino migrants, notably Germany, Greece, France and the United Kingdom.

Return migration data on student migration from Europe have been collated from online sources. Scholarships in European countries have enabled an unknown number of Filipinos to acquire further studies or training in their respective fields. According to Muizenberg (2003: 359), more than 2,000 Filipinos have received post-graduate training in the Netherlands. The Embassy of Germany provides information on alumni associations of former scholars to Germany, and interestingly, there is even an umbrella organisation called the Federation of Alumni Associations of Former Scholars to Germany from the Philippines (see http://www.manila.diplo.de/Vertretung/manila/en/07/alumni__orgs.html). The Philippines is one of 14 countries in Asia participating in the Erasmus Mundus Mobility with Asia (EMMA). Started in 2004, the programme funds the mobility flows of students and staff from partner and eligible countries in Asia to spend one semester or more in a partner university in Europe (see http://emmasia.udn.vn/). Between 2004 and 2013, 224 Filipinos have availed of this programme. Former grantees have formed the Erasmus Mundus Association-Philippines (*see* https://www.facebook.com/EMAPhilippines) and the Philippines also became part of the larger Erasmus Mundus Students and Alumni Association - South East Asia (EMA-SEA) which was formed in 2008 (*see* https://www.facebook.com/EMASEAchapter/info).

8.3.2 Foreign citizens, international travellers, foreign workers and international students

Based on available data, this section presents a sketch of foreign citizens, inbound travellers and immigrants to the country, with a particular focus on the transnational migration of Europeans. We will begin by presenting some data from the 2010 census on foreign citizens in the Philippines. As of 1 May 2010, there were 177,365 foreign citizens in the Philippines; the total number accounts for 0.2 percent of the total household population (NSO, 2012). The five major countries of origin of foreign citizens were the following: (1) United States – 29,972; (2) China – 28,705; (3) Japan – 11, 584; (4) India – 9,007; and (5) Canada – 4,700. Altogether, the top five countries accounted for close to half, 47.34 percent, of the total population of foreign citizens in the Philippines (NSO, 2012). Foreign citizens from European countries are presented in Table 9.18; the data are limited to European countries with at least 100 citizens in the Philippines. Fifteen European countries meet this criterion, with the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain and France as the top five source countries.

Table 9.18 European Countries with At Least 100 of Their Citizens Residing in the Philippines (as of 1 May 2010 Census) (Source: PSA-NSO (2012)

Country	No. of Citizens in the Philippines
1. United Kingdom	3,604
2. Germany	3,184
3. Italy	1,460
4. Spain	1,099
5. France	1,014
6. Switzerland	872
7. Turkey	739
8. Sweden	513
9. Belgium	445
10. Austria	424
11. The Netherlands	407
12. Denmark	374
13. Hungary	206
14. Greece	129
15. Armenia	115

Next, we turn to international visitors coming to the Philippines. Although they are not counted as international migrants (because of their short stay), this information offers a glimpse of internationally mobile persons. From 2010, the number of international visitors has been increasing and will likely increase in view of the government's campaign to reach 10 million visitors by 2016. Europe ranks third to Asia and the Americas as the source region of international travellers to the Philippines (Table 9.19). Recent tourist-friendly reforms introduced by the Bureau of Immigration aim to facilitate the extension of stay in the Philippines. This is already evident among Korean visitors, who have shown a tendency to remain longer in the country. Korean visitors include those enrolled in English-language courses, which may require a longer stay to complete their programme of study. Another window for longer stay or residence in the Philippines is through the Special Resident Retiree's Visa, a programme aimed at attracting retirees to invest and to stay in the Philippines. A government owned and controlled corporation, the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA), manages the programme. According to the organisation's website, the names of retiree associations indicate the foreigners who are participating in this programme – PRA Japanese Club, EURAMA Association (for those from Europe and the Americas), and United Korean Community Association in the Philippines (*see* http://www.pra.gov.ph/main/retiree_association?page=1).

Table 9.19 Visitors Arrivals by Country of Residence, 2010-2012 (Source: Data are from the Department of Tourism as cited in Table 8.1 in NSCB (2013)

	2010	2011	2012
Grand Total	**3,520,471**	**3,917,454**	**4,272,811**
Asia	1,960,819	2,286,441	2,535,312
America	711,355	747,656	783,295
Europe	360,991	389,823	442,686
Oceania	203,211	228,144	252,711
Africa	3,584	4,193	5,163
Overseas Filipinos	228,445	207,152	215,943

Foreigners working in the Philippines constitute a small number as indicated by data on the number of alien employment permits issued by the Department of Labour and Employment (Table 9.20). In the past, Americans and British were the majority of alien employment permit holders; those coming from Japan and China, and recently, South Korea, are currently the major national groups of foreign workers in the country.

Table 9.20 Alien Employment Permits (AEPs) Issued by Nationality, Philippines: 2005-2011 (Source: Data are from the Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics, as cited in IOM and SMC (2013: 48)

	American	British	Chinese	Japanese	Korean	Others	Total
2005	562	403	1,370	3,367	2,499	2,622	10,823
2006	665	391	1,592	3,469	3,296	2,922	12,335
2007	605	384	1,754	3,414	3,713	3,722	13,592
2008	657	375	1,929	2,953	3,308	3,377	12,599
2009	644	302	1,776	2,751	3,007	3,738	12,218
2010	766	423	2,287	2,732	3,490	4,627	14,325
2011	1,001	285	3,604	3,204	3,839	5,209	17,142

Concerning international students at the tertiary level, the number of inbound students is much smaller compared to the number of outbound students. According to UNESCO International Statistics, as of 2012, there were 2,665 international students enrolled in the country's higher education institutions. The top five major origin countries of inbound students are largely from within Asia: South Korea, China, Iran, United States and North Korea (Table 9.21). Other countries in the region – China, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea – are way ahead in establishing themselves as hubs for international students (even as these countries also have significant outflows of students). The establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community in 2015 may spur more student mobility within the region. In preparation for this, the Philippines is changing its academic calendar to be in sync with the rest of the ASEAN countries. Some universities, such as the University of the Philippines, will change the start of the academic year from June to August beginning this 2014. Others are expected to follow suit in the succeeding years.

Table 9.21 Top Source Countries of International Students to the Philippines, 2012 (Source: UIS (2014)

Country	Number
1. South Korea	551
2. China	550
3. Iran	284
4. United States	280
5. North Korea	142
Others	778

9.3.3 Europeans in the Philippines

Academic literature dealing with the migration of Europeans to the Philippines is very sparse. One of the notable exceptions is the work of Van Den Muizenberg (2004, 2003) who wrote on the two-way migration between the Philippines and the Netherlands. Dutch migrants and visitors to the Philippines include missionaries, academics, and volunteers engaged in development work. To augment the patchy data on Europeans in the Philippines, websites of embassies of European countries in the Philippines were consulted. In their websites, European countries invariably refer to their long-term relations with the Philippines.[20] Several embassies referred to the presence of Filipinos in their respective countries (such was the case for the United Kingdom and Italy) or the role of Filipinos in their businesses (e.g., Norway mentions the 25,000 seafarers on Norwegian ships). They establish their links in the country through various ways:

- The presence of nationals – the United Kingdom mentions that 115,000 nationals visit the Philippines and some 15,000 reside in the Philippines; Norway refers to the presence of 3,000 nationals, mostly connected with the shipping industry; France and Italy make mention of the volunteers in various fields. It is interesting to note that Norway's embassy has a Maritime Sec-

20 The following websites are the sources of information cited in this section: https://www.gov.uk/government/world/philippines; http://www.manila.diplo.de/; http://www.ambmanila.esteri.it/Ambasciata_Manila; http://www.ambafrance-ph.org/-Embassy-of-France-in-Manila-; http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Embajadas/MANILA; http://www.norway.ph/. The websites of other embassies were also consulted but they have little information relevant to the project. The research team invited selected embassies to the launch of EURA-NET Philippines on 18 June 2014 and to make a presentation about their nationals in the Philippines. They were not able to attend nor participate in the meeting.

tion, which speaks of the importance of this sector in promoting the interests of both countries. According to the embassy's website, Norway has an ongoing programme to support maritime education in the Philippines. Some national groups have formed associations to foster fellowship among their members. One example is the long-established German Club (http://www.germanclub.ph/index.php/about-us/history). A variant is the formation of an organisation that promotes ties with the local society, such as the Philippine-Italian Association.

- The presence of development agencies, foundations and non-government organisations –
- The website of the German Embassy has a listing of German organisations operating in the Philippines. The presence of these organisations imply the transnational migration of personnel who are likely to have a relatively long-term stay as well the comings and goings of personnel who may travel to the Philippines for assignments and projects. As mentioned by Muizenberg (2004, 2003), the Dutch missionaries, volunteers and development workers who had spent time in the Philippines (particularly during the martial law period) contributed to the rise of intercultural marriages with Filipino women, which in turn, added to the population of the Filipino community in the Netherlands.
- The establishment of schools – The British School (est. 1976), the German School (est. 1981), and the French School (est.1988) are among the international schools in the Philippines; all are located in Metro Manila.
- The establishment of organisations to promote economic, cultural and social ties with the Philippines – The European Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines is "a service-oriented organization whose main goal is to foster close economic ties and business relations between the Philippines and Europe. The ECCP does this by providing a wide range of business services and by creating linkages between companies, organizations and individuals with existing or potential business interests in Europe and the Philippines."[21] At least five cultural institutions have been founded in the Philippines; among others, they usually include the teaching and promotion of their language. The oldest is Alliance Francaise de Manille (1920); it has expanded outside of Metro Manila with the establishment of Alliance Francaise de Cebu (2007), which grew out of the Les Amis de France; the Goethe Institut (1961); the British Council (1978); and Instituto Cervantes (1994). The Embassy of Italy offers Italian language through the Dante Alighieri Society.

This initial work will be expanded in the next stage of the EURA-NET project. The collection of primary data on the transnational mobility of Europeans in the Philippines will offer the possibility to examine the Philippines as a destination country and to probe the transformative characteristics of European migration in a country that has been more accustomed to outmigration.

9.4 Conclusion

This report highlighted temporary transnational migration based on the experience of a country of origin. Temporary migration from the Philippines is primarily labour migration in which the country has acquired a wealth of experience. The Philippines' involvement with temporary labour migration is instructive of how the best-laid plans can have unexpected results. Destination countries in the Gulf region and Asia purposely designed labour migration to be temporary – and yet, forty years later, the very same countries continue to rely on labour migration to meet their labour needs. On the part of an origin country like the Philippines, labour migration was also envisioned to be a stop-gap meas-

21 Source: http://www.eccp.com/membership-benefits.php. According to the same source, ECCP has over 700 members and has close to three-decades of experience in advocating for a better business climate in the Philippines.

ure –and four decades after, it does not show signs of abating. In the Gulf and Asian context, labour migration continues without workers in less skilled occupations becoming settlers. The destination countries continue to need workers but the human beings who come are treated only as workers.

Filipino migration to Europe also evolved in ways that were not anticipated. Europe was a transit place for some Filipino migrants, and for others, an accidental destination, having been brought to the continent by their employers from other countries. The possibilities to regularise their legal status, to have long-term residence, and to access citizenship made it possible for migrant workers to transition to settlement. With family reunification, migrants have been joined by family members, which increased and diversified the Filipino communities in Europe. As a consequence, the concerns of Filipinos are no longer confined to labour issues, but have now extended to other aspects, such as family adjustments following reunification, raising children in Europe, nurturing Filipino culture in the young generation, health concerns, the greying of the Filipino community, retirement plans, including returning to the Philippines, and so forth. Addressing these issues will require Filipinos to engage with actors and institutions beyond the Philippine Embassy and the Filipino community. Navigating this terrain will require facility with the language that will empower Filipinos to interact with the local society and to promote engagement with other immigrant groups. Despite their long presence in destination countries, they tend to be invisible in the public arena. While Filipinos enjoy a positive reputation in the host countries – they have high employment and they do not figure in criminal activities – they tend to keep to themselves. Institutions in migrant receiving countries in Europe also have a responsibility to ensure that policies and programmes are inclusive of third-country nationals like Filipinos. The settlement of third-country nationals in Europe is reminiscent of the emergence of the "new immigration" in traditional countries of settlement when old paradigms of immigrant incorporation gave way to new approaches. In relation to the Philippines, as had been suggested in an earlier study, Philippine government institutions, particularly Foreign Service Posts, have to be cognizant of the changing demographics and changing nature of Filipino communities in their countries of assignment to develop appropriate programmes and services (Asis and Roma, 2010). The keen interest of overseas Filipinos to maintain links with the home country and to support development endeavours suggests real potential to foster meaningful transnational links.

International migration to the Philippines is of a much smaller scale. Trend and patterns of the return migration of Filipinos are less known compared to outmigration from the Philippines. The transformation of temporary migration to settlement, the continuous renewal of work contracts, or the option of re-migrating to other destinations suggest trajectories other than return migration as final stage of the migration process. As to the transnational migration of Europeans to the Philippines, this counter-flow is numerically insignificant; nonetheless, the impact of this migration cannot be dismissed as trivial. The solidarity with the poor that the Dutch volunteers nurtured during their stay in the Philippines has had far-reaching consequences, including fostering solidarity with Filipino migrant workers in the Netherlands and in Europe in general. The contribution of Norwegians in strengthening maritime education in the Philippines is another example of how European migration may create some impact on Philippine society.

The empirical phase of the EURA-NET project is expected to unearth hitherto lesser known and understood aspects of transnational temporary migrations between the Philippines and Europe, an important step towards better knowledge, better understanding, and better policies.

References

Arguillas, F.O.(2011) The Transnational Lives of Filipino Nurses in Ireland in the Midst of an Emerging Philippines-Ireland Migration System, PhD dissertation, Cornell University

Asis, M.M.B. (2005) The Filipinos in Sabah: Unauthorised, Unwanted and Unprotected. In: Jatrana, S., Toyota, M. and Yeoh, B.S.A. (eds) Migration and Health in Asia. London and New York: Routledge.

Asis, M.M.B. (2004) Borders, Globalization and Irregular migration in Southeast Asia. In: Ananta, A. and Arifin, E. N. (eds) International Migration in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Asis, M.M.B.and G.M.Roma (2010) Eyes on the Prize: Towards a Migration and Development Agenda in the Philippines. In: Baggio, F. (ed), Brick by Brick: Building Cooperation between the Philippines and Migrants' Associations in Italy and Spain. Manila: Scalabrini Migration Center.

Asis,M.M.B., Baggio, F., Palabrica, J.M. and Roma, G.M. (eds.) (2010) *Transnational Bridges: Migration, Development and Solidarity in the Philippines.* Manila: Commission on Filipinos Overseas and Scalabrini Migration Center.

Baggio, F. and Asis, M.M.B. (2006) Global Workers, Local Philanthropists: Filipinos in Italy and the Tug of Home. In: V. Naerssen, T, Spaan, E. and Zommers, A. (eds), Global Migration and Development. New York and London: Routledge.

Battistella, G. and Asis, M.M.B. (2011) Protecting Filipino Transnational Domestic Workers: Government Regulations and Their Outcomes. Discussion Paper Series No. 2011-12. Makati City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. Available at http://www.pids.gov.ph/dp.php?id=5006&pubyear=2011

Battistella, G., Asis, M.M.B. and Abubakar, C. (1997) Migration from the Philippines to Malaysia: An Exploratory Study. Research report submitted to the International Organization for Migration. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center.

Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) (2013) *CFO Compendium of Statistics on International Migration*. 2nd edition. Manila: CFO.

Fresnoza-Flot, A. (2009) Migration Status and Transnational Mothering: The Case of Filipino Migrants in France, *Global Networks*, 9(2): 252-270.

Fresnoza-Flot, A. and Pecoud, A. (2007). Emergence of entrepreneurship among Filipino immigrants in Paris, *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 16(1): 1-28.

Hoegsholm, F. M. (ed.) (2007). *In de Olde Worlde: Views of Filipino Migrants in Europe*. Quezon City: Philippine Social Science Council and Philippine Migration Research Network.

Ignacio, E.N. (2004) *Building Diaspora: Filipino Cultural Community Formation on the Internet*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Llangco, M.O. (2013) Transnationalised Belonging: Second Generation Filipinos in England. MA thesis, The University of Birmingham.

Maas, M. (2011). Filipino Immigrant Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands: Beyond Business. PhD dissertation, Radboud University.

Maas, M. (2005) Transnational Entrepreneurship: Exploring Determinants and Impacts of a Dutch-based Immigrant Business, *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 14(1-2): 19-192.

Maglipon, J. (1999) A Community of Exiles, *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 8(1-2):239-267.

Malit, F.T. Jr and Youha, A.A. (2013) Labor Migration in the United Arab Emirates: Challenges and Responses, Migration Information Source, 18 September 2013, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/labor-migration-united-arab-emirates-challenges-and-responses, accessed on 2

May 2014.
Martin, P. (2001) There is Nothing More Permanent than Temporary Migration, Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/TemporaryWorkers-Overstays, accessed on 20 May 2014.
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) (2013) *2013 Philippine Statistical Yearbook*. Makati City: NSCB.
Osteria,T., Carillo, D. and Sarli, A. (2013) *The Health Dimension of Asian Migration to Europe.* Manila: Published by De La Salle University for Asia-Europe Foundation.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) (n.d.) Compendium of OFW Statistics, 2013. Available at http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/statistics.html
Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistics Office (PSA-NSO) (2012). Foreign Citizens in the Philippines (Results from the 2010 Census). Available at http://census.gov.ph/content/foreign-citizens-philippines-results-2010-census
Takenaka, A. (2007) Secondary migration: who re-migrates and why these migrants matter? Migration Information Source, 26 April 2007, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/secondary-migration-who-re-migrates-and-why-these-migrants-matter, accessed on 2 May 2014.
UNESCO International Statistics (UIS) (2014) Global Flow of Tertiary Level Students from/to the Philippines (as of 6 April 2014).
United States Department of State (2001-2014) Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: Department of State.
Van Den Muizenberg, O. (2003) A short history of social connections between the Philippines and the Netherlands, Philippine Studies, 51(3): 339-374.
Villaroya, E. (2010) Filipino Migrants' Associations in Spain as Potential Agents of Change In: Baggio, F. (ed), Brick by Brick: Building Cooperation between the Philippines and Migrants' Associations in Italy and Spain. Manila: Scalabrini Migration Center.
Zanfrini, L.and Sarli, A. (2010) What are the Opportunities for Organizing the Filipino Diaspora in Italy? Lessons from the MAPID Project. In: Baggio, F. (ed), Brick by Brick: Building Cooperation between the Philippines and Migrants' Associations in Italy and Spain. Manila: Scalabrini Migration Center.
Zanfrini, L.and Asis, M.M.B. (eds) (2006) *Orgoglio e pregiudizio: una ricerca tra Filippine e Italia sulla transizione all'eta attiva dei figli de emigrati e dei figli de immigrati*. Milan: FrancoAngeli.

10. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF TEMPORARY MIGRATION TO AND FROM THAILAND

Manasigan KANCHANACHITRA, Sakkarin NIYOMSILPA and Sureeporn PUNPUING

10.1 Introduction

There has been a long history of migration between Thailand and Europe for various reasons. Thais migrate to Europe mainly for work, family reunion, training, study and temporary visits. On the other hand, Europeans are increasingly migrating to Thailand for reasons including work, retirement, marriage, and medical treatment.

In this report, we discuss the flows and patterns of temporary migration to and from Thailand using data from various sources. The aim is to understand the contemporary pattern of temporary migration between Thailand and Europe. The period that we focus on is from year 2005 to the most current data that are available.

We begin by discussing the flows and patterns of migration from Thailand to Europe, which include labour migration, marriage migration, and education migration. The majority of Thais migrate to Europe for work and we observe a continuously increasing trend. Marriage migration is another type of migration that seems to be increasing in recent years, with many Thai women migrants now residing in European countries.

The flows of migration from Europe to Thailand has received little attention in research in the past, as the number is not as significant and there are relatively few issues arising from this type of migration. However, it has been observed in recent years that the number of migration from Europe to Thailand is on the rise with the emergence of 'lifestyle migration'. Retirement and medical migration in particular are becoming more popular in past years, and with Thailand's policies that support these types of migration, we can expect a continuous growth in the future.

10.2 Methodology

In order to understand the flows and patterns of temporary migration to and from Thailand, we use data from various sources. For migration patterns from Thailand to Europe, we rely mainly on official sources including Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Thailand Ministry of Labour.

Data from the Department of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offer a comprehensive overview of the number of Thais residing in each country. The numbers are reported by Thai Embassies and Consulates in the destination country. This data source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is considered to sufficiently reflect the patterns and flows of Thais residing abroad to a certain level. However, a major drawback of the numbers obtained from consulates and embassies is that they are estimates by the Thai Embassies/Consulates at based on the number of registered Thais in those destination countries. Since registration is not compulsory, the numbers may only serve as a rough estimate.

Thailand Ministry of Labour (MOL) provides only data of those who applied for working abroad through MOL. There is a significant number of Thai workers who work illegally in foreign countries, while they stay legally in these countries, particularly Thais who marry and live with their spouses in Europe, and those who overstay their visa. The MOL could not record these temporary migrants in the database. However, data from MOL give us trend and magnitude of legal temporary migrant workers from Thailand.

Another main source of data for Thais in Europe is from Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), Ministry of Labour. TOEA oversees the deployment of Thai workers abroad and maintains a record of those deployed overseas through legal channels. These numbers thus provide insights to the flows and patterns of Thai workers to Europe over the years. Data collected by TOEA can be disaggregated according to the destination country, the type of job, the worker's province of origin, etc. Again, it must be noted that these numbers do not include Thai workers who migrate to work through irregular channels, such as those overstaying their visas in the destination country or entering the destination country illegally. Although we are very much interested in learning more about irregular migrants, they are difficult to track and there is no data source to our knowledge that comprehensively collects these data.

Thailand sends many students to study in Europe each year. Unfortunately, there is no organisation in Thailand that keeps track of the number of students sent abroad. The Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) in Thailand has a record of all students with government scholarships who pursue their education abroad and students on private money who choose to register with the Commission. Therefore, the numbers obtained from OCSC underestimates the total number of Thai students going abroad each year, but they do provide a valuable insight to student migratory trends. To reflect a more accurate picture of the overall flows and patterns of Thai students in Europe, we also rely on data from the destination countries such as from OECD. The destination countries often provide a more reliable data source as they record the number of Thais entering their country under a Student Visa.

To gather information about migration from Europe to Thailand, on the other hand, an important source of data that we utilise is from Thailand Immigration Bureau. The Bureau records all arrivals at every port of entry to Thailand, and therefore the data provide a powerful insight to the patterns and trends of migration from Europe to Thailand over the years. It should be noted that the Immigration Bureau records the number of entries into the Kingdom of Thailand, not the number of people—or migrants—coming into Thailand. This means that if one person enters Thailand multiple times within a certain period, he will be counted by how many times he entered the country. The data that are collected include the nationality of the person entering Thailand, type of visa used, and the point of entry.

For the number of Europeans working in Thailand, the Office of Foreign Workers Administration provides the number of Work Permits granted each year, disaggregated by the nationality of the recipient and their work sector/industry. However, many foreigners in Thailand work illegally, typically by overstaying their tourist visas, and oftentimes opt for the so-called "visa-run", where the tourist can extend their stay by leaving Thailand to another neighbouring country and returning back to Thailand immediately. The Immigration Bureau has a record of only the numbers of entries into Thailand, but does not have a record of how many times a certain person has re-entered the country using the "visa-run" method. These foreigners thus do not have a Work Permit, whereas the numbers as obtained by the Office of Foreign Workers Administration are only limited to foreigners who work in Thailand legally.

10.3 Migration from Thailand to Europe

There are different types of out-migration of Thais to Europe, which include labour migration, family migration and reunion, training, study and temporary visits. It is estimated that there were 1,039,032 Thais living or working in foreign countries based on data collected from 92 Thai embassies and consulates in 2012. Figure 10.1 shows that the largest proportion of Thais was in America and the South Pacific (39 per cent), followed by East Asia (30 per cent), Europe (24 per cent) and South Asia, Middle East and Africa (7 per cent). It is presumed that a large proportion of Thais in East Asia are contract labourers or trainees/trainers who went to work in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.



Figure 10.1 Estimated number of Thais living/working outside of Thailand by region, 2012 (Source: Department of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013)

For those Thais in Europe, almost 60,000 live, work or study in the United Kingdom(UK), about 56,000 are in Germany, followed by France (31,000), Sweden (28,756), the Netherlands (16,000), and Norway (13,293) among others (Figure 10.2). It is important to note that this is a cumulative number, and does not necessary correspond with numbers of recent immigration that are often recorded on a yearly basis. Also, this is only the official number, which means that it refers to Thai nationals registered with the Embassies or Consulates who enter, live, work or study in these countries legally. For example, the highest number of Thais are in the UK, while the number of Thais who went to the UK under the Ministry of Labour channels is not the first rank for the most recent year, while other countries such as Sweden and Finland were the major destination countries during the last five years (see Table 10.1).



Figure 10.2 Estimated number of Thais living/working in Europe by country, 2012 (Source: Department of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013)

10.3.1 Labour migration

Similar to many developing countries, migrants often move to work in the countries with stronger economies, with an expectation of higher wages and job opportunity in the destination than origin countries (Torado, 1976). The majority of out-migration from Thailand is labour migration. Official numbers from the Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), Ministry of Labour indicate that since 2005, over 1.5 million Thai workers obtained work permits in foreign countries. Figure 10.3 indicates that the total number of Thai workers deployed overseas has been more or less constant since 2005, and ranged annually from 130,000 to 162,000.

The labour migrants are dominated by males (80 per cent). Figure 10.4 shows that, during 2005-2013, males consistently outnumbered female migrant workers. The male Thai workers usually worked in construction, manufacturing and agriculture sectors, while female migrants were concentrated in service, commercial and domestic sectors such as live-in maids, care providers, waitresses, traditional massager and entertainers. The majority are semi- and low-skilled workers. Currently, the major destinations of Thai workers are countries in East and Southeast Asia, replacing the Middle East as the most common destination region (Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), 2013). The proportion of Thai workers in Europe is not high due to laws and regulations and labour demand of the destination countries as well as the mismatch between available work and the workers' qualifications.



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
male	115 267	135 752	137 923	137 325	124 227	121 168	121 391	108 892	107 184
female	24 400	25 094	23 994	24 527	23 484	22 627	26 232	25 209	23 327
total	139 667	160 846	161 917	161 852	147 711	143 795	147 623	134 101	130 511

Figure 10.3 Total number of Thai workers deployed overseas, 2005-2013 (Source: Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), Ministry of Labour, 2005-2013)



Figure 10.4 Proportion of male/female Thai workers deployed overseas, 2005-2013 (Source: Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), Ministry of Labour, 2005-2013

10.3.1.1 New- and re-entry migrant workers

Each year, the TOEA records both number of migrant workers who are newly travelling to work abroad, and those re-entering to work in their previous destination countries. Figure 10.5 shows the number of workers deployed overseas for migrant workers who are newly entering, and re-entering a foreign country respectively. The patterns of both categories do not fluctuate. There is a slightly higher number of workers who are newly entering than re-entering each year. This probably indicates that the Thai workers performed their jobs well, and were allowed to work in the destination countries again, or they received long-term work contracts. During 2005-2013, the number of new-entry migrants is lowest in 2013 (78,105) and the highest in 2006 (103,565) (Figure 10.5). For the re-entry migrants, the total is lowest in 2013 (52,406) and highest in 2009 (68,994) (Figure 10.6). It is interesting to note that, in 2009, the number of newly-entering workers declined while the number of re-entering workers increased.



Figure 10.5 Number of new-entry Thai workers deployed overseas, 2005-2013 (Source: Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), Ministry of Labour, 2005-2013)

10.3.1.2 Labour migration in the EU

The number of Thai workers deployed in European countries has been generally increasing overtime, with a sharp increase in 2011 and 2012, followed by an equally sharp drop in 2013. This is distinctly different from the general pattern of Thai workers deployed overseas (Figure 10.4), where the number did not fluctuate very much. Figure 10.7 shows the total number of Thai workers deployed in Europe during 2005 to 2009. There was a two-fold increase from 5,013 in 2005 to 10,796 in 2009. Following that, the number declined slightly in 2010, and then increased in 2011 and 2012, peaking at 25,251 workers in 2012and dramatically declining to almost half of the peak number to13,843 in 2013. This noticeable fluctuation of Thai migrants to Europe may be related to the changes in policies or regulations of the EU favouring international migration, or from the impact of the economic downturn in Europe during the last several years.



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
male	46 769	47 992	52 228	57 819	57 793	53 615	47 038	44 288	42 765
female	8 824	9 289	9 703	10 433	11 201	10 388	10 348	10 185	9 641
total	55 593	57 281	61 931	68 252	68 994	64 003	57 386	54 473	52 406

Figure 10.6 Number of re-entry Thai workers deployed overseas, 2005-2013 (Source: Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), Ministry of Labour, 2005-2013)



	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Male	3 683	4 118	6 627	7 149	8 261	6 751	13 621	19 463	11 339
Female	1 330	1 520	1 786	2 211	2 535	2 427	5 341	5 788	2 504
Total	5 013	5 638	8 413	9 360	10 796	9 178	18 962	25 251	13 843

Figure 10.7 Total number of Thai workers deployed overseas in Europe, 2005-2013 (Source: Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), Ministry of Labour, 2005-2013)

Furthermore, data shown in Table 10.1 indicate that, during 2005 to 2013, within Europe, eleven countries were the preferred destination for Thai workers deployed overseas, though the rank of the top five varies from year to year. The UK is the only country that was among the top five destinations for Thai migrants during 2005-2013. Denmark and Italy were among the top five for six years while Ireland was in the top five for two years. Greece, Spain and Poland were the fifth most popular destination country in 2005, 2006 and 2009 respectively, and Switzerland was the fourth ranked destination in 2012. Portugal was among in the top five destination countries for four years, while Sweden was in the top five for seven years, and was the top ranked destination since 2007(except for 2011). Finland was among the top five destination countries for seven years. However, it must be noted that the numbers reported in Table 10.1 include only Thai workers who were officially deployed through official channels. The numbers are therefore much lower than, for instance, the total number of visas issued as reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These numbers only reflect the number of those who travel for working purposes through official channels only, and do not include those who travel for other purposes such as for study, tourism or family reunification. For instance, in 2013 it was reported by the Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a total of 7,295 visas were issued to Thai nationals, while the number of the officially-deployed Thai workers in the same year was lower at 3,537.

In summary, during 2005-2013, the UK was the most popular destination country for Thai workers deployed overseas, followed by Sweden and Finland, Denmark and Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Greece, Spain and Poland.

Table 10.1 Top five destination countries for officially-deployed Thai workers, 2005-2013 (Source: Thailand Overseas Employment Administration (TOEA), Ministry of Labour, 2005-2013)

Year	Country	Male	Female	%Male	% Female	Total
2005	United Kingdom	1,022	542	65.3	34.7	1,564
	Denmark	1,043	14	98.7	1.3	1,057
	Italy	325	109	74.9	25.1	434
	Ireland	185	149	55.4	44.6	334
	Greece	312	6	98.1	1.9	318
2006	United Kingdom	1,104	553	66.6	33.4	1,657
	Denmark	1,196	22	98.2	1.8	1,218
	Italy	299	98	75.3	24.7	397
	Ireland	177	195	47.6	52.4	372
	Spain	285	61	82.4	17.6	346
2007	Sweden	2,285	90	96.2	3.8	2,375
	United Kingdom	1,052	576	64.6	35.4	1,628
	Finland	1,027	77	93.0	7.0	1,104
	Denmark	989	25	97.5	2.5	1,014
	Italy	308	112	73.3	26.7	420
2008	Sweden	3,637	230	94.1	5.9	3,867
	United Kingdom	1,001	576	63.5	36.5	1,577
	Denmark	641	9	98.6	1.4	650
	Italy	304	124	71.0	29.0	428
	Finland	245	113	68.4	31.6	358
2009	Sweden	5,376	627	89.6	10.4	6,003
	United Kingdom	797	475	62.7	37.3	1,272
	Italy	326	101	76.3	23.7	427
	Finland	218	201	52.0	48.0	419
	Poland	182	134	57.6	42.4	316
2010	Sweden	2,913	416	87.5	12.5	3,329
	Finland	1,599	353	81.9	18.1	1,952
	United Kingdom	711	419	62.9	37.1	1,130
	Italy	206	150	57.9	42.1	356
	Portugal	304	32	90.5	9.5	336
2011	Finland	2,341	415	84.9	15.1	2,756
	Sweden	2,210	339	86.7	13.3	2,549
	United Kingdom	570	376	60.3	39.7	946
	Portugal	370	35	91.4	8.6	405
	Denmark	372	9	97.6	2.4	381
2012	Sweden	5,028	559	90.0	10.0	5,587
	Finland	2,647	406	86.7	13.3	3,053
	United Kingdom	468	307	60.4	39.6	775
	Switzerland	258	31	89.3	10.7	289
	Portugal	235	39	85.8	14.2	274
2013	Sweden	6,037	566	91.4	8.6	6,603
	Finland	3,105	432	87.8	12.2	3,537
	United Kingdom	381	250	60.4	39.6	631
	Denmark	461	8	98.3	1.7	469
	Portugal	330	48	87.3	12.7	378

By the end of 2012, there were 5,587 Thai workers in Sweden, the majority being male (90 per cent). Almost all (96 per cent) were from the North eastern region, including Chaiyaphum, Udornthani, Khon Kaen, Nong Bua Lamphu and Nakhon Ratchasima Provinces. Ninety-six per cent worked in agricultural (berry picking and fishery sectors), and the remainder worked in services, sales worker in shops and markets, skilled workers in different business units, clerks and basic occupations. The majority (82 per cent) of these workers had primary education, while less than one per cent had a bachelor's degree.

Italy has strict immigration laws, regulations and a labour quota system. This has contributed to problems of labour trafficking, particularly from the neighbouring countries of Albania, Romania and Bulgaria, and countries in Africa. The Italian Government does not allow recruitment companies to import labourers. In addition, Thai traditional massage is classified as a service for wellness and beauty, not as a physical therapy. This presents difficulties for Thai workers who wish to work in this sector. Although, they have massage therapist certificates from Thailand, as they are not recognised by the Italian Government. The Thai masseuse/masseurs need to pass Italy's standards and practices and, thus, the majority of Thais who work in this sector enter Italy on a tourist visa, and then overstay or marry an Italian in order to obtain a visa extension.

The Italians are proud of their culture and, particularly, Italian cuisine, and this reduces the opportunity for the Thai restaurant sector in Italy. Thai chefs wishing to work in Italy need to be certified by the Italian Government. Also, the process of setting up a Thai restaurant is lengthy, and all related documents must be in Italian. However, the TOEA asserts that there remain opportunities for Thai workers and Thais married to an Italian in different types of service work such as housekeeper, cook, waiter/waitress, masseur/masseuse, mechanic and assistant to their spouse (TOEA, 2013).

In 2012, 260 Thais worked in Italy, two-thirds of whom were male. Thais from the Northern region of Thailand received the largest number of work permits, follow by those from the Northeast, Central, Eastern and Western regions. The majority were skilled workers and worked in the business sector, followed by technician or mechanic, services and sales in shops/markets, construction and agriculture. Two Thais worked for legal firms at the managerial level.

Although, Germany was not in the top five destination countries for Thai migrant workers during the past nine years, Germany used to have a significant number of Thai migrants, particularly females. The TOEA estimated that more than 50,000 Thais were living in Germany, of whom the majority are women married to a German. These women may work as an assistant to a Thai cuisine chef, other jobs in Thai restaurants, factories, beauty salons, Thai massage parlours, salespersons in shops, cleaners and domestic workers. Each year, the Thai migrants in Germany remitted about 200 million Euro (TOEA, 2010).

There are approximately 600 Thai restaurants in Germany, with about 5,000 Thai employees. The government permits the Thai restaurants to import no more than five Thai workers who must have at least seven years of experience and have passed the German standard labour skills test.

As of 2010, Germany had about 1,300 spa and wellness salons including massage, with an annual clientele of about one million visits. This sector would seem to be an opportunity for Thai workers but, in practice, Thai traditional massage is not accepted as a wellness therapy. Therefore, aspiring Thai massage therapists need to pass all the German professional standards.

There are opportunities for Thai workers, especially in Germany's deficient occupations sector, which include physician, engineer, scientist, IT expert, especially in computer science, IT systems developer, Internet and network specialist, software programmer, developer of circuits, and multimedia specialist.

In the past, the German Government implemented policies to attract highly skilled IT workers under their 'Green Card Programme' by issuing a five-year residential permit. However, this programme was not successful due to lack of a path to permanent residency status. It is predicted that in

2014 Germany will require about 135,000 scientists and 95,000 engineers in the following sectors: (1) Engine engineer; (2) Industrial electrician; (3) Research and development specialist; (4) IT computer specialist; (5) Automobile engineer; (6) Chemical rubber and plastics specialists; (7) Construction economists; and (8) Energy and water energy specialists. Since 2009, the government allowed skilled immigration for citizens of ten countries that are new members of the EU and other countries who are familiar with the German culture and language.

10.3.2 Marriage migration to the EU

While the main reason for migration to foreign countries often relates to economic need or career advancement, there are other significant reasons such as study, family reunion and marriage. This section of the report refers to Thai women migrating via marriage to a citizen of an EU member country.

The ILO (2010) has estimated that there are approximately 200,000-300,000 Thai migrant workers in Europe. The majority tends to be long-term migrants, mostly through a marital connection with a European citizen, e.g., German (Ratanaloan, 2005; Ruenkaew, 2009), Danish (Lisborg, 2002) and Swiss (Boonmathya, 2005). The majority of these Thais live in northwest Europe (ILO, 2010).

Germany is the top destination for Thai women in Europe. Since 1975, the number of Thai women who migrated to live in Germany has continuously increased; more than 1,000 bi-national marriages have occurred annually since 1991. In Germany in 2002, there were 45,458 Thais, of whom 80 per cent were women. This number represents a significant increase from 26,675 in 1995 and from 998 in 1975 (German Federal Statistical Office cited in Plambech, 2007). In 2007, there were 53,952 Thai migrants living/working in Germany, of whom 86 per cent were females. Of these women, approximately 60 per cent were married to a German national (StatBA, 2008).

Statistics from Denmark show that the number of Thai immigrants increased from 339 in 1979 to 5,627 in 2005 (Danmarks Statistik cited in Plambech, 2007). In the Netherlands, the number of Thai migrant women increased from 3,865 in 1996 to 9,483 in 2006 (Suksomboon, 2008). The Central Bureau voor de Statistiek estimated that, among 14,281 Thai migrants in the Netherlands, about 71 per cent (or 10,200) were females in 2008 (CBS 2008).

Moreover, there is a significant number of Thai female migrants in Norway, Sweden, UK and Switzerland, although the total is smaller than in the above-mentioned countries. The age of the majority of these Thai migrant women ranges between the mid-twenties to the late thirties, an age suitable for marriage (Suksomboon, 2008).

10.3.3 Student mobility

To our knowledge, there are no important issues regarding Thai student mobility. Although students enter the destination countries with a student visa, some also work part-time in the formal or informal sectors. A popular place for Thai students to work part-time is at a Thai restaurant, where the contract is mainly informal. Some students do end up working or living in the destination countries, and some get married to the local people. This group of students may be at risk of unfair employment such as a low wage rate or long working hours. There are no statistics on the numbers of Thai students who work part-time or stay in the destination countries after their graduation. However, it seems that the number of students remaining in the destination country after graduation is not significant, and there is limited research on student mobility that is related to social or economic issues.

Data on Thai students studying in foreign countries are also limited. The Office of the Civil Service Commission has a database that includes the number of students who receive Thai government scholarships and those (including private scholarships) who reported themselves to the Office of the Civil Service Commission. While a significant number of Thai students who study abroad are supported by public or private organizations or their family, it is not compulsory for these students to report to the

Office of the Civil Service Commission, Thailand.

The number of new students under the responsibility of the Office of the Civil Service Commission entering Europe during 2005-2013 ranges from about 200-400 each year. The highest were in 2008 and 2012 with 325 and 391 students entering Europe respectively. The lowest was in 2010 with 194 students (Figure 10.8).



Figure 10.8 New Thai students entering Europe each year 2005-2013 (Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission, Thailand, 2014)

During 2005-2013, there were a total of 2,472 new Thai students studying in Europe at different levels of education. The majority was at the doctorate level, at about 1,300 new students. The number of students at the Master's and Bachelor's degrees were about 500 and almost 400 respectively (Figure 10.9).



Figure 10.9 Total number of new Thai students classified by degree, 2005-2013 (Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission, Thailand, 2014)

As for the destination country, about 1,735 or 70 per cent of new Thai students studied in the United Kingdom during 2005-2013. The number of Thai students ranged from 134 to 320in France, the Netherlands and Germany respectively. There were 11-30 students in Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Italy and Spain. Less than 10 students were in Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Portugal, Poland, Luxembourg and Czech Republic (Figure 10.10).



Figure 10.10 Total number of new Thai students in Europe classified by country, 2005-2013 (Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission, Thailand, 2014)

The accumulated number of Thai students in Europe indicates the current number of students studying in each country. Normally, students will spend at least 3-4 years to complete a Bachelor's degree, 1-2 years for a Master's degree, and 3-5 years for a Doctoral degree. Data from the same source, the Office of the Civil Commission, Thailand show that the accumulated number of Thai students in Europe is almost stable during 2005 to 2013. There were approximately 2,000-2,600 students in Europe each year during 2005 to 2013. The number of Thai students was highest during 2006-2007, and started a slight decline until 2013 (Figure 10.11).



Figure 10.11 Accumulated number of Thai students in Europe, 2005-2013 (Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission, Thailand, 2014)

During the period of 2005-2013, the top four destination countries for Thai students did not change; however, the fifth rank was alternated between Italy, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden (Table 10.2). During this study period, the number of Thai students each year under the care of the Office of the Civil Commission is over 1,000 in the United Kingdom, between 250 and 550 in France, 130-400 in Germany, and 100-165 in the Netherlands. The reasons related to the concentration of students in these particular countries are probably due to language and field of study. English is studied and used by Thai students/trainees more than other languages; and Thailand needs more graduates in Sciences and Technology particularly from these countries. Meanwhile, those who studied in other EU countries are more likely to be in social sciences, arts and humanity.

It is very important to note that these numbers of Thai students are based on the Thai Office of the Civil Service Commission, and are much lower than the statistics collected at the destination countries. For example, in 2011 OECD reports that the number of Thai students in the United Kingdom (5,903) is about five times higher than the number (1,393) recorded by the Office of the Civil Service Commission, Thailand. Similarly, the number reported by OECD is almost eight times higher in Germany, three times higher in France, eight times higher in Austria. The main reason as explained earlier is that the majority of Thai students are either self-funded or receive scholarships from private organization. These students are not obliged to report to the Thai Office of the Civil Service Commission. Surprisingly almost the same number of Thai students reported by Thailand (105) and OECD (138) in the Netherlands in 2011 (Figure 10.12). This could be because the majority of the Thai students in the Netherlands received Thai government scholarships or the Netherlands scholarships given through the Thai government.

Table 10.2 Top five countries of destination for Thai students under the responsibility of OCSC, 2005-2013 (Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission, Thailand, 2014)

Year	Country	Number		Year	Country	Number
	United Kingdom	1,115			United Kingdom	1,265
	France	380			France	253
2005	Germany	325		2010	Germany	232
	Netherland	128			Netherland	113
	Italy	81			Italy	46
	United Kingdom	1,198			United Kingdom	1,393
	France	551			France	240
2006	Germany	414		2011	Germany	195
	Netherland	165			Netherland	105
	Italy	94			Austria	12
	United Kingdom	1,226			United Kingdom	1,355
	France	490			France	289
2007	Germany	365		2012	Germany	169
	Netherland	160			Netherland	118
	Switzerland	93			Sweden	30
	United Kingdom	1,284			United Kingdom	1,336
	France	395			France	243
2008	Germany	336		2013	Germany	127
	Netherland	166			Netherland	101
	Switzerland	89			Switzerland	48
	United Kingdom	1,282				
	France	312				
2009	Germany	281				
	Netherland	138				
	Italy	69				



Figure 10.12 Number of Thai students in Europe classified by country, 2011 (Data at the Destination Countries) (Source: Education at a Glance 2013 - © OECD 2013; Table C4.7)

10.4 Migration from Europe to Thailand

Studies on migration often involve the transfer of populations from a less developed country to a more developed country. The reasons are typically for economic betterment, or to flee political instability within one's own country. However, the flow from more affluent countries to less affluent ones persists for a variety of reasons. Fewer studies have focused on the flow of populations in this opposite direction.

Table 10.3 shows the total number of people from EU member states entering Thailand during 2005-2013. These numbers include those that go through the Thai border control under every type of visa: Transit Visa, Tourist Visa, Non-immigrant Visa, Diplomatic Visa, Official Visa, and Courtesy Visa. The data also include persons from countries where a visa is exempted for a stay of 30 or 90 days or less (depending on the country of origin).

Among the EU member states, the UK has the highest number of persons entering Thailand, with the number almost reaching one million persons in 2013. Closely behind are Germany and France, at 767,000 and 635,000 persons a year. As for EU member states with the smallest number of persons entering Thailand are Cyprus and Malta, each at approximately 2,500 persons in 2013.

As for the trend during 2005-2013, the data show that there is an increase of persons entering Thailand from every EU member state. The percentage change of these countries range from a 15 per cent increase (Ireland and Greece) to as high as 775 per cent (Estonia). Other countries that also see a significant rise in persons entering Thailand include Lithuania (643 per cent), Romania (587 per cent), and Poland (567 per cent). Lithuania and Romania started out with less than 3,000 persons coming to Thailand in 2005, and now there are close to 10,000 for Lithuania and approximately 20,000 persons for Romania in 2013.

Temporary migrants are most likely to enter Thailand under a Non-immigrant Visa. Table 10.4 shows the number of persons from EU member states who enter Thailand using a Non-immigrant

Visa. From the table, it can be seen that the countries with the highest number of persons entering Thailand using this type of visa are the UK, Germany and France 56,000, 35,000 and 21,000 persons in 2013 respectively. It should be noted, that there is quite a significant drop in the number of persons entering Thailand under this visa from 2012 to 2013 in nearly every country considered.

The pattern of persons entering Thailand under a Non-immigrant Visa is quite different from the pattern of total persons entering Thailand. Although the majority of countries from EU see an increase in the number of persons entering Thailand under this type of visa during the period of 2005-2013, the number is not as significant as previously seen in Table 10.3.

Moreover, there are several countries that see a decline in the number of persons coming into Thailand with this Non-immigrant Visa. The five countries with a declining trend include Slovenia, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia and Cyprus.

Table 10.3 Persons from EU member states entering Thailand (Source: Thai Immigration Bureau)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% change
Austria	57,534	77,335	82,691	81,662	88,870	98,194	96,566	101,923	109,509	90.34
Belgium	56,886	74,027	74,570	78,079	83,047	82,746	85,414	98,040	103,707	82.31
Bulgaria	2,149	2,938	3,817	4,091	3,765	4,584	5,750	7,177	9,012	319.36
Croatia	1,824	2,097	2,891	3,431	3,582	3,728	4,420	5,095	5,683	211.57
Cyprus	1,960	2,778	3,989	3,487	2,843	2,659	3,069	2,732	2,461	25.56
Czech Republic	10,351	15,482	20,049	20,748	26,731	28,488	29,850	34,259	36,208	249.80
Denmark	103,278	130,222	143,874	153,816	148,338	156,987	168,438	172,571	166,132	60.86
Estonia	1,429	2,973	7,418	8,202	7,271	8,794	9,890	11,037	12,510	775.44
Finland	83,477	113,402	144,249	158,476	161,972	154,866	162,789	161,780	148,162	77.49
France	279,205	337,688	380,802	405,937	437,766	482,255	538,085	592,825	635,090	127.46
Germany	443,769	537,384	559,553	557,432	592,471	634,696	649,086	707,229	766,685	72.77
Greece	13,214	18,201	19,928	18,363	19,058	18,483	15,725	14,288	15,269	15.55
Hungary	11,836	18,539	19,517	17,152	15,738	17,706	17,586	17,978	21,468	81.38
Ireland	57,975	72,689	75,831	74,710	67,480	59,988	61,588	63,041	66,864	15.33
Italy	120,520	157,194	176,440	156,708	174,665	173,678	191,134	206,507	212,173	76.05
Latvia	1,622	3,991	6,023	4,823	3,553	4,587	5,507	6,205	7,108	338.22
Lithuania	1,202	2,389	3,943	4,760	5,592	6,142	7,345	6,817	8,931	643.01
Luxembourg	2,316	3,208	3,219	3,057	3,393	3,750	3,974	4,325	4,439	91.67
Malta	866	1,148	1,369	1,278	1,331	1,796	1,994	2,247	2,594	199.54
Netherlands	154,222	188,208	199,695	201,485	213,932	212,470	214,646	220,600	227,579	47.57
Poland	10,068	16,230	21,412	27,806	33,673	38,829	42,159	49,030	67,107	566.54
Portugal	18,124	25,935	25,579	23,448	22,799	21,899	26,569	32,012	35,855	97.83
Romania	2,993	3,694	4,850	6,020	6,989	9,061	12,481	15,702	20,575	587.44
Slovakia	2,984	2,763	5,771	6,869	8,191	9,473	10,795	12,704	14,004	369.30
Slovenia	2,640	5,264	5,801	5,802	6,140	5,982	6,401	7,072	7,161	171.25
Spain	51,374	71,217	83,879	78,353	76,928	69,631	98,480	116,862	125,672	144.62
Sweden	219,396	315,155	368,030	400,555	358,241	362,569	380,185	371,590	346,658	58.01
United Kingdom	780,206	891,546	888,453	850,749	871,907	847,198	890,249	911,880	944,222	21.02

Table 10.4 Persons entering Thailand under a Non-immigrant Visa (Source: Thai Immigration Bureau)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% change
Austria	3,334	-	4,344	4,363	4,746	5,025	5,157	5,391	4,121	61.70
Belgium	4,236	-	6,261	6,272	6,714	7,327	7,523	7,258	5,164	71.34
Bulgaria	253	-	374	386	368	362	445	445	403	75.89
Croatia	164	-	300	533	416	449	513	521	474	217.68
Cyprus	160	-	189	210	227	219	156	147	29	-8.13
Czech Republic	414	-	533	643	742	666	581	549	410	32.61
Denmark	5,365	-	7,848	7,477	7,726	7,697	8,100	8,605	6,487	60.39
Estonia	181	-	187	126	145	232	211	214	162	18.23
Finland	5,628	-	5,125	3,560	4,015	4,243	4,530	4,240	3,033	-24.66
France	17,516	-	24,648	25,140	25,390	27,196	28,550	29,977	21,486	71.14
Germany	30,820	-	41,425	41,311	41,004	42,929	43,389	43,131	34,549	39.94
Greece	231	-	346	345	335	400	241	442	507	91.34
Hungary	819	-	1,402	1,252	907	738	818	682	464	-16.73
Ireland	2,151	-	2,949	3,063	3,171	3,383	3,270	3,165	2,417	47.14
Italy	6,670	-	6,735	6,795	7,219	8,010	8,782	9,276	6,584	39.07
Latvia	73	-	70	92	141	153	207	208	182	184.93
Lithuania	48	-	103	130	141	145	201	199	172	314.58
Luxembourg	170	-	258	290	274	260	253	216	174	27.06
Malta	61	-	77	104	113	127	122	132	131	116.39
Netherlands	10,126	-	15,658	14,859	16,170	16,595	16,467	15,839	10,522	56.42
Poland	789	-	890	930	1,053	913	1,054	987	798	25.10
Portugal	468	-	404	425	466	514	606	648	426	38.46
Romania	346	-	427	411	457	513	598	649	385	87.57
Slovakia	320	-	311	306	321	284	310	267	255	-16.56
Slovenia	253	-	364	286	257	233	172	169	157	-33.20
Spain	1,094	-	1,977	1,693	1,779	1,800	2,336	2,549	2,040	133.00
Sweden	8,154	-	10,162	10,857	10,859	11,332	11,734	12,079	8,168	48.14
United Kingdom	53,054	-	87,643	88,013	89,106	90,525	87,786	81,479	56,048	53.58

The majority of European migrants in Thailand can be categorised as follows: skilled workers, retirees, marriage migration, and finally medical tourism, a growing industry in Thailand. Here, we review the existing literature regarding the different types of European/Western migration to Thailand.

10.4.1 Skilled labour migration

Thailand is relatively open with regard to the import of professional skills of foreign nationals, both from developed and developing countries. Foreign professionals are important for multinational and transnational companies that are operating in Thailand, and therefore may have an effect on the country's economic growth. Local IT companies in Thailand, for instance, actively recruit foreign workers and the number of foreign IT professionals is increasing, particularly for companies that are promoted by Thailand's Board of Investment (Manning & Sidorenko, 2007).

To legally work in Thailand, the foreign labour must obtain a Non-immigrant visa B (to conduct business/to work) and a work permit. According to work permit data held by professional and skilled foreign nationals, the majority of foreign skilled labours in Thailand come from Japan (at 13,032 in 2012), followed by United Kingdom, China, the Philippines, USA, India, France, Taiwan, Australia and South Korea (with between 2,400 and 9,000 work permits for each country). The majority of these foreign skilled labours were mainly senior officials and managers (approximately 60 per cent), followed by professionals (approximately 30 per cent). For the UK specifically, the majority of skilled workers are teachers/lecturers/professors in the education sector at close to 40 per cent, followed by managers at almost 30 per cent. For France, the majority are managers at approximately 40 per cent, followed by high senior officials at approximately 30 per cent (Office of Foreign Workers Administration, 2014).

As for the industry of work in 2012, approximately 22 per cent of all foreign skilled migrants worked in the education sector, followed by trade and manufacturing at approximately 15 per cent each. This is a change in the trend, as the majority of foreign skilled migrants at 30 per cent in 2006 were in manufacturing, followed by trade and education at approximately 15 per cent each (Office of Foreign Workers Administration, 2014). Therefore, there was a rapid growth of the demand for foreign skilled migrants in the education sector of Thailand.

For skilled migrants from the UK, the majority at almost 40 per cent are in the education sector in 2012, followed by real estate service and rental at approximately 20 per cent. The proportion of UK migrants in the education sector has also increased from approximately 30 per cent in 2006. For France, the majority of skilled workers in 2012 are in the real estate service and rental industry and hotels and restaurants at approximately 20 per cent each (Office of Foreign Workers Administration, 2014).

Table 10.5 reports the number of foreign nationals with work permits residing in Thailand for the years 2006-2012. The UK, France and Germany are the three European countries with the largest number holding work permits. France has seen some increase from 2,800 to 3,500, a 26 per cent increase from 2006-2012. On the other hand, the numbers of work permits held by UK and German nationals have been quite stable over the years. UK on average hold close to 10,000 work permits, while Germans hold approximately 3,000 permits.

Interestingly, Finland is a country with the largest percentage increase in holding work permits in Thailand, going from 312 permits to 453 permits, a 45 per cent increase. This increase in the number of work permits contrasts the declining number of Finnish entering Thailand under a Non-immigrant Visa as seen previously in Table 10.4. This suggests that the reduction of Non-immigrants comes from categories not relating to work, such as to study, to stay with family, to participate in projects or seminars, to attend a conference or training course, among others.

Table 10.5 Number of foreign nationals with work permits remaining in Thailand (Source: Office of Foreign Workers Administration)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	% Change
Austria	295	332	355	224	264	255	287	-2.71
Belgium	637	696	793	566	642	602	662	3.92
Denmark	678	722	848	567	580	631	710	4.72
Finland	312	288	473	351	428	425	453	45.19
France	2,756	3,091	3,568	2,600	2,769	3,048	3,466	25.76
Germany	2,980	3,187	3,727	2,599	2,710	2,735	2,867	-3.79
Ireland	337	372	456	335	340	376	417	23.74
Italy	1,155	1,289	1,551	1,200	1,323	1,414	1,615	39.83
Netherlands	1,186	1,299	1,537	1,098	1,129	1,096	1,206	1.69
Norway	335	384	451	274	261	317	307	-8.36
Sweden	946	1,111	1,358	928	959	1,026	1,111	17.44
Switzerland	1,135	1,182	1,298	892	942	939	981	-13.57
UK	9,487	10,150	11,923	8,473	8,606	9,061	9,815	3.46

However, aside from these official numbers of the work permits of foreign professionals and skilled labours, there are many skilled workers in Thailand working without a work permit. Some decided to continue working although their work permit has expired. Some entered Thailand as tourists, and decided to stay and find local jobs such as becoming an English teacher or operating their own businesses (Howard, 2009: 194; Sciortino & Punpuing, 2009: 16). It is difficult to estimate how many Europeans are currently in Thailand working without a valid work permit, or staying the duration of their visas. From an internet-based survey conducted by Howard (2009: 208), it is found that approximately 40 per cent of the respondents hold a work permit, while 32 per cent never held a job while in Thailand. This leaves approximately 30 per cent that do not fall in either of the previous two categories, suggesting that they do not hold a work permit, and have held a job while in Thailand. Seemingly, the most popular occupation among the respondents from Howard's study is being an English teacher at 14 per cent.

10.3.2 Marriage migration

Cross-national marriages between Thai women and Western men have grown substantially in the last 10-20 years. In the past, Western/Thai marriages are not socially acceptable as Thai women who marry Western men are associated with prostitutes. These days, however, marrying a Westerner has become a trend, particularly in many parts of the North eastern region of Thailand (Adskul, 2007; Mekbusaya, 2004). In 2003-2004, it was reported that as many as 15,000 women from the North eastern region are married to or engaged in romantic relationships with men from Western European countries and the U.S.(NESDB, 2004). The provinces where having a Western husband is most common include KhonKaen, Udon Thai, Nongkhai, Mahasarakarm, Chaiyaphum, Srisaket, Sakonnakorn, Surin, Burrirum and Loei. Germany is the number one country in marrying Thai women, followed by Switzerland and the UK (Seepai & Senarat, 2010). After marriage, some remain in Thailand with their Western husband, while some move with their husbands to their country of origin.

Despite the typical perception of the 'Asian bride' as young and naïve, the majority of Thai women who enter these cross-national relationships are relatively mature, in their late twenties or older, had been previously married or had been in relationships with Thai men, and many have children from past relationships. Most Thai women that marry Western men are typically in the lower socio-economic status from the North eastern region of Thailand, and find transnational marriages a desirable option to obtain a higher economic status, and even actively seek Western husbands through various channels. The decision is often encouraged by their parents to gain access to overseas resources through their foreign husbands to enhance their livelihood (Sirijit, 2013: 184; Sunanta & Angeles, 2013: 707). However, it should be noted that many more women now marry Western men for more than financial reasons, particularly those who have been married before. These women claim to prefer Western men because Western men tend to be more open-minded about the women's past, and they are more responsible and respectful than Thai men (Jaidee, 2009). Western men, on the other hand, view Thai women to be submissive, gentle, eager to please and respectful (Nitichan, 2004; Jaidee, 2009).

There are different ways in which one enters into a cross-national marriage. For Westerners, some meet their future spouse at tourist-related establishments, some through networking arrangements or marriage agencies. A study conducted by Seepai and Senarat (2010) found that the majority of Thai women met their Western husband at work (54 per cent); followed by through their relatives/friends (20 per cent), while travelling (20 per cent), and the rest through dating companies/internet or other networking media. Since finding a Western husband is becoming more desirable, dating and match-making agencies are blossoming in Thailand, with poor supervision from authorities. Many women are exploited as they end up paying expensive fees with no guarantee of a decent Western husband.

The economic impact from cross-national marriages on the macro scale is unclear; most of the economic benefits fall on the Thai women's family and her community. Once a woman marries a Western man, the husband is expected to support her and her family financially. The local community also expects the trans-national couple who are regarded as 'wealthy' to contribute financially to local charities and activities, such as making large donations/merit money to the local temples. The couple that contributes a large sum of money, or helps out with the temple utility bills, will gain respect and status in their community (Seepai & Senarat, 2010).

10.3.3 Retirement migration

Thailand is rapidly gaining popularity among many people around the world as a retirement destination. With the emergence of 'lifestyle migration', migrants are driven from a more affluent country to a less affluent area, in search of a leisurely and better lifestyle after retirement (Benson & O'Reilly, 2009; Casado-Diaz, 2012). The decision to move to another country for retirement in most cases stems from previous visits as tourists or workers, and the retirees have become acquainted somewhat with the lifestyle (Williams, King, Warnes & Patternson, 2000; Casado-Diaz, 2012). For Thailand, the relatively low cost of living and a warmer climate make it an attractive setting for retirees.

A rough estimate of the number of Western retirees residing in Thailand is approximately 98,000 residents (Howard, 2008). This number is obtained by contacting all relevant embassies and consulates in Bangkok, and extrapolating from tourist arrival numbers. The UK, Switzerland, France and Austria estimated that around 10 per cent of their total residents are retiree. Meanwhile, Howard (2008) conducted an Internet survey and found that around 15 per cent of the respondents were retirees.

One important motive for retiring in Thailand is the availability of attractive sexual partners (Warnes, 2009; Howard, 2008). Therefore, the retirees in Thailand from Western countries are overwhelmingly men. It is not uncommon to see a much older Western man aged 70 or over with a much younger Thai woman. From the German Social Security data, there were 657 German old-age benefit recipients that reside in Thailand on 31 December 2005, with the male to female ratio being as high as 18.3 (Warnes, 2009: 351). For UK State pensioners, there were about 1,000 beneficiaries in Thailand in 2005, with the sex ratio skewed towards men at 3.5 males for every female (Warnes, 2009: 347). The relative large proportion of male retirees is uncommon in most other retirement destination countries, as women typically have a younger eligibility age and greater longevity than men. Therefore, this migration pattern of Western male retirees to Thailand is quite unique.

The growth of retirees coming to Thailand is also at an unprecedented rate, particularly in the past 20 years. Data obtained from the US Social Security Administration show that there were 397 recipients of US Social Security Retirement Benefits (RB) and Widow(er) Benefits (WB) residing in Thailand in 1997. This number increased to 1,205 in December 2005, which is a 203.5 per cent increase in less than 10 years (Warnes, 2009: 352). This rapid pace of growth is quite staggering particularly when compared to other retirement destination countries, such as Poland, where the growth was the second highest at 85.5 per cent during the same period.

10.3.4 Health migration

Thailand is widely regarded as the global leader in medical tourism, where patients from all around the world come to seek affordable and quality health services (Connell, 2011: 260). In Thailand, the medical tourism industry is rapidly growing in size, from having 550,161 international patient visits in 2001 to 1,363,295 visits in 2008 (see Figure 10.13). The rapid increase within this 7 year period is partly a result of the government's support to promote Thailand as a medical hub. The Department of Export Promotion in the Ministry of Commerce, together with other agencies and organisations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tourism Authority of Thailand, Institute for Small and Medium Enterprises Development, Thai Chamber of Commerce, and Private Hospital Association, established a medical tourism industry, while big private hospitals formulated business strategies to specifically attract foreign patients (Kanchanachitra, Pachanee, Dayrit, & Tangcharoensathien, 2012: 69-70).



Figure 10.13 International patient visits (Source: Kanchanachitra, Pachanee, Dayrit, &Tangcharoensathien, 2012: 58)
*Estimates for Malaysia and Thailand reflect all international patients, estimates for Singapore and the Philippines are for patients who travelled specifically for health care

10.4 Temporary versus Permanent Migration

Although this report focuses on the characteristics of temporary transnational migration in Thailand, it is difficult to distinguish between temporary and permanent migration given our limited data and policy on such matter. Thailand authorities do not keep track of the duration in which the migrant remains abroad, and migrants can maintain their rights as Thai citizens even if they no longer reside in Thailand. A Thai migrant can be absent from Thailand for decades and still have their names in the House Registration, which is a document that proves a person's residence in Thailand. Therefore, there is no official record of how long a migrant is absent from Thailand, making it difficult to distinguish between temporary and permanent migration.

Thailand is also at the receiving end of migration. In this case, Thailand considers nearly all incoming migrants to be temporary since granting a Thai Permanent Residency—a status that is considered permanent—is rare. Each year, there are less than 100 persons per country that would be issued a Permanent Resident status since the Thai Government limits the maximum number allowed. Long-stay migrants in Thailand typically hold a Thai Non-immigrant Visa and extend it once it expires. From Thailand's point of view, they are temporary immigrants regardless of the years they have been in Thailand. Many have stayed in Thailand for 10-20 years on a tourist visa, deploying the "visa-run" method every three months. Practically, we may consider them to be permanent, but legally they are still considered temporary.

The Thai system only records the number of entries into our country, without acknowledging the number of times the same person has entered Thailand, or the duration of the stay. This makes it extremely difficult to keep track of the migration characteristics in Thailand, and to distinguish between those who are temporary movers from those who are permanent.

Qualitatively, we may be able to distinguish those who are permanent movers from those who are not. Long-stay migrants in Thailand are typically men, single, has at least a bachelor's degree, a business owner/entrepreneur or works in a skilled job. Thais who settle permanently in Europe tend to come from various educational background, are mostly women, married to a local, a business owner or works in a low- or semi-skilled job.

Temporary transnational migration is yet an unfamiliar concept in Thailand. This is reflected in the lack of policy, and therefore data, regarding permanent and temporary migration. Raising awareness in this issue can be a tremendously benefit for Thailand in understanding its own migration characteristics, as well as the social, political, legal, and cultural impact they entail.

10.5 Conclusion

There has been a long history of migration between Thailand and Europe for various reasons. Approximately a quarter of all Thai emigrants nowadays are to Europe, mainly for work, family and reunion, training, study and temporary visits. There is no consensus regarding the approximation of Thais in Europe. While the official number, as provided by the Department of Consular Affairs, Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, show that the majority of Thais are in the UK, Germany, and France; the Ministry of Labour states that Sweden, Finland and the UK respectively are the top countries of destination. These numbers include only Thais that are legally in Europe, leaving out a substantial amount of irregular and illegal migrants.

Migrants from Thailand are predominantly male, working in construction, manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Female migrant workers, on the other hand, are mostly in service, commercial and domestic sectors, and entertainers. Germany is one of a few countries in Europe where Thai women migrants overwhelmingly exceed men through marriage migration. These women, married to German men, typically work in restaurants, factories, beauty salon, massage parlours, shops, and private homes; therefore, creating a blurred meaning between the terms 'marriage migration' and 'labour migration'.One of prominent types of Thai migration to Europe is labour migration. The number of Thai workers sharply increased in the year 2011-2012. However, the number plummeted in 2013 which is expected to be the result of changes in policies or regulations of the EU favouring international migration, or from the impact of the economic downturn in Europe during the last several years.

In 2010, ILO has estimated that there are approximately 200,000-300,000 Thai migrant workers in Europe. The majority tends to be long-term migrants, mostly through a marital connection with a European citizen, e.g., German, Danish and Swiss. The majority of these Thais live in northwest Europe.

Another type of Thai migration to Europe is student migration. The source of official data on Thai student in Europe can only be retrieved from The Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC). The OCSC has a database that includes the number of students who receive Thai government scholarships and those (including private scholarships) who reported themselves to the OCSC. While a significant number of Thai students who study abroad are supported by public or private organisations or their family, it is not compulsory for these students to report to the OCSC. The top destinations for Thai students are the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands.

The flow of migrants in the opposite direction, from Europe to Thailand, is a phenomenon not to be overlooked. The total number of people coming from every EU Member State has been steadily increasing in the last decade, with several countries witnessing a significant increase of more than 500 per cent. Skilled labour migration and marriage migration have long been important reasons for migrating to Thailand for many years, whereas retirement migration and health migration are rapidly gaining popularity among Europeans coming to Thailand in recent years. The majority of European migrants to Thailand are overwhelmingly men, particularly retirees, and marriage migrants due to the availability of attractive partners. The male to female ratio of German retirees in Thailand was as high as 18.3 in 2005.

In sum, there is an increasing trend of migration between Thailand and Europe in both directions. Data indicate that Thais are continuing to seek for job opportunities in Europe, while an increasing number of Thai women are involved in cross-cultural marriages. Europeans, on the other hand, increasingly find Thailand as a desirable destination for retirement and for medical treatment. However these numbers, as mentioned throughout the report, only reflect official/legal migrants and there remain many irregular and illegal migrants that should also be taken into account.

References

Adskul, S. (2007). The Cross Cultural Marriage of Rural Women in UdonThani Province. Ramkhamhang Journal, 296-311.

Agunias, D. R., & Newland, K. (2007, April). *Circular migration and development: Trends, policy routes, and ways forward*. Washing ton D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MigDevPB_041807.pdf

Benson, M., & O'Reilly, K. (2009). Migration and the search for a better way of life: a critical exploration of lifestyle migration. The Sociological Review, 57(4), 608-625.

Casado-Diaz, M. (2012). Exploring the geographies of lifestyle mobility: Current and future fields of enquiry. In: Wilson, J., ed. (2012) The Routledge Handbook of Tourism Geographies. Routledge, pp. 120-125. ISBN 978-0-415-56857-9.

Chantavanich, S. (2007, 29-30 August).*Factors affecting Thailand immigration policies during 1992- 2004.* Paper presented at the *2007* Conference on International Migration, Multi-local Livelihoods and Human Security: Perspectives from Europe, Asia and Africa. Institute of Social Studies, the Hagues.

Connell, J. (2010) Migration and the globalisation of health care. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

Connell, J. (2011). A new inequality? Privatisation, urban bias, migration and medical tourism. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 52(3), 260-271.

Curran, S. R., Garip, F., Chung, C. Y., & Tangchonlatip, K. (2005). Gendered migrant social capital: Evidence from Thailand. *Social Forces*, *84*(1), 225-255.

Dow, A. (2006). *Going Back- Moving on: Thai Migrant workers receive compensation for unsatisfactory overseas employment*. ILO: Bangkok.

European Migration Network. (2011). *Circular and temporary migration*. National Contact Point Luxembourg.

Gullaprawit, C. Policies towards the free flow of skilled labour in ASEAN: The case of Thailand [PowerPoint Slides]. Retrieved from http://www.adbi.org/files/2013.01.23.cpp.sess2.3.gullaprawit.skilled.labour.thailand.pdf.

Hall, A. (2011). Migration and Thailand: Policy, perspectives and challenges. In J. W. Huguet & A. Chamratrithirong (Eds.), Thailand migration report 2011 (pp. 17-37). Bangkok: The International Organization for Migration.

Howard, R. W. (2008). Western retirees in Thailand: motives, experiences, wellbeing, assimilation and future needs. Ageing and Society, 28(2), 145.

Howard, R. W. (2009). The migration of westerners to Thailand: an unusual flow from developed to developing world. International Migration, 47(2), 193-225.

Huguet, J. W. (2008). Do International migration policies in Thailand achieve their objectives? (ILO Asia Regional Programme on Governance of Labour Migration Working Paper No. 13). ILO, Bangkok.

Hugo, G. (2009). Best practice in temporary labour migration for development: A perspective from Asia and the Pacific. *International migration*, *47*(5), 23-74.

Huguet, J. W., & Chamratrithirong, A. (2011). Thailand migration report 2011.International Organization for Migration, Regional Office Bangkok, Thailand, 97.

Huguet, J. W., Chamratrithirong, A., &Natali, C. (2012). Thailand at a crossroads: Challenges and opportunities in leveraging migration for development. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

Huguet, J., & Punpuing, S. (2005). *International migration in Thailand*. International Organization for Migration (IOM): Bangkok.

International Labour Organization. (2014). *Promoting jobs, protecting people: Thailand.* Retrieved from http://ilo.org/asia/countries/thailand/lang--en/index.htm

International Labour Organization and European Union Project (2010). *Thailand – EU service providers meeting: Strengthening the coordination and referral system on return and reintegration of migrant workers*. Bangkok, Thailand.

Jaidee, T. (2009). Thais marrying farang, beyond financial reasons. Retrieved from http://www.

whaf.or.th/?p=885
Kamolthip Kallstrom**,** J. (2011)**.** *Transnational seasonal migration and development: Lives Of Thai berry pickers returnees from Sweden* (Master Thesis). International Development Studies (MAIDS), Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
Kanchanachitra, C., Pachanee, C., Dayrit, M. M., & Tangcharoensatien, V. (2012). Medical tourism, in Southeast Asia: Opportunities and challenges. In J. R. Hodges, L. Turner & A. Kimball (Eds.), Risks and challenges in medical tourism: Understanding the global market for health services (pp. 56-86). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Kang, X. (2012, 24-26 August). Migration policies of Thai Nationals abroad and evaluation of migration policy effect. Paper presented to First Thai-Chinese Strategic Research Seminar. Bangkok, Thailand.
Manning, C., & Sidorenko, A. (2007). The regulation of professional migration: Insights from the health and IT sectors in ASEAN. The World Economy, 30(7), 1084-1113.
Manolo, A. (2006). Policies *and best practice for management of temporary migration.* International Symposium on International Migration and Development, Turin, Italy.
McDougall, E., Natali, C., & Tunon, M. (2011). Out-migration from Thailand: Policy, perspectives and challenges. In J. W. Huguet & A. Chamratrithirong (Eds.), Thailand migration report 2011 (pp. 39-51). Bangkok: The International Organization for Migration.
Mekbusaya, Y. (2004). Cross-Cultural Marriage of Thai Women in Kaendon Sub-district Buriram Province (Unpublished Thesis). Mahasarakham University, Thailand.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand
NaRanong, A., & NaRanong, V. (2011). The effects of medical tourism: Thailand's experience. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 89(5), 336-344.
National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand (NESDB). (2004). NESDB survey on Thai women who are married to foreign men in north eastern provinces. Bangkok: NESDB.
Nitichan, N. (2004, April).Thai women's issues abroad. *Koo Sang Koo Som*, 464.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2014). Education at a Glance 2013 - © OECD 2013; Retrieved from Table C4.7:
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2013_eag-2013-en
Osaki, K. (2003). Migrant remittance in Thailand: Economic necessity or social norms? *Journal of Population Research*, 20(2):203-222.
Plambech, S. (2007). *Managing migration; risks and remittances among migrant Thai women* (Master's Thesis). Institute of Social Anthropology, Lund University, Sweden.
Ratprasatporn, P., & Thienpreecha, K. (2002). *Foreign investment in Thailand: Review of the current legislative regime*. Retrieved from http://www.boi.go.th/english/download/ business_analysis/26/foreign-investment-laws.pdf
Ruenkaew, P. (2009, July/August). Female transnational migration from Thailand like thirty years before? *Pacific News,* N. 22 r. 32.
Ruhs, M. (2005). 'The potential of temporary migration programmes in future international migration policy. Paper prepared for *the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration*. Retrieved from http://www.gcim.org/attachements/TP3.pdf
Rukumnuaykit, P. (2009). *A synthesis report on labour migration policies, management and immigration pressure in Thailand*. ILO: Bangkok.
Sciortino, R., & Punpuing, S. (2009). International migration in Thailand 2009.International Organization for Migration, Thailand Office.
Seepai, S., & Senarat, S. (2010).Lifestyle of Isan women who marry Western men: A case study in Pimai (Research report). Roi Et Rajabhat University, Thailand.
Sirijit, S. (2013). Gendered Nation and Classed Modernity: The Perceptions of Mia Farang (Foreigners' Wives) in Thai Society. In Cleavage, Connection and Conflict in Rural, Urban and Contemporary Asia (pp. 183-199). Springer Netherlands.
Suksomboon, P. (2008). Remittances and 'Social Remittances' Their Impact on Livelihoods of

Thai Women in the Netherlands and Non-migrants in Thailand. *Gender, Technology and Development*, *12*(3), 461-482.
Sunanta, S. (2009).Global wife, local daughter: Gender, family, and nation in transnational marriages in northeast Thailand (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://circle.ubc.ca/handle/2429/6267
Sunanta, S., & Angeles, L. C. (2013). From rural life to transnational wife: agrarian transition, gender mobility, and intimate globalization in transnational marriages in northeast Thailand. Gender, Place & Culture, 20(6), 699-717.
Thailand Alien Employment Act of 1978 and 2008
Thailand Immigration Act of 1979
Thai Immigration Bureau. (2014). Immigration bureau statistics. Retrieved from http://www.immigration.go.th
Thailand Investment Promotion Act 1977
Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014). Thailand's visa information: Issuance of visa. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/services/123/15398-Issuance-of-Visa.html
Thailand Office of the Civil Service Commission. (2014). Statistics on Study Abroad. Retrieved from http://www.ocsc.go.th/ocsc/th/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=80&Itemid=317
Thailand Office of Foreign Workers Administration. (2014). Yearly statistics. Retrieved from http://wp.doe.go.th/wp/index.php/2013-07-25-03-45-44/2013-07-25-03-50-28/2013-07-25-03-56-45
Todaro, M.P. (1976). *Internal migration in developing countries: A review of theory, evidence, methodology, and research priorities*. ILO: Geneva.
Vlady, K. (2008). *Behind the law; breaking the law: Study on Western migration to Thailand* (Master's Thesis). International Development Studies (MAIDS), Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok
Warnes, T. A. (2009).International retirement migration. In International handbook of population aging (pp. 341-363). Springer Netherlands.
Wickramasekara, P. (2013). Circular and temporary migration regimes and their implications for family. *QScience Proceedings*, 2013.
WIEGO, (2014). *Law & informality: Country Study: Thailand*. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing. Retrived from http://wiego.org/informal_economy_law/country-study-thailand
Williams, A. M., King, R., Warnes, A., & Patterson, G. (2000). Tourism and international retirement migration: new forms of an old relationship in southern Europe. Tourism Geographies, 2(1), 28-49.
Woolfson, C. , Thörnqvist, C., & Herzfeld Olsson, P. (2011). *Forced labour in Sweden? The case of migrant berry pickers*. Council of Baltic Sea States.

11. CHARACTERISTICS OF TEMPORARY MIGRATION IN TURKEY

İlke ŞANLIER YÜKSEL and Ahmet İÇDUYGU

11.1 Introduction

Turkey's migration scheme has witnessed a paradigm change since the beginning of the 2000s in terms of legal framework along with the amount and the flow of migratory movements. Temporary movements of people in the transnational space had marked this multi-dimensional change. Turkey has become a country of immigration and transit migration in addition its previous status as a country of emigration. The majority of migrants in Turkey now are temporary, circular, and seasonal (even irregular) because of globalised networks, easy travel opportunities, access to information technologies, and the dynamic characteristics of populations. Turkey's geographical location plays a crucial role in understanding the size and the characteristics of temporary mobility of people between Europe and Asia.

Initially, Turkey was known as a country of emigration. Starting from the early 1960s and until the mid-1970s large numbers of Turkish citizens migrated to Western European countries, especially the Federal Republic of Germany. From the 1970s onwards, although European countries restricted regular labour migration to Western European countries, the emigration process continued through family reunification and asylum track. Despite the fact that these emigration flows turned into permanent settlement, those migrants were initially considered temporary migrants. After the oil crisis of the 1970s, Middle Eastern (ME) and North African (NA) countries, as well as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1989, emerged as new destinations for temporary labour migration. Particularly during the last decade, temporary mobility of large numbers of students, especially to Europe and North America, became significant as a new form of emigration.

Recently, Turkey has also become known as a country of immigration and transit route to the European Union (EU) for irregular migrants from Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan and from African countries such as Somalia. Turkey, whose population approaches 77 million, has also become a destination for irregular, circular labour migrants from neighbouring countries, the Russian Federation and other parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Turkey also gets extensive flows of asylum seekers, such as Syrians leaving their homelands due to civil war. Turkey also receives regular migrants, highly skilled migrants, professionals, students and life-style migrants as different forms of temporary migration.

Since Turkey embraced these emigration and immigration (including transit) patterns, migration policy in Turkey can also be examined in both directions. In terms of emigration, especially following the mass labour mobility towards Europe in the 1970s, Turkey came up with development programs in order to both sustain the temporary nature of migrants and to maximize economic growth by channelling remittance savings into employment-generating activities. In the context of immigration, Turkey is an important actor in terms of migratory regimes because of its geographical position in between Europe, Middle East and North Africa. Turkey is one of the signatories and parties to many international agreements related to transnational migration such as the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

On a regional level, Turkey signed visa liberalisation agreements with a number of its neighbours in the Caucasus and Middle East, which has resulted in an increase in the number of irregular temporary migrants. Turkey also signed readmission agreements with various countries during the last few years in order to deal with irregular migration. On a national level, conforming to the EU membership criteria has also played a very crucial role in policy change and Turkey has been harmonizing its migration policies with the EU's "Common" Migration Policy. A new Law on Foreigners and International Protection that introduces a new legal and institutional framework for migration and asylum was adopted on April 2013.

The changing patterns of migration into and out of Turkey, and Turkey's efforts to become a member of the EU are generating pressures for a better understanding of temporary migration patterns and better policies for migration both in and out of Turkey. For that reason, this report includes data on the quantity of different forms of temporary transnational movements during the last decade in order to be able to pursue further research.

11.2 Method of Data Gathering and the Sources of Data on Temporary Migration in Turkey

Data on international migration in Turkey is scarce and its credibility is questionable. Therefore, it is very difficult to gather reliable estimates of migratory flows from and/or to Turkey. Historically speaking, during the 1960s the Turkish Employment Service and the Turkish Labour Ministry were the major sources on emigration by disseminating the annual number of workers sent to various countries. However, this official data is only available until 1980 and did not include all flow of labour and any other types of migratory flows.

Regular censuses, and the Address Based Population Registry System, which replaced censuses in 2007, have also been major sources of statistics and operationalised by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). They gather information on the place of birth, residence and citizenship of people residing in the country. These data could typically be used to describe the countries of origin of the immigrants residing in Turkey. However, TurkStat "remained reluctant to furnish any statistics on migration-related data, apart from simple frequency tabulations of the total number of foreign-born persons living in the country" as İçduygu (2009b: 283) noted. Not only are emigration statistics scarce, but numbers on immigration are also not readily available. The Bureau for Foreigners, Borders and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior previously provided the fundamental data on immigration. These data do not reflect a satisfactory assessment of migratory flows to Turkey.

Although the Ministry of Interior collects information on work, study and residence permit holders, the data circulated reflect only some aggregate figures based on a categorisation of foreigners according to their citizenship. New Law on Foreigners and International Protection will effectuate residence permits to have additional categories such as long-term and short-term, family-related, humanitarian and human trafficking victims - residence permits.

Concerning foreigners working in the country, the statistics on the work permits provided by Ministry of Labour and Social Security is also far from giving full and credible estimates. Nevertheless, work permits are one of the instruments referring to temporary nature of migration. The three categories of work permits are temporary (valid for one year and renewable to three/six years in time), permanent (with the condition of eight years of continuous residence and six months of employment history in Turkey) and independent work permits (with the condition of five years of continuous residence history). Work permits will be used as residence permits upon ratification of the new law.

Since 1972, information on arrivals and departures is recorded at Turkish borders by the General Directorate of Security Passport Police. However, arrival and departure data are not reliable enough to produce elaborate information on both immigration and emigration flows available. Furthermore, tourism statistics on all departures and arrivals fail in producing estimates of international migration, as they do not include any facts on the purpose and length of stay.

Data concerning asylum seekers and refugees is gathered by the Ministry of Interior and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Compared to other migration related statistics, figures on refugees are fairly reliable and comprehensive. However, the data on irregular migration, which is also compiled by the Ministry of Interior, only include information on the nationality and the year of apprehension of those who were caught while crossing the borders illegally and those who were apprehended or were working without valid documentation. The General Staff of Turkey also published cumulative data on cases of the illegal crossing of borders.

Naturalisation statistics, which include figures on the previous citizenship of those who were naturalised, are published by the Bureau of Population and Citizenship Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior. It is also possible to obtain information on the number of foreigners (by country of citizenship) who have acquired Turkish citizenship through marriage with a Turkish citizen. The Ministry of Education collects data on international students in Turkey, but again only little information is disseminated.

Overall, available immigration-related statistics in Turkey are inadequate and often unreliable (İçduygu, 2009b). However, the adoption of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in April 2013 and the formation of the General Directorate of Migration Management are major attempts to improve the collection and compilation of data on international migration in Turkey. The General Directorate will employ a computer-based data management system (GÖÇ-NET) to connect local and international duties. This electronic network will hopefully include all the necessary information on any mobility in and out of Turkey. Moreover, as it is mentioned in LFIP, an annual migration report including migration statistics will be published regularly by the co-operation of the General Directorate and TurkStat. It was announced that the first report will be disseminated in February 2015. These attempts are concrete signals to systematise any significant progress in gathering data on international migration. If this attempt is successful, this new source will yield relatively good demographic data, including information on temporary international migration.

11.3 Temporary Emigration Trends

During the last decade, there have been six main types of temporary migration of Turkish citizens: family-based movers; labour emigration; asylum seekers; emigration of professional and highly skilled people; emigration for educational purposes; and returnees. Unfortunately, there is no detailed and trustworthy Turkish data source on these flows of emigration. The existing data on emigration is very limited. However, data on emigration from Turkey is available indirectly from reports on immigration in receiving countries. Consequently, data used here for emigration estimates are derived from a variety of sources[1], including statistics in the destination countries, which provide a very general description of the overall emigration status in Turkey.

11.3.1 Family-based movers

The presence of large Turkish migrant communities in the migrant-receiving countries is the main reason for family-based migration. These communities form networks that keep the migratory flows continuously active. Family-based movements include activities, such as family reunification, long and short-term family related visits, and marriage-related migration. These movements are primarily directed to Western European countries since the vast majority of emigrants are located there, and to a certain extent, Australia and North America. There was a considerable decline in this family-based movement in the 2000s. It is estimated that the total number of Turkish emigrants to Europe may have fallen to the level of less than 50,000 per year in the early 2000s, compared to the figure of 100,000 in the 1990s. Nearly one third of them are those who moved in the family-based flows, either as temporary stays or permanent settlements. It is assumed that there were declining trends of family-based

1 These sources include the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of the Interior, OECD SOPEMI, Eurostat, UNHCR, UNFPA, and country-specific reports and documents.

migration in the late 2000s (İçduygu, 2013).

11.3.1 Labour migration

11.3.1.1 Regular labour migration

It was estimated that nearly 3 million Turkish citizens were living in Europe in 2005, approximately 105,000 Turkish workers in the Middle Eastern countries (İçduygu and Sert, 2011), and over 75,000 workers in the Commonwealth of Independent States (İçduygu and Karaçay, 2012). The total number of migrant Turkish citizens equalled to 3.3 million[2] (Fassman and İçduygu, 2013). During the last decade contract-dependent labour migration has constituted a large part of Turkish emigration. The number of workers sent abroad grew steadily until 2006 when the figures hit the highest point with 81,000 workers. The numbers dropped to 57,652 in 2008 and continued to fall until 2011 with a fluctuation in 2009. The number of workers sent abroad by the Turkish Employment Agency rose significantly in the period of 2011-2012 from 53,828 to 67,045, reaching the highest point since 2007 (see Table 11.1).

Table 11.1 Number of workers sent abroad by the Turkish Employment Agency (TEA), 2003–2012 (Source: Turkish Employment Agency (TEA), http://www.iskur.gov.tr, Ministry of Labour and Social Security)

Receiving country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
European Union	4299	2783	1710	1330	8249	1861	1637	1323	1619	1377
Other European countries	237	406	176	32	2337	3204	1766	78	46	850
The ME countries	10189	9774	24798	39823	23263	25257	32 546	33993	28331	40158
CIS	16330	22433	28663	36898	36019	19543	17264	14307	18235	17448
Australia, Canada, USA	93	78	94	59	278	53	97	27	21	3
Israel	422	130	417	602	254	115	541	401	50	887
Other	2581	4594	4497	2635	4868	7619	5628	4718	5526	6322
TOTAL	34151	40198	60355	81379	75268	57652	59479	54847	53828	67045

This population movement was primarily a contract-based labour migration, in which workers are hired for a period of 3–24 months by Turkish or foreign contracting firms operating mainly in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and in the Middle Eastern (ME) Countries. For example, in 2009, nearly 60,000 workers were sent within the contract-based schemes. As far as the destination countries are concerned, in 2009 as the share of the Middle East and North Africa countries increased, there was a visible decline in the number or workers to the CIS countries; this trend continued throughout 2010. However, in 2011 the number of Turkish workers sent to the Middle East dropped while the share of workers in CIS countries increased. Overall there was a slight decrease in the number of total workers sent abroad in 2011. In this year the top five destination countries were Iraq (20%), Russia (17%), Saudi Arabia (15%), Turkmenistan (9%) and Qatar (6%) (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). In 2012, the Middle Eastern countries occupied the major portion, with 40,158 workers representing nearly 60% of all extraterritorial employment by the TEA. Among these countries, Iraq and Saudi Arabia had the highest records with 15,051 and 8,324 people respectively.

2 This excludes just over one million emigrants from Turkey who have been naturalised in receiving countries, since they are accepted as permanent settlers.

Table 11.2 Number of Turkish workers sent abroad by the Turkish Employment Agency (TEA), 2003–2012 (Source: Turkish Employment Agency (TEA) http://www.iskur.gov.tr)

Countries	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Canada	2	1	2	2	11	2	3	2	0	0
Israel	422	130	417	602	254	115	541	401	50	887
USA	87	74	90	57	219	40	64	12	14	2
Europe										
Austria	11	22	23	2	368	77	66	54	31	3
Belgium	2	0		6	270	38	25	14	12	2
France	422	530	593	377	1863	298	241	136	144	20
Germany	3366	2197	1074	708	5632	1426	1280	1094	1414	1240
Sweden	42	29	10	9	36	10	7	5	1	1
United Kingdom	12	2	2	1	80	12	18	20	17	0
Albania	111	70	11	27	268	1615	533	0	0	3
Bulgaria	36	88	44	58	421	241	374	48	13	0
Romania	2	230	113	169	1648	1348	859	30	33	83
MENA										
Algeria	160	699	724	1 478	879	792	1 834	1 963	2 209	1219
Egypt	0	0	118	694	574	90	27	50	2	27
Iraq	601	4900	8237	7525	6711	4742	3886	5405	10904	15051
Jordan	368	752	2241	2239	1086	350	364	280	250	332
Qatar	241	454	1604	4597	4879	2355	3312	3687	3381	505
Kuwait	26	230	151	596	94	8	5	1	40	19
Libya	2 515	668	986	770	2548	5902	13578	15643	1951	690
Morocco	182	279	330	368	989	1 187	207	251	1 004	813
Saudi Arabia	6064	1146	6452	19841	3759	7544	7195	6349	8100	8324
Sudan	29	18	107	469	352	191	158	232	357	23
United Arab Emirates	1	628	1843	1176	1392	2096	1980	132	133	85
CIS										
Azerbaijan	1049	745	629	632	1 298	939	858	555	1594	2197
Georgia	357	276	104	9	105	103	64	136	598	626
Kazakhstan	1532	4403	5775	8627	7974	4613	1595	1011	877	985
Moldova	0	0	-	85	0	-	0	-	-	0
Russia	10816	13271	19540	24142	23118	15696	9482	7718	9266	13762
Turkmenistan	1603	2031	964	1086	735	1234	4291	4625	4899	4810
Ukraine	89	761	1017	1926	2655	2523	832	217	492	153
Uzbekistan	773	455	349	147	134	90	142	45	509	47
Others	2581	4872	6503	2954	4916	1975	5658	4731	5526	6322
TOTAL	34151	40198	60355	81379	75268	57652	59479	54847	53821	67045

Figure 11.1 shows Turkish labour stock in the Russian Federation from 2003 to 2012. According to these figures, the mid-2000s had the highest numbers of labours. The numbers gradually decreased due to the temporary nature of contract-based labour migration. This trend is supported by data on the annual flow of Turkish citizens' workforce to Russia provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Table 11.3).



Figure 11.1 Turkish labour stock in Russia, 2003-2012 (in thousands) (Source: İçduygu, Karaçay and Göker, 2013)

Table 11.3 Annual flow of Turkish citizens' workforce to Russia (Source: Turkish Employment Agency (TEA), http://www.iskur.gov.tr/)

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Russia	10816	13281	19540	24142	23118	16095	9482	7718	10584	13762
TOTAL	34151	40198	60355	81379	70024	58602	59479	54847	52491	57953
%	31.7	33	32.4	29.7	33	27.5	15.9	14.1	20.2	23.7

As for the European Union countries, the number of workers sent by the TEA in recent years remained as low as nearly 1,500 people yearly since 2008. In 2012, 2,227 workers were sent to the European Union countries and other European countries. This type of migration to EU countries was almost entirely directed to Germany based on a bilateral agreement in 1991, which allowed German firms co-operating with Turkish partners to hire Turkish workers (see Table 11.4). The total number of Turkish workers who found employment in Germany in 2000 was 2,100, accounting for over 90 per cent of the total workers who were recruited to Europe by the TEA. This figure was 82 per cent in 2001 and 71 per cent in 2004. Among the workers who were recruited to Europe in 2006 64 per cent went to Germany, similar to 2005 figures. Again in 2007 and 2008 respectively, 67 per cent and 77 per cent of the workers sent to Europe went to Germany. In both 2009 and 2010, contract-based labour to Europe declined, but numbers rose again in 2011. In 2012, 1,240 workers were sent to Germany, with a moderate decrease compared to 2011 (see Table 11.2).

In addition, some 350,000 Turkish citizens were reported to be present in other countries, the vast majority in the traditional immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, and the USA. The overall emigration picture implies that over 5 per cent of the nation's total population was living outside of Turkey (see Table 11.4). From 2005 to 2010, there was a considerable change in the number of Turkish citizens living abroad, which increased from 3,3 million to 3,7 million. Turkish migrant stock in Germany has decreased and constituted 43 per cent of the total migrant stock in 2010 indicating a 15 per cent drop from 2005.

Table 11.4 Turkish migrant stock abroad in 1985, 1995, 2005 and 2010 (Source: Figures are compiled from the various files of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2014)

	1985		1995		2005		2010	
	# (x 1000)	%	# (x 1000)	%	# (x 1000)	%	# (x 1000)	%
Austria	75.0	3.1	147.0	4.4	127.0	3.8	110.0	3
Belgium	72.5	3.1	79.5	2.4	45.9	1.4	39.4	1
France	146.1	6.2	198.9	6.0	208.0	6.3	459.6	12.1
Germany	1400.1	59.3	2049.9	62.0	1912.0	57.9	1629.4	43.2
Netherlands	156.4	6.6	127.0	3.8	160.3	4.9	372.7	9.8
Scandinavian Countries	41.2	1.7	73.0	2.2	51.6	1.6	145.6	3.8
Switzerland	51.0	2.2	79.0	2.4	79.5	2.4	71.6	1.8
Other European Countries	42.0	1.8	87.0	2.6	130.0	3.9	223.8	5.9
Total Europe	1984.6	84.0	2841.3	85.9	2714.3	82.1	3052.1	81.0
The ME Countries	200.0	8.5	127.0	3.8	105.0	3.2	162.6	4.3
Australia	35.0	1.5	45.0	1.4	60.0	1.8	71.0	1.8
CIS Countries	0.0	0.0	50.0	1.4	75.0	2.3	104.9	2.7
Other Countries	140.0	5.9	245.0	7.4	350.0	10.6	375.5	9.9
TOTAL	2359.6	100	3308.3	100	3304.3	100	3765.1	100

The nature of Turkish emigration has also changed in terms of the skill profile of emigrants. In the 1960s and 1970s, emigration from Turkey was predominantly unskilled. But in the last two decades, emigrant labour has become increasingly highly skilled, highly educated and showing cosmopolitan characteristics, indicating a trend of brain drain from Turkey. There are no direct statistics to illustrate this trend, but a number of studies provide indirect evidence (Güngör and Tansel, 2007; Koşer Akçapar, 2009).

The nature of the emigrant populations differs considerably according to the three main destination regions: Europe, the MENA countries, and the CIS. Turkish emigrant communities in Europe continue to remain the same or even experience some increase while the number of the predominantly male worker communities in the ME countries, and the CIS fluctuated from year to year due to the nature of contract-dependent labour migration.

11.3.1.2 Irregular migration

It is extremely difficult to give precise numbers because of the nature of irregular labour migration. It includes ‘illegal entries’, ‘overstayers’, and ‘rejected asylum-seekers’. In addition, family-related migration and asylum-seeking may contribute to the categories of ‘overstayers’ and ‘rejected asylum-seekers’. Nearly one quarter of all Turkish citizens interviewed stated that they have tried to enter a country without the required papers (11%), or attempted to overstay their visa or permit (11%) according to data derived from a Eurostat/NIDI Project in the late 1990s in Turkey by İçduygu and Ünalan (2002). Anecdotal evidence of irregular migration in Turkey and Europe indicates that in the 2000s, although there were still on-going flows of irregular migration, the trend was on the decline. For instance, there were 2,350 Turkish citizens apprehended in Central and Eastern Europe as irregular migrants in 2004 and this figure dropped to 2,124 in 2005 (Futo and Jandl, 2006) and to less than 2,000 in 2006 (İçduygu, 2013). This figure was 1,788 in 2007, indicating the lowest figure of last five years (İçduygu, 2013). In 2008, this figure was even lower than the figure in 2007 with around 1,400 caught Turkish citizens as irregular migrants. In the early 2010s, figures provided by FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) indicated that although there were some flows of irregular migrants from Turkey to Europe that have continued in recent years, there was also a considerable declining trend in the numbers: for example, in 2010 there were more than 4,000 Turkish citizens who were refused entry at the EU borders with the reason of potential irregularity, this figure was less than 3,500 in 2011, and around 3,000 in 2012[3].

11.3.2 Asylum-seekers

Asylum-seeking contributed considerably to the overall level of emigration in the late 1990s and early 2000s as it is mentioned earlier. Data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), shows that the annual flows of asylum-seekers from Turkey to Europe were around 11,529 in 2005 and steadily decreased in the last ten years. It seems that the number of asylum-seekers from Turkey has stabilized at a level of less than 7,000 in the second half 2000s. The figure was around 5,800 in 2010 and 5,300 in 2011 indicating an on-going decline in asylum applications (see Table 11.5). The declining trend continued in 2012 with a slight decrease, 5,211 people from Turkey applied for asylum in the European Union (lowest recorded figure for decades), and comprising 1.8 per cent of all asylum applications in Europe.

Table 11.5 Asylum applications submitted in European Union, 2005-2012 (Source: Various UNHCR Sources (2007-2013)

Country of origin	Numbers						Percentage					
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Afghanistan	8902	17920	25310	22939	26159	24681	3.8	6.3	8.9	8.5	10.9	8,3
Iran	7973	9974	10398	13003	10789	11690	3.8	3.5	3.7	4.8	4.5	4
Iraq	46967	39106	23332	19176	13623	10464	19	13.8	8.2	7.2	5.6	3,5
Turkey	6491	6914	6434	5828	5376	5211	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.2	1,8
Others	166403	208692	217904	209002	183661	244623	69.7	74	76.9	77.4	76.6	82
TOTAL	233736	282606	283378	269948	239608	277587	100	100	100	100	100	100

3 www.frontex.europa.eu.

11.3.3 Highly skilled migrants

Although there is no adequate data on this type of migration, one can assume that there has been a considerable flow of high skilled labour and professionals particularly in the areas of computer sciences, finance, and management amounting to an annual figure of around 5,000 – 6,000 individuals in the late 2000s and early 2010s (İçduygu, 2013). The main destination countries are the traditional migrant-receiving countries such as Australia, Canada, the USA, and some European countries. As an example, data on occupational distribution by visa status of persons from Turkey admitted by the US with temporary status can be retrieved from USA Homeland Security sources. The number of workers with specialty occupation has risen from 1,604 in 1994 to 5,192 in 2005 (Gökbayrak, 2009) and dropped to 4,294 in 2012[4]. In recent years, the main characteristic of this movement is its temporary-migration nature, rather than being a movement for permanent settlement (Pitkänen et al., 2012).

11.3.4 Migration for educational purposes

Pitkänen et al. reveal student migration is often temporary, taking place in binational or wider transnational contexts (2012: 208). According to the United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 50,924[5] Turkish citizens moved to another country to pursue higher education degrees in 2012. Figure 11.2 shows annual Turkish student mobility for tertiary education. The USA is the leading destination for students from Turkey. Other major destinations for degree students are Germany, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Austria, Azerbaijan, France and Ukraine consecutively[6].



Figure 11.2 Outbound tertiary level students from Turkey, 2004-2012 (Source: UNESCO, http://www.uis.unesco.org)

One other type of student mobility is short-term movement of tertiary level students in exchange programs, of which the European Commission's Erasmus programme is the most common. The number of Turkish Erasmus students studying abroad has risen from 1,142 in the 2004-2005 academic year to 10,268 in the 2011-2012 academic year[7]. The total number of students who joined the program between 2004 and 2012 is 48,903.

4 US Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2012, https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2012-nonimmigrant-admissions, retrieved on 24 April 2014.
5 Data retrieved from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://www.uis.unesco.org/, 16 March 2014.
6 http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx, retrieved on 16 March 2014.
7 Statistics of the Erasmus Sub-Programme, Country Statistics Report, http://ec.europa.eu/education/library/statistics/aggregates-time-series/country-statistics_en.pdf, retrieved on 31 March 2014.

11.3.5 Return migrants

Since Germany is the country hosting the largest group of Turkish citizens, the only possible data on returnees was obtained in Germany. Every year about 40,000 Turks return from Germany to Turkey (Durugönül, 2013). Economic failure and having critical health problems are among migrants' basic motives to return. Furthermore, Turkish migrants who have close family members living in Turkey will tend to return. According to İçduygu (2012: 24), it can be assumed that "more than 1,500,000 Turkish workers and their family members have returned home since the beginning of migratory flows in 1961".

As it is already mentioned there were declining trends of family-related migration in the late 2000s. As a new trend since the early 2010s, there have been debates about the return migration of the second- and third-generation "Euro-Turks" from Europe to Turkey (İçduygu, 2013: 13).

11.4 Temporary Immigration Trends

Immigration in the last decade is marked by the mobility of ethnically non-Turkish people, compared to earlier flows. In this period, temporary immigration could be characterised by three patterns: regular migration, irregular migration, and asylum flows. The influx of foreign nationals, mostly from the countries neighbouring Turkey, has continued at a significant level during the last decade.

11.4.1 Regular migration into Turkey

Family reunification, labour migration, mobility of professionals and high-skilled workers, students and life-style migrants are among the regular types of immigration. The address-based population registration system provides a general picture of the registered population of foreign nationals in Turkey (see Table 11.6).

Table 11.6 Population of foreign nationals in 2012 (Source: Address-based Population Registration System, TurkStat, 2013)

Country	2012
Germany	25589
Afghanistan	19539
Iraq	19124
Azerbaijan	18917
Georgia	15653
Russia	15582
Iran	12211
Bulgaria	12157
Turkmenistan	11668
Syria	10067
United Kingdom	9309
Kazakhstan	8436
Ukraine	6985
Uzbekistan	6517
Kyrgyzstan	6115
United States	5959
Moldova	5450
Greece	4395
China	3882
Austria	3859
Others*	57250
TOTAL	278664

*Others contains unknowns and stateless

Table 11.7 shows the number of foreign nationals who are granted residence permits and their motives in 2009 and 2012. Data, which reveals both temporary migrants (87 per cent of total permits in 2012) and those who were granted permanent residency (13 per cent of total permits in 2012), does not include the massive influx of Syrian refugees since the 2011 crisis. In 2009, the majority of those permitted with residency in Turkey were citizens of Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Iraq and the Russian Federation. Residence permits with temporary status make up 80 per cent of all permits granted in 2009. This ratio has increased to 87 per cent in 2012 and the total number of permits rose to 320,572 in 2012. The annual increase of total residence permits is reflected in Figure 11.3.



Figure 3. Residence permits granted by years, 2010-2012 (Source: General Directorate of Migration Management, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/goc-istatistikleri_363_378, retrieved on 18 April 2014)

Table 11.7 Distribution of residence permits by years and motive, 2009 and 2013 (Source: Ministry of Interior, 2013)

Years	2009									2012								
	Family reunification	Research	Work	Other	Education	Refugee	Short Term	Long Term	TOTAL	Family reunification	Research	Work	Other	Education	Refugee	Short Term	Long Term	TOTAL
Afghanistan	515	1	27	12	1646	807	732	1641	5381	906	-	62	117	3588	4733	727	1335	11468
Azerbaijan	5386	2	812	223	3540	26	5734	4899	20622	6407	11	1200	470	6204	30	9687	1582	25591
Belgium	110	72	230	1	27	-	60	290	790	138	68	229	2	116	1	86	495	1135
Bulgaria	5133	2	478	171	1703	4	2160	6672	16323	3888	9	573	217	831	4	1842	1953	9317
Canada	155	35	200	2	60	3	46	174	675	191	42	314	2	65	1	92	347	1054
China	424	4	4115	100	664	10	1253	341	6911	784	11	2839	103	997	19	1975	454	7182
Finland	40	2	109	-	40	-	17	45	253	70	2	179	2	41	-	71	306	671
France	600	37	730	5	151	-	82	359	1964	775	34	981	9	546	2	131	885	3363
Georgia	1066	3	272	39	540	11	297	426	2654	2464	4	5679	711	715	15	17533	241	27362
Germany	1308	402	949	24	463	1	334	2080	5561	1584	362	1546	22	1418	3	463	3917	9315
Greece	571	17	110	14	884	3	42	1157	2798	832	20	345	39	1556	12	69	2149	5022
Hungary	86	5	98	1	112	-	33	77	412	87	4	152	1	138	-	36	114	532
India	169	2	220	9	39	-	233	16	688	253	6	469	14	144	4	207	6	1103
Iran	840	6	236	342	1791	2184	370	94	5863	2294	18	917	236	5069	4643	2752	128	16057
Iraq	1333	1	200	201	968	5424	1229	1673	11029	1644	3	253	644	1450	8544	1782	2896	17216
Italy	184	213	396	6	150	-	44	233	1226	283	254	677	3	497	-	150	632	2496
Kazakhstan	1252	-	411	53	1184	4	1967	2701	7572	1665	6	997	101	1449	5	2314	3499	10036
Kyrgyzstan	975	10	387	52	1063	1	1372	1042	4902	1229	-	1035	224	1301	133	2050	1233	7205
Macedonia	527	-	59	22	440	-	96	32	1176	577	1	93	63	601	-	219	37	1591
Moldova	2997	2	389	1031	368	1	175	115	5078	2698	1	1022	1249	390	5	2745	158	8268
Mongolia	58	-	36	6	1149	-	72	1	1322	90	1	38	63	993	-	128	3	1316
Netherlands	444	17	338	6	85	-	303	481	1674	523	20	441	2	208	-	220	1445	2859
Uzbekistan	1108	-	153	119	222	40	1750	1089	4481	1869	-	699	1819	389	146	2988	920	8830
Philippines	284	-	108	15	37	-	75	15	534	288	-	305	227	61	6	227	64	1178
Poland	191	12	375	8	512	1	139	144	1382	218	23	515	3	600	-	77	238	1674
Romania	997	5	186	24	189	-	108	34	1543	862	4	413	67	272	1	268	38	1925
Russian Federation	4634	12	3727	198	969	14	4424	3605	17583	6376	6	4230	259	1061	23	7209	2826	21990
Serbia and Montenegro	337	5	93	16	512	46	116	93	1218	201	3	56	18	331	31	88	39	767
South Korea	579	2	251	2	96	-	72	288	1290	576	8	320	1	253	1	169	742	2070
Syria	2395	-	63	20	517	13	391	45	3444	4675	2	304	102	1690	108	8593	687	16161
Thailand	182	1	199	11	37	-	70	6	506	192	-	275	11	124	1	67	9	679
Turkmenistan	1075	-	102	139	2240	8	1226	283	5073	2120	4	1133	4632	6216	47	2916	119	17187
Ukraine	2892	4	2008	222	362	7	408	293	6196	3439	1	3413	408	497	12	4048	460	12278
United Kingdom	966	102	1223	15	177	1	1072	2320	5876	1107	83	1830	15	216	1	945	5648	9845
USA	1791	219	1115	10	388	3	339	898	4763	2024	255	1841	14	702	-	340	2013	7189
Other	6053	265	3607	262	6233	728	2916	3317	23381	8351	284	6692	2496	16561	1898	6976	5382	48640
TOTAL	47657	1460	24012	3381	29558	9340	29757	36979	182144	61680	1550	42067	14366	57290	20429	80190	43000	320572

11.4.1.1 Labour migration

Based on the new legal arrangement in 2003, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) is responsible for providing work permit data since 2003. The most recent data by MLSS reveals a dramatic increase in work permits issued to foreigners from 2003 to 2012 (see Table 11.8).

Table 11.8 Work permits given to foreigners by the status of permission (Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Work Permits of Foreigners Statistics, 2013)

Years	Status of Permission				
	Definite	Extension	Indefinite	Independent	TOTAL
2003	509	295	50	1	**855**
2004	4843	2222	226	11	**7302**
2005	5484	3764	159	31	**9438**
2006	6691	3 744	120	18	**10603**
2007	5816	3007	96	11	**8930**
2008	6999	3583	107	16	**10705**
2009	9238	4693	83	9	**14023**
2010	9338	4760	101	2	**14201**
2011	11634	5073	161	22	**16890**
2012	26741	5531	78	10	**32272**

According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, there has been a steady but moderate increase in the number of work permits in the period of 2007-2011. The number of work permits was less than 1,000 in 2003, but it rose to more than 9,000 in 2005 and over 10,000 in 2008. In 2011, 16,890 people were granted work permits in total: the majority of these permits (11,634) had definite status. There has been an increase in the number of work permits issued by the Ministry in 2012 to a total of 32,373 (see Table 11.8). A significant number of these permits were issued to non-nationals from neighbouring countries, including Georgia (6,434), Ukraine (2,601) and the Russian Federation (2,160), as well as from countries where ethnic-Turk populations are living such as Turkmenistan (1,422). Most of these permissions are granted to labourers working in care and domestic help sectors, as can be traced from the higher number of women demanding and obtaining the permits: in 2012, among 6,434 work permits given to Georgian citizens, 5,882 were issued to women and 552 to men, and similarly 2,079 Ukrainian women compared to 522 Ukrainian men obtained work permit in the same year. Another development is regarding the rise in the number of Chinese nationals who were granted work permits. Mainly a male population (2,166 men compared to 282 women obtained work permit in 2012), the Chinese labour migrants in Turkey are employed as contract-based workers in the construction of thermal plants (see Table 11.8, Table 11.9 and Figure 11.4).

Table 11.9 Work permits given to foreigners by the status of permission, 2012 (Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Work Permits of Foreigners Statistics, 2013)

Nationality	Status of Permission			
	Definite	Indefinite	Independent	TOTAL
China	2447	1		**2448**
England	827	3		**830**
Germany	1117	9		**1126**
Georgia	6434			**6434**
Moldova	885	4		**889**
Russia	2154	5		**2160**
Turkmenistan	1422			**1422**
Ukraine	2600	1		**2601**
USA	936			**936**
Uzbekistan	828		1	**829**
Other	7091	55	9	**25117**
TOTAL	26741	78	10	**32272**

As Figure 11.3 reveals, we observed an increase in the number of work permits granted to women. The percentage of permits granted to women has increased from 36,1 per cent in 2009 to 60,6 per cent in 2012. In 2012, as already mentioned above, Turkey declared an amnesty program to regularize irregular migration. Due to this amnesty program, those irregular migrants, especially eligible women who work on domestic sector, received their work permits. This regularization process can be clearly observed in Figure 11.4.



Figure 11.4 Proportional distribution of work permit given to foreigners by years and gender (Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Work Permits of Foreigners Statistics, 2013)

Another type of work related temporary migration is the small-scale trade, or 'luggage trade' as it is called in Turkey, made especially by citizens of former Soviet Union countries. It is interesting to note that revenue from the 'luggage trade' made by migrants to Turkey, particularly those from the former communist countries in the neighbouring regions, is highly significant (Table 11.10). In 2005, the amount of revenues from the luggage trade was nearly US$ 3.5 billion. In 2006, the amount of revenues from the luggage trade was more than US$ 6.4 billion, indicating a near 85 per cent increase compared to the figure in the previous year. In 2007 luggage trade was around US$ 6.0 billion. In 2008, an increasing trend is observed with the revenues from luggage trade reaching US$ 6.2 million. Although there was a decline in between years, revenues from luggage trade have increased to US$ 6.3 million in 2012.

Table 11.10. Luggage trade revenues (million US$), 2000–2012 (Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury, http://hazine.gov.tr/; Central Bank of Turkey (2013)

Year	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**
Revenues from luggage trade	3953	3880	3473	6408	6002	6200	4783	4951	4424	6300

11.4.1.2 Highly skilled migrants

The more recent trend of the regular migration of *professionals* and *skilled migrants* is another component of immigration to Turkey. Unfortunately there is also a lack of empirical data on this type of migration. According to data provided by Ministry of Labour and Social Security, more than 7,000 skilled migrant obtained work permissions in 2012 for professional activities such as architecture, engineering, publishing, broadcasting, computer programming, od head offices and for services such as telecommunications, information technologies, education, legal and accounting, health, finance and consultancy. One available data on instructors in universities is provided by *Öğrenci Seçme ve Yerleştirme Merkezi* (ÖSYM, meaning Measuring, Selection and Placement Center). According to this data, the number of instructors working at universities in Turkey has doubled from 815 in 2003 to 1,703 in 2012 (see Figure 11.5).



Figure 11.5 Number of foreign national instructors working at Turkish higher education system (Source: Compiled from various reports of ÖSYM, http://www.osym.gov.tr/belge/1-128/sureli-yayinlar.html, 2014)

11.4.1.3 Migration for educational purposes

Available data on temporary migration related to study purposes is also scarce. ÖSYM provides annual statistics of foreign national students in higher education in Turkey. According to the ÖSYM statistics, a three-fold increase in total international students is observed from 2003 to 2013 (see Figure 11.6). In 2012, 34 per cent of all international students enrolled in higher education institutions were women.



Figure 11.6 Number of international students in Turkey, 2003-2013 (Source: Compiled from various reports of ÖSYM, http://www.osym.gov.tr/belge/1-128/sureli-yayinlar.html, 2014)

In the 2012-2013 academic year, the top ten nationalities in Turkish higher education were Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Turkish Cypriot, German, Greek, Iranian, Afghan, Bulgarian, Syrian and Kazakh. Annually, around six per cent of all tertiary students in Turkey complete a study. International students from Asian countries are mostly immigrating into Turkey whereas Europe and North America are the favourite destinations for outbound degree level students.

11.4.1.4 Life-style migration

Life-style migration of both retired and non-retired people is a relatively new form of immigration in Turkey compare to its century-long history of migration. EU citizens particularly from the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Nordic countries (Südaş, 2011) are the subjects of this kind of migration.

Life-style migration of a temporary or permanent style has a clear visibility especially in Western and Southern coastal towns of Turkey and large urban sites, such as İstanbul. There are 138,757 foreign national people who possess real estate in Turkey. Table 11.11 shows five major cities, which are preferred among foreign owners.

Table 11.11 Number of foreign property owners in 2012 (Source: General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre, http://www.tkgm.gov.tr/, 2014)

City	Number of people
Antalya	44387
Muğla	22362
Aydın	19894
İstanbul	11651
Bursa	4690
Other	35773
TOTAL	138757

The majority of foreign real estate owners are of European origin, predominantly British (see Table 11.12). The United Kingdom is followed by Germany, Greece, the Russian Federation and Ireland. Citizens of the United Kingdom make up 27 per cent of the total foreign property owners in Turkey.

Table 11.12 Number of foreign nationals owning property in Turkey by country, 2012 (Source: General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre, http://www.tkgm.gov.tr/, 2014)

Nationality	Number of people
United Kingdom	38345
Germany	17035
Greece	9803
Russian Federation	7364
Ireland	6945

According to Südaş (2012), the total number of properties acquired by foreigners was a bit more than 37.000 in 2003 and increased 16 per cent by mid-2004, 15 per cent by mid-2005 and 13 per cent by mid-2006. In 2012, there were 116,455 properties owned by foreigners, mostly EU citizens (90 %)). A shift in policy after 2003 in accordance with the EU adaptation process is the reason behind the increase during the last decade. Mediterranean climate, inexpensive property and low life expenses are the major reasons for EU citizens to immigrate (Südaş, 2011).

11.4.2 Irregular migration and transit migration

This category mainly contains *temporary migrant workers* who often have irregular status from the CIS countries. Various economic sectors in Turkey particularly textile, sex and entertainment, construction, and tourism rely on this form of cheap labour, while upper and middle-class Turkish families employ female domestic helpers as babysitters or care-givers for the sick and elderly. Many of them enter Turkey legally in accordance with Turkish visa requirements but overstay their visas and subsequently become illegal while in the country. However, there appears to be almost no available data on this type of migrant workers. The only data available is the number of foreigners entering and exiting Turkey (work related or otherwise).

Data on the numbers of irregular migrants who have been apprehended indicates a considerable decline from 2003 to 2010 (Table 11.13). Starting from 2003, a decrease is observed in the number of irregular migrants detained: this figure, which was 56,000 in 2003, dropped below 35,000 in the year

2009. In 2006, there was a slight increase in the numbers of irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey, rising to nearly 52,000. A total of 65,737 irregular migrants were apprehended in 2008, indicating an upward trend in irregular flows to Turkey since 2003. But a sharp decrease is observed in 2009, and continued with flows until 39,888 people in 2013. Most of the irregular workers are coming from Georgia, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In recent years, İçduygu (2013) made a cautious estimate of around 20,000-40,000 foreign workers annually employed illegally in Turkey. When it is considered that these figures represent only detained irregular migrants, it is clear that the scale of irregular migration in Turkey is two or three times greater than these figures (İçduygu, 2009a).

Table 11.13 Irregular migrants and smugglers apprehended, 2003-2013 (Source: Turkish National Police, http://www.egm.gov.tr, retrieved on 2 April 2014)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Irregular Migrants Apprehended	56219	61228	57428	51983	64290	65737	34345	32667	44415	47510	39888
Smugglers	937	956	834	951	1242	1305	1027	750	625	505	783
Not admitted into Turkey	9362	11093	8818	8107	14265	11046	12804	15227			

The second group of irregular migrants involves *transit migrants* who come to Turkey mainly from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq and recently Afghanistan), and from Asia and Africa (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Congo). Turkey has been a key actor in international transit migratory movements for the last two decades. Thousands of migrants, with the intention of temporary stay, enter Turkey and find their way to developed countries in the West and North. Some of these transit migrants arrive legally with tourist visas, but often drift into illegality as they overstay their right of entry, or try to enter a third country without proper travel documents. Table 14 reflects the related figures of irregular transit migrants. As the numbers show, there are about 500,000 irregular migrants on the move and more than half of those migrants are coming from Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Bangladesh.

Table 11.14 Transit type of irregular migrants (illegally entering or departing) to Turkey, 2003-2012 (Source: İçduygu, 2013)

Country of Origin	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	TOTAL
Iraq	3757	6393	3591	6412	9384	4818	1128	1327	1142	792	95796
Pakistan	6258	9396	11001	3508	6970	9186	2774	1842	2226	615	68445
Afghanistan	2178	3442	2363	3665	6614	10839	3917	2725	3843	2747	65026
Iran	1620	1265	1141	972	1107	1288	817	1075	958	1033	24123
Bangladesh	1722	3271	1524	2313	981	802	108	153	106	324	17 839
TOTAL (Five)	15535	23767	19620	16870	25056	26933	8744	7122	8275	5511	271299
Others	9 201	11078	16966	20494	23649	21849	14092	3755	22425	12218	227611
TOTAL	24736	34845	36586	37364	48705	48782	22836	10877	30700	17729	498910

Another group consists of *rejected asylum-seekers* who are reluctant to return home. As they do not have working permits under Turkish law, they look for illegal forms of employment. It is significant to note that Turkey — a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention with its ‘geographical reservation’ — only grants asylum to persons from Eastern Europe and the CIS. Taking into consideration the fact that thousands of asylum-seekers originate from the Middle East, unless granted refugee status and earning the right to settle in a third country, many of them will go underground and work illegally.

11.4.3 Asylum flows

Since the early 1980s, Turkey has become a major country of asylum. Regime change in Iran in 1979 and then the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War of 1990-91, the subsequent political turmoil in Iraq and the US invasion contributed to the asylum flows to Turkey. Officially, Turkey has not yet lifted the 'geographical limitation' in the implementation of the 1951 Geneva Convention. Therefore, asylum applications of non-Europeans to Turkey are processed in *de facto* basis if not *de jure*. From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Turkey received approximately 5,000–6,000 asylum applications a year. Since 2007, there has been a considerable increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving annually in Turkey. This increase was remarkable in the last two years: in 2011 and 2012, Turkey received more than 16,000 each year (see Tables 11.7 and 11.15).

Table 11.15 Asylum applications in Turkey, 1997–2012 (Source: Compiled by the authors from data obtained from the UNHCR Ankara Office and Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior, 2013)

	Iranians		Iraqis		Other		TOTAL	
	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons
1997	746	1392	1275	2939	83	117	2 104	4448
1998	1169	1979	2350	4672	124	187	3 643	6838
1999	2069	3843	1148	2472	184	290	3 401	6605
2000	2125	3926	791	1671	108	180	3 024	5777
2001	1841	3485	497	998	372	709	2 710	5177
2002	1456	2505	402	974	219	315	2 077	3794
2003	1715	3092	159	342	373	514	2 247	3948
2004	1225	2030	472	956	540	922	2 237	3908
2005	1021	1716	490	1047	753	1151	2 264	3914
2006	1343	2297	364	724	1094	1527	2 801	4548
2007	1024	1668	1784	3470	1651	2502	4 413	7604
2008	1230	2217	3161	6904	1925	3270	6 316	12981
2009	N/A	1981	N/A	3763	N/A	1140	N/A	7834
2010	N/A	2881	N/A	3656	N/A	2689	N/A	9226
2011	N/A	3411	N/A	7912	N/A	4697	N/A	16020
2012	N/A	3589	N/A	6942	N/A	6194	N/A	16725
TOTAL	N/A	42012	N/A	49442	N/A	26404	N/A	119347

In the search for a pragmatic solution, the Turkish authorities agreed that they would handle all applications together with the UNHCR Office in Ankara, and then the UNHCR would find a re-settlement country outside of Turkey for those accepted non-European cases. In the last two years asylum applications in Turkey have come from over thirty different countries, mainly in the Middle East, Africa and Asia (see Tables 11.7 and 11.14). In the early 2000s, the yearly average of asylum applications in Turkey was around 4,000 people, mostly coming from Iran and Iraq. The figures started to shift in 2007 and the largest portion of this increase was due to the rising number of asylum-seekers from Iraq. A total of 3,470 Iraqi asylum-seekers in 2007 and 6,904 in 2008 arrived in Turkey, representing far greater numbers compared to annual figures of the last decade. Also, there has been a considerable increase in the number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan (2,642) and from Somalia (647) in 2008. Although the figures dropped in 2009, the total number of asylum applications continued increasing drastically after 2010: from 7,834 in 2009 to 9,226 in 2010, to 16,020 in 2011 and finally to 16,725 in 2012. As a result of the significant rise in the number of asylum application in 2011, the UNHCR Global Report announced Turkey among the top five receiving countries of asylum seekers in the whole world. The Iraqi asylum seekers remained as the major group applying in Turkey with 6,942 people in 2012, followed by 4,401 Afghanis people and 3,589 Iranians.

Since the outbreak of the crisis in March 2011, mass flows from Syria to its neighbouring countries Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey is observed. The number of Syrians that sought shelter in neighbouring countries has increased rapidly since late 2011, reaching 2.8 million as of April 2014. In January

2012, the total number of Syrian refugees was 18,861; half of them sought asylum in Turkey, over 6000 in Lebanon and the rest in Jordan. By June, the total number of refugees increased fivefold as Turkey's share declined to 35 per cent. By January 2013, there were over 600 thousand Syrians refugees in total. 160,000 of them took refuge in Turkey, 178,000 in Jordan, 165,000 in Lebanon, 14,000 in Egypt and 80,000 in Iraq. The number of registered Syrian refugees reached over 1.5 million in June 2013 and almost 2.5 million by January 2014. In April 2014, there were over one million refugees in Lebanon, 588,000 in Jordan, 722,000 in Turkey, 247,000 in Iraq and 136,000 in Egypt. Turkey hosts 26 per cent of the total Syrian refugee population as of April 2014 (see Table 11.16). According to UNHCR and AFAD (2013), more than 500 people have been arriving daily across official crossing points, sometimes as many as 1,000-2,000 daily.

Table 11.16 Syrian migration to neighbouring countries, January 2012-April 2014 (Source: UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php, 2014)

Country	January 2012	June 2012	January 2013	June 2013	January 2014	April 2013
Jordan	3063	27344	178260	491365	590746	588135
Turkey	9500	33079	163161	377035	577937	722234
Egypt	-	924	14478	69207	132740	136654
Lebanon	6290	25411	165003	490709	890136	1040322
Iraq	8	5839	80919	159384	216271	247272
TOTAL	18861	92597	601821	1529140	2426175	2791287

Triggered by the Arab Spring in Northern Africa that led to the exodus of thousands of people to Southern Europe, the political crisis in Syria eventually led to the emergence of an immigration crisis in Turkey, especially in the nearest border crossing points in Hatay province. Since the beginning the Turkish state provided immigrants accommodation in the camp and container sites in the bordering cities of Syria and granted them Temporary Protection status. According to the UNHCR[8], the estimated total number of Syrians in Turkey reached 700,000 as of April 2014, with 722,055 people registered and 220,242 settled in camps (see Table 11.17). Around 30 per cent of these live in the 22 government-run camps in 10 provinces near the Syrian-Turkish border. The majority of Syrians are assumed to be settled in Gaziantep (33,946 registered in camps, 150,042 registered outside of the camps), following Şanlıurfa (72,668 in camps, 100,200 outside) and Hatay (14,635 in camps, 118,597 outside). The sudden increase in the Syrian population that migrated to Turkey and the unpredictable nature of the situation in Syria has led to rising challenges of assistance, especially regarding housing and medical treatment, as well as the politicization of the migration issue in Turkey.

Table 11.17 Syrian migration to Turkey, December 2011-April 2014 (Source: UNHCR, Turkey Syrian Daily Sitrep Reports, 2014)

Date	In camps	Outside of camps*	Registered	TOTAL**
16 December 2011	8000	-	8000	-
17 April 2012	23955	-	23955	-
1 June 2012	24433	-	24780	-
10 September 2012	80104	-	78431	81000
1 January 2013	150906	60-70000	148441	210-220000
17 April 2013	191446	66942	258388	400000
3 June 2013	195738	149003	344741	400000
7 October 2013	200135	300974	500985	500-600000
January 2014	210201	349793	559994	700000
28 April 2014	220242	501813	722055	800000

*From 17 April 2013 onwards the number of refugees living outside of camps represents the registered number of refugees living outside of camps.

** Estimates including number of refugees registered and awaiting registration and also government estimations.

Finally, in the broad picture, Table 11.18 reflects a general comparison of undocumented migration, asylum applications and residence permits. It is estimated that in 2003 over 210,000 foreign nationals were recorded as migrants in Turkey according to the three types of migratory flows mentioned

8 UNHCR Turkey Syrian Refugee Daily Sitrep, 28 April 2014, retrieved on 29 April 2014, available at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=3016.

above. More than two-thirds (around 152,000) were legal immigrants, and 60,000 were irregular (undocumented/clandestine) and/or transit migrants. Asylum-seekers account for a very small proportion (2%) of the flows of foreign nationals. In 2005, there were over 192,000 foreign citizens in Turkey who were classified as migrants of various kinds: 57,000 (29%) irregular migrants, 4,000 (2%) asylum-seekers and 131,000 (69%) regular migrants with residence permits. The figures of 2009 reveal the existence of a total of over 205,500 regular/ irregular migrants and asylum-seekers in Turkey. Less than 4 per cent of them are asylum seekers whereas 17 per cent of them are irregular migrants and the remaining 79 % are registered migrants with residence permits. In 2011, the number of migrants jumped to 273,000 due to a marked increase in residence permit figures. There were nearly 220,000 regular migrants with residence permits, in addition to over 16,000 asylum seekers and nearly 43,000 irregular migrants apprehended in 2011. These figures rose to 267,300 regular migrants with residence permits, 16,725 asylum applications and nearly 47,510 assumed undocumented migrations in 2012. Iraqi asylum seekers (6,942 people) and Afghan asylum seekers (4,401 people) comprised the majority of the asylum applications (nearly 68%). As for residence permits, there was a significant increase of residence permits granted for work reasons, ranging from 23,027 in 2011 to 32,850 in 2012.

Table 11.18 Indicative numbers of migration to Turkey, 2003–2012 (Sources: UNHCR Ankara Office (2001-2012), Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior (2003-2013)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Undocumented Migration	**56200**	**61200**	**57428**	**51983**	**64290**	**65737**	**34345**	**32667**	**42576**	**47510**
Illegal entries	30348	34745	26046	18876	30120	45462	22975	25637	30700	17729
Overstays	25852	26455	31382	33107	34170	20275	11370	7030	11876	28253
Asylum application	**3966**	**3908**	**3914**	**4548**	**7640**	**12981**	**7834**	**9226**	**16020**	**16725**
of which: Afghan	77	341	365	339	427	1571	1009	1248	2486	4401
of which: Iran	3108	2029	1716	2297	1668	2217	1981	2881	3411	3589
of which: Iraq	342	964	1047	724	3470	6904	3763	3656	7912	6942
Residence Permit	**152203**	**155500**	**131594**	**186586**	**183757**	**174926**	**163326**	**176944**	**219217**	**267299**
of which: work	21650	27500	22130	22805	25475	18900	17483	19351	23027	32850
of which: study	21810	15000	25240	24258	22197	28597	27063	29266	37260	34643
of which: other	108743	113000	84224	139523	135365	127429	118780	128327	156919	199806

As the above table summarizes the quantity of immigration flows to Turkey for the last decade, new questions remain to be answered in further research: What are the transformative characteristics and development impacts of the temporary mobility of people? What are the kinds of experiences and conceptions of migrants in their daily living and working environments? What are their motivations for transnational mobility? What are the connections and networks that temporary migrants are a part of?

11.5 Conclusion

This report has illustrated detailed information on the quantity of temporary migrants in Turkey, collected from official Turkish sources, reports provided by national and international institutions and scholarly works. The findings are illustrated in a comparative table of permanent and temporary migratory flows (Table 19). Since Turkey has long been known as a migrant sending country, more accurate data could be gathered from host countries and European Union sources. Turkish migrant stock has always been a very large figure as guest-worker programmes have validated since the beginning of 1960s in Europe. Even though that specific programme of temporary migration had ceased by the end of 1970s, the emigration of citizens of Turkey has continued through family reunification schemes resulting in permanent migration. Figures in this report show an interesting trend that some of those who migrated permanently and their descendants with hyphenated identities have returned to Turkey in the last ten tears. During the last decade, contract-dependent labour migration has constituted a large part of Turkish temporary emigration mostly to CIS and MENA countries rather than European countries even though Europe was historically the major destination. Highly skilled migrants and student mobility as other types of temporary migration also show an increasing trend.

According to data gathered in this report, the shift in Turkey becoming more of an immigrant country than an emigrant one emerges as an important finding. Immigration in the last decade is marked by the mobility of ethnically non-Turkish people, compared to earlier flows. In this period, temporary immigration could be characterised by patterns of regular migration, irregular migration, and asylum flows. Migrants coming for work from countries such as China, Ukraine and many CIS countries, student mobility mostly from CIS and neighbouring countries and life-style migrants mostly from European countries and the Russian Federation constitute the regular migration scheme. Various economic sectors in Turkey particularly textile, sex and entertainment, construction, and tourism rely on the form of cheap labour provided by irregular migrants, while upper and middle-class Turkish families employ female domestic helpers as babysitters or care-givers for the sick and elderly. Another group of irregular migrants involves *transit migrants* who come to Turkey mainly from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq and recently Afghanistan), and from Asian and African countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Somalia, and Congo). Turkey has been a key actor in international transit migratory movements for the last two decades due to its strategic location on European-Asian transnational space. Thousands of migrants, with the intention of temporary stay, enter Turkey and find their way to developed countries in the West and North. The last category for immigration listed in this report is asylum seeking temporary migrants. Because Turkey has not lifted the 'geographical limitation' in the implementation of the 1951 Geneva Convention, asylum applications of non-Europeans to Turkey are processed as temporary protection. Since 2007, there has been a considerable increase in the number of asylum seekers annually arriving in Turkey, mostly coming from Iraq, Iran and Somalia. By 2011, a new mass migration pattern emerged as internal conflict broke out in Syria. Today, the number of Syrian refugees has reached 800 thousand in Turkey and turned into an immigration crisis.

Table 11.19 An overview of migration categories for Turkey[9]

	Temporary Migration from Turkey -2012	Temporary Migration to Turkey -2012	Long term/ Permanent
Total number of migrants	3300000[(1)]		1000000
Residence permits holders		277572	43000
Belgium		640	495
China		6728	454
Finland		365	306
Germany		5398	3917
Greece		2873	2149
Hungary		418	114
India		1097	6
Netherlands		1414	1445
Philippines		1114	64
Thailand		670	9
Ukraine		11818	460

9 This table summarizes the data mentioned throughout the country report. The sources are variable and mentioned in the report. The numbers shown are not necessarily mutually exclusive; some categories may contain numbers in other categories. The numbers are annual flows of related migrant category unless stated otherwise.

Family based movers	less than 50000	61680
Belgium		138
China		784
Finland		70
Germany		1584
Greece		832
Hungary		87
India		253
Netherlands		523
Philippines		288
Thailand		192
Ukraine		3439
Regular labour migration	67045	42067
Belgium		229
China		2839
Finland		179
Germany		1546
Greece		345
Hungary		152
India		469
Netherlands		441
Philippines		305
Thailand		275
Ukraine		3413
Apprehended irregular migrants	1400 (2008)(2)	47510(3)
Professionals and highly skilled migrants	6000	7000
Asylum seekers	5211	16725(4)
Students	50924(5)	44025(6)
Belgium		107
China		346
Finland		7
Germany		1822
Greece		1704
Hungary		15
India		45
Netherlands		255
Philippines		26
Thailand		33
Ukraine		282
Return migrants	40000(7)	
Syrian refugees		1165279 (2014) (8)
Transit migrants		17729(9)
Life-style migrants		138757

Note: (1) This estimate excludes just over one million emigrants from Turkey who have been naturalised in receiving countries, since they are accepted as permanent settlers. (2) The most recent data available belongs to 2008. (3) The estimate is there are about

500000 irregular migrants on the move. (4) This number does not include Syrian refugees who have been forced migrating since March 2011. (5) This figure illustrates the stock number. (6) This figure illustrates the stock number. (7) This is an estimate figure. (8) The number is retrieved from http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 on 2 January 2015. (9) The estimate is there are about 500000 irregular migrants on the move.

References

AFAD, (2013) Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Field Survey Results, *https://www.afad.gov.tr/Dokuman/TR/61-2013123015505-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-2013_print_12.11.2013_eng.pdf*, retrieved 27 March 2014.

Durugönül, E. (2013) Turkish Return Migration from Europe, *European Review*, 21(3): 412-421.

Employment Agency (TEA), *http://www.iskur.gov.tr*, Ministry of Labour and Social Security.

Fassmann, H. and İçduygu, A. (2013) Turks in Europe: Migration Flows, Migrant Stocks and Demographic Structure, *European Review*, 21(3): 349-361.

FRONTEX, *www.frontex.europa.eu,* retrieved on 12 April 2014.

Futo, P. and Jandl, M., eds. (2006) *2005 Year Book on Illegal Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe*, Vienna: ICMPD.

General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre, *http://www.tkgm.gov.tr/,* 2014

General Directorate of Migration Management, *http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/goc-istatistikleri_363_378*, retrieved on 18 April 2014.

Gökbayrak, Ş. (2012) Skilled Labour Migration and Positive Externality: The Case of Turkish Engineers Working Abroad, *International Migration*, 50(1): 132–150.

Güngör, N. and Tansel, A. (2007) Brain Drain from Turkey: An Investigation of Students' Return Intentions, *ERC Working Papers 0701*, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University.

İçduygu, A. (2009b) Turkey. In: Fassmann, H., Reeger, U. and Sievers, W. (eds) *Statistics and Reality: Concepts and Measurements of Migration in Europe*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 291-296.

İçduygu, A. (2012) 50 Years after the Labour Recruitment Agreement with Germany: The Consequences of Emigration for Turkey, *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 17(2): 11-36.

İçduygu, A. (2013) Turkey and International Migration, 2012-13. *Report Prepared for The Annual Meeting of the OECD Expert Group on Migration,* Paris, November 27-29th 2013.

İçduygu, A. and Karaçay, A. B. (2012) The International Migration System Between Turkey and Russia: Project-Tied Migrant Workers in Moscow, *International Migration,* 50(1): 56-74.

İçduygu, A. and Sert, D. (2011) Project-Tied Labor Migration from Turkey to the MENA Region: Past, Present, and Future, *International Labor and Working Class History,* 79(1): 62-80.

İçduygu, A. and Ünalan, T. (2002), Tides between Mediterranean Shores: Undocumented Migration in the South of Europe*, Papers in Demography,* No. 7*,* Ankara: Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies.

İçduygu, A., Karaçay, A. B. and Göker, Z. G. (2013) *The Russian-Turkish Migratory System: Methods of Estimations and Forecasting in Migration Flows*, Project Report, TÜBİTAK 111K484.

İçduygu, Ahmet (2009a): *International Migration and Human Development in Turkey.* Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series, Vol. 52.

Koşer Akçapar, Ş. (2009). Turkish Brain Drain to the USA. In İçduygu, A. and Kirişci, K. (eds) *Lands of Diverse Migration*. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 109-248.

Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2013) *Labour Statistics 2012*, Ankara.

ÖSYM, *http://www.osym.gov.tr/belge/1-128/sureli-yayinlar.html*, 2014.

Pitkänen, P., İçduygu, A. and Sert, D. (2012) Current Characteristics of Migrant Transnationalism. In: Pitkänen, P., İçduygu, A. and Sert, D. (eds) *Migration and Transformation: Multi-Level analysis of Migrant Transnationalism*. New York: Springer, 207-224.

Statistics of the Erasmus Sub-Programme, Country Statistics Report, *http://ec.europa.eu/education/library/statistics/aggregates-time-series/country-statistics_en.pdf*, retrieved on 31 March 2014.

Südaş, İ. (2011) Two Distinct Groups of EU Immigrants In Coastal Turkey: A Case Study on the

Retired and Non-Retired Europeans In Marmaris, *Siirtolaisuus - Migration Quaterly,* 1: 26-37.
Südaş, İ. (2012) Lifestyle Migration to Turkey: EU Citizens Living on The Turkish Sunbelt. Unpublished Paper, *http://lifestylemigrationhub.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/lifestyle_migration_turkey.pdf*, retrieved on 3 April 2014.
Turkish Employment Agency (TEA), *http://www.iskur.gov.tr/*
Turkish National Police, *http://www.egm.gov.tr*, retrieved on 2 April 2014.
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, *http://www.uis.unesco.org/,* 16 March 2014.
UNESCO, Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students, *http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education /Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx*, retrieved on 16 March 2014.
UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response, *http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/ regional.php*, 2014.
UNHCR, Turkey Syrian Daily Sitrep Reports, *http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees*, 2014.
US Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2012, *https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2012-nonimmigrant-admissions*, retrieved on 24 April 2014.

Institutional Sources

Address-based Population Registration System, *TurkStat*
Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior
Central Bank of Turkey
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Labour and Social Security
Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Work Permits of Foreigners Statistics
Undersecretariat of Treasury

12. FLOWS AND PATTERNS OF TEMPORARY MIGRATION: COUNTRY REPORT FROM UKRAINE

Petro CHORNIY, Oksana HODOVANSKA, Ihor MARKOV, Svitlana ODYNETS, Danylo SUDYN, Anna TROFIMOVA and Ganna ZAREMBA

12.1 Introduction

Ukraine is characterized by almost all known types and forms of external migration. Over the past half century four historical migration eras, or as they are called four waves of Ukrainian mass exodus abroad are distinguished, each of which is featured by dominating type of migration. Thus, the “first wave” that began from about the 60’s of the 19th century and ended with the beginning of World War I is characteristic for the displacement of more than 2 million representatives of the agricultural population abroad, of which 800 thousand stayed in the Americas (the US, Canada, Brazil, Argentina) and more than half a million moved to the Far East of Russia. A distinctive feature of the second wave of Ukrainian external migration became a mass exodus of the Western population (during the times of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet republic as a part of the USSR external migration was stopped) to work in Western Europe, particularly in France and Germany. In contrast to the emigration to America, more than 40% of Ukrainian guest workers returned home from Europe. According to the latest research the emigration from Western Ukraine in the interwar period came to almost 600 million people, of which about 200 thousand went to the US (more than 100 thousand to the US and Canada and about the same number to Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay). More than 25 thousand went to Palestine. The third wave of massive external migration of Ukrainians is called political.

After the Second World War in Central and Western Europe 2–3 million Ukrainians moved to mainly Germany, Austria, Italy. These were mostly people taken for forced labour, evacuated prisoners from Nazi concentration camps, prisoners of war, escapees from Ukraine and political emigrants of 1920’s. Most of them either voluntarily or under pressure returned back home. Among the 220 thousand Ukrainians who still remained, proving that in the USSR they would face political, national and religious persecution during the years of 1947–1957 went to other Western European countries: the Americas and Australia. As the result, the first three waves of Ukrainian immigration formed one of the largest diasporas in the world (over 12 million).

However, the most massive and the most common was the latest, the fourth wave of Ukrainian external migrations that began almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR and the declaration of the independence of Ukraine in 1991, which continues to this day. From 4 to 5 million of its citizens left Ukraine for two decades, mainly in search of work. The fourth wave of Ukrainian immigration simultaneously embraced more than 35 countries on four continents and acquired features characteristic of the modern multinational and global migration. Unlike previous periods, it is not conditioned by push and pull factors between countries of origin and destination, and preferably does not mean “a whole family moving from one country to another” or “separation” of the family from the country for some time. The fourth wave is “unauthorized” and, therefore, mostly illegal and relies on advanced networks that combine the country of origin immediately with many receiving countries and form a sequence of conditions and the choices among them. This migration is primarily a personal rather than a family, and within a short historical time, as well as at the level of one person it combines its several types moving from one to another. To a very small extent does it mean an integration into the host society, ethnic assimilation or formation of diaspora as it was before. A migrant lives mainly in his cross-border communicative space “in correlation” with the family, stakeholders at home, colleagues, employers and partners in host countries.

The era of recent migrations affected Ukraine in a specific way. Shortly time after the fall of the

"Iron Curtain" Ukraine became a country of immigration and transit of migrants from the East, mostly from the New Independent States to the EU. Contrary to the fourth wave of Ukrainian external migration, these recent ones are practically not studied. However, closer acquaintance with them on the basis of available sources reveals the typological similarity of this kind of the mobility to external migration of Ukrainians. We define both of them as "temporary" in the coordinates of the differences between the "temporary nature" and "consistency", which was characteristic for the migrations of previous eras, and which are considered by the national legislation through the prism of countries of origin and host countries.

12.2 Types of Temporary Transnational Migration and Mobility

12.2.1 Migration in terms of statistics

12.2.1.1 Methodological concerns

The main task in studying migration flows and tendencies is to obtain reliable statistical data which would allow estimating quantitative and qualitative dimension of migration. The quantitative dimension covers (1) the scale of migration processes, i.e., the quantity of people involved; (2) temporality of migration; and (3) frequency of migration. Qualitative dimension of migration includes: (1) reasons for immigration/emigration; (2) reasons for chosen time frame of migration (permanent, long-term, short-term, one-time or circulating); and (3) the migrant's social portrait (social, ethnic, national origin, level of education, profession, family status, etc.). The above-mentioned list is important for describing major migration tendencies and flows; nevertheless, it is not always easy to obtain such data. The sources of statistical data can be divided into two groups in accordance with the ways of data collection: (1) data received from official sources; and (2) results of sampling research.

State conducted registration data are received via current registration procedures performed by governmental institutions. Major services which collect relevant information and the types of data they collect include: census (information on incoming and outgoing migrants based on their relatives' reports); reports on the quantity of the foreigners working in Ukraine (officially employed); reports on the quantity of the foreigners on the territory of Ukraine (officially registered); register of refugees; border crossing statistics; foreign students registration; state register of tax payers (foreigners registered as tax payers); registration of change of permanent residence address; sampling research on the matters of labour migration (2008, 2012); statistical report on agricultural development; registration of migrants with academic titles; consulate registers; statistics of payment balance (Poznyak, 2013). These sources can be sorted out into four larger groups: (1) Sources of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (population census; current record of changes of place of residence; and records on persons with an academic degree); (2) Sources of various Ministries (the State Migration Service of Ukraine, the State Border Service of Ukraine, the State Employment Service of the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine); (3) Sources of the National Bank of Ukraine; and (4) Specific sample surveys (Bara, 2014: 37–38).

The latter does not belong to the volume of such qualification: sampling research differ from state statistics data by a number of characteristics described further. Both kinds of sources have their advantages and drawbacks. It should also be mentioned that the data from the National Bank of Ukraine is not included into the research of migration processes, as they relate to money transfers and remittances from Ukrainian migrants abroad. This is an important indicator for estimating the scale and consequences of migration for the donor country, but in case of concentration on temporality its significance is of a minor importance. For the present research, only two groups of statistical data should be taken into consideration for the reasons described below.

The second group of sources includes both the results of sampling research conducted by state statistics services and results of research conducted by individual researchers or scientific institutions. It is quite possible to unite them in one group despite differences in data collection and processing, as their key feature is the problem of representativeness. As state statistics presupposes full coverage approach (registering *all* individuals who migrate), its results are largely representative (in case the methodological limitations of state registration of migrants are taken into account). At the same time, research results often demonstrate *case-study* logic, and therefore have shortcomings of three types: (1) Spatial (only some of the regions are encompassed by the survey); (2) Temporal (sampling research are carried out with a time interval, and so their results are discrete, e.g., module sampling research of the households on the issues of labour migration were carried out in Ukraine in 2008 and 2012, hence, there is no information on the period in between; and (3) Representational (the individuals who took part in the surveys is selected group representing population in general).

The mentioned disadvantages may overlap in one sampling research, and therefore results of such research risk being interpreted wrongly. The advantage of such research is the possibility of studying those aspects of migration which are not covered by state statistics institutions or are registered with considerable methodological flaws. So, though lacking representativeness, sampling research adds up to qualitative description of migration processes and tendencies. Nevertheless, using both types of research data, we approximate exhaustive overview of migration processes in Ukraine, both immigration and emigration.

12.2.1.2 Results of state registration of migrants and trans-border movements

First of all, it is worth mentioning that the census data are the most representative for evaluating external migration, and also a permanent migration to Ukraine. Unfortunately, this source of information is not available for the year of 2014: the last census in Ukraine took place in 2001. Despite the fact that the next one was planned to take place in 2011 (in accordance with UN recommendations of the 10-year period between the censuses), it was postponed until 2016. Migrations after 2001 are not represented. Methodologically, the validity of the data of the 2001 census can not be perfect, as the questionnaire included only the following queries: (1) Type of residence (permanent residence, temporary residence or temporary absence); (2) Place of work (within the residence area or any other area); (3) Citizenship; and (4) Position: "Have you resided in this location continuously since birth?" (Bara, 2014: 37).

The absence of data from 2011 census is not critical, as it would not show a full picture of migration *from* Ukraine. In general reports of state statistics services migrant can be found in three rubrics: (1) Population of Ukraine (in terms of migration (physical movement) of population); (2) Tourism (citizens of Ukraine who went abroad and foreigners coming to Ukraine); and (3) Education and science (scientists and other employees of academic institutions who left Ukraine for permanent residence abroad).

The difference between these rubrics is not formal, but methodological: in the first case, state services only record the individuals who changed their registration address, i.e., permanent migrants.

The data on migration of the population are calculated on the basis of counterfoils of withdrawal of registration of permanent residence address, introduced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for ensuring full information in population registration databases and also for developing statistics on incoming migrants for all types of movements of residents. The counterfoils are documents of questionnaire type which are filled out at passport offices for all citizens who left one locality and moved to another for permanent or temporary residence for the period *not shorter than 6 months*. (See: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/ds/nas_rik/nas_u/nas_met.html).

In case of the second paragraph, it comes to the data of State Border Guards Service which fixes instances of crossing the border by each person (see: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/tyr/tyr_u/tyr_met.html), i.e., if one person crosses the border thrice, there will be three instances of crossing the border in the report (as three crossings of the border). Under such conditions, circular migrants distort the data, i.e., circular migrants who cross the border several times a month (with high frequency) will show a large number of instances of border crossing. The same number will be achieved if a large quantity of permanent migrants crosses the border only once. Still, such methodological drawback can be overcome if achieved data are compared with the data on permanent migrants. There is another problem appears here: not all people change their registration address which is, in fact, slightly altered by Soviet Institute of Residence Permit. Consequently, we might pay attention to the opinion of Soviet demographists on the Residence Permit (Boyarski, 1967: 105–111) who mentioned inefficacy of following-up migration flows using the changes of residence permit: people refuse spending their time and effort on the document which does not offer any future benefits. Since in the Soviet Union the residence permit influenced chances of employment and finding new place of residence, such remark by Soviet demographists is a substantial one. The institute of residence address registration has no function in the independent Ukraine, except forming voters' lists for the governmental and presidential elections, thus, it will have even less validity for migration research than it could have in the Soviet Union.

The State Statistics Service distinguishes between the terms *tourist* and *excursion participant*, therefore, its data should be considered with caution. 'Tourists' are persons who travel in places beyond their permanent residence *not longer than one year* for the purpose of recreation and entertainment, sports, receiving medical treatment and for health improvement, visiting relatives and friends, for *business purposes*, etc.

Excursion participants are people who acquire services of travelling in Ukraine, which does not exceed *24 hours*, accompanied by a professional tour guide and following routes offered in advance for acquaintance with historical and cultural sites, natural sites, museums, famous places, etc. (see: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/tyr/tyr_u/tyr_met.html).

From the definition above it becomes clear that people who visit the country even with a business purpose but stay for less than a year are described as tourists. The category of tourists in official statistics unites different groups of mobilities – from life-style migration to labour migration. This drawback is compensated by the fact that more detailed fixation of the reason for entering the country allows defining several categories of migrants. These categories sound somewhat vague and are defined insufficiently, and will be discussed further.

In case of the scholars, the situation is different. Firstly, permanent emigration is registered, but also are study and research trips, though the latter are officially registered by the employees as business trips. Secondly, migration is registered only for those scholars who were employed by scientific, educational or research institutions of Ukraine, that is, if a scientists resigns and then migrates, state statistics classify him or her as person who resigned from their position. Speaking of *temporality* in state statistical reports on migration, we can outline two modes: (1) permanent; and (2) temporary, which is classified as tourism by state statistics (up to 12 months).

Circular migration is permanent trans-border movements in the border regions. It is not taken into account by such classification at all, and neither are such characteristics of temporary migration as: (1) How many times on average a migrant crosses the border (only the number of instances of crossing the border is registered); and (2) How much time a temporary migrant spends abroad (not registered). The only exception is migration of researchers and academics, when governmental statistics is more sensitive (see further). To summarize, we can say that temporality dimension of migration seems irrelevant for governmental statistics institutions; moreover, even the types and reasons for migration do not attract attention of governmental institutions. For this reason, only assumptions on migration types in Ukraine can be made.

12.1.1.3 Results of sampling and personal research

Sampling and personal researches belong to the category of expert research. This, however, does not make them less credible. In general, they are coherent to the data from other sources, and therefore should also be included into the analysis. Sampling research is focused on studying migration from Ukraine. Currently, only *one* research dealt with migrants in Ukraine: International Organization for Migration (IOM) has conducted a study on migration in Ukraine in 2011 (Migration, 2013: 9). 400 migrants from all regions of Ukraine, including irregular migrants, were interviewed.

Most of the surveys concentrate on the migration from Ukraine. According to methodology of research they can be divided into two groups: (1) Surveys in which individuals are sampling unit; and (2) Surveys in which households are sampling unit. The distinction between them is quite relative, but important for estimation of the scale of migration. The study of the first one pays special attention to motivations for migration and ideas about migration temporality, i.e., to the sense and meaning of migration to respondents. The second one allows receiving information regarding absent members of the households. The latter is important, as the first researched group does not include current migrants.

12.3 Migration tendencies and flows

12.3.1 Migration to Ukraine

As Table 12.1 shows, until 2005 the number of people arriving in Ukraine for permanent residence was smaller than those leaving the country. We can say that it is relevant for people who *legally* arrived in Ukraine or left the country for permanent residence. Oleksiy Poznyak (a member of the National Advisory Board) mentions that the problem is that a part of migrants coming to Ukraine do not register because of the complex procedure of registration (it was simplified in 2012). Therefore, the mentioned balance of migration is a very provisional index.

Another interesting feature is that reasons for migration/moving into Ukraine change: after 2011, less and less people have visited Ukraine as tourists (by 2,5 times less in 2013 than in 2011). Also, the number of people coming to Ukraine for business trip or diplomatic purposes became smaller. Instead, the quantity of people coming for cultural exchange, sports or religious purposes has considerably increased. Of course, this can be explained by the changes in registration procedure easing the explanation of the reasons for crossing the border, but then the “private purpose” reason would dominate. According to the member of the National Advisory Board Olena Malynovska, the registration of the purpose of visit is made on the basis of documents he or she has, and if a migrant does not have such documents, the reason of “private purpose” would be enough. Therefore, either there is a change in adjudging the purpose of travel on the part of border guards, or there is an increase in the number of people using falsified evidence for their travel purpose[1].

1 Changes in the quantity of tourism visits cannot be explained by the classification carried out by the border guards: the ratio of foreigners who came to Ukraine for tourism and the number of foreign tourists who used the services of travel companies is stable since 2006, therefore, we can claim there is a decrease of the quantity of tourists coming to Ukraine.

Table 12.1 The scale of migration processes in Ukraine, 2002-2013 (Source: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2014/ds/mr/mr_u/mr0114_u.html)

	Domestic migration		External migration			
			Arrived		Left	
	Thousands of persons	Per 1 thousand of population	Thousands of persons	Per 1 thousand of population	Thousands of persons	Per 1 thousand of population
2002	717,5	14,9	42,5	0,9	76,3	1,6
2003	722,5	15,1	39,5	0,8	63,7	1,3
2004	750,8	15,8	38,6	0,8	46,2	1,0
2005	723,6	15,4	39,6	0,8	35,0	0,7
2006	721,7	15,4	44,2	1,0	30,0	0,7
2007	711,9	15,3	46,5	1,0	29,7	0,7
2008	673,5	14,6	37,3	0,8	22,4	0,5
2009	609,9	13,3	32,9	0,7	19,5	0,4
2010	652,6	14,2	30,8	0,7	14,7	0,3
2011	637,7	14,0	31,7	0,7	14,6	0,3
2012	649,9	14,3	76,4	1,7	14,5	0,3
2013	621,8	13,7	54,1	1,2	22,2	0,5

Note:only the number of those who changed registration address is given

Table 12.2 Foreigners arriving in Ukraine (according to the purpose of visit), in 2006–2013 (thousands of persons) (Source: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/tyr/tyr_u/arh_vig.html)

	Total number of arrivals	Purpose of visit						
		Business, diplomacy	Tourism	Private travel	Education	Employment	immigration (permanent residence)	Cultural exchange and sports, religion, etc.
2006	18 935,8	1 011,2	1 210,2	16 552,2	45,3	4,6	15,8	96,6
2007	23 122,2	909,0	1 445,0	20 563,0	49,5	7,8	24,0	123,9
2008	25 449,1	1 048,4	1 693,3	22 291,0	65,2	12,0	27,8	311,3
2009	20 798,3	741,9	1 350,2	18 348,1	103,5	31,8	8,6	214,1
2010	21 203,3	694,6	1 083,0	19 089,1	67,5	14,8	48,3	206,1
2011	21 415,3	645,0	1 226,0	19 180,2	59,2	16,1	64,8	224,1
2012	23 012,8	350,2	940,1	16 795,2	23,8	9,1	40,4	4 854,0
2013	24 671,2	167,4	488,5	18 167,7	0,3	0,3	5,1	5 841,9

Table 12.3 Foreigners arriving in Ukraine for tourism in 2000–2012 (thousands of persons) (Source: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/tyr/tyr_u/potoki2006_u.htm)

	Foreigners who visited Ukraine (thousands of persons)	Foreigners who visited Ukraine for tourism	Foreign tourists who used services of tourism companies in Ukraine
2000	6 430,9	–	377,9
2001	9 174,2	–	416,2
2002	10 516,7	–	417,7
2003	12 513,9	–	590,6
2004	15 629,2	–	436,3
2005	17 630,8	–	326,4
2006	18 935,8	1 210,2	299,1
2007	23 122,2	1 445,0	372,5
2008	25 449,1	1 693,3	372,8
2009	20 798,3	1 350,2	282,3
2010	21 203,3	1 083,0	335,8
2011	21 415,3	1 226,0	234,3
2012	23 012,8	940,1	270,0

The scale of permanent migration can be seen in table 12.4. Scale of circular migration can be obtained by comparing the data of the State Statistics Service and the State Border Guard Service[2].

2 Due to the large volume of data, we will offer such analysis for statistical data for the year of 2012. Basing on the data of the State Statistics Service (Tymoshenko, 2013: 441) we can estimate the number of Ukrainian citizens who returned for permanent residence to Ukraine, and the quantity of citizens of other states who moved to Ukraine. Unfortunately, only the data for the European countries, the USA and Canada are provided.

Table 12.4 Foreign migrants according to citizenship and countries of arrival/departure in 2012 (Source: (Tymoshenko, 2013: 441)

	Persons in total		**Citizens of Ukraine**	
	Quantity of travellers arriving	Quantity of travellers departing	Quantity of travellers arriving	Quantity of travellers departing
Total	**76361**	**14517**	**11188**	**10561**
By country				
Countries of Europe	**36833**	**9766**	**7454**	**8307**
Austria	83	143	15	127
Belarus	1814	548	390	440
Estonia	66	23	15	14
Spain	248	379	173	374
Italy	392	208	141	168
Latvia	216	40	42	18
Lithuania	168	53	25	35
Moldova	3970	315	1702	251
Germany	659	1616	264	1536
Poland	1378	241	65	146
Russia	16001	4920	4310	4199
Hungary	93	276	34	269
Czech Republic	128	431	60	413
Countries of America	**2232**	**890**	**570**	**676**
Canada	206	92	59	71
USA	1666	754	491	599
Countries of Asia	**39309**	**3568**	**3118**	**1555**
Countries of Asia	**39309**	**3568**	**3118**	**1555**
Azerbaijan	3441	113	169	15
Armenia	1149	19	168	6
Georgia	1728	64	171	9
Israel	1311	1326	737	1279
Kazakhstan	813	232	228	185
Kirgizstan	204	4	31	2
Tajikistan	475	5	19	1
Turkey	2290	328	54	12
Turkmenistan	8003	175	67	5
Uzbekistan	2741	95	1165	15
Countries of Africa	**7949**	**268**	**43**	**9**
Countries of Australia and Oceania	**38**	**25**	**3**	**14**

The number of the short-term migrants can be calculated by extracting the number of permanent and long-term migrants out of their general quantity[3]. However, it should borne in mind that here we deal with the quantity of instances of crossing the border, not with people. The number of instances of crossing the border can be divided into two groups: (1) "One-time" crossing (purpose: tourism, business trip, diplomatic purpose); and Manifold crossing (purpose: private, cultural exchange, sports, religion). A cluster analysis of the data collected by the State Border Guard Service was performed to distinguish the groups of countries characterized by the certain groups of migrants[4]. Such clusters were received:

- By quantity of both types of migration (see Table K.1):
  a. Russia;
  b. Belarus, Moldova;
  c. Other countries.
- By quantity of repetitive crossings the state border (see Table K.2):
  d. Russia;
  e. Belarus, Moldova;
  f. Other countries.
- By quantity of "one-time" crossings the state border (see Table K.3):
  g. Russia;
  h. Belarus;
  i. Poland;
  j. Other countries.

There is a different picture in the case of single crossings: migrants from Moldova belong to "other countries" category, instead, Poland appears in the list. As regards to the latter, we assume it pertains to tourism. There can also be other reasons: business contacts which do not need cross-border travel often (therefore, the name "one-time" migration cannot be justified in this case). The received structure is quite stable: the same situation is also observed in 2013.

State statistics data also indicate the age and sex of the migrants to Ukraine, as well as where they intend to go (urban or rural areas), though such data is only available for persons officially registered in Ukraine.

Table 12.5 Demographic characteristics of migrants to Ukraine, 2010-2012 (Source: Tymoshenko, 2011: 421-423; 2012: 423-425; 2013: 426–428)

		2010	2011	2012
Average age of the migrants	Men	38,04	38,7	28,79
	Women	40,23	40,81	34,5
Percentage of migrants moving to cities	Men (%)	53,23	53,67	67,02
	Women (%)	46,77	46,33	32,98
	In total (%)	75,21	75,39	88,98
Percentage of migrants moving to villages	Men (%)	51,09	52,38	54,49
	Women (%)	48,91	47,62	45,51
	In total (%)	24,79	24,61	11,02
	Men (%)	52,7	53,35	65,64
	Women (%)	47,3	46,65	34,36

3 Still, we can estimate the number of instances of crossing the border by citizens of other states on the basis of the data in Table 1.2.4 and 1.2.2. First, we should calculate the quantity of permanent residents. The quantity of permanent and long-term migrants was estimated by the State Border Guard Service according to the formula: k (permanent and long-term migrants) = k (students) + k (employment) + k (immigration). Statistically, the result does not differ much from the State Statistics Service data (the discrepancy comes to 13 782 persons): according to the State Statistics Service, there are 38 648 permanent and long-term migrants, and according to the State Border Guard Service they are 52 430. Thus, the results are valid and reliable. So, let us use the data of the State Border Guard Service (see: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2013/tyr/tyr_u/vig2012_u.htm).

4 Hierarchical cluster analysis is used. Measure of the distance: squared Euclidean distance, measure of the distance: between-groups linkage.

It becomes evident that migrants usually head to the cities, while the gender ratio is equal. In regards of the age, there are more young men aged up to 30[5], therefore, this is a labour migration to Ukraine. The data of 2012 differ, as the preparation for Euro-2012 football championship took place, and therefore the number of male labour migrants who came to work at construction projects increased. With the help of cluster analysis, the following regions can be distinguished to outline regional differences.[6]

Table 12.6 Groups of regions by number of foreign migrants officially registered as permanent residents, 2002-2013[7]

Clusters	2002	2009	2013
1.	Donetsk region	Donetsk region	Kharkiv region, city of Kyiv
2.	Crimea	Kharkiv region	Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk region
3.	Odesa region, city of Kyiv	Odesa region, Crimea, city of Kyiv	Crimea, Odesa region
4.	Dnipropetrovsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhya regions	Vinnytsya, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhya region	Other regions
5.	Other regions	Other regions	

Note: Clusters are organized by the decrease of quantity of foreign migrants.

The results show regional similarities of migration patterns: these are border and/or industrial regions. This feature is quite stable: economic fluctuations do not influence it much. We should also take into account the fact that many foreign students also migrate to Ukraine, which can influence regional differences, as students mostly migrate to Kharkiv and Odesa (as the member of the National Advisory Board O. Malynovska mentions).

In particular, according to the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, in 2012/2013 49,400 foreign students arrived in Ukraine, most of them from Turkmenistan (see Figure 12.1).



Figure12.1 Foreign students according to citizenship, 2012/2013 academic year (thousands of persons) (Source: Malynovska, 2014)

Such data influence considerably the information of the countries of origin of the migrants. According to the State Statistics Service data, such structure is as follows (see. Figure 12.1):

- Turkmenistan;
- Russia;
- Azerbaijan;
- Other countries.

5 Despite the fact that the average age for migrants of both sexes is very similar, the age heaping is more sloping, i.e., age groups are more evenly represented, than in men's groups, for whom the largest is the age group under 30.
6 Hierarchical cluster analysis, measure of the distance – squared Euclidean distance, similarity measures – between-groups linkage.
7 Year 2009 was selected for the analysis to demonstrate regional features of migration in the period of economic recession. (Cf. Table. 1.2.2: in 2009, the number of foreigners who came to Ukraine searching for employment opportunities increases).

As we see, the first position coincides with the information from the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine; therefore, we can say that students form a large part of the registered foreign migrants in Ukraine, so the data show rather the state of student migration, not all features.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) also conducted a research on migration in Ukraine in 2011 (Migration, 2013: 9). According to it, 51 per cent of migrants in Ukraine have a university education, 81 per cent reside permanently in Ukraine, 10 per cent are students or temporary labour migrants, 9 per cent have an unregulated status or seek for refuge, 80 per cent can speak Ukrainian or Russian fluently, 66 per cent of migrants' children go to Ukrainian schools, 91 per cent have good friends among the locals.

12.3.2 Migration from Ukraine

Migration from Ukraine receives more attention from researchers, but is almost not registered by state statistics. As in case of migration to Ukraine, data of the change of registration and data from the State Border Guard Service appear to be the major sources of information, though the latter offers less differentiated picture. The reasons for leaving the territory of Ukraine are divided into three categories (while the incoming immigration was included seven categories):

- business trip;
- organized tourism;
- private journey.

Naturally, as the categories are so limited, the main reason stated in all reports is "private journey" (see Table 12.7).

Table 12.7 Departures of citizens of Ukraine to other countries, 2002-2013 (thousands of persons) Source: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2012/tyr/tyr_u/arh_vigw.html)

	Number of crossings of the state border by the citizens of Ukraine	**Purpose of travel**		
		Business trip	Tourism (organized by travel companies)	Private travel
2006	16 875,3	800,5	1 453,7	14 621,1
2007	17 334,7	771,0	1 898,2	14 665,5
2008	15 498,6	924,0	1 792,3	12 782,3
2009	15 333,9	837,1	1 422,9	13 073,9
2010	17 180,0	866,0	1 275,4	15 038,6
2011	19 773,1	897,1	1 590,2	17 285,8
2012	21 432,8	362,6	641,8	20 428,4
2013	23 761,3	275,2	354,8	23 131,3

Also, the State Border Guard Service reports the destination country, but as O. Malynovska mentioned, the control here is far from sufficient: it is not the destination country which is reported, but the one which is stated in travel documents (if migration is transit, the country of transit will be stated as destination country). In this case, we can disregard this drawback: most of the trips are circular migration, and it rarely is transit. Having analysed the data of 2013, we received the following groups of countries[8]:

- Poland (business trips);
- Russia (private journeys);
- Belarus (business trips);
- Turkey, Egypt (mostly tourism);
- Other countries.

8 Hierarchical cluster analysis, measure of the distance – squared Euclidean distance, similarity measure – between-groups linkage, standardization of each index (the reason of travel) is performed according to the formula: $z_i = \frac{x_i - \bar{x}}{s_x}$ in order to avoid distortion caused by multiple border crossing instances.

In all countries, private journeys form the majority, but there are some special features: more people go to Belarus and Poland for business rather than to other countries, private journeys usually take place Russia, tourists head to Turkey and Egypt. The largest number is private journeys. Neighbouring countries as destination countries for circular migration dominate. In addition to the data of the State Border Guard Service, the State Statistics Service data on the migrants who changed their registration address can also be used.

Table 12.8 Demographic characteristics of migrants from Ukraine, 2010–2012 (Source: (Tymoshenko, 2011: 421-423; 2012: 423-425; 2013: 426–428)

		2010	2011	2012
Average age of the migrants	Men	34,56	34,29	35,46
	Women	39,43	40,54	41,03
Percentage of migrants moving to cities	Men (%)	42,3	46,29	50,42
	Women (%)	57,7	53,71	49,58
	In total (%)	81,34	83,59	85,07
Percentage of migrants moving to villages	Men (%)	44,72	46,7	49,69
	Women (%)	55,28	53,3	50,31
	In total (%)	18,66	16,41	14,24
	Men (%)	42,75	46,35	49,97
	Women (%)	57,25	53,65	50,03

As seen in table 12.8, city residents migrate more often than village residents. The number of males is smaller than females, and men migrants are younger than women. In both cases, we deal with the migration of working-age people; therefore, we can assume that they are labour migrants.

Another part of statistical data is migration of researchers and academics. The State Statistics Service records both permanent and temporary migrations; however, the first is quite insignificant (see Figure 12.1). The results are shown in Table 12.9.

Table 12.9 Number of researchers and academics who left Ukraine, 2006-2011 (Source: Kalachova, 2008: 74; 2010: 46; 2011: 60; 2012: 58)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Researchers	27	9	12	12	21	18
Doctors of science	1	0	1	0	3	3
Doctors of science (candidates)	8	4	4	3	4	2
technicians	6	1	1	1	0	2
Other staff	0	3	0	0	0	0
Other	0	1	0	1	0	0

Table 12.10 Classification of scientists of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine who travelled abroad by purpose of visit, 2006-2012 (Source: Kalachova, 2008: 179; 2010: 157; 2011: 166; 2012: 158; 2013: 148)

	Number of scientists who went abroad	**Purpose**		
		internship, studies, qualification courses	teaching	Scientific research
2006	8922	2793	419	5710
2007	10983	3914	570	6499
2008	11288	3797	891	6600
2009	10442	3990	538	5914
2010	9898	3933	574	5391
2011	10264	3787	489	5988
2012	2702	519	94	2089

Note: Refers to the employees of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine.

Table 12.11 Classification of scientists who travelled abroad by duration of visit, 2006–2012 (Source: Kalachova, 2008: 185; 2010: 162; 2011: 172; 2012: 162; 2013: 149)

	Up to 3 months	**3 months – 1 year**	**1–2 year**	**More than 2 years**
2006	7982	692	127	121
2007	9855	879	160	89
2008	10216	858	127	87
2009	9467	767	111	97
2010	8906	819	96	77
2011	9354	786	49	75
2012	2462	187	19	34

Note: Refers to the employees of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine.

The State Statistics Service also records the age of the candidates and doctors of science who migrated abroad and also their destination countries. The traditional ones are Germany, Russia and the USA. Most migrants are men. These results are supported by the data of the World Bank, according to which 3.5 per cent of all scientists (*tertiary-educated*) emigrated from Ukraine, an also 0.9 per cent of all medical doctors of Ukraine (1,350 persons) (Migration, 2011: 249).

12.3.3 Results of sampling research

Unfortunately, sampling research is first and foremost concentrated on studying labour migrants with Ukrainian citizenship (Migration Policy, 2008), (Migration, 2005a), (Migration, 2005b), (Kotusenko, 2007), (Markov, 2009), (Migration, 2009), (Emigration, 2010), (Report, 2013), (Migration, 2013), (Coupé and Vakhitova, 2013). Other kinds of migration including transit migration are not researched. Systematic research of Ukrainian labour migration has been carried out since 2005. In particular, the following characteristics of labour migrations were researched in 2005. First of all, geographical dimension of migration was given (see Table 12.12).

Table 12.12 Number of Ukrainian labour migrants, 2005 (thousands of persons) (Source: Kotusenko, 2007: 9; Migration, 2005a: 10–11)

Country	Number of labour migrants with official registration	Number of illegal labour migrants (expert evaluation)
Russia	94	1 000
Poland	3,5	250–300
Italy	200	200
Czech Republic	54,8	120–150
Spain	2,8	50–100
Portugal	70	150
USA	1,6	20–40
Israel	0,3	20
Greece	1,3	3
Turkey	0,08	5–35

The major reasons for migration were the necessity to earn for living (51.3%), earn money for studies (for the migrant or for his/her children) (22, 3%), purchase of housing (20%) (Migration, 2005b: 30). The survey demonstrated that official statistics is ineffective in terms of registration of labour migrants: it is completely unable to record the reasons and purpose of foreign travel. Most migrants (52, 3%) cross the border with tourist visa, i.e., they do not declare their intentions to work. Therefore, governmental statistics institutions record false reasons for migration abroad. Most respondents admitted to providing false information when they go abroad (Migration, 2005b: 35–36). Most migrants are men (70%) who come from towns or villages, all of them are of working age (Migration, 2005a: 11).

In 2008 and 2012, two surveys of households regarding labour migration were carried out (with participation of the State Statistics Service and M. Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Research), and their results add up to the official statistical data by allowing to estimate a real size of migration (while the state statistics have a range of limitations), and by giving a more differentiated view on temporariness of migration. According to the research, migrants are divided into several groups: (1) Migrants who returned to Ukraine; (2) Short-term labour migrants (living outside Ukraine no more than a year: planning to be in a foreign country not longer than a year); and (3) Employed migrants (living outside Ukraine no more than a year: planning to be in a foreign country not longer than a year) (Report, 2013: 13).

Two criteria are combined in this classification: real and planned period of living abroad. The survey also did not include circular migrants. Nonetheless, its results allow finding out social and demographic characteristics of a Ukrainian labour migrant. Also, the Monitoring of Social Changes provides interviews conducted annually by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of

Sciences of Ukraine. Those surveyed were asked a question “Do you or your family member have a temporary labour experience abroad?”, thus allowing to fix the number of work migrants from Ukraine.

Table 12.13 Estimated number of labour migrants, 2002-2010 (Source: Coupé and Vakhitova, 2013: 28)

	2002	2004	2005	2006	2008	2010
Estimated number of labour migrants, millions*	1,8	2,0	2,1–2,6	2,7–3,3	2,4–3,2	2,3

*The number of people with some migration experience. The calculation took place using data on the total number of households and the population aged 15–64.

The results coincided with the research carried out in 2008 by the State Statistics Service and M. Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Research, while applying different methodologies: individuals were taken as sampling unit by the Monitoring Research of the Institute of Sociology, and households were studies by the Institute of Demography (see comments on methodological differences above).

Table 12.14 Ukrainian labour migrants by duration of stay abroad since the last departure, 2005-2008 (age and place of residence) (Source: Migration, 2009: 85)

	Total	Women	Men	Urban settlements	Rural areas
Total quantity of labour migrants, thousands of persons	1476,1	484,8	991,3	803,2	672,9
By duration of stay, %					
Less than 1 month	5,8	6,5	5,4	6,1	5,5
From 1 to 3 months	38,3	32,1	41,3	37,1	39,3
From 3 to 6 months	18,7	11,6	22,0	15,4	21,5
From 6 to 12 months	22,6	27,9	20,2	25,8	20,0
Over 12 months	14,6	21,9	11,1	15,6	13,7

Table 12.15 Quantity of Ukrainian labour migrants by category, age and place of residence before going abroad, 2010-2012 (Source: Report, 2013: 29)

	Total	Women	Men	Urban settlements	Rural areas
Total quantity of labour migrants, thousands of persons	1181,6	405,9	775,7	540,1	641,5
By category					
labour migrants, who returned to Ukraine	37,4	32,8	39,8	37,3	37,4
Short-term labour migrants	48,5	43,1	51,3	44,6	51,8
Employed emigrants	14,1	24,1	8,9	18,1	10,8
Segment of labour migrants in total population aged 15-70, %	3,4	2,2	4,8	2,2	6,3

Table 12.16 Labour migrants by age, sex and place of residence before going abroad, 2005–2008 (Source: Migration, 2009: 29)

	Total	Women	Men	Urban settlements	Rural areas
Total quantity of labour migrants, thousands of persons	1476,1	484,8	991,3	803,2	672,9
By age, %					
15-24 years of age	15,3	12,0	16,8	13,9	16,8
25-29 years of age	14,2	12,3	15,1	13,0	15,6
30-34 years of age	15,7	16,6	15,2	16,2	15,1
35-39 years of age	14,6	14,2	14,9	15,3	13,9
40-49 years of age	29,3	30,2	28,9	29,8	28,7
50-59 years of age	10,9	14,7	9,1	11,8	9,9

Table 12.17 Labour migrants by age, sex and place of residence before going abroad, 2010–2012 (Source: Report, 2013: 32)

	Total	Women	Men	Urban settlements	Rural areas
By age groups, %					
15-24 years of age	11,0	12,0	10,3	9,2	12,6
25-29 years of age	15,8	8,7	19,5	15,5	15,9
30-34 years of age	18,3	17,4	18,8	20,3	16,6
35-39 years of age	13,4	13,1	13,6	13,7	13,1
40-49 years of age	25,3	24,2	25,9	23,3	27,0
50-59 years of age	14,8	20,9	11,6	15,2	14,5
60-70 years of age	1,4	3,7	0,3	2,8	0,3

Table 12.18 Labour migrants by country of residence, sex and place before going abroad, 2005–2008 (Source: Migration, 2009: 33)

	Total	Women	Men	Urban settlements	Rural areas
Total quantity of labour migrants, thousands of persons	1476,1	484,8	991,3	803,2	672,9
By countries of stay, %					
Russian Federation	48,1	30,0	57,0	49,0	47,0
Italy	13,4	25,1	7,7	13,3	13,7
Czech Republic	11,9	10,5	12,5	8,4	16,0
Poland	8,0	10,6	6,7	6,6	9,6
Hungary	3,2	2,7	3,4	2,8	3,6
Spain	2,7	3,8	2,2	3,5	1,8
Portugal	2,6	3,3	2,3	2,6	2,6
Other countries	10,1	14,0	8,2	13,8	5,7

Table 12.19 Labour migrants by country of residence, sex and place of before going abroad, 2010–2012 (Source: Report, 2013: 37)

	Total	Women	Men	Urban settlements	Rural areas
Total quantity of labour migrants, thousands of persons	1181,6	405,9	775,7	540,1	641,5
By countries of stay, %					
Russian Federation	43,2	20,4	55,2	45,2	41,6
Poland	14,3	19,5	11,5	13,3	15,1
Italy	13,2	30,2	4,3	13,5	12,9
Czech Republic	12,9	9,4	14,8	7,0	17,9
Spain	4,5	5,6	3,8	6,7	2,5
Germany	2,4	2,5	2,3	4,4	0,6
Hungary	1,9	3,0	1,4	1,0	2,7
Portugal	1,8	2,0	1,8	2,5	1,2
Belarus	1,8	2,5	1,5	1,2	2,3
Other countries	4,0	4,9	3,4	5,2	3,2

Main regions providing source of labour migration are western regions of Ukraine. There is an interesting tendency: immigration aims at eastern regions, and emigration comes from western regions. These results differ from state statistics data: according to the surveys, older age categories are represented more than younger ones (though the state statistics data show the contrary), and data on the geography of migration differ completely too.

Table 12.20 Migration-intensive regions (Source: Coupé and Vakhitova, 2013: 42)

Region	Number of migrants, in 1000s	Population, 2008, in 1000s	Per cent of migrants
Cherkaska	66.25	1 311.43	5.05
Chernihivska	22.53	1 130.52	1.99
Chernivetska	117.52	903.47	13.01
Crimea	41.36	1 968.21	2.10
Dnipropetrovska	22.07	3 388.41	0.65
Donetska	76.76	4 523.30	1.70
Ivano- Frankivska	95.01	1 381.44	6.88
Kharkivska	57.80	2 787.59	2.07
Khersonska	25.43	1 104.02	2.30
Khmelnytska	62.79	1 346.64	4.66
Kirovohradska	8.03	1 035.13	0.78
Kyiv	16.94	2 743.40	0.62
Kyivska	9.54	1 733.57	0.55
Luhanska	82.64	2 346.15	3.52
Lvivska	160.79	2 555.02	6.29
Mykolaivska	33.42	1 200.09	2.78
Odeska	30.67	2 392.28	1.28
Poltavska	16.13	1 520.01	1.06
Rivnenska	37.09	1 151.11	3.22
Sumska	25.09	1 192.10	2.10
Ternopilska	71.15	1 096.29	6.49
Vinnytska	46.05	1 666.81	2.76
Volynska	64.24	1 035.82	6.20
Zakarpatska	238.84	1 242.01	19.23
Zaporizka	34.96	1 827.72	1.91
Zhytomyrska	10.31	1 301.17	0.79
Total	1 473.44	45 883.68	3.21

According to other surveys, in 2004–2009 the geography of Ukrainian labour migration remains stable (Markov, 2009) (see Table 12.21), but the numbers have increased considerably.

Table 12.21 Number of Ukrainian labour migrants, 2004-2008 (thousands of persons) (Source: Markov, 2009)

Country	Number of labour migrants with official registration	Number of illegal labour migrants (expert evaluation)
Russia	169	2 000
Poland	16,5	450
Italy	195,4	600
Czech Republic	64	200
Spain	69,9	200
Portugal	37,9	75
Greece	20	60–80
Great Britain	10	70
Ireland	3,5	10

There is a range of other surveys that estimate the scale of labour migration, among them is the research conducted by O. Poznyak which includes an attempt to estimate the number of circular migrants in Ukraine: the author believes that their number is 279,500 people (in 2008) (Poznyak, 2012: 2). Taking into account the fact that in 2008 the number of long-term labour migrants was 1,476,100 persons, the segment of circular migrants looks quite small. The author presents the specific features of geographical destinations of circular migrants in the following chart (Figure 12.2).



Figure 12.2 Specific features of geographical destinations of circular migrants (Source: Poznyak, 2012: 3)

The research on circular migration was carried out in 2008 (1,014 migrants were interviewed) (Migration policy, 2008: 31–43), though only short-term migrants who returned to Ukraine were included in the sampling, mostly those who migrated in 2005–2007. Respectively, the average period of stay abroad was 2 years, but half of the respondents stayed abroad not longer than one year (Migration policy, 2008: 33).



N= 1,014 returning migrants

Figure 12.3 Returning migrants in the sample per year (%) (Source: Migration policy, 2008: 33)

The research shows that circular migration takes place mostly to Russia which corresponds to the above mentioned research results by O. Poznyak.



N= 1,014 returning migrants

Figure 12.4 Main first destination countries (%) (Source: Migration policy, 2008: 34)

The research has also shown that only 30.2 per cent (less than one third of the migrants who took part in the survey) plan to migrate again (Migration policy, 2008: 42). These results show that the research encompassed a specific group of circular migrants and did not include pendulum migrants who cross the border for retail trade.

12.3.4 Transit migration in Ukraine

Transit migration can be considered in two dimensions☹1) Ddirect: Ukraine is a transit country for migrants; and (2) Indirect: Ukraine is a recipient country for migrants from some countries, and a donor of migrants for other countries. There is no clear definition, however, concerning the enough number of migrants for a country to be considered the transit one. Accordingly, members of the NAB O. Malynovska and O. Poznyak claimed that Ukraine is not a transit country because of a very low number of transit migrants.

Still, the geographical position of Ukraine brings on an opinion to the contrary. The argumentation given by NAB members was an insignificant number of illegal migrants to Ukraine detained by the State Border Guard Service, or by officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the territory of Ukraine (see Figure 2, Figure 4), which has not been larger than 20,000 persons annually since 2005. These conclusions can be supported by the fact that the number of illegal migrants who managed to get to the territory of the European Union is not larger than 1,000 persons annually (see Figure 6). Therefore, Malynovska comes to the conclusion that the movement of foreigners via the territory of Ukraine is insignificant.

These data can be refuted by results of another research. According to IOM, in 2012 there were 230,891 officially registered migrants in Ukraine (Migration, 2013: 9), while major countries of origin were Russia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (Migration, 2013: 9); Malynovska comes up with the same data (see Figure 3, Figure 5) as well as the findings of the State Statistics Service. Another important index for migration is human trafficking. 120,000 of Ukrainian citizens became victims of human trafficking in the previous several years

Ukraine is not only a country of origin for trafficking, it also becomes destination country for people who suffer from domestic and international trafficking more and more often (Migration, 2013: 12). Similarly, according to the research conducted by the World Bank, Ukraine is a part of "Ukraine-Russia" and "Russia-Ukraine" migration corridor (Migration, 2011: 1, 3, 18). Nevertheless, the migration flows from Ukraine do not go mostly between these two countries. In particular, Ukrainians also migrate to:

- Russia;
- Poland;
- USA;
- Kazakhstan;
- Israel;
- Germany;
- Moldova;
- Italy;
- Belarus;
- Spain (Migration, 2011: 249).

Residents of the following countries migrate to Ukraine (Migration, 2011: 249):

- Russia;
- Belarus;
- Kazakhstan;
- Uzbekistan;
- Moldova;
- Azerbaijan ;
- Georgia;
- Armenia;
- Tajikistan;
- Kirgizstan.

These results show that there is indirect migration via Ukraine: in case of immigration donor countries are countries located to the East from Ukraine, and in case of immigration the destination countries are the countries of the West (though, the countries of Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) are also included). According to governmental statistics, the same correlation is seen (see Table 12.22): A part of the emigrants from Ukraine are not Ukrainian citizens (from 8.44 per cent to 27.25 per cent), and this gives evidence of the existence of transit migrations. It is worth mentioning that the source of the problem is in methodology of registration of migration governmental statistics does not offer indications if non-Ukrainian citizens who migrate return to their home countries or go to other countries.

Table 12.22 Number of citizens of Ukraine and other countries who left for Europe, 2010 –2012 (persons) (Source: Tymoshenko, 2011: 434; 2012: 436; 2013: 441)

	Those who left the country	
	total	Citizens of Ukraine
2010	14 677	13 439
2011	14 588	12 272
2012	14 517	10 561

According to the World Bank data, migration flows to and from Ukraine are large. In particular, 6,563,100 persons (14.4 per cent of population) emigrated, and 5,257,500 persons (11.6 per cent of population) immigrated. So, migration flows are quite intensive, and therefore, the opinion of the members of NAB is only one of possible versions of description and analysis of migration processes in Ukraine.

Even Ukrainian State Statistic Service registers some 22.3 millions of instances of crossing the border (into Ukraine) and 18.4 millions of instances of crossing the border (outside Ukraine) during the period o 2006–2012. The data confirm that Ukraine is a country of intensive external migration flows, especially the immigration and the transit migration.

In this regard, we should consider the demographic changes in Ukrainian society. According to IOM, from 1991 till 2012, the total population decreased by more than 7 million because of low birth rate and intense emigration. In 2012, the birth rate was 1.29 children per woman, and it is forecast that by 2050 the total population will decrease by 10 million more, and over 50 per cent of the population will be older than 45. Can this tendency become a pro argument in terms of immigration increase, and transit migration on its territory as a natural movement of population from East to West in the conditions of continuing demographic decline in the West? This supposition proved, a change in proportion between immigration and transit migration to the increase of immigration should be expected in the near future.



Figure 12.4 Illegal migrants caught at the border in 1999–2012 (persons) (Source: Malynovska, 2014)



Figure 12.5 Citizenship of illegal migrants caught at the border in 2012 (persons) (Source: Malynovska, 2014)



Figure 12.6 Illegal migrants found at the territory of Ukraine in 2001-2011 (thousands of persons) (Source: Malynovska, 2014)



Figure 12.7 Illegal migrants found at the territory of Ukraine in 2012, by citizenship (persons) (Source: Malynovska, 2014)



Figure 12.8 Illegal migrants sent to Ukraine according to the EU Agreement of Readmission in 2011–2012 (persons) (Source: Malynovska, 2014)

12.3.5 Patterns of temporary migration

State registrars' data appear to be very imprecise tool of estimation of migration. First, categories of permanent, long-term and short-term migrants are being confused; permanent ones are combined with the long-term migrants if they are registered as residing in Ukraine; unregistered long-term and permanent migrants are considered temporary migrants. Second, there is no strict registration of migration flows: where migrants arrive from, where they are heading: state services register separately those who arrive in Ukraine and those who leave. Third, there is no registration of migration types: formulations of reasons for arrival and departure are vague and often not properly fixed (which is proved by an increase in the number of a reason reading: "cultural, sports exchange or religious purpose"). Therefore, individual study becomes one of major sources of research in migration processes. On the basis of synthesis of information from both groups of resources the following conclusions have been drawn.

12.3.5.1 Migration flows to Ukraine

The following classification of migration temporality can be made on the basis of state statistics: (1) long-term and permanent migrants (duration of stay longer than 6 months); (2) short-term migrants (duration of stay less than 6 months); and (3) short-term circular migrants. Unfortunately, there is no available research on short term circular migration.

A migration corridor "Russia–Ukraine" can be named (confirmed by the data of governmental statistics and the World Bank). This corridor means movement of people from CIS countries and also Central Asia and the Far East. Migrations usually take place in the South and East of Ukraine (industrial regions and border regions). According to the State Statistics Service, the information on migrants is "contaminated" with a large number of students who distort the data, but the data from other sources show the pattern is quite stable.

Predominantly, they are people of working age. Over ¾ of migrants arrive in cities. According to the temporality of migration, the classification of migrants can look as follows:

- migration for business and diplomatic purposes;
- tourism;
- migration for private purposes;
- study migration;
- migration with purposes of employment;
- immigration;
- migration for cultural, sports or religious purpose.

Still, the data received in sampling studies show that officially declared reasons for in-coming and outgoing migrations are often not true, and migrants often give false information about themselves Therefore, the data of the governmental statistics must be used with caution, and further research is needed.

12.3.5.2 Migration from Ukraine

State statistics registers only the citizens of Ukraine who travel abroad, while foreigners can get registered only if they have permanent residence in Ukraine and now are leaving, yet, the destination of their travel is not fixed. According to the State Statistics Service, the classification of the migrants can be as follows: (1) business trip; (") "organized tourism"; and (3) travel for private purposes. The major problem with finding out the reasons of migration has been already mentioned: the migrants often provide false information about themselves. Still, the data of sampling research allows receiving more reliable information.

Three corridors can be seen: (1) “Ukraine–Russia” (according to the data of state statistics, the World Bank, and individual research); (2) “Ukraine–Poland” (not mentioned by the World Bank, based only on the data of state statistics, and individual research); and (3) “Ukraine –EU” (outlined in individual research only).

According to the temporality of migration, the following groups of migrants can be named:

- long-term and permanent migrants (duration of stay longer than 6 months);
- short-term migrants (duration of stay less than 6 months);
- short-term circular migrants;
- for the scientists, temporality is more differentiated:
  - permanent residence;
  - more than 2 years;
  - 1–2 years;
  - 3 months – 1 year;
  - up to 3 months.

The predominant migration for the researchers and academics is the stay of up to 3 months (according to the State Statistics Service), though according to the World Bank, 3.5 per cent of all researchers and academics of Ukraine have migrated abroad, i.e., this type of migration is large-scale, but not well registered and properly analysed. According to individual research, temporality of migrants is more differentiated, but in this case quantitative indices which would allow its proper estimation are missing. Social characteristics of the migrants from Ukraine are: (1) Working-age people; (2) Over 80 per cent of migrants come from the cities, – according to governmental statistics, and conversely, according to individual research their number comes to 50–60 per cent; and (3) A large percentage of scientists and academics (3.5 per cent of all researchers and academics) and medical doctors (0.9 per cent of all doctors) migrate.

12.3.5.3 Transit migration

Direct transit migration via Ukraine is not mentioned by any source; still, the existence of “Russia–Ukraine” corridor would imply that migrants can move on to the EU, and not remain in Ukraine. Also, indirect migration is quite large: Ukrainians migrate to the EU; and migrants from CIS countries, Central Asia and the Far East come to Ukraine. According to the World Bank, both processes are equally large-scale (they encompass over 10 per cent of the population of Ukraine). An interesting feature is seen: residents of Western regions migrate to the EU, and migrants to Ukraine usually stay in the Eastern and Southern regions.

12.3.6 Main categories of temporary migrants

12.3.6.1 Intellectual migrants

We suggest using this term instead of “Educational migration”, as the latter does not fully define this group of social mobilities in Ukrainian circumstances. The first research in intellectual migration[9] from Ukraine as an independent social phenomenon appeared after 2005 (Kopystyanska et al., 2005; Nikolaenko, 2007; Petrova, 2007), despite the fact that skilled migration from Ukraine starts after

9 Intellectual migration is understood as physical spatial movement of persons who work in the sphere of science, education, art, religion, etc. and other socially important spheres: journalists, scientists, lecturers, lawyers, writers, artists, etc.

1991, and it reached its peak in the early 2000's (Petrova, 2008). Reliable estimations of the scale of Ukrainian skilled external migration are not found: governmental statistics is irrelevant in terms of real size of skilled migration. First of all, the State Statistics Committee considers intellectual migration only as migration of scientists, and only those who have a doctoral or post-doctoral degree. Secondly, only those scientists who reported leaving Ukraine permanently are included into such data. For instance, in 1991 39 scientists with post-doctoral degree officially emigrated, and in 1996 they were 83. From 2006 till 2011, 99 researchers left Ukraine (Kalachova, 2008; 2010, 2011; 2012), but these numbers do not reflect the scale of skilled migration from Ukraine even approximately.

Young people, students in particular, are not included into the State Statistics Committee data. National statistics of the host countries would allow evaluating the size of migration flows and their geography, but here we also meet serious challenges: the EU statistics centres do not collect detailed data on migration flows from extra-Schengen countries. "Invisibility" of all types of intellectual migration causes "short-sightedness of Ukrainian researchers" for Ukrainian state statistics: in all researches performed in the previous nine years, Ukrainian scholars consider intellectual migration as the migration of researchers (Kharlamova, Naumenko, 2010; Petrova, 2007: 127) or analyse it on macro-level with an accent on international flows of intellectual migration, in which Ukrainian skilled migrants occupy a place of national outsiders who "destroy genetic resources of the country" (Nikolaenko, 2007). The reasons for intellectual migration from Ukraine are quite obvious: in 2008–2010, only 0.3 per cent to 0.43 per cent of GDP were allotted from state budget to science, while the law "On Scientific and Technical Research" was adopted in the mid-1990's, according to which the funds allotted to scientific institutions cannot be lower than 1,7 per cent of GDP. In 2014, the amount of 0.27 per cent of the GDP was allotted for science, which is the smallest sum allotted for this purpose in the years of independence of Ukraine (The Law of Ukraine "On the State Budget")

Ukrainian researchers analyse the phenomenon of intellectual migration, using mostly methods of "container theory": effectiveness of migration tactics of Ukrainian professionals is estimated from the perspective of macro-economic state processes, not from the perspective of qualified migrants. The movement of people abroad is perceived as loss of workforce and human capital, and also as a gap to be filled out by the immigrants from the third world countries (Olshevska, 2007; Nikolaenko, 2007). Therefore, national policy of Ukraine must be aimed at keeping its skilled workforce inside the country (Soroka et al., 2012). Thus, in the previous twenty years, a large-scale quantitative research of intellectual migration from Ukraine that would study motivation, choice of countries, tactics and strategies, trans-national experiences of highly skilled migrants – paradigms of political and cultural interaction, creation of social networks and social capital – currently remain out of the scope of interest of Ukrainian scholars.

Migration tactics of Ukrainian students are studied in the framework of "container theory". Several paradigms are accented: pro-Ukrainian migration paradigm (aimed at return to Ukraine), pro-Ukrainian intermediary migration paradigm (permanent residence in Ukraine with a chance of work contract in the West), pro-Western intermediary paradigm (permanent residence abroad with a possibility of short business trips to Ukraine), and emigration model (permanent residence and work abroad). Ukrainian researchers also distinguish a temporary (short-term trips for internship and conferences abroad) and permanent (moving for permanent residence abroad) intellectual migration (Petrova, 2007).

Almost unanimously Ukrainian researchers name such reasons of intellectual migration as the lack of reforms in education and science, insufficient state funding for education and science, poor working conditions, artificially created internal obstacles for obtaining foreign grants and scholarships, insufficient financial and housing conditions, lack of moral or psychological freedom, and low wages (Abreu, 2009; Levina, 2007), and among the consequences: scientific development slowing down and decreasing scientific potential of the country (Korkh, 2008). Some experts name positive outcomes of this type of migration, first of all, the decrease in unemployment in Ukraine (Smalijchuk, 2007, Levina et al., Dron' 2008), but in fact, there is no research showing any correlation between migration and unemployment levels.

12.3.6.2 Students

According to the research of the Society Research Centre conducted from 2008 till 2013, the number of Ukrainian students abroad increased 1.5 times: from 21,500 to 32,600 persons. Most of them study in Poland due to the large number of state-financed programmes for foreign students in this country. Also, there is a law in Poland which grants foreign students a year of legal stay in the country after their graduation to look for a job in relevant sphere. This allows this group of mobilities to transform into other ones, e.g., qualified specialists or lifestyle migrants.

Among other countries, except Poland, where Ukrainian students study are Germany, Russia, Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, France, Canada, and Austria. According to the Association with the EU Agreement (June 27, 2014), the process of receiving a Schengen visa will be facilitated for students, postgraduate students, and NGO members.The major reasons for choosing foreign universities for Ukrainian students usually are better dorms, scholarships, students' mobility in accordance to Bologna process, better financing for research projects, wider choice of available internships.

12.3.6.3 Researchers and academics

Most often, academics and researchers leave Ukraine for participation in research projects. The second most popular reason is internships and participation in study courses. The third – and the least popular reason is teaching. A study or teaching visit abroad most often lasts less than three months. The longer is the travel abroad the less becomes the number of Ukrainian researchers and academics taking part in it. Most popular countries for migration are Germany, Russia, and the USA. In 1991–2011, the dynamic decrease in the number of scientists and researchers in Ukraine becomes more and more visible, which also explains the decrease in migration for this group.

The motivation for migration for academics and researchers is improving their qualifications for further professional activities, and also commercialization of Ukrainian education, the lack of financial resources for innovative infrastructure in scientific institutions of Ukraine, and intensification of requirements before lecturers and researchers while the salaries remain insufficient.

12.3.6.4 Skilled migrants

This group is not numerous, but has a potential to grow. First of all, highly qualified migrants mobilise in two ways: "macro": via organizations/companies which are mostly international and have contracts abroad; and "micro": via freelance/self-employment. Nowadays, Ukrainian qualified migration mostly encompasses technical sciences and IT specialists, engineers, etc. They are usually employed at large plants, IT-companies or building and construction companies. It is difficult to name the countries where Ukrainian qualified migration is most active, but most likely these are European countries and the USA.

12.3.6.5 Labour migrants

The results of the studies of contemporary external migration of the Ukrainian citizens allowed us to set out a number of features that *distinguish modern Ukrainian labour migration from its previous waves* in the nineteenth-twentieth centuries and let trace it as a part of global migration.

First, unlike previous stages, the current Ukrainian trips have become a most widespread and also covered several continents and dozens of countries. Ukrainian experts unanimously point to the lack of reliable statistical information on the number of citizens of Ukraine who during the first two decades of its existence as an independent state went to work abroad and are still there now. This gap is attempted to be filled in through researches and surveys. Depending on the difference in the methodology of expert estimates the final data on the number of Ukrainian immigrants appears to range from 1.5 to 5 million (Malynovska, 2011: 4-5; Pozniak, 2012; Markov, 2009: 7–8, 59).

Over the last twenty years the labour immigration from Ukraine covered all the countries of present day European Union, as well as Asia, the American continent and Australia. (Libanova: 2009; Markov, 2009: 69). Experts are unanimous that current migration flows from Ukraine are almost equally divided between the two main areas – the EU and Russia (Malynovska, 2011: 5). The results of the recently published migration survey of households in Ukraine in 2012 demonstrate the decrease in the segment of migrants to Russian Federation and increase in the segment of migrants to EU countries (Libanova, 2013)

Besides the traditional for the post-soviet period of Ukrainian immigration movement to the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (above all, to Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary), the most intensive immigration streams headed South European countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy), as well as Ireland. Other Western European countries (above all, Germany, France and the United Kingdom) are among the migration priorities for Ukrainians; however, due to the strict immigration restrictions in these countries, the possibility for Ukrainians to move there remains scarce. Some of the Ukrainian guest workers, however, arrive in these countries from other countries of the EU (Archive ETNAS, 2008: 545a). The number of Ukrainian migrants in the Western European countries has been steadily increasing, in particular, owing to the youth who receive education there, and then try to gain a foothold and make a career.

Like in the previous periods of economical migration, there is a distinct domination of West Ukrainian labour workers heading westwards; however, the percentage of the representatives from the Central, Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine is growing steadily. The two-third of migrants to Russia comes from Central and South-Eastern regions. It's necessary to say that our expert data on the resident countries (Markov, 2009) concerning the representatives of Western regions, on the one hand, and their compatriots from the Centre, South and East of Ukraine, on the other, in general coincide with the data of the National random study of the population of Ukrainian labour migration conducted by the State Statistics Committee, the data from Ukrainian Centre for Social Reform headed by E. Libanova, showing up that Ukrainians from the West of Ukraine amount to 57,4% of guest workers (Libanova, 2009). According to 2012 survey, 70% of all labour migrants come from Western Ukraine (Libanova, 2013: 38).



Figure 12.9 Map-Diagram "Labour Immigration of Ukrainians in Europe" (Source: Markov, 2009: 68–69)

The authors of the random survey of the population of Ukraine on migration carried out by the State Statistics Committee, the Ukrainian Centre for Social Reform under the leadership of E. Libanova unite all regions of Ukraine in terms of the participation in the migration in seven migration-focused geographical areas.

The first place belongs to the most western district of the Trans-Carpathians with the highest level of popular participation in the migration to the following countries: Czech Republic (c. ⅔ of all Ukrainian labour migrants in Czech Republic originate from the Trans-Carpathian region), Hungary and Slovakia. This is explained by factors of geographical proximity, ethnical features of the region (here resides the bulk of the Hungarians and Slovaks), historical ties (Ukrainian Trans-Carpathian region in different times was part of Hungary and Czechoslovakia). By the level of targeting Russia, however, the area is characterized as the largest among the other two regions located entirely within the Western Ukraine (Libanova, 2013: 39).

Next comes the Bukovyna region (bordering Romania), which natives work in the countries of "Old Europe" (50% in Italy). High level of orientation on Italy is explained by the fact that in the Chernivtsi region a part of romance language speaking population is the highest (Romanians and Moldovans), many ethnic Ukrainian friends are in Romania and Moldova, the inhabitants of which began to actively migrate to Italy before the Ukrainians.

The third position also belongs to located in western Ukraine, Galicia-Volyn region with significantly higher level of orientation on Poland (in comparison with other areas) and even higher one targeting Portugal, Spain, Italy, at relatively low focus on NIS (New Independent States – "СНД") countries. The district provides a quarter of the volume of Ukrainian migrant workers: about ¾ of all migrants to Poland (according 2012 Survey only ⅔ of labour migrants to Poland originate from Galicia (Libanova, 2013: 40), a half to Portugal and Spain and a third to Italy. And 99% of all labour migrants to Belarus originate from Volyn region (Libanova, 2013: 40).

The fourth position goes to West-Central region (Vinnytsya, Rivne, Khmelnytsk and Cherkasy regions). There is about a half of all migrants working in Russia and NIS countries. In this and the more eastern districts any significant differences between the levels of participation in labour migration, between urban and rural residents are not observed. As mentioned in the survey, a higher intensity of migration of rural population in Ukraine on the whole is provided by the above-mentioned four western districts.

The fifth position goes to East-Central region, to which the authors of the survey include Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhzhya, Kyiv, Kirovograd, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernigiv regions and the city of Kyiv. While the previously mentioned regions occupied higher or all-country level of participation of the population of working age in labour migrations, here it is noticeable lower that on the whole in Ukraine. The region is characterized by RF oriented migration (1.5 higher than in Ukraine on average).

In the sixth place the authors of the survey put the southern region (Crimea, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odessa regions). On the whole district the level of participation in labour migration is somewhat higher than in East-Central area. However, it is noticeably lower than in the other five areas. Compared to the previous area the orientation toward Russia is not so sharply expressed, while the higher is the level of the orientation towards the EU. The highest level in Ukraine is fixed here: the migration is focused on the countries of the South, which the authors of the survey include south of the former Yugoslavia, Malta, Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, developing countries, where according to the demographic-health survey of the population of Ukraine in 2007, there exists the highest risk of becoming victims of trafficking. And the last place belongs to the most eastern Lugansk region, which is characteristic for definite RF-oriented labour migration (Libanova, 2013: 66–67). The level of labour intensity is average in Ukraine and higher than in the previously mentioned two regions.

Second, migration has covered major age, educational and professional groups and spheres of socially active population. From other side, all the varieties of origin, age group, social status, level of education and sphere of occupation are devoid of sense by the status of immigrant with consequently menial or frequently changed jobs (Markov, 2009: 62–63). Nevertheless, the social dynamics of Ukrainian labour migration define people with higher and secondary special education. This is confirmed by the results of our sociological and expert surveys, official statistics of the countries in which we conducted a study. The growth of deficit for specialists of relevant qualifications in the EU causes successful replacement by Ukrainians the vacancies in areas of skilled labour, both university and vocational education and hence appearance of employers' 'demand for Ukrainians'. These facts, added by exits of thousands of highly qualified Ukrainian specialists to other states for employment by contracts, indicate that modern Ukrainian emigration is formed by socially active people not abused at home.

Third, for a long time the majority of Ukrainians have worked and resided in recipient countries illegally. According to the the data of sampling observance of households in Ukraine, the number of Ukrainian immigrants who received the labour contract in written form had only one-third of employed workers among all who were employed, the rest worked by verbal agreement (Libanova, 2009:37). The repeated modular selective survey of population of Ukraine on migration showed that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians legalized their stay and employment in host countries, and only one in five migrant worker remains irregular (Libanova, 2013).

Fourth, one more important feature is the indicator of independent women's participation in external Ukrainian migration. If in general researchers see the gender structure of Ukrainian labour migration in the ratio 2/3 to 1/3 in favour of men (Pozniak, 2012: 3), at its European trend there is some benefit of women. For example, the numerical superiority of women over men in Italy and Poland, EU largest recipients of Ukrainian immigrants, estimated at a ratio of, respectively, 82/18 and 67/33, as well as in Greece – 70/30. It should be added that the modern Ukrainian migration was initiated mass exodus of women to work in Greece and Italy (Markov, 2009: 60–61). In-depth interviews and focus group discussions conducted by us in the host countries provide grounds to assume that the transfer to globalization creates both a new room for social self-assertion of a woman and social mode of life, in which family factor is differently organized than before. A family remains the basis of life activity for a woman, however, from the social point of view a shift takes place; from "a family as the world for a woman" to the family as a motivation for woman's self-assertion beyond that limit, presupposing at the same time, the dimension of "family correlation". Hence, female immigration as a characteristic feature of Ukrainian labour migration to the EU countries signifies the circular type of the latter. It chiefly combines both affection towards homeland and the family in the mother country and the readiness for changing circumstances and environment connected with the advent of new goals. This also includes ability to integrate quickly in the society of the country of residence.

Fifth, Ukrainian migration towards the European Union over the past two decades indicates the content of the social dynamics of the migration process, namely, the gradual transition from the "shuttle" trips to neighbouring countries – to long-term trips to Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal and then, to a level that is characterized as transnational movements of migrants.

Sixth, the initial orientation, especially on short trips, seasonal work in foreign countries, which eventually changes into the timing uncertainty of return. The vast majority of Ukrainians, who went to work abroad in the 1990's – 2000-ies, focused on relatively short-term stay in the host country. They planned to quickly earn the money needed to repay debt, purchase accommodation, pay tuition fees for children, or to eliminate any other causes that led to the migration, and then to return back home in a year or two. However, guest-workers usually remain for a long time, explaining the need to solve the material needs of their families in Ukraine (Archive ETNAS, 2008: 575 a). Over time, many of them arrange their lives in the host country, reuniting with their families there. The amount of short-term irregular migrants decreased under the influence of financial crisis.

Seventh, Ukrainians in move. Ukrainian migrants move all over the host country for example, from the south of Italy to the centre and further to the north), and from one state to the other (from the Czech Republic or Portugal to Spain, Ireland, from there – to Canada and Argentina), where there are generally better working conditions and higher pay (Archive ETNAS, 2008: 575a). The highest concentration of Ukrainians is to be fixed in metropolitan areas – Madrid, Rome, Milan, Lisbon, Athens, and Moscow. Following the accession of Central and Eastern European countries into the Schengen area the need was felt for skilled workers in technical areas of these states, as well as an increase took place in opportunities for legal employment there, and a vast outflow of Ukrainian migrants from Poland to the Czech Republic in connection with the best working conditions in this country was observed. At the time of the global financial crisis our expert data recorded Ukrainian migrants moving to London, which was caused by a significant investment in building infrastructure for the Summer Olympic Games in 2012 (Markov, 2009: 71).

Eighth, deployment of the financial crisis was not a turning factor for Ukrainian migrants to return to their homeland. The example of contemporary Ukrainian labour migration shows, that the global economic crisis of recent years, which has covered primarily developed countries, tend not to mean the reverse movement of migrants through "trodden corridors" from the resident to the country of origin. The return back of some of Ukrainian migrants can be considered as one of the links in the chain of their migratory movements. Moreover, Ukrainian migration experience during the crisis can serve as a basis for the assertion, that intense migratory movements will remain a constant feature of social relations, regardless of the current state of the world economy (Markov, 2011).

Ninth, availability of developed social networks. Modern Ukrainian migrants organize widely distributed social networks, through which they transport people from Ukraine to host countries and in the reverse direction, regurgitate earned money to Ukraine, rapidly convey information about the situation on the labour market, opportunities to obtain housing, legal characteristics of the country or region, in particular, associated with the elaboration of documents for legalization, family reunification, other legal conditions of stay. Every week guest workers go ‘to buses’ – a determined place of meeting, exchange of information and informal market where minibuses with people from Ukraine bringing transfers, letters, fresh media arrive at (theses are in Rome, Naples, Bologna, Barcelona, Madrid and other cities of significant accumulation of Ukrainians).

According to the repeated modular selective survey of population (households) of Ukraine on migration, more than three-quarters of Ukrainians seek for job through friends, relatives, acquaintances and a significant minority – directly through an employer, private agencies and private individuals providing employment. Over 60% of remittances to their homeland Ukrainian workers make personally, through friends, relatives, courier, drivers, and only about 40% – through banks, by post or other organizations (Libanova, 2013). The correlation of above mentioned parameters remained virtually the same as in 2008, when the first all-national selective household survey on labour migration was conducted (Libanova, 2009: 37)

Experts note that thanks to the good organized networks Ukrainians are flexible concerning quickly changing conditions on the labour market, in particular, in a time of financial crisis. A sort of self-regulation of modern Ukrainian migration through the social networks is being observed. Ukrainians shape contemporary migration systems uniting Ukraine simultaneously with a number of the host countries and based on the developed social networks. Development of the migrant networks produces the common space in which there is intense trade, information exchange, and cross-border movement of workers. The systemic crisis in Ukraine, compared with the EU, the rise of unemployment and a further fall in wages in foreign currency stimulate increasing migration attitudes of Ukraine’s population, especially among the younger generation[10].

In recent years, the number of migrants from Ukraine grew primarily due to family reunification, i.e. mostly because of young people leaving to study and work in the host countries. Among them, Germany is the most popular destination for education of students from Ukraine. According to the latest household survey, Germany occupies disproportionately higher position in comparison with other countries in regards of the number of Ukrainian labour immigrants with higher education (90% vs. 19% in Hungary and Spain, which share the second and third position in regards of these matters) (Libanova, 2013).

The developed (particularly, in the years of economic recession) Ukrainian immigration system has become a breeding ground for the further integration of the current “ labour migration” and the “migration of skilled professionals” by expanding the space of horizontal mobility. In regard of the concept of “horizontal circular migration, the group of work migrants can be divided into such categories which are inter-connected and define one another:

10 According to the poll conducted by the Russian online recruitment company HeadHunter, which promotes developing business in the CIS and Baltic states, more than 5,017 of the site users (48 per cent of young professionals with higher or incomplete higher education – the average age of the respondents – 30 years) in November 2012 reported serious intentions to leave Ukraine to work, 43 per cent admitted that they sometimes consider the possibility of finding work abroad, and only 4 per cent do not plan to leave Ukraine. The most popular for the planned migration were: Europe (63 per cent), USA / Canada (42 per cent), Australia (20 per cent). Moreover, compelling reasons for choosing the country is high level of education in the West and availability of scholarships. Respondents identified the main reasons why young people leave: the lack of a good future for themselves and their families in Ukraine (72 per cent), low pay (44 per cent), lack of conditions for professional self-realization (41 per cent), unstable political situation (34 per cent) the possibility of working abroad normally even at menial jobs (33 per cent) and the possibility to easier start own business (14 per cent). Most respondents believe that it is better to emigrate at a young age (hh.ua 2012).

Seasonal migrants
We consider this group of migrants to be temporary migrants which circulate between Ukraine and another country (often, but not always, cross border), and can change the directions and duration of migration very fast. Seasonal migration has a repetitive character, but often can combine several types of migration. For example, a migrant goes to seasonal work to Poland, and later migrates for long-term work to Spain where he gets a university degree. Emigration process combines several migration types, integrates them into new quality. This also corresponds to suggested concepts of circular horizontal migration and demonstrates a need of new classification of temporary mobility. This can be important in determining proportion in the groups of mobilities for our further in-depth interviews.

Cross border migration ("pendulum"; "retail trade")
Related to cross border migration, the way of migration is important as well as a partial linkage to physical time (characterized by consistency: several times per day, per week, or per month). Cross border migration also has a formal base: a certain number of people living in cross border regions hold citizenship of EU countries and therefore freely move between Ukraine and neighbouring countries. Some EU countries have special conditions for border crossing: e.g, Poland has issued an order for 30-km border zone the dwellers of which can freely move between Ukraine and Poland.

Cross border work migration is most often represented by retail trade of Ukrainian goods which are cheaper in Ukraine than in EU. As it was mentioned above, the representatives of this group often become seasonal migrants in the countries of cross border migration, and later they return to retail trade or switch for a different type of social mobility. This pattern is clearly represented by horizontal space of the change of social mobility groups.

Permanent migrants
There are two categories of permanent migrants with whom migration it is an inherent part of their life: (1) "Circular migrants" (migrants who go to work to Russia, Czech Republic, Poland for several months and return home, and then leave again): residence in Ukraine with short-term travel abroad; and (2) "Long-term" migrants: residence in one or several destination countries for a long time (from 1 to 15–17 years with short-term or without visits to Ukraine (some of them plan to return back to Ukraine in a few years or "to die in Ukraine").

12.3.6.6 Humanitarian migrants

Refugees
Since 1991 (the year Ukraine became independent), refugees have been forming a separate group of migrants in the country. Their first influxes into the country (end of the 1980's – first half of the 1990's) were a result of military conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Chechnya. There were tens of thousands of people (among them, for example, were 10 thousand Meskhetian Turks, 60 thousands of migrants from Transnistria), whose legal status was determined on the basis of special resolutions of the government (Malynovska, 2010). Among 18 thousand refugees who appealed to local authorities for help in 1993, the majority were ethnic Ukrainians, and a considerable part of them were Russians. Armenians comprised approximately a quarter of all migrants. Those were mostly Ukrainian migrants and members of mixed families. The number of migrants from Asia and Africa was comparatively small (Malynovska, 2010).

The procedure of granting a refugee status was introduced in Ukraine in February 1996 by the law of Ukraine 'On the Refugees' (1993; new version of the Law was adopted in 2001). Over 10 thousand asylum seekers have appealed to migration service agencies by 2001. 5, 500 migrants (including children) received a refugee status. Out of 2155 applications submitted in 2008, only 125 received a positive response; while in 2001 there were a total of 916 applications, and 455 foreigners were granted the refugee status. The reasons for the decrease in the percentage of favourably met applicants are, as one of the most outstanding Ukrainian professionals in the sphere of migration O. Malynovska puts it, “stricter criteria of granting the refugee status, introduced by the new legislation, insufficient power and repetitive reorganizations of the migration service bodies, which sometimes altogether stopped considering applications. Another reason lies in compositional changes of the refugees as a group; among economic migrants prevail (rather than victims of persecution). As a result, the number of refugees, which was the largest in 1999 (more than 3 thousand persons including children), decreased to 2,201 persons in 2008“ (Malynovska, 2010).

According to the UN Refugee Agency, in 2013, 1,310 persons applied for refugee status (1,093 adults) (UN Refugee, 2012), which can be considered an average quantity for the previous 4 years. As of January 1, 2013, there have been approx. 2,500 of persons with a legally recognized refugee status in Ukraine (UN Refugee, 2012)

The decrease is partially explained by such facts: some migrants returned to their native countries (for example, after the improvement of the situation in Yugoslavia, moved further to other countries agreeing to accept them or received Ukrainian citizenship (about 1,000 persons) (UN Refugee, 2012) Among the refugees, there are migrants from over 40 countries of Asia, Africa and Europe (UN Refugee, 2012). In the recent years, most persons seeking refuge in Ukraine come from (usually transiting from Russia) from Afghanistan, Somali, Syria and Kirgizstan, Iran, Russian Federation, and Congo.

Nationals of former USSR countries have potentially higher chances of successful integration into Ukrainian society due to language and cultural similarities, but at the same time they have the lowest chances for receiving a refugee status (Ivashchenko-Stadnik, 2013). Refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants remain one of the most marginalised social groups in Ukraine. Their rights to work, freedom and security, fair trial and education are often violated even because of the fact that the process of granting a refugee status remains not transparent and overly politicised. According to COMPAS project report (migration research at the borderlands of Europe), Ukraine can be considered a safe country for refugees from some countries, in particular, the CIS countries (Armenia, Georgia and Moldova), but it is not always so for the refugees from Uzbekistan and Chechnya, and, in general, from African and Asian refugees and migrants, in particular, for Nigeria, Liberia, and Somali nationals (Düvell, 2009).

A high level of education is characteristic for the refugees. According to the data provided by experts of the Institute of Social Studies at the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, 52, 1% of migrants have a university degree; 46.8% of women and 32.8% of men received a vocational training (Düvell, 2009). Despite this, refugees very often seem unable to find an appropriate job (the employment of the majority of them is connected with retail trade at markets). Since the state does not provide assistance to refugees in obtaining accommodation, they have to rent it, and they often have to share accommodation with other people in order to make the rent more affordable. Another painful problem is education of the refugees’ children, although the right to education in Ukraine is guaranteed by the law (Düvell, 2009). To support the family, some of the children have to start working at the age of 10 – 12. For those who arrived in Ukraine in adolescence, the obstacles they face in terms of education include difficulties in adaptation, in particular, language problems. There are no special programs to help the children of the refugees to prepare for the demands of Ukrainian educational system (Malynovska, 2010). Sometimes, refugees are facing problems of implementation of the basic human rights; in particular, there is a discriminatory practice of humiliation of dignity of refugees because of their nationality at the law enforcement agencies.

Almost half of all refugees who stay in Ukraine are concentrated in the capital or neighbouring area (the city of Kyiv and Kyiv region), and more than one fourth – in Odesa region. Large numbers of refugees reside in Lviv, Kharkiv and Trans-Carpathian regions. There are two centres for temporary residence of the refugees, one of which is located in Odesa, and another in Trans-Carpathia region (the office is located in Uzhhorod, and residential centres are located in Mukachevo and Perechyn). In 2014, new temporary residence centre for the refugees will be opened in Yagotyn, Kyiv region.

The order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued on August 22, 2012 № 605-p approved the "Action plan for integration of refugees and persons who need special protection in Ukrainian society until 2020" (see: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/605-2012-%D1%80).The Action plan includes measures on offering a programme in Ukrainian language studies, forming tolerance towards the refugees and persons who need special protection, giving residence for the refugees, supporting national and cultural identity of the refugees, and also opening centres for their social integration.

- The State Employment Service of Ukraine conducts informational and educational projects, including job fairs for the refugees. In the beginning of 2013, 4 refugees were registered by the State Employment Service of Ukraine, two of whom received the status of an unemployed person and social payment for the unemployed. Others were given consultations.
- Ukrainian language courses were available in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa in 2012 due to financial support of the regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; 72 refugees received certificates of completion. Two Sunday schools for refugees from Afghanistan and their children work in Kharkiv for teaching the refugees their native language and culture.
- Due to the efforts of the NGOs and media, the issues regarding formation of tolerant attitude from the locals to the refugees are fully covered.
- As a rule, refugees and transit migrants have to stay in Ukraine accidentally. Mostly, they tend to head for Western European states.

There are no visible signs of situation with migrants in Ukraine becoming more acute: ethnic ghettos or districts are not being formed, religious confrontations or social protests and strikes are very uncommon (UN Refugee, 2010), and it can be inferred from that there is a predominant group of foreigners from CIS countries who are known ('culturally marked') for Ukrainians, a number of foreigners from South-East and Central Asia and Africa in Ukraine being far from large, and also this indicated a transit character of migration.

Ukrainian refugees in other countries

According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for the Refugees, 26,400 citizens of Ukraine received the status of a refugee or humanitarian protection while being in other countries. The belonging to a national minority is, as a rule, a reason for receiving such status. Mostly, the refugees live in Germany where there is a special programme with a help of which the Jews from post-Soviet countries can receive a refugee status.

Nevertheless, in the recent years there is an increase in the number of cases of receiving a refugee status by Ukrainian citizens for political motivation. In 2012, 1,500–1,900 Ukrainians annually ask for granting them a refugee status in foreign countries (table 1). Most of them have a status of economic migrants. In particular, in 2012, the largest number of applications was registered in the USA (274), France (210), Canada (178), Czech Republic (174), Sweden (133), Germany (124) and Poland (72). In the times of independence, only several cases of external migration for political reasons were registered in Ukraine.

Table 12.23 Number of petitions submitted by Ukrainian citizens for refugee status in foreign countries and the number of positive decisions taken on these petitions, 2007–2012 (Source: Data from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of submitted applications	1875	1691	1724	1599	1603	1749
Number approved for refugee status or humanitarian protection	322	273	285	275	398	323

On July 7, 2014 the European Asylum Support Office published statistical data for 2013. The EU encountered a considerable growth of applications for refugee status. In 2013, 435 760 applications from asylum seekers in EU countries were received. 34 per cent received positive response. Major recipient countries are Germany, France, Sweden, Great Britain, and Italy. The report does not mention Ukraine except for several cases, connected with migration to Czech Republic (a large number of asylum seekers from Ukraine is traditionally registered there). Our state is not present in the top-20 list of countries with high migration risk in the European context. The report does not show the data of 2014, when problems with safety emerged in our state because of aggression from Russia. Ukrainian migrants are mentioned only as a potential threat connected to the crisis in the east of the country[11].

12.3.6.7 Irregular migrants

Human Trafficking

In terms of human trafficking, Ukraine can be regarded as a country of origin, transit and destination in the system of trafficking men, women, and children (IOM, 2014), who are used for sexual and work exploitation all over the world. (TIP, 2012). Quantitative data on human trafficking are very approximate, and are based on the IOM research, the US Department of State reports, and also expert analysis and scientific research reports in Ukraine. Several reasons can serve as an explanation, and first of all, the fact that Ukrainian official statistics provides no offer for even a vague idea about the scope of the problem: e.g., in 2013, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine investigated 131 cases of human trafficking (MIA, 2013), while according to IOM-Ukraine 929 victims appealed for help in the very same year (IOM, 2014). The contrast is large, despite the fact that most victims in Ukraine do not seek professional help. Secondly, even those who ask for help do not always receive a legal status of a victim of human trafficking for the reason that they are two categories of persons who can be identified as victims of trafficking. The first one is persons who were recognized as victims of a crime by law enforcement bodies, and the second is persons who were found by NGOs. It is possible that the police considers a person to be a victim (article 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine), but NGOs cannot do that. A person receives a special legal status only after a criminal investigation case is opened (if it is). For instance, only 54 persons received a status of a victim of trafficking in Ukraine by the end of 2013 (MIA, 2013). Due to the difference in criteria and goals, and also the methodology of calculations, official statistical evaluation of the number of victims of human trafficking in Ukraine and from Ukraine does not reflect real proportions of the problem.

According to IOM, over 120 000 of Ukrainians suffered from human trafficking from 1991 till 2014 (IOM, 2013). There is a lack of data about foreigners who became victims of human trafficking. Among new tendencies we can name the positive dynamics of labour exploitation – the increase in number of victims in various categories: girls (aged 15–24), men (from 23 per cent in 2009 to 51 per cent in 2013), children and foreigners. In 2013, Russian Federation was the major country of trafficking of Ukrainians (76 per cent). Among others are Poland (7.5 per cent) and to smaller extent – Turkey, Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, Moldova, Iraq, South Korea and China (IOM, 2014; Levchenko,

11 (June 23, 2014. Newsletter of the EU Representative in Ukraine: EU news see: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/newsletter/nl_230614_(2).pdf).

2013).

The majority of the victims suffer from exploitation in building, agriculture, industry, timber industry, services and housework, and also in providing medical care for ill persons (IOM, 2013). By gender, 48 per cent of victims were women and 52 per cent – men for the period of 2007–2014. 99 per cent of victims of sexual exploitation who asked for help from IOM and a law enforcement institution are women (IOM, 2013). By region, work exploitation is most common among victims from Western Ukraine (IOM, 2014): most often, they are residents of rural areas who suffer because of high level of unemployment in villages and low level of critical attitude to information village dwellers show in their communication with criminal agents (Levchenko, 2011)

Experts also point to the growing dynamics of domestic trafficking and exploitation of foreigners in Ukraine, predominantly work exploitation (IOM, 2013). The countries the victims come from usually are Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Russian Federation and Congo (IOM, 2013). In the US Department of State Global report on counteracting human trafficking in 2010 Ukraine belongs to Tier 2 Watch List – a list of countries "the governments of which do not fully adhere to TVPA minimal standards, but put some effort into it" (TIP, 2011).

Ukraine holds the 86^{th} position in the Global Slavery Index of 2013, an index which provides a ranking of 162 countries, based on a combined measurement of three factors: estimated prevalence of modern slavery by population, level of child marriage, and level of human trafficking in and out of a country.

Despite the growth of problem, Ukraine does not have an effective policy of counteracting human trafficking. The State social programme for counteracting human trafficking will end in 2015. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery are ratified by the state of Ukraine, however, current legislation corresponds to international legislation in a very limited way, in particular, to the Conventions of the Council of Europe. There are serious challenges in identification of victims of human trafficking, and the conditions of compensation payments to the victims are still not formulated.

The law on protection of Ukrainian citizens abroad does not exist, and the witness protection programme, in fact, does not work in Ukraine. Also, it is very hard to find evidence of the crime of human trafficking (Levchenko, 2013). Problems are also caused by low level of competence of the employees of the law enforcement institutions, a tendency on relaying responsibility for human trafficking on the victims, lack of coordination in the work of the law enforcement institutions, difficulties of court proceedings in such cases, lack of information about the state activity in counteracting human trafficking and competence in human trafficking issues, and stigmatization of the victims (IOM, 2013). Ukraine does not have programmes, specialized structures or shelters for reintegration of the victims of human trafficking; NGOs are the only organizations which offer qualified help to the victims of human trafficking.

Immigration and transit migration

Brief overviews of the processes of immigration to Ukraine and of transit migration across its territory will be combined in one chapter. First of all, because the level of research of these phenomena does not allow separate analysis: in contrast to the external migrations, immigration and transit migration are, in fact, not studied. We have literally quite a few major works on the subject of current immigration, which, though, reflect only certain aspects of the process (Brajchevska et al, 2004; Malynovska, 2003).

Secondly, the existing data show that immigrants most often consider their stay in Ukraine as a possibility of further immigration to EU countries, or, vice versa, the primary intentions of further moving to the EU change to permanent residence in Ukraine. Therefore, we deal with intertwining of immigration and transit migration. The latter example also indicates "the relativity of permanence" and allows using the principle of temporariness for all groups of immigrants in Ukraine, except the nations and ethnic groups which were deported by Stalinist regime and continue returning to Ukraine after the declaration of its independence in 1991.

Four groups of sources each focused on specific issues and priorities were selected for presentation of transnational migration channels via the territory of Ukraine: 1) existing statistical research data which include the data of Ukrainian statistics and research results; 2) international research and reports by European experts which concentrate on Ukraine's 'inclusion' into international traffic, control over these processes and forecasting possible outcomes, primarily, for the EU countries; 3) the data published by Ukrainian experts and researchers in which both the groups of migration movements and their geographic location at the territory of Ukraine are pointed out, as well as migration axis inside the country, and possible development scenarios offered for Ukrainian society with a larger segment of foreigners; 4) reports of the mission of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Ukraine and annual reports of human rights organizations which allow seeing problematic points and dynamics of the process taking into account both internal (Ukrainian) and external (international) norms and reality. Statistical data were considered in a separate paragraph, while the other three sources will be analysed altogether.

Experts and reviewers suggest considering Ukraine a country of transit and a destination country for the immigrants. According to the UN data, presented by the staff of the National Institute of Strategic Researches for the President of Ukraine, "we should take into consideration the fact the number of migrants Ukraine now takes the fourth place in the world after the USA, Russia, and Germany with total quantity of 6, 7 million (3, 6 % out of the total flow of migrants in the world). Since 2005, the migration rate in Ukraine has grown to become positive – for the first time after 1993" (Malynovska, 2010). This conclusion corresponds to the analysis of state statistics data; researchers and academics also agree with it

However, the above-mentioned data support the opinion of the experts: the number of migrants remaining in Ukraine is insufficient. To reach the West, Ukraine is made use of as a transit country by the overwhelming majority of migrants. (Butkewych, 2010) The representatives of NIS countries are prevailing among the migrants (Moldova, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, North-Caucasus region of Russia, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan), including Georgians, people from Southern-Eastern Asia and Middle East, Africa. In recent times, the illegal migrants have been arriving even from the region of Caribbean (Malynovska, 2010). According to non-official data, up to 500 thousand illegal migrants pass the territory of Ukraine annually (Malynovska, 2010)

"Traditional" channels of illegal migration, controlled by international organized crime, go across the territory of Ukraine – mostly from African and Asian countries to Western Europe.

Figure 12.10 Map-Diagram "Immigration and Transit Migration in Ukraine"

In view of this, Ukraine plays a role of a "gateway" between Europe and Asia. The attractiveness of Ukraine for illegal transit can be explained by a whole range of factors: it's practically unsecured northern and western borders; traditionally high level of corruption in law enforcement, border guards service, and state officials in general; insufficient legal regulation of migration; absence of centralised structure of migration management with powers scattered among numerous authorities; and low qualification of a large number of officials dealing with migration in the first years of Ukraine's independence, etc. (UGS, 2009). The network of political and governmental corruption is not only the cover for illegal migration, but also the main axis of its re-creation and system consolidation.

Most frequently, illegal migrants use the territory of Ukraine as one of steps towards the entry into the countries of Western Europe. The so-called "economical" migrants (citizens of the countries of Southern-Eastern Asia and Middle East) arrive in Central Asia and Trans-Caucasus continue to use the territory of Ukraine to move further to economically developed countries in search of employment or personal business (Tyndyk, 2004). Transit migrants arrive in Ukraine illegally avoiding entrance points or using fake documents.

According to the data given by already mentioned staff of the National Institute of Strategic Researches, the major part of illegal migrants arrive in Ukraine through Ukrainian–Russian border (the number of detained by the officials comes to 80 per cent out of all detained migrants), and Ukrainian–Belarus border (11 per cent of the detained). Among the main directions of the movement of migrants who cross Ukrainian border, we should name Bryansk–Chernihiv and Sumy direction from the border with Russian Federation, and Gomel'–Chernihiv from the border with Belarus. Illegal migrants leave Ukraine through Ukrainian-Slovakian (almost 60 per cent of the detained), Ukrainian–Polish (20 per cent of the detained) (Tyndyk, 2004), and Ukrainian–Hungarian borders (Prybytkova, 2007).

Ukrainian experts name the most widely used ways of illegal migrants' penetration in Ukraine: they arrive in the country on short-term visas (as tourists planning to visit non-existing relatives or travelling for private reasons), then, they stay in Ukraine illegally or move further to the West; migrating students arrive in the NIS countries through private of state firms, which make the needed documentation for them using official papers of educational institutions of Russia and Ukraine (Pylynsky, 2009). Former students and workers from some countries (mainly, Nigeria, Sri-Lanka, Angola, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan) stay illegally on the territory of Ukraine, unwilling to return to their native countries; “shuttle” or “pendulum” migrants (citizens of Baltic countries) use near border territories of Ukraine for purchasing non-ferrous metals, food, narcotic substances. Mostly, they arrive through border crossings and avoid border control when leaving the country.

The experts points three of the most widely spread mechanisms of illegal migration: transit by air or railway, when the citizens of Southern-Eastern Asia and Middle East countries (China, Vietnam, Korea, India, Sri-Lanka, Afghanistan) enter Russian Federation by airways (Moscow, Saint-Petersburg) or sometimes via Belarus; then they move to Ukraine by railway (Kyiv, Lviv, Mukacheve, Uzhhorod, Odessa), afterwards, they reach target country through Poland, Slovakia, Hungary. The citizens of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Somali, Angola, Zaire, etc. use all means of transport for transit migration: by air, railway, and on foot pedestrian border crossings. Groups of migrants travel by air or railway to Ukraine or to Russian Federation, from where they head for Ukraine, accompanied by conductors, and then – further, to the European Union. The air, railway and pedestrian transit also has its specificities: a large number of citizens of Lebanon arrive in Ukraine by air, and then they travel by railway or on foot towards western border and cross it in order to get to the countries of Western Europe.

The number of people in a group depends on the difficulty of the route and the chosen means of transport. Groups of 10 or more are formed to travel by international airlines and ships. Somewhat smaller groups (3–5 persons) travel by vehicles (from Iraq to Jordan, from Pakistan to Azerbaijan, from Russia to Ukraine). The number of people in the groups changes with the change of a means of transport. A single group may split into smaller ones and vice versa; several small groups may unite into a large one” (Kostyuk, 2010).

Experts point out that current illegal migration has acquired an organized character in Ukraine. There is a set of “firms” providing services for migrants to cross the borders of Ukraine. Ways of illegal residence on the territory of Ukraine and crossing the State border are subject to change and improvement depending on the preventive measures taken by Ukraine, in particular, under the pressure of the EU (Kostyuk, 2010).

Illegal immigration flows to Ukraine are a part of Central European route – one of five major Euro-Asian illegal migration transit routes to the EU countries. Four other routes encompass Vietnam, Pakistan-India, Sri-Lanka-Bangladesh, Afghanistan, China, Kurdistan, Uzbekistan-Tajikistan, and Chechnya ones (Saliar 2008). The Central European route which goes across Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and Slovakia to Western Europe is used by migrants from Middle and Far East, South-East Asia and CIS countries. According to the estimations by European experts, currently this route is not one of the most dangerous in Europe. In 2004–2008, Ukraine has been a leader in counteracting illegal migration among the countries of Sederkoping process[12].

Ukrainian law enforcement agencies detain tens of thousands of illegal migrants annually. This number is comprised by those illegal migrants who transited Ukraine, and were detained on the territory of the EU and returned to Ukraine according to the Agreement of Readmission between Ukraine and the EU (the Agreement came into effect in 2010) and because of the lack of funds for keeping them in Ukraine and returning them to their countries of origin (according to relevant agreements with

12 Sederkoping process was initiated in 2001, during the presidency of Sweden in the EU in order to encourage closer cooperation for asylum seekers and migrants in the countries located at the Eastern border of the EU. Since 2004, the Sederkoping process is especially concentrated upon exchange of knowledge in migration, providing asylum and protection, and also managing the borders between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden on one side, and Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine on the other.

the EU and other migrants' countries of citizenship which regard readmission of illegal migrants), the law enforcement agencies deport about 20–25% of illegal migrants detained out of Ukraine. The majority of them stay in Ukraine. In 2005–2011, the number of those detained for violating the rules of legal stay in Ukraine has been approximately the same (approx. 12,000–14,000 persons), while the number of those detained at the border for violating migration laws has been decreasing since 2006. In the recent years, a tendency of different countries of origin becoming more widespread has been noticed: most illegal migrants come from the new independent states (CIS states) while previously, the majority of such migrants came from Asian countries. (Migration in Ukraine, 2013).

The next type of data suggested by researcher Lesya Kostyuk includes gender and age characteristics of illegal migrants. 67 per cent of the detained on the territory of Ukraine in 2007 were men, 72 per cent were people of working age almost a quarter of them (24 per cent) were children and an insignificant number of people (4 per cent) were of retirement ag*e* (Kostyuk. 2010).

The low skilled persons often without any work experience are generally believed to prevail among illegal migrants. However, a tendency towards the growth in the numbers of migrants – high-level professionals, in particular, the representatives of popular trades, has been noticed recently (Kostyuk. 2010). In general, internal axis of migration flows in Ukraine leads from Odesa in the north-east across central regions (Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk) to the south-west to Odesa.

Kharkiv region is included into the intensive migration axis mostly as educational and labour immigration centre, attracting newcomers from Vietnam, Georgia, Azerbaijan, China, Israel, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (Pylynsky. 2007). The largest number of foreigners permanently resides in Donetsk region, and also in Odesa and Kharkiv region, and in Crimea where the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation is based. The largest number of legal immigrants reside in Kyiv (the capital city), and the cities of Donetsk, Kharkiv and Odesa.

Odesa region occupies a special place in migration, as high migration mobility of population registered there, mostly as a result of its geographical poisition — as a border and a coastline region. The large sea ports of Odesa, Illichivsk, Reni, Yuzhny, Izmail create high transportation and transit potential of the region which is also used by migrants, including the illegal ones. An important factor which makes Odesa region attractive for illegal migrants is the dominance of trade and service spheres in its economy, and transnational migrants prefer these spheres for their first economic activity in Ukraine. One of the reasons for this preference is a low control over these economic sectors where corruption and "shadow" operation are common; these spheres are also scarcely monitored in official economic statistics.

Illegal migrants mostly find their niche at the black market sector of Ukrainian economy (Malynovska, 2010), or they live on casual earnings (Kostyuk, 2010). According to the IOM data, the number of migrants involved reaches 75 per cent (Malynovska, 2010). Easily available jobs are usually found in large industrial cities with low job competition: wholesale markets trade, building industry, other jobs commonly described as "the three Ds" – Dirty, Dangerous & Dumb. In this respect, Ukraine follows the universal trend (Butkevych, 2010). Legal employment continues being problematic for migrants, as chances for legal employment depend not only on a migrant's wish, but also on a good will of an employer: whether they are willing to provide reasons to relevant governmental officials why they would rather employ a foreigner, assist in registration and receiving a permit. Usually this procedure is avoided, and migrants stay deprived of their rights to be observed by both employers and governmental officials. In most cases, the problem is solved with a bribe offered to members of the relevant governmental agencies (Butkevych, 2010). At the same time, the absence of work permit becomes the legal basis for detaining those working migrants who applied for a refugee status. This happens due to the conflict of the legislation regarding the refugees (which gives them the right for temporary employment without a special permit) and the law of Ukraine "On the Legal Status of Foreigners and Persons Destitute of Nationality" (reading that all foreigners and persons destitute of nationality are to obtain a work permit) (Butkevych, 2010).

Ukraine becomes a target country for a certain groups of migrants - immigrants from CIS countries, mainly, Middle Asia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan, and this tendency grows. They legally enter Ukraine and are lawfully allowed to stay in the country for 90 days without registration (Butkevych, 2010). The main countries of origin of the legal migrants are Russia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (IOM, 2013). Mostly they find jobs in retail trade, building and agriculture.

1.2.3.6.8 Lifestyle migration

Volunteers

Volunteering movement started in the 1990's in Ukraine, first of all, due to civic organizations. First, the movement took place from Ukraine to Europe, as Ukraine was closed to foreign volunteers. The exchange of volunteers began in the late 1990's – early 2000's, keeping the same directions which broadened due to mutual exchanges: "Ukraine–Europe–Ukraine". The goals of volunteering programmes are cultural interaction and practical work: restoration and social work, ecology projects, and so on.

Volunteering can be short-term and long-term. Short-term volunteering can last from two to five weeks, and these projects mostly involve volunteers from many countries, up to 20 persons or more. Any person older than 18 can become a volunteer (rarely the minimum age is 16), and there is no maximum age. Short-term projects are oriented for inter-cultural communication. Union Forum NGO experts (working on short-term volunteer projects) mention that over 100 volunteers go to Europe with their organization. The same numbers and activity characterize "Alternative V" and "Swit-Ukraine" (World-Ukraine). 90% of volunteers are women, and 10 % – men. Mostly, short-term volunteer projects are regarded by young people as a chance for travelling and communication.

A considerable decrease of international volunteering of Ukrainians is currently seen (more than twice comparing to the early 2000's). This is explained by increasing demands to the conditions and obligations offered by project organizers, better chances for tourism and inter-cultural communication. We can see the same tendency with the number of international volunteers in Ukrainian volunteering projects. Up to 100 volunteers from all over the world come to Ukraine for two to three weeks. The year of 2014 had different statistics when all projects were delayed except one (in Lviv region): the farthest from "hot" regions and closest to the EU. Still, only 4 participants arrived. Therefore, short-term volunteering projects are currently under question.

Long-term volunteering in Ukraine functions due to the European Voluntary Service (EVS), which lasts from 6 to 12 months depending on the project. Volunteers come to and from the EU, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Turkey. Long-term volunteering has age limits: a volunteer should be 18 to 30 years of age, in some projects 16–17.The programme also has limitations in numbers: 12 volunteers from one organization for 6–9 months programmes, and 15 volunteers for 12 months programmes. Therefore, annually approx. 300 Ukrainians take part in volunteer projects lasting for a year, mostly in Poland, Germany, and France. Usually, one volunteer goes for one project, so the long-term projects are oriented on communication with local community as an additional task.

Up to 250 volunteers from Europe take part in long-term projects in Ukraine annually. They usually implement the projects in the regions where host NGOs are located: Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Trans-Carpathian region. Many volunteers from Ukraine continue their mobility in different directions: some of them stay in the country where they volunteered, others move to other European countries looking for study programmes, internships or work, and so they get a status of intellectual or work migrants.

Tourists
As it was mentioned above, the category "tourism" is one of major reasons for official migration of Ukrainians. Still, real and so-called tourism must be distinguished. Most Ukrainians go abroad as tourists, but many of them use the category as a formulation that disguises their intentions. Real tourists usually go to Balkan countries, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, etc. The so-called tourists stay in the countries they came to after their tourist visas expire and become irregular work migrants. It is difficult to find a proportion of those so-called tourists, as relevant statistical data are unavailable.

Business migrants (business travel)
This group is completely not represented in research materials, still, the National Advisory Board considered it to be important for further study, first of all, due to signing the Association Agreement which presupposes common markets for the EU and Ukraine. Though Ukrainians will have an opportunity to develop small, medium-sized and large business in the EU, it is going to be large businesses which will concentrate their resources in Ukraine.

External work migrants who returned to Ukraine and started their own business (which often is based both in Ukraine and former country of stay) also belong to this group.

"Brides"
Among migrants leaving Ukraine for family reasons, there is a number of women aiming at marriage or cohabitation with citizens of the EU countries and other countries with higher level of economy both for economic reasons (hoping to reach a higher social position) and for emotional motivation. As marriage is perceived as higher social status for women as well as a source of income, and due to high social pressure on women regarding family life and parenthood as an obligation for women, many female migrants aspire to find a husband abroad often having experienced unsuccessful relationships in Ukraine. There are reported cases of marriage of 40–50 year old women to older men in hope of receiving a place to live and better chances of receiving citizenship. Unfortunately, no statistical data are available as migrants travelling for private reasons do not tend to indicate the actual purpose of migration.

Numerous agencies for the so-called "mail order brides" prosper due to organizing internet-based communication. Some cases of voluntary engagement into sex business among young women, mostly students, are reported in the media and in some in-depth interviews. Such migrants travel abroad for several days (usually weekends) for earning additional income to pay for their studies or purchase more expensive clothing. Destination countries usually include the ones which do not require a visa (e.g., Turkey). Potential clients are usually found in social networks while a migrant is in Ukraine.

An emerging type of short-term migration to Ukraine are short-term visits with a goal of finding sexual partners (observed mostly in large cities of Ukraine). Such migrants are men of different age who either use the services of marriage and dating agencies or visit night clubs (which they find in social networks). They may spend their vacation or stay for a weekend in Ukraine.

In some countries (e.g., the USA, Canada) there is a special visa type – "fiancé visa" for three months. This visa often becomes migration factor, as after it expires a migrant becomes irregular. Unfortunately, there is no research date regarding marriage migration of men.

12.3.6.8 Return migrants

This group is often represented by migrants who returned to the country of origin because of losing their job in the host country, or personal decision to return due to family or other matters. Some of them start their own business in the home country. Still, they keep their contacts with the migrants' social networks in the previous and potential host countries. Often their relatives are current work migrants or intellectual migrants (usually students whose education fees were earned abroad by the return migrants). Therefore, this group keeps its potential for further migrations.

12.3.6.9 Potential migrants

Basing on latest research conducted by GfK Ukraine, the largest potential migrants group is people aged 18–40 (27%). They are mostly potential work migrants, less often – potential intellectual migrants: highly qualified specialists and students. Most potential migrants claim they are ready to leave for some time: 1–2 years. The most likely destination countries are Russia, Germany, Italy, the USA, and the UK. Comparing the shares of responses regarding the most probable destination country with the share of countries where return migrants have worked, we can forecast an increase of migration flow to Germany, the UK, Spain, the USA, Canada and proportionate decrease of migration to Russia, Poland, and Czech Republic[13].

In addition to this, the poll conducted by the Russian online recruitment company HeadHunter, which promotes developing business in the CIS and Baltic states, more than 5,017 of the site users (48% of young professionals with higher or incomplete higher education – the average age of the respondents is 30 years) in November 2012 reported serious intentions to leave Ukraine for work, 43 per cent admitted that they sometimes consider the possibility of finding work abroad, and only 4% do not plan to leave Ukraine. The most popular countries for the planned migration were: Europe (63%), the USA / Canada (42%), Australia (20%). Moreover, compelling reasons for choosing the country is high level of education in the West and availability of scholarships. Respondents identified the main reasons why young people leave: the lack of a good future for themselves and their families in Ukraine (72%), low pay (44%), lack of conditions for professional self-realization (41%), unstable political situation (34%) the possibility of working abroad normally even at menial jobs (33%) and the possibility to easier start own business (14%). Most respondents believe that it is better to emigrate at a young age (hh.ua, 2012). Therefore, the systemic crisis in Ukraine, compared with the EU, the rise of unemployment and a further fall in wages in foreign currency stimulate increasing migration attitudes of Ukraine's population, especially among younger generation.

Residents of border regions are more ready to migrate which can be explained by their inclusion into migration networks, closer cultural and economic ties with neighbouring countries, legal conditions (e.g., simplified border crossing for residents of 30-km zone on the EU border), and so on. The experts say that only 8–10% of those who claimed their readiness to migrate actually do this. It is more efficient to find potential migrants by comparing interconnections among the groups of social mobilities.

13 http://life.pravda.com.ua/technology/2008/10/28/9584/).

4. External Migration Flows Related to Ukraine

Finally, we tried to combine the scattered and fragmented state statistical indicators and expert assessments about the external migration flows, related to Ukraine in the common table that is below:

Table 12.24 Groups of social mobility

Permanent migration	Temporary migration[1]			
	Groups and subgroups of mobility			**Quantity**
	Intellectual migrants	Students		54 350[2]
		Researches and academics		10 264[3]
		Skilled migrants		N/A
	Return migrants			279 500[4]
	Labour migrants	Seasonal migrants		
		Cross border migration		
		Long migrants		1 181 600[5]
	Humanitarian migrants	Refugees		1310; c.2500[6]
	Irregular migrants	Human Trafficking		929; 131; 54[7]
	Immigration and transit migration			632[8]
	Lifestyle migration Tourists Business migrants "Brides"		Volunteers	N/A
			18 935 800[9]	
			N/A	
			N/A	
	Potential migrants			N/A
	TOTAL			c. 20 464 000

Note: (1) State services divide all migrants into two groups: tourists and migrants. In case of the first rubric, it comes to the data of State Border Guards Service which fixes instances of crossing the border by each person. In second case, state services only record those individuals who changed their registration address, i.e., both permanent and temporary migrants, because the only criterion for person to be counted as migrant is fact that this person moved to another locality for permanent or temporary residence not shorter than 6 months. We consider such people as temporary migrants, because often they don't stop their movement between different countries. (2) Migrants to Ukraine. Median number of foreign students, which enters Ukraine per year (data 2006-2012). (3) Migrants to Ukraine. Median number of scientists from National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, who travelled abroad according to 2006-2012 data. (4) Migrants from Ukraine – according to O.Poznyak. (Poznyak, 2013). (5) Migrants from Ukraine – according to survey of households, conducted in 2012 (Libanova, 2013). (6) Migrants to Ukraine. According to the UN Refugee Agency, in 2013, 1,310 persons applied for refugee status (1,093 adults), which can be considered an average quantity for the previous 4 years. In 2013 c. 2500 people in Ukraine had refugee status. (7) Migrants from Ukraine. According to IOM, 929 people were victims of human trafficking, but only 131 cases were invrestigated, and only 54 people got the status of victims of trafficking. (8) Median number according to 2006–2012 data. (9) Migrants to Ukraine. Median number of foreign tourists, who entered Ukraine, per year (according to 2000-2012 data).

12.4 Conclusions

During the first decades after the fall of the totalitarian regime of the former Soviet Union and declaration of independence, Ukraine found itself "at the intersection" of the two external migration flows: mass exodus of Ukrainians mainly to the EU and the Russian Federation, and immigration and transit migration through its territory (mainly to the EU). Due to the archaic and limited statistical indicators and migration law, which do not actually categorize current temporary migration, we have no reliable statistics on both migration flows.

While in the case of external migration of Ukrainians, the lack of reliable state statistics is partly compensated by fairly intensive sampling studies conducted in the last decade, statistical data and studies in the host countries – the immigration and transit migration in Ukraine is practically not studied. We provide the information by putting together mean and not always reliable state statistics, individual research, analytical reports, reports of Ukrainian and international NGOs, Media publication.

Ukrainian experts claim that the vast majority of Ukrainian external migrants make up the *labour migrants*. Depending on the difference in the methodology of research the final data on the number of those whom we conventionally call *labour migrants* appear to range from 1.2 to 5 million. Over the last twenty years the labour immigration from Ukraine covered all the countries of present day European Union, as well as Asia, the American continent and Australia. Experts are unanimous that current migration flows from Ukraine are almost equally divided between the two main areas – the EU and Russia, however, in recent years, the European destination becomes more popular. Most labour migrants originate from Western Ukraine. Labour migration has covered all ages, educational and professional groups and spheres of socially active population. From other side, all the varieties of origin, age group, social status, level of education and sphere of occupation are devoid of sense by the status of immigrant with consequently menial or frequently changed jobs. Nevertheless, the social dynamics of Ukrainian labour migration define people with higher and secondary special education. The growth of deficit for specialists of relevant qualifications in the EU causes successful replacement of the vacancies in areas of skilled labour by Ukrainians with university and vocational education. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians legalized their stay and employment in host countries, and only one in five labour migrants remains irregular. One more important feature is the indicator of independent women's participation in external Ukrainian migration. The modern Ukrainian migration initiated mass exodus of women to work in Greece and Italy. The gender structure of Ukrainian labour migration is 2/3 in favour of men. Ukrainian labour migration towards the European Union over the past two decades indicates a gradual transition from the "shuttle" trips to neighbouring countries to long-lasting trips to Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal (thus, approaching a level that is characterized as transnational movements of migrants). The initial orientation, especially during short trips, seasonal work in foreign countries eventually changed into the timing uncertainty of return.

Ukrainian labour migrants often move all over the host country and from one state to the other (from the Czech Republic or Portugal to Spain, Ireland, from there – to Canada and Argentina), where there are generally better working conditions and higher pay. Recent financial crisis was not a key factor for Ukrainian migrants to return to their homeland. For some of Ukrainian migrants the return can be considered as one of the links in the chain of their migratory movements. Ukrainians shape contemporary migration systems uniting Ukraine simultaneously with a number of the host countries (which is based on the developed social networks). The development of the migrant networks produces common space in which there exists intense trade, information exchange, and cross-border movement of workers.

In regard of the concept of "horizontal circular migration" (see D 1.1), the labour migrants group can be divided into the categories which are inter-connected and define one another: seasonal migrants, cross border migrants and permanent migrants practice migration permanently, it is an inherent part of their life: circular migrants and long-term migrants, residence in one or several destination countries for a long or short term or without visits to Ukraine.

Another of the examined mobility groups we name intellectual migration. It includes students studying in European universities. The number of Ukrainian students in different EU countries is growing, many of them look for work in the country of study or other EU countries, thus showing a tendency to join a group of skilled migrants. On the other hand, labour migrants and their children replenish the group of students. There is one more group belonging to intellectual migration – Ukrainian skilled migrants (technical staff and IT specialists, engineers, etc.) They are usually employed at large plants, IT-companies or building and construction companies mostly in the European countries and the USA. Academics and researchers are one more group of intellectual migration. Mostly they leave Ukraine for participation in research projects, study courses and teaching. The motivation for migration for academics and researchers is to improve their qualifications for further professional activities, the lack of financial resources for innovative infrastructure in scientific institutions of Ukraine, and increasing requirements while the salaries remain insufficient.

The group of *humanitarian migrants* constitutes refugees and victims of human trafficking. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for the Refugees, 26,400 citizens of Ukraine received the status of a refugee or humanitarian protection while being in other countries. The belonging to a national minority is, as a rule, a reason for receiving such status. In the recent years before the Revolution of Dignity there has been an increase in the number of cases of receiving a refugee status by Ukrainian citizens for political motivation. In 2012 the largest number of applications was registered in the USA, Canada and the EU countries. Most of them have a status of economic migrants. We also assume that the number of refugees from the Ukraine in 2014 will increase due to the Russian military aggression.

In terms of human trafficking, Ukraine can be regarded as a country of origin, transit and destination in the system of trafficking men, women, and children, who are used for sexual and work exploitation all over the world. According to IOM, over 120 000 of Ukrainians suffered from human trafficking from 1991 till 2014. The main countries of trafficking of Ukrainians are Russian Federation, Poland and to a lesser extent – Turkey, Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, Moldova, Iraq, South Korea and China. We can say about the increase in the number of victims of labour exploitation.

The group of *lifestyle migrants* is represented by volunteers, tourists, business migrants and "brides". Many volunteers from Ukraine continue their mobility in different directions after the end of their programs: some of them stay in the country where they volunteered, others move to other European countries looking for educational courses, internships or work, – they receive a status of intellectual or labour migrants. Except real tourists, the category of "tourism" is one of major reasons for official migration of Ukrainians. The so-called tourists stay in the countries they came to after their tourist visas expire and become irregular labour migrants. *Business migrants* are representatives of big businesses in Ukraine, who start their business in different countries.

Ukrainian labour migrants in the host countries and those returning are building a business that often combines the host country and Ukraine. Contingent group of so-called "brides" we refer those who go mainly to the EU with a marriage purpose. A separate category here are persons (the EU citizens and Ukrainians) involved in the sex business, who using Internet communications travel for short term in both directions as service providers or as customers.

And the last mobility group *is return migrants*. This group is often represented by migrants who returned to the country of origin because of losing their job in the host country, or personal decision to return due to family or other matters. Some of them start their own business in the home country. Still, they keep their contacts with the migrants' social networks in the previous and potential host countries. Often their relatives are current work migrants or intellectual migrants (usually students whose education fees were earned abroad by the return migrants). Therefore, this group keeps its potential for further migrations.

Experts and reviewers suggest considering Ukraine a country of transit and destination for the immigrants. As immigration and transit migration in Ukraine is almost unexplored, we combined them as a separate segment. Closer acquaintance with these phenomena allows us to draw their typological parallel with Ukrainian external migration and distinguish similar groups: migrant workers, mental workers (students, researchers, skilled professionals), humanitarian and illegal migrants (refugees and victims of human trafficking), lifestyle migrants. The representatives of CIS countries are prevailing among legal and illegal migrants (Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, North-Caucasus region of Russia, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan), including Georgia. There are also people from Southern-Eastern Asia and Middle East, Africa among them. In recent times, the illegal migrants have been arriving even from the region of Caribbean**.** "Traditional" channels of illegal migration, controlled by international organized crime, go across the territory of Ukraine – mostly from African and Asian countries to Western Europe.

To reach the West, Ukraine is made use of as a transit country by the overwhelming majority of migrants. The existing data show that immigrants most often regard their stay in Ukraine as a possibility of further immigration to EU countries, or, vice versa, the primary intentions of further moving to the EU change to permanent residence in Ukraine. Therefore, we deal with intertwining of immigration and transit migration.

Current illegal migration has acquired an organized character in Ukraine. Illegal immigration flows to Ukraine are a part of Central European route – one of five major Euro-Asian illegal migration transit routes to the EU countries. The Central European route which goes across Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and Slovakia to Western Europe is used by migrants from Middle and Far East, South-East Asia and CIS countries. The low skilled persons often without any work experience are generally believed to prevail among illegal migrants. However, a tendency towards the growth in the numbers of migrants – high-level professionals, in particular, the representatives of popular trades, has been noticed recently.

In conclusion, we can define three trends that combine mass external migrations of Ukrainians with immigration and transit migration in Ukraine: (1) distinguished by us types of migration and migrant groups are combined moving from one group to another already at the stage of starting and during the migration, forming its new quality; (2) on the other hand, the development of migration systems that combine the country of origin and host countries, and form a mobility space that exists in parallel with the recipient societies, donor communities, respective states, make basis for further integration of different mobility groups; (3) both flows of trans migrants related to Ukraine, re formed on the basis of "horizontal circular migration" . This concept includes not only the periodic movement of migrants from one country (or region) to the other in search of better living and working conditions in which the country of origin or stay becomes one of the "links" of movements, but also presupposes that contemporary migration is one of those threads that define social circulation in horizontal communication space. Therefore, the development of external migrations is connected with the changes of the types of social mobility.

This, in turn, presents us with a need for differentiation of "temporalities" and their social typologization based on migrants and non-migrants polls in order to explore the transformative characteristics of temporary mobility of people. Its implementation within the project should include time-spatial differences in the approaches to the typology of migration, differences in the definition and understanding of the concepts of "border", respectively, in the European and Asian dimensions.

References

Abreu Bastos, O., Koshulko, V. (2014) Intellectual migration as an issue of contemporary education in Ukraine. MEST Journal, 2(1): 30-36.

Action plan for integration of refugees and persons who need special protection in Ukrainian society until 2020 (2012). Available at: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/605-2012-%D1%80

Archive of Ethnology Institute of NASU (2014) Department of Social Anthropology, National Consulting Council, April 10, 2014.

Archive ETNAS (2008): 575 a. Interviews with Ukrainian labour migrants.

Bara A., Bartolomeo A., Brunarska Z., Makaryan S., Mananashvili S., Weinar A. (2014). Regional Migration Report: Eastern Europe. European University Institute. Available at: http://www.carim-east.eu/publications/regional-migration-report/

Boyarskiy, A. (1967) Course of demography. Moscow: Statistika.

Braichevska, O, Volosiuk, H., Malynovska, O. (2004) Non-traditional immigrants in Kyiv – Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2004.

Butkevych, M.. (2010): “An image of migrants as threat to national security is being built”. Available at: http://commons.com.ua/?p=8384

Commander, S. (2013) Migration from Ukraine: Brown or Brain? New Survey Evidence Available at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp7348.pdf

Coupé T., Vakhitova H. (2013). Costs and Benefits of Labour Mobility between the EU and the Eastern Partnership Partner Countries. Country report: Ukraine. Kyiv: CASE; CEU. Available at: http://www.case-research.eu/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20country%20study%20-%20final.pdf

Düvell, F. (2009) On the fringes of Europe: refugees in Ukraine. Research Resources. Report 2. CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN MIGRATION.

Emigration (2010) Population of Ukraine. Labour emigration in Ukraine. Kyiv: M.Ptukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 2010. Available at: http://www.idss.org.ua/monografii/poznyak_2010.pdf

Ganguli, I. (2013) Scientific Brain Drain and Human Capital Formation After the End of the Soviet Union. CARIM-East Research Report. CMR, Working Paper, 62 (120).

IOM Ukraine. Migration in Ukraine. Facts and figures. September 2013. Available at: http://iom.org.ua/ua/pdf/UKR%20FF_F.pdf

External labour migration of the Ukrainian population. State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms. Available at: http://www.kiev-dialogue.org/fileadmin/user_upload/KG_8_2012/Foreign_labor_Migration_of_Ukr.pdf.

IOM Ukraine (2014). Migration in Ukraine. Facts and figures. Available at: http://iom.org.ua/en/iom-activities/

IOM Ukraine (2013). Migration in Ukraine. Facts and figures. Available at: http://iom.org.ua/en/iom-activities/

IOM Ukraine. Migration in Ukraine. Facts and figures. September 2011. Available at: http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/countries/docs/Ukraine/Migration-in-Ukraine-Facts-and-Figures.pdf.

Ivaschenko-Stadnyk, E. (2013) Evaluation of migration mobility according to sociological research in Ukraine, Explanatory Note 13/94 - CARIM EAST— consortium for applied research on international migration, July 2013.

Ivaschenko-Stadnyk, E. (2013) Asylum seekers and refugees in Ukraine: problems of recognition, social protection, and integration// Explanatory Note 13/98 /Socio-political framework of migration. CARIM EAST— consortium for applied research on international migration.

Kalachova, I. (2008) (ed.). Scientific and innovative activity in Ukraine. Kyiv: State Committee of Statistics. Available at: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2012/08_2012/zb_nay_2007.zip

Kalachova, I. (2010) (ed.). Scientific and innovative activity in Ukraine. Kyiv: State Committee of Statistics. Available at: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2012/08_2012/zb_nay_2009.zip
Kalachova, I. (2011) (ed.). Scientific and innovative activity in Ukraine. Kyiv: State Committee of Statistics. Available at: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/katalog/nauka_in/nid%20_2010.zip
Kalachova, I.(2012) (ed.). Scientific and Innovative activity in Ukraine. Kyiv: State Committee of Statistics. Available at: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2012/09_2012/zb_nay_2011.zip
Kalachova, I. (2013) (ed.). Scientific and innovative activity in Ukraine. Kyiv: State Committee of Statistics. Available at: http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2013/sb/09_13/zb_ny_12.zip
Kearney, M. (1995) The Local and The Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism, Annual Review of Anthropology, (24): 547–565.
Kharlamova, G., Naumova, M. (2010). Migration as part of construction of human capital of Ukraine. Ekonomika I derzhava, (4), 32-36.
Kopystyanska H. (2005) The study of external immigration attitudes of intellectuals in the context of intellectual capacity, Lviv: Institute for Regional Studies of the NAS of Ukraine. Available at: http://znc.com.ua/ukr/publ/periodic/shpp/2005/1/p075.php
Kostuyk, L. (2010) Illegal Migration in Ukraine: Reasons, Social Consequences. – Kyiv. – 34 p.
Kotusenko, V. (2007) Labour Migration from Ukraine and its Ethical Implications. Oikonomia. 2007. No 3. P. 9–13.
Law of Ukraine “On the State Budget of Ukraine for the year 2014”, January 16, 2014 № 719-VII. Available at: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/719-18
Law of Ukraine “On scientific work”. 13.12.1991 № 1977-XII. Available at: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/anot/1977-12
Law of Ukraine. “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine” On scientific and technical research activity”, September 8, 2011 № 3714-VI. Available at: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3714-17
Levchenko, K. (2013) The problems of anti-human trafficking, Kyiv: La Strada. Available at: http://www.novisa.org.ua/upload/Full%20monitoring_UKR_60-74.pdf
Levchenko, K. (2011) SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE LAW OF UKRAINE “On combating human trafficking”. Available at: file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Admin/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D0%B8%20%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D1%8B/Downloads/FP_index.htm_2012_1_82.pdf
Levchenko, E. (2010) (ed). Ukrainian Greece: reasons, perspectives (based on results of survey among labour migrants). Kyiv.
Levina, I., Diachenko, J. The Migration as Factor Development of Intellectual Capital. Available at: http://zbirnuk.bukuniver.edu.ua/files/articles/ar_8/14.pdf
Libanova, E. (2013) (ed.). Report on methodology, organization and results of module sampling research on labour migration in Ukraine/ International Labour Organization. Technical support group for decent work and ILO Bureau for Eastern and Central Europe. Budapest, ILO.
Libanova E. (2009) Ukrainian external labor migration, Kyiv: Ukrainian Center for Social Reforms, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
Libanova, E. (2002) Formation of migration flows in border regions of Ukraine/ E.Libanova, O. Poznyak // Migration and Border Regime: Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Kyiv: National Institute of Problems of International Security: 124–144.
Malynovska, O. (2014) Migration and Migration Policies in Ukraine. (Report at NCC meeting April 10, 2014).
Malynovska, O. (2011) Labour Migration: social consequences and political response. Analytical

report. Kyiv: National Institute for the Strategic Studies. Available at: http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/Malin_migraziya-dace3.pdf.
Malynovska, O. (2011) Labour migration: social outcomes and ways of managing. Kyiv: NISR.
Malynovska, O. (2010) Shadow migration flows and their influence on economic safety of the country (labour migration aspect). Available at: http://old.niss.gov.ua/monitor/marrch/13.htm
Malynovska, O. (2010) Migration and Migration Policies. Kyiv.
Malynovska, O. (2003) Refugees in the World and In Ukraine: Patterns of Problem Solution. Kyiv: Genesa.
Markov, I. (2011) Features of social communications of Ukrainian immigrants in EU. Available at http://www.uef.fi/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=d0131449-20e9-4f94-b3c6-8d3eebfce212&groupId=208747&p_l_id=2000673
Markov, I. (2011) The concept of migration policy in Ukraine: score an own goal. – Available at: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/24332368.html
Markov, I., Boyko, Y., Ivankova-Stetsyuk, O., Seleshchuk, H. et al. (2009). At the Crossroads. Findings of the complex research of the processes of Ukrainian labour migration/ Ed. I. Markov. Lviv. Available at: http://www.navihator.net/public/docs/uploaded/n9c25mu-Migracia_03-1.pdf.
Migration, 2009. External labour migration in Ukraine. State Statistics Committee.
Migration, 2011. Migration and Remittances. Factbook 2011. 2nd edition. The World Bank.
Migration, 2013. Migration in Ukraine: facts and figures. International Organization for Migration (IOM).
Migration (2005a) Study on labour migration. Kyiv. Available at: http://www.ilo.org.ua/b/%D0%9F%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%86%D1%96%D1%97/Migration%20Policy%20Study%20Final_2005.pdf
Migration (2005b) Ukrainian labour migration to the EU seen by sociologists. Kyiv-Warsaw, 2005. Available at: old.pauci.org/file/KJoC3YBaYoA_.doc
Migration policy (2008). The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration Policy in Ukraine. Available at: http://etf.europa.eu/webatt.nsf/0/C12578310056925BC12574B90055DB51/$file/NOTE7WBHPM.pdf
Newsletter of EU Representative in Ukraine: EU news (2014) Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/documents/newsletter/nl_230614_(2).pdf .)
Nikolaenko, V. (2007) Intellectual migration and social security. Available at: http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mihrastiia_i_tolerantnist_v_ukraiini.pdf#page=119
Olshevska, I. (2007) International Migration of Human Capital in Globalization (Doctoral dissertation). Available at: http://migration-research.com/novina.html?id=141
Petrova, J. (2007) Intellectual migration in Ukraine: motivation and consequences for society. Migration and Tolerance in Ukraine.
Poznyak, O. (2013) Collecting statistical data on migration in Ukraine. Explanatory note 13/114. Available at: http://www.carim-east.eu/media/exno/Explanatory%20Notes_2012-114.pdf
Poznyak, O. (2012) External labour migration in Ukraine as a factor in socio-demographic and economic development. Research Report CARIM-East RR 2012/14. Online http://www.carim-east.eu/media/CARIM-East-2012-RR-14.pdf.
Poznyak, O. (2012) Social outcomes of European integration of Ukraine. International migration. Available at Online http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/09446.pdf.
Pribytkova, I. (2007) Legal and illegal migration in Ukraine, Republic of Belarus and Moldova in 2004-2006. Analytical report.
Pylynski, Y. (2007) Migration and tolerance in Ukraine. Kyiv: Stylos.
Pylynski, Y. (ed.) (2009) Non-traditional immigrants in Kyiv: seven years later. – Kyiv.
Rubl B. (2007) Capital of diversity: trans-national migrants in Montreal, Washington, and Kyiv. Kyiv: Krytyka.

Saliar, S. (2008) Migration in Ukraine. A Country Profile: International Organization for Migration.
Soroka M. (2012) The problems of labour migration in Ukraine, Odesa: Odessa National University of Economics. Available at: http://www.sworld.com.ua/konfer28/106.pdf
Tymoshenko, G. (2011) (ed.). Population of Ukraine in 2010. Kyiv: State Statistics Service. Available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2011/nasel_2010.zip
Tymoshenko, G. (2012) (ed.). Population of Ukraine in 2011. Kyiv: State Statistics Service. Available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2012/zb_nasel_2011.zip
Tymoshenko, G. (2013) (ed.). Population of Ukraine in 2012. Kyiv: State Statistics Service. Available at: http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/PXWEB2007/ukr/publ_new1/2013/zb_chnas_2012.zip
Tyndyk N. (2004) Administrative and legal measures taken by the officials to prevent migration process in Ukraine // Synopsis of the Dissertation for Scientific Degree of the Candidate of Juridical Sciences. Irpin'. Available at: http://www.lib.ua-ru.net/diss/cont/34143.html
UN Refugee Agency (2012). Available at: http://unhcr.org.ua/uk/resursi/statistics
UN Refugee Agency (2010). Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html
World Factbook. September 2011 (2011) In: Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures. IOM. Available at: http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/countries/docs/Ukraine/Migration-in-Ukraine-Facts-and-Figures.pdf.

13. CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF TEMPORARY BORDER-CROSSING MIGRATION

Pirkko PITKÄNEN and Mari KORPELA

It may be concluded that there are serious data problems in terms of temporary transnational migration. It is difficult to know the volume and significance of the phenomenon because existing data are unreliable or simply do not exist at all. In particular, recent trends of temporary cross-border movements are not sufficiently recognised by researchers and policy-makers. Despite the methodological problems described in the preceding chapters, it can be said that an increasing number of people are currently on the move across national boundaries. Not only has the border-crossing mobility increased but the chains of transnational mobility have also spread considerably. On a global level, Asia and Europe are the most important migrant-receiving regions and Asia the region experiencing particularly high outward migration.

This report has shown that it is difficult to distinguish between permanent and temporary migration and statistical data on the related phenomena tell a very partial truth. First of all, preceding statistics are compiled differently in different countries which makes statistical cross-country comparisons very difficult, and often even impossible. Further, even within one country, statistical data on a particular phenomenon do not necessarily cover longer time periods and different authorities may compile statistics on the same phenomenon differently. In the European context, the length of residence permits is often used as an indicator of the permanence or temporality of one's migration. This is, however, somewhat misleading. Usually, the statistics refer to first residence permits but we cannot know whether those permits are renewed later on and if so, for how long. People's reasons for their stay may also change over years or the officially stated reasons do not tell the whole truth of their intentions. There are also several phenomena related to temporary migration where a significant number of individuals do not register with appropriate authorities as a consequence of which their migrations do not show up in statistics.

13.1 Flows and Patterns of Temporary Migration between EU and Asia

The emerging global markets and world-wide competition for science and technology skills are key catalysts for temporary migration between EU and Asia. For example, an increasing number of Asian, particularly Chinese and Indian scientists, engineers and ICT experts, are being drawn into European labour markets in which international recruitment has become a significant component of human resource planning. In Europe, the aging population causes an increasing need for foreign labour: certain sectors need professionals with specific skills (e.g. ICT and health sectors), whereas other sectors are in a need of inexpensive and flexible labour force (e.g. agriculture, domestic sector). At the same time, people in Asia (and elsewhere) know more than before about opportunities available abroad. Transnational travel has also become easier, faster and cheaper.

While European companies try to recruit highly skilled educated people from Asia and other continents, Asian countries, China in particular, seek to attract highly-skilled experts from abroad. The highly skilled migrants bring skills and expertise into the country but also raise problems of social integration as they tend to live in separate communities. The inward flow of skilled foreign professionals is on a rise also in India and skilled professional migrants are welcome to Thailand as well. The skilled migration from EU member states to China and other Asian countries is thus an emerging phenomenon, though still relatively rare as far as numbers are concerned. Yet, the numbers are increasing. In most cases these migratory movements are temporary by nature.

An important type of temporary migration is circular movement across national borders. Sometimes, it is a question of circulation to and from neighbouring countries, at other times, the destinations are further away. Circular migratory movements are especially characteristic for Indian and Chinese ICT experts who leave their home country, move to a second, and then either return to the initial home country, or move on to a third one. Chapter 12 reveals that also Ukrainian labour migration has circular characteristics: instead of settling permanently in one place, the migrants move within a particular country and also across borders in search for better work opportunities. Migrants may also live in one country and cross the national border on a regular basis to work in another. They may also stay for a short period in the target country, for example, for the harvest season. This kind of seasonal migration is often induced by a seasonal demand for labour which cannot be supplied by the native work force at adequate prices. For instance, year after year, hundreds of Thais travel the long journey to Finland and other Scandinavian countries in order to work as wild-berry pickers. Their earnings are vital for the livelihood of their families back home and their contribution crucial for the competitiveness of the respective industry. At the same time problems also appear: the phenomenon has raised concerns on the highly insecure income and the very hard working conditions where the temporary workers are without the rights and protection that workers in the destination countries usually have.

In addition to scientists and ICT experts, health care workers represent an occupational group whose skills are in short supply to the extent that there is a global market for their skills.[1] Also several EU member states recruit nurses and other health professionals from abroad, particularly from the Philippines. Though the initial purpose of the recruitment practices may be to attain permanent health staff, the transnational familial relationships cause short-term migratory movements (such as pendular or seasonal) in cases in which the migrants' children or other family members remain in the home country[2]. Family reunification programmes play a vital role in making temporary migration permanent. In Germany, there are bilateral agreements and programmes in the care sector which allow nurses from the Philippines (and other Asian countries) to come to work in the country for a limited period of time. In many cases, however, their residence in Germany has become permanent, as the long-term residence has been ushered by the offer of regularisation programmes giving a legalised status to migrants which in turn results in family reunification. As a consequence of family reunifications, the highly feminised nature of Filipino communities in Germany has diversified with the arrival of the husbands and children of migrants. In this respect, the case of Germany may be exemplary for other EU countries. For example in Finland, Filipino nurses can seldom bring their families to the country due to high income requirements of the immigration regulations as a consequence of which, their migration to Finland often ends up being temporary, which is a loss for Finland.

Both the German and Dutch migration policies are coloured by the past experience with guest worker migration that was intended to be temporary but ended up being permanent when many guest workers did not return to their countries of origin but instead, brought in their families. Family migration is the most common reason to immigrate to the Netherlands; for example migration from Turkey is predominantly family-based. There are, however, also other kinds of migrants in the country. Migrants from China and India are typically skilled workers and the Filipinos residing in the Netherlands are often au pairs. The Philippine report (Chapter 9) describes that many au pairs end up moving from

1 The total flows of health care migration are difficult to measure as there are no common or 'standard' data of methods of tracking trends in the mobility of nurses or physicians. Given data limitations and incompatibility, it is not possible to develop a detailed overview of all flows of health professionals between countries but it is still evident that international recruitment of health staff has grown significantly since the late 1990s (see Adams & Kennedy, 2006: 7).

2 With regard to the international recruitment of health professionals, many emerging questions concern ethics. Although international recruitment may be of benefit to the receiving countries, to individual migrants and to some extent to their families and home countries in case they benefit from remittances, it exacerbates the problems being faced by the health systems of some migrant-sending countries.

one country to another in Europe seeking for new job opportunities as the au pair visa does not allow them to stay in one country for more than a year. Such a practice jeopardises the cultural exchange and educational aspects of the au pair system. In fact, Maruja Asis and Graziano Battistella mention that some European countries are considering expanding the au pair programmes to the care of the elderly, which indicates that the system is used above all as a source of cheap labour for the care sector.

Also Germany has been an important immigration country because of the guest worker scheme which brought 14 million temporary migrants to Germany from Spain Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia until it was closed in 1973. Another two million people arrived afterwards through family reunification and four million guest workers ended up staying in Germany permanently. Currently, in Germany, there are seasonal farm workers from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania and immigration from Asia, especially from China and India, has been growing. The Chinese come to Germany above all as students, whereas Indian newcomers are typically highly skilled professionals or their family members.

Finland has become a country of immigration after it joined the European Union in 1995. The number of foreign arrivals has increased since then, though Finland maintains a rather strict immigration policy. Significant groups of temporary migrants include seasonal berry pickers from Thailand and Indian ICT experts. Also student migration to Finland in on increase. As a part of global competition for talent, Finland, like many other European countries has become more active in the international recruitment of tertiary level students[3]. For countries facing real or prospected skill shortages tertiary level students represent 'semi-finished' highly skilled workers as a consequence of which, some EU member states (e.g. Finland, the Netherlands) allow recent university graduates to stay in the country for 0,5-1 year in order to search employment. The positive skilled migration potential that students might represent is, however, not seen in all EU countries. For example in Hungary, the residence permits of foreign students expire immediately upon their graduation.

The main source countries for international student migration to EU are China and India. Despite the fact that the United States has remained the most popular destination country for Chinese students seeking to study abroad, their numbers in European higher education institutions have grown rapidly since the beginning of the new millennium. From 2000 to 2010, the total number of Chinese students studying in EU member states multiplied approximately six times. The recent increase in student migration to EU and other developed countries has recalled a discussion on brain drain in China. Today, there are specific programmes targeted to attract the highly educated to return to China after completing their degrees abroad. Chinese universities also attract an increasing number of students from Europe. As an example, student migration from Germany to China has been growing over the last few years.

A counter-flow can be seen in the Indian case too. India is the second important sending country in the European student market and a growing number of European tertiary level students are interested in studying in Indian universities. In practice, however, the flows of Indian students are intensely concentrated in English-speaking regions, mainly to the United States. Within the EU, Indian tertiary level students are mainly studying in Britain which receives around 80 per cent of all Indian students in Europe, while Germany and France attract the majority of the remaining students.

India continues to grow as a technology hub with huge foreign investments and with very strong international ties. Skilled Indian migrants work above all in the fields of ICT technology and health care. Besides high-skilled professionals, many semi-skilled Indians are working in EU countries (mainly in the UK) either temporarily or permanently. Low-skilled male migration has directed above all to the Gulf countries, whereas women form a considerable share of the Indian population in Europe. India aims to form bilateral agreements with various European countries in order to promote

3 International degree students typically reside in a foreign country for several years but can still be seen as temporary due to their (presumably) temporary migration intentions in order to complete their degrees.

migration as the country has a huge potential for migration due to its large population.

The case of China is similar in many respects. China has much migration potential due to its large population and booming economy which increases investment potential. Only 5 per cent of the total Chinese migration population lives in Europe but this number is increasing rapidly. Currently, about 500,000 Chinese are living in Europe, above all in the UK, France, Italy and Spain. Chinese migrants have traditionally been working in the restaurant and laundry businesses but their fields of employment have been diversifying. For example, educated Chinese are increasingly finding jobs in Chinese firms operating in Europe or in European firms that operate in China.

Migratory movements from Thailand to EU are a clearly increasing trend too, although Europe has not been the most popular migration destination for Thais; currently about a quarter of all Thai migrants reside in Europe. Temporary migration of Thai people to EU can broadly be categorised into three types: (seasonal) work, family reunion and study. Most of the Thai migrants are low-skilled or semi-skilled, typical sectors being construction, manufacturing, agriculture and domestic service or massage. There is also a clear trend of increasing circular migration where the migrant returns to work in the same European country on a regular basis. Among Thai migrants in Europe, current issues of concern include deception from recruitment agencies, labour exploitation and human trafficking. An important category is marriage migration: many Thai women have moved to Europe because they have married European men. Further, student migration is an emerging type of Thai migration and is often mixed with labour migration as many students apply for a part-time job while studying abroad. Most Thai students return to Thailand after graduation.

The Philippines has often been presented as an exemplary emigration country. Sustained outmigration from the Philippines in the last four decades has resulted in a diaspora population of 10.4 million, which means about 10 per cent of the national population. Many of the Filipino migrants are temporary workers in the destination countries. The Philippines has been very active in promoting outward migration and in trying to protect overseas Filipino workers. Today, there are about 800,000 Filipinos in Europe, mostly in the UK, Italy and Germany. Unlike the organised, state-supported labour migration to the Gulf countries, Filipino migration to Europe has largely been an individual undertaking except for nurses who have been recruited in groups. Filipino migration to Europe is dominated by female migrants who work either as nurses or in domestic service. In many cases, they have initially worked as irregular migrants but have managed to regularise their position with amnesty programmes, which have enabled them to bring their family members to Europe. In this way, temporary labour migration often transforms into long-term residence in the European destination.

Turkey has earlier been a country of emigration but has lately become a country of immigration and transit too. Migrants come to Turkey above all from the neighbouring countries; Georgia, Ukraine, Russian Federation and from countries where there are ethnic Turks, i.e. Turkmenistan. There are also Chinese nationals in Turkey working as contract-based workers in the construction of thermal plants. Recently, asylum seekers from Syria have caused a crises in Turkey as their number is very high (700,000-800,000 in April 2014). Over 5 per cent of Turkey's total population lives outside of the country. In 2005, nearly three million Turkish citizens lived in Europe and there were significant numbers of Turkish people also in the Middle East and the CIS countries. In the 60s and 70s, emigration was mostly unskilled, but nowadays, there are concerns of brain drain in Turkey because outmigration is increasingly high skilled and a large number of Turkish students are studying abroad. There is also family-based migration to places with large Turkish communities in Europe. At the same time, every year about 40,000 Turks return to Turkey from Germany. Currently, a trend of return migration of the second- and third-generation "Euro-Turks" can be seen as well.

Similarly to Turkey, Ukraine is located at the border to EU. Since 1991, there has been a mass exodus of Ukrainians to EU and the Russian federation. A particular characteristic of Ukrainian outmigration is that there are many independent female migrants, especially in Greece and Italy.[4] Ukrainian migrants tend to be very mobile within Europe, that is, they are flexible according to the labour market needs. So far, there are not many skilled migrants from Ukraine to EU but this phenomenon has potential to grow. In the past two decades, Ukraine has become a country of immigration, too. For example, there are students and labour migrants coming from Turkmenistan, China and Russia.

Turkey and Ukraine are often transit countries for migratory movements from Asia to EU.[5] Also Hungary, as a Schengen country, has gained growing importance as a transit country both for Asian companies planning expansion to Europe and for regular and irregular migrants. This state of affairs has recently attracted considerable political and media attention in Hungary. Though the absolute numbers of foreign newcomers have remained relatively small, in-migration from Asia, particularly from China, has increased remarkably since Hungary joined the European Union in 2004. It is relatively easy to gain a residence permit to Hungary if one invests money there and especially Chinese investors have used this channel of immigration. Student migration to Hungary is increasing and in the Hungarian context student migration is clearly temporary. As Agnes Hars (Chapter 6) states, Hungary lacks integrative supports to migrants and consequently, much of the migration is temporary by nature. Temporary migration to Hungary includes also the staff of various UN organisations (c. 300 persons) and academics (to the Central European University). A current concern in Hungary is that outward migration (mainly to other EU countries) has been on increase. There is some student migration but, above all, Hungarians migrate abroad because of work. For example, there are 17,000-18,000 Hungarian posted workers in Germany and Austria working in the fields of manufacturing, meat processing and construction. It is also worth mentioning that there are about 1,000 Hungarian soldiers abroad working for NATO, UN etc. The Hungarian government has recently made efforts to end the increasing emigration due to the fear of labour shortage, e.g., in health care and ICT sectors.

Temporary migration between EU and Asia is not just a one-way process from Asia to EU. Many Asian countries, for example India and Thailand, attract 'lifestyle seekers' from Europe. Lifestyle migration is a heterogeneous phenomenon whereby people, typically citizens of affluent industrialised nations, move, permanently or temporarily, abroad in order to find a more relaxed life, usually in a country with lower living costs (incl. cheaper property prices) and sunny climates. Living in the destination country may also be considered more meaningful and 'authentic' than at home (Benson & O'Reilly, 2009 a; 2009b; Korpela, 2010). Retirees are the largest group of lifestyle migrants but an increasing number of young people and people of working age as well as entire families with children move abroad in order to improve their quality of life. Very often lifestyle migrants do not register in their destinations as a consequence of which it is impossible to know their exact numbers but it is a question of tens of thousands of people. Sometimes, registration is not possible due to the rules of the destination, at other times, lifestyle migrants find it too difficult or of no benefit. In spite of the administrative confusions, many European lifestyle migrants have established permanent homes in Asia. Often, it is a question circular migration whereby people regularly move between their countries of origin and the host countries. In addition to Thailand and India, among the EURA-NET partner countries, Turkey is a popular lifestyle migration destination. Moreover, Hungary attracts some lifestyle migrants and health tourists because of its spas. Moreover, Thailand, India and some other Asian countries (Malaysia, Singapore) are becoming important centres of medical tourism (international medical travel) which refers to people travelling abroad in order to obtain non-urgent healthcare services, usually at cheaper prices and much quicker than in their home countries.

In Thailand, there are almost 100,000 foreign retirees, most of them men. Related to this, cross-national marriages have become increasingly popular in Thailand in the past two decades, also in the

4 In Ukraine, there is also the phenomenon of "mail order brides" where Western men come on organised tours to Ukraine in order to search for a wife.

5 Ukraine is a European country while Turkey is located both in Asia and Europe. Neither of them are EU member states.

form of European men marrying Thai women and moving to live in Thailand. Some Asian countries (e.g. Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand) have set up specific visa categories and programmes to attract wealthy (and healthy) retirees. With such visas, a person is allowed to stay in the host country but his/her rights are very limited. However, even in those countries, many lifestyle migrants do not participate in these programmes but use various other strategies to enable their stays.

Transnational migration is not always voluntary. People may be forced to leave their country for many reasons: they may be fleeing war or persecution or life may be otherwise unsafe for them in their initial home country. On a global scale, most of those fleeing their own countries end up in neighbouring states, while others end up seeking asylum[6] in Europe and elsewhere. In the countries taking part in EURA-NET, the number of asylum seekers has increased significantly for example in Germany and Turkey. In case of a negative decision, the asylum seeker must leave the host country and may be expelled, as may any other non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation.

The volume of irregular migration between EU and Asia is very difficult to measure, as the availability of reliable data is very limited.[7] Yet several country reports presented in this document indicate an increase in the volume of irregular migration from Asia to Europe. Turkey and Ukraine as transit countries between Asia and EU suffer from this phenomenon in particular. In Turkey, there are significant numbers of irregular migrants from the CIS countries and transmigrants from the Middle East, Africa and Asia on their way to Europe. Also in Ukraine, there are many irregular migrants on their way to Europe, originating mainly from the CIS countries but also from Asia and Africa. It has been estimated that in the Netherlands, there are 88,000-163,000 irregular migrants, and the numbers are high in Germany and Hungary as well. As the Turkish report (Chapter 11) indicates, migrants either cross national borders illegally or enter the destination country legally in accordance with the country's visa requirements but overstay their visas and subsequently become 'illegal migrants'[8]. In many cases, irregular migration is close related to human smuggling and trafficking which are severe problems for example in China, Hungary, Ukraine and Turkey.

Irregular migration from China to EU countries is a particularly severe problem in Southern European countries, partly due to many job opportunities in the informal economy and the *de facto* acceptance of unauthorised migrant workers. Tian Fangmeng and Hu Xiaojiang (Chaper 3) argue that the amnesty programs in certain European states have encouraged illegal migration from China to Europe. Moreover, it is estimated that around half a million irregular Indian migrants enter EU member states every year. There are also substantial numbers of irregular Thai migrants in Europe. Irregular migration is, however, not only a European problem but common in various Asian countries too. For example in China, there is much undocumented migration from several Asian countries. Also India struggles with the problem of foreigners not leaving the country when their residence permits expire. Sometimes, also Europeans overstay their visas in India and also in Thailand, consequently becoming irregular migrants.

An initial temporary orientation of migrants may eventually change into an uncertainty of return or a long-term residence in the host country. The Ukrainian country report indicates that this is often the case with Ukrainian seasonal workers in Western and Southern European countries. Migrants may also return to their country of origin because of losing their job in the host country or because they have made a personal decision to return due to family or other reasons. They often keep contacts

6 While the reason why asylum seekers have left their country is typically a result of discrimination or political or ethnical persecution, in some cases, their trans-boundary mobility may also be determined by economic factors in the home country. The term 'economic migrant' is often loosely used to refer to asylum seeking persons attempting to enter a country without legal permission and/or by using asylum procedures without bona fide cause.

7 As described in Chapter 8, possible indicators include the number of migrants found to be illegally present and the number of migrants ordered to leave the country.

8 The term 'illegal' carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants' humanity. Thus, there is a tendency to prefer the term 'irregular migrant' and restrict the use of the term 'illegal migrant' to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.

with their social networks in the previous host countries and are, thus, potentially ready for further migrations. In other words, return migration is not necessarily permanent. As a consequence, some migrant-sending countries try to make the return permanent through a number of reintegration programmes and practical policies targeting return migrants. Reintegration policies concern both voluntary and involuntary return: skilled nationals, stranded migrants, asylum seekers, victims of human trafficking and other migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in the host country. As an example, China has changed its visa policy and residence management system in order to facilitate the nationals' return back to China. Both in China and India, industrial parks and other endeavours have been designed by public actors and returnees themselves to nurture high-tech enterprises. At least to some extent, these strategies have been successful in luring citizens back home.

The case of the Philippines is, however, different. Although Filipinos have found employment in about 200 countries and territories and many of them eventually return back to the Philippines, there are no policies of reintegration in the country. Even no data on return migration are available, and the trends and patterns of return migration are less known compared to outmigration. It is also remarkable that there is a lack of reintegration policy in traditional migrant-receiving European countries. This may cause problems as in the course of increasing temporary migratory movements from Europe, the number of returnees increases as well.

13.2 Types of Temporary Transnational Migration

On the basis of the research findings, a number of categories of temporary migration can be presented. Though the categories are partly overlapping and not all-comprehensive, they are useful tools for providing practical insights and theoretical analyses of the transformation processes underway due to the temporary border-crossing migration.

European companies actively promote businesses in Asia, especially in China, and Chinese companies are keen to invest in Europe. In the context of emerging global markets and the growing internationalisation of companies, Asia plays an increasingly important role as a destination for European *intra-company transferees*, and *vice versa*. International recruitment practices are also central when considering temporary migration in the EU-Asia context. Countries which in the past were largely unaffected by migration are being drawn into an increasingly global labour market. Besides *high-skilled and skilled workers*, this concerns university students. Further, work-related transnational mobility concerns also *low-skilled* professions which form a significant category of temporary migrants in the EU-Asia context.

The country reports presented above reveal that the mobility of *tertiary level students* between Europe and Asia is on the increase. Not merely because Asian students are increasingly studying in European universities but also because European tertiary level students have adopted increasingly mobile transnational lifestyles. Asia, China in particular, appears as an increasingly attractive destination for university students.

People's border-crossing movements are not merely about a flow between two countries but there is much circulation. Indian and Chinese high-tech professionals are often used as examples of *circular migrants* whose main objective is to pursue career opportunities that will enable them to maximise their earnings and savings but the phenomenon can be seen among other national and professional groups as well. In some cases border-crossing mobility between EU and Asia is pendular. As an example, a number of *seasonal workers* from Thailand and Ukraine move on a regular basis to Europe to work in agriculture, services and construction.

As a consequence of people's increasingly mobile lifestyles, wider social patterns are also in a state of change. The growing role of transnational familial ties and networks is an example in this respect. *Family-based movers* form a very heterogeneous group of people whereby the temporariness of residence typically depends on the stay and departure of other family members. Family reunification plays a vital role here. For example in the Netherlands, each year more than forty per cent of temporary migrants are joining a family member. Correspondingly, the lack of possibility for family reunification may cause temporary forms of migration (e.g. Filipino nurses in Finland). *Lifestyle migration* – a search for a better quality of life abroad in countries with warm climates and cheaper living costs – appears to be another emerging social pattern in the EU-Asia context, though the phenomenon is so far relatively small as far as numbers are concerned. Nevertheless, lifestyle migration has social and economic implications and concerns tens of thousands of people.

Further, numerous *asylum seekers* are moving back and forth over Asian and European borders (typically from Asia to EU) seeking safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than their own and await a decision on the application for refugee status. In case of a negative decision, the asylum seeker must leave the host country. Return to one's country of origin may also be voluntary. *Return migration* describes a situation where migrants, after a period abroad, return to their home country, either permanently or temporarily.

Migratory movements may also take place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit or receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition for *irregular migration* but according to International Organization for Migration (IOM), an irregular migrant is a person who, owing to unauthorised entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country (IOM, 2014). Despite the lack of adequate statistics, it may be estimated that an increasing number of people stay or work abroad without the necessary authorisation or documents required under immigration regulations or cross an international boundary without a valid passport or other travel documents. Human trafficking, which is closely connected to irregular migration, seems also to be an increasing tendency in the EU-Asia context.

13.3 Concluding Remarks

The findings indicate that in the contexts of Asia's growing markets and increasingly educated population and Europe's ageing population and labour shortages, temporary migration between EU and Asia is growing. An unprecedented number of high- and low-skilled workers, tertiary level students, family-based movers, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants are currently on the move from Asia to Europe, often with the intention that afterwards there will be return to the country of origin or onward movements. English-speaking countries have attracted the most migration flows but recent developments show that non-English speaking EU member states have also become popular among Asian migrants.

It is clear that the volumes of migratory movements from Asia to EU and from EU to Asia are very unbalanced. Whereas the migration of Asian people to EU has intensified massively, migration from Europe to Asia is almost a non-existent phenomenon in the ilght of statistics (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, the picture illustrated in the country reports above reveals that Europeans have adopted increasingly mobile transnational lifestyles. Temporary migratory movements of European intra-company transferees, scientists and other experts, tertiary level students, family-based movers and 'lifestyle migrants' to Asian countries are emerging phenomena, though rare as far as numbers are concerned. Return migration is a further pattern of temporary migration which is relevant in both directions. Thus, as S. Irudaya Rajan in Chapter 7 argues, 'the notion of only the citizens of poor nations disappearing into the rich to make fortunes is not true anymore'.

The reports presented in this document indicate that there is a need for a common definition for temporary migration and that the phenomenon itself needs to be properly explained. In particular, there is a lack of research and statistics on emerging types of border-crossing movements, such as lifestyle migration. It is also obvious that there is lack of adequate data with regard to irregular forms of temporary migration. Additional information is also needed on the Europeans' residence in Asia. Qualitative assessments are topical in this respect as migration from Europe to Asia is rare in numbers and little is known of these phenomena. What is feasible at this point is that temporariness typically characterises the residence of Europeans in Asia and presumably their intentions as well. On the other hand, Asian people typically migrate with the intention to stay permanently in Europe but, due to the laws and regulations in the receiving countries, their residence often ends up being temporary.

People's border-crossing movements are not just about a flow between EU and Asia but much circulation occurs. Additional information is needed on the circulatory forms of current migratory movements. Many methodological challenges arise here due to the fact that although migratory processes involve several countries, most data have been gathered on national levels. As data categories differ across countries, cross-country comparisons become very difficult. Besides the shortages of reliable data, the researchers face the fact that the phenomenon itself is very diverse and complex and often difficult to identify. As O'Reilly (2007: 281) states, people 'migrate, oscillate, circulate or tour between their home and host countries. Some retain a home in more than one place, some work in one place and live in another; others simply move, while others still simply visit.' The picture becomes even more complicated when the researchers consider the fact that, basically, temporary movement implies a return 'home' but, in practice, an increasing number of people do not have any permanent residence that they would call home. (Bell and Ward, 2000: 91; O'Reilly, 2002: 181.)

References

Adams, E. & Kennedy, A. 2006. Positive Practice Environment: Key considerations for the development of a framework to support integration of international nurses. Geneva: International Centre on Nurse Migration.

Asylum and Migration Glossary 2.0. 2012. European Migration Network, European Commission. January 2012.

Bell, M. & Ward, G. 2000. Comparing temporary mobility with permanent migration. *Tourism Geographies,* 2:1, 87-107.

Benson, M. & O'Reilly, K. 2009a. Lifestyle Migration: Escaping to the Good life. In M. Benson 6K. O'Reilly (Eds.) Lifestyle Migration. Expectations, Aspirations and experiences. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Benson, M. & O'Reilly, K. 2009b. Migration and the Search for a Better Way of Life: A Critical Exploration of Lifestyle Migration. *Sociological Review,* 57:4, 608-625.

IOM 2014. Key Migration Terms. Retrieved from http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html

Korpela, M. 2010. A Postcolonial Imagination? Westerners Searching for Authenticity in India. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36:6, 1299-1325.

O'Reilly, K. 2002. Britain in Europe / the British in Spain: Exploring Britain's changing relationship to the other through the attitudes of its emigrants. *Nations and Nationalisms,* 8:2, 179-193.

O'Reilly, K. 2007. Intra-European migration and the mobility –Enclosure dialectic. *Sociology,* 41:2, 277-293.

APPENDIX 9.1

Au pair migration from the Philippines: Persisting concerns[1]

By Jennifer ARAIS HAGAN

The category "au pair", a migrant childcare provider, has been the subject of considerable contention and confusion in the context of managing migration. Historically, the *au pair*, a French term meaning "on par" or "equal to", was a young European woman who traveled to another European country to learn that country's language through her inclusion (on equal terms) in a host family. Government-sponsored au pair programmes have been portrayed as cultural exchanges in which young migrants receive pocket money, room, board, and educational opportunities while providing affordable live-in childcare to their host families. As au pair programmes expanded to include many countries beyond Europe, critics contend that governments and au pair agencies use the language of cultural exchange to obscure the exploitation of cheap domestic labor from developing countries. The Philippines, today a major sending country of au pair programme participants, plays a significant role in the protection of and discourse about au pairs. This report discusses past efforts of the Philippine government to protect au pairs as workers, and the recent shift to regulate au pair migration as cultural exchange participants.

The Philippine Ban on Au Pairs to Europe (1997-2010)

Categorising au pairs as workers, the Philippine government banned its citizens from participating in au pair programmes abroad in 1997. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) cited reports of "unfair compensation, excessive working hours, discrimination, and sexual assault" as decisive factors in issuing a blanket ban on the emigration of au pairs to Europe. In instituting a ban on au pairs, the Philippine government recommended that European countries to allow Filipinos to enter their countries working as domestic workers on regular terms. Although the ban on au pairs was in place for over a decade, pressure from both the au pair agency industry and Filipino au pairs themselves forced the POEA to reconsider the ban.

In 2007, the International Au Pair Association (IAPA), representing au pair recruitment agencies, wrote to Philippine Foreign Affairs secretary Alberto G. Romulo, requesting that the Philippine government develop a new policy framework and offering IAPA's assistance in facilitating the return of Filipino au pairs to Europe. The letter criticized the Philippine au pair ban as a temporary measure that became permanent based on unsubstantiated allegations of abuse. The letter further stated that the ban was ineffective and outdated because Filipino au pairs continued to travel to Europe in significant numbers, and au pair industry reform had established international standards and a code of conduct.

Scholarly work and media reports also indicated problematic aspects of the Philippines' au pair ban. Au pairs leaving the Philippines were generally able to sidestep the ban, with many au pairs reporting that they paid bribes to border control officials at the airport (Oien, 2009: 74). European host countries' recognition of the Philippine au pair ban was also poor: Norway and Denmark continued to accept au pairs traveling from the Philippines, while other countries, such as Sweden and Finland, accepted Filipino au pairs as long as they applied for their positions and traveled from European countries (75). Government surveys in Norway and Denmark demonstrated that, despite the Philippine au pair ban, Filipinos came to constitute 73 per cent and 63 per cent of the au pair population of these countries respectively by 2009 (Cruz-Larsen, 2009). The ban also drove the migration of Filipino au pairs beyond the oversight of Philippine migration authorities, leaving them vulnerable to labor exploitation in Europe and unable to avail of the protections that the Philippine government guarantees

1 Jennifer Arais Hagan was working as a Visiting Researcher at the Scalabrini Migration Center from April 2014 to October 2014.

to its overseas migrant workers by law (Kjaer, 2013: 13; Stenum, 2008: 14).

Filipino au pairs themselves also began to organize and voice their complaints about their government's au pair ban. They complained the that ban resulted in a lack of government support for au pairs who reported suffering from the same problems that prompted the ban: unfair compensation, excessive working hours, abuse, and sexual assault. Without action from the Philippine government, Filipino au pairs were encouraged to seek help from NGOs, trade unions, and sympathetic parliament members. Later, the accidental deaths of two Filipino au pairs in Europe and subsequent disputes over liability and cost of repatriation mobilised all parties, including the Philippine government, to seek the regularization of Filipino au pairs migrating to Europe.

Beginning with discussions with Swiss authorities, the Philippines engaged in bilateral talks to develop guidelines for the protection of Filipina au pairs as well as for the preservation of the cultural exchange aspects of au pair programmes in each host country. Switzerland was the first country to come to an agreement with Philippine authorities on the treatment of Filipino au pairs, and the Philippine-Swiss agreements contains the strictest, most detailed guidelines on the migration of Filipino au pairs to Europe. The guidelines set forth elements of a standard au pair contract, and clearly distribute the costs of travel and insurance to host families. The Philippine-Swiss guidelines on au pairs are unique in (1) requiring recruitment agencies to perform follow-up visits to host family homes to check on the welfare of au pairs; (2) requiring host families to attend an orientation on Philippine culture; (3) requiring Switzerland to provide a 24-hour support hotline and free counseling to au pairs; (4) establishing a database on au pairs and host families, including a blacklist of host families who violated the rules of the programme; and, (5) requiring au pair agencies to ensure the psychological and moral fitness of host families.

The Philippine-Swiss agreement was shortly followed by bilateral agreements with Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands on the treatment of au pairs. Though less detailed, these agreements similarly established elements of the standard au pair contract, restricted the scope of au pair responsibility to light household chores, distributed the costs of travel and insurance to host families, and provided for channels of dispute settlement between au pairs and host families. A lifting of the Philippine au pair ban for all of Europe followed.

Refocusing the Philippine Au Pair Programme and Ongoing Concerns

In 2012, the Philippines issued new guidelines on the migration of au pairs, shifting oversight of the process away the employment-focused POEA to the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO). This shift reflects the intention of the Philippine government to refocus the au pair programme as cultural exchange rather than labor migration. The CFO is charged with providing Country Familiarisation Seminars to prospective au pairs, emphasising the cultural exchange aspects of the programme while offering advice on remittances, education on contract rights, warnings about possible risks of migration. The categorisation of au pairs as cultural exchange participants places them largely beyond the scope of labor laws of both the Philippines and the destination country. Under the cultural exchange rubric, au pairs perform thirty hours of "light household chores" rather than work, and remain unprotected by minimum salary regulations and other laws governing the employer/employee relationship.

The continuous and growing presence of Filipino au pairs in European au pair programmes calls into question the stated purpose of such programmes – cultural exchange (see Table 4).

Research findings and media accounts suggest that Filipino au pairs participated in au pair programmes primarily as a livelihood strategy, while host families mainly sought affordable domestic work (Oien, 2009: 15; Stenum, 15-18). Filipino au pairs frequently express their need to send remittances to dependent families. Filipino au pairs in Denmark, for example, frequently sought employment as domestic workers outside the host family house to augment the modest pocket money they received as au pairs, in direct violation of programme regulations (Cruz-Larsen, 2009; Stenum, 2008: 49). Many au pairs report that their circumstances, often excessive hours performing chores for the host family or work outside the home, precluded them from enjoying language instruction and other cultural exchange elements of the au pair programme (Kjaer, 2013: 23-24).

As perennial concerns with au pair programmes persist, new challenges are emerging. Integration and reintegration remains a concern. Au pairs lack opportunities to legally stay in any particular receiving country beyond the maximum two-year limit, and frequently remain undocumented to pursue work in that country or apply to become an au pair in another European country. It is possible for an au pair to transfer to different European countries until she reaches the age limit of the country's au pair scheme, thereby pursuing temporary cultural exchange as a de facto and unsustainable career path (Kjaer, 2013: 35). When au pairs do return to the Philippines, they find their employment prospects are not necessarily enhanced by their participation in this cultural exchange programme, and no programme exists for their reintegration.

Despite concerns, some European countries are considering the expansion of au pair programmes. Ireland, Denmark, and the UK have tentatively approved proposals to permit au pairs to care for the elderly. For families in these countries, eldercare au pair represents a more affordable alternative to nursing homes and trained live-in care providers. Au pair agencies in Ireland, the first country to approve an eldercare au pair scheme, advertise round-the-clock, non-medical eldercare for as low as 60 Euros per week. As European countries face aging populations and deficits in eldercare, the demand for au pairs for the elderly can be expected to rise.

Conclusion

The category of au pair remains ambiguous. The au pair is considered neither a worker nor a student, despite the labor obligations and educational opportunities assigned to her/her. The Philippines, a major source country of au pairs to Europe, initially embraced the definition of the au pair as a worker until recently reemphasising the cultural exchange aspects of au pair programmes. After a thirteen-year ban on the migration of au pairs to Europe, the Philippines has reengaged with European countries on the protection of au pairs, who have been recognized as a group that is vulnerable to exploitation. New sets of agreements and guidelines with Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands introduce new protections for au pairs defined as cultural exchange participants. The efficacy of these bilateral arrangements is uncertain, as the increasing demand for the au pair as domestic worker overshadows the aspirational definition of the au pair as cultural exchange participant.

References

Cruz-Larsen, Tessi. 2009. “Filipino au pairs go for ‘black work’” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, global nation.inquirer.net/diaspora/diaspora/view/20090107-181950/Filipino-au-pairs-go-for-black-work 2/3.

Kjaer, Agnette Aslaug. 2013. *Au Pair: Challenges to Safe Migration and Domestic Work*. Bangkok: Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW).

Oien, Cecille. 2009. *On Equal Terms? An Evaluation of the Norwegian Au Pair Scheme*. Oslo: Fafo.

Stenum, Helle. 2008. *Au Pair in Denmark: Cheap Labor or Cultural Exchange*. Copenhagen: Fag og Arbejde – Trade and Labour (FOA).