Saku Pihko, Tampere University
https://doi.org/10.58077/56ER-KB75
Memory permeates experience. Immediate encounters with the world (Erlebnisse) are retrospectively transformed into meaningful, socially shared experiences (Erfahrungen) by way of contextually situated, socially, culturally, and materially mediated interpretations and meaning making. These crystallize into structures of experience that condition the meanings ascribed to future experiences, such that it becomes clear that memory becomes indistinguishable from experience. They blend in a cyclical manner, as experience draws on memory and memories of past experiences serve as templates for later experiences.[1] Due to this inherent memory-dependence of the process of experiencing, historians of experience need to understand the psychological workings of human memory.
During the last few decades, memory has become an object of increasing interest among historians and social scientists.[2] Memory is also one of the most thoroughly researched areas of human psychology.[3] While the fruits of the rich body of psychological scholarship on individual memory are widely known, historians have mostly neglected engaging with its findings and have instead emphasized the social dimension of memory and remembering.[4] There is certainly value in thinking about the collective aspects of memory, but historians (of experience) can also benefit from incorporating a psychological understanding of the autobiographical memory (also known as recollective or episodic memory) of individuals into their methodological toolbox.[5]
Psychological studies indicate that while memory certainly involves the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of information about past events, its functions are far from passive. Memory is not a storehouse of information within the brain. Rather, memory, just as experience, operates in an inherently reconstructive manner. It is an active process of creative interpretation that entails a striving for meaning, heavy selection and schema-based generalization, the combination of information from several sources, and a risk of inaccuracies and error. Memories of different events often merge, as people are usually far better at abstracting the general structure of similar events than at remembering an individual event in exact detail. People also rationalize what they remember and tend to recall the general gist of things rather than reporting exact details. These effects only increase when remembering recurring events.[6] Memories of past events and occurrences are always constructed anew at the moment of recollection from the perspective of the present. Memory processes and subsequent reports are also extremely sensitive to cues and contextual influences that prompt and frame the act of remembering.[7] Moreover, memories fade over time, but this fading does not take place in a linear fashion, as, for example, emotionally impactful events can often be recalled in great detail even after significant stretches of time. Nevertheless, studies suggest that as a rule of thumb, the more time that has passed between an event and its recollection, the more reconstruction will take place and the more information from other sources will be integrated into the memory that is formed.[8] Memory, in other words, is highly malleable and is best understood as an active process of reconstruction entangled with its situational context. Memory is also culturally variable. However, cultural differences seem to primarily influence superficial aspects of memory, such as the specific details people remember, rather than the fundamental core of mnemonic processing.[9] Thus, while the human brain is a highly plastic, historically situated biocultural entity subject to change over time,[10] historians who study radically different cultures can nevertheless utilize psychological findings on memory.
The clear affinities between the psychology of memory and the theory of historical experience – their shared emphasis on interpretative reconstruction in context – makes for a productive intellectual fit.[11] The dynamics of memory formation carry major implications for the construction of historical experiences at the level of the individual, as mnemonic processes play a subtle but influential role when everyday events and occurrences (Erlebnisse) are processed into experiences proper (Erfahrungen). Whereas someone seeking in vain to uncover the authentic experiences of historical individuals might hope to expunge the effects of memory from experience reports in historical sources, analytical historians of experience can prefer to dispense with this impossible aspiration and instead embrace the effects of reconstructive, schema-based generalization that influenced the memory formation of the people whose processes of experiencing are taken as the object of study. Once the inevitability of these effects is acknowledged, memory can be understood as an important variable of experiencing. Memory explains how experience works, as memory processes function as a fundamental avenue through which context imposes upon experience. This also supplies a central reason why experiences change over time. Thus, memory is to be understood not as a negative filter of selection and distortion disconnecting Erfahrungen from prior Erlebnisse, but as a positive and productive force in the emergence of historically situated experiences.
Notes
[1] Sari Katajala-Peltomaa and Raisa Maria Toivo, ‘Three Levels of Experience’, Digital Handbook of the History of Experience (2022); Ville Kivimäki, ‘Reittejä kokemushistoriaan. Menneisyyden kokemus yksilön ja yhteisön vuorovaikutuksessa’, Eletty historia. Kokemus näkökulmana menneisyyteen, eds Johanna Annola, Ville Kivimäki, Antti Malinen (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2019), 9, 17-18, 23-24; Ville Kivimäki, Sami Suodenjoki and Tanja Vahtikari, ‘Lived Nation: Histories of Experience and Emotion in Understanding Nationalism’, Lived Nation as the History of Experiences and Emotions in Finland, 1800-2000, eds Ville Kivimäki, Sami Suodenjoki, Tanja Vahtikari (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 11-13; Raisa Maria Toivo, ‘Kapitalismista kokemukseen eli uskon(non) merkitys yhteiskuntahistoriassa’, Varhaismodernin yhteiskunnan historia: Lähestymistapoja yksilöihin ja rakenteisiin, eds Raisa Maria Toivo, Riikka Miettinen (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2021), 143-44.
[2] Geoffrey Cubitt, History and Memory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 1-3; Geoffrey Cubitt, ‘History and Memory’, Debating New Approaches to History, eds Marek Tamm, Peter Burke (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 127-31; Geoffrey Cubitt, ‘History, psychology and social memory’, Psychology and History. Interdisciplinary Explorations, eds Cristian Tileagă, Jovan Byford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 15-18.
[3] Jonathan K. Foster, Memory: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2.
[4] On social memory, see e.g. James Fentress and Chris Wickham, Social Memory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). The social aspects of memory have also been emphasized by historians of experience. See e.g. Ville Kivimäki, Antti Malinen and Ville Vuolanto, ‘Communities of Experience’, Digital Handbook of the History of Experience (2023) on communities of experience functioning as memory communities. Cf. Cubitt, ‘History, psychology and social memory’, 17, who notes that current ways of thinking about memory seek to transcend the opposition between individual and collective memory.
[5] Cf. Kenneth J. Gergen, ‘Foreword’, Psychology and History, eds Tileagă, Byford, xiii, who notes that psychological concepts like memory can function productively in historical research. For applications of memory psychology to historical methodology, see e.g. Johannes Fried, Der Schleier der Erinnerung. Grundzüge einer historischen Memorik (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2004); Saku Pihko, ‘The Construction of Information in Medieval Inquisition Records: A Methodological Reconsideration’, I quaderni del m.æ.s., 22 (2024), 179-81.
[6] Iris Blandón-Gitlin, Elise Fenn and Kendra Paquette, ‘True and False Memories in Forensic Contexts’, The Routledge International Handbook of Legal and Investigative Psychology, eds Ray Bull, Iris Blandón-Gitlin (London: Routledge, 2020), 37-38, 40, 42, 45, 50-51; Scott C. Brown and Fergus I. M. Craik, ‘Encoding and Retrieval of Information’, The Oxford Handbook of Memory, eds Endel Tulving, Fergus I. M. Craik (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 98, 100; Martin A. Conway, Autobiographical Memory. An Introduction (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990), 98, 101, 104; Cubitt, ‘History and Memory’, 128-29; Cubitt, ‘History, psychology and social memory’, 21-22, 31-32, 37; Deborah Davis and Elizabeth F. Loftus, ‘Internal and External Sources of Misinformation in Adult Witness Memory’, Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology. Volume 1. Memory for Events, eds Michael P. Toglia, J. Don Read, David F. Ross, R. C. L. Lindsay (New York: Psychology Press, 2007), 196-207, 218, 223-24; Fentress, Wickham, Social Memory, 31-32, 40; Foster, Memory, 6-8, 13-14, 23-26, 63, 68-72; David A. Gallo and Mark E. Wheeler, ‘Episodic Memory’, The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology, ed. Daniel Reisberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 190-97; Gisli Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1992), 83-91, 99-100, 326; Cara Laney, ‘The Sources of Memory Errors’, Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology, ed. Reisberg; Ulric Neisser and Lisa K. Libby, ‘Remembering Life Experiences’, Oxford Handbook of Memory, eds Tulving, Craik, 315-21; J. Don Read and Deborah A. Connolly, ‘The Effects of Delay on Long-Term Memory for Witnessed Events’, Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology. Volume 1. Memory for Events, eds Michael P. Toglia, J. Don Read, David F. Ross, R. C. L. Lindsay (New York: Psychology Press, 2007), 123; John A. Robinson, ‘Perspective, meaning, and remembering’, Remembering our past. Studies in autobiographical memory, ed. David C. Rubin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 203; David C. Rubin, ‘Introduction’, Remembering our past, ed. Rubin, 4-7; Harriet M. J. Smith, Hannah Ryder and Heather D. Flowe, ‘Eyewitness Evidence’, Forensic Psychology, eds Graham M. Davies, Clive R. Hollin, Ray Bull (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 181, 183, 192; Mark A. Wheeler, ‘Episodic Memory and Autonoetic Awareness’, The Oxford Handbook of Memory, eds Tulving, Craik, 598.
[7] Craig R. Barclay, ‘Autobiographical remembering: Narrative constraints on objectified selves’, Remembering our past. Studies in autobiographical memory, ed. David C. Rubin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 94, 121; Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Paquette, ‘True and False Memories’, 37-41, 51; Brown, Craik, ‘Encoding and Retrieval’, 100; Conway, Autobiographical Memory, 60, 141; Davis, Loftus, ‘Internal and External Sources’, 212-19, 224; Ronald P. Fisher, Neil Brewer and Gregory Mitchell, ‘The Relation between Consistency and Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony: Legal versus Cognitive Explanations’, Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing. Current Developments and Future Directions, eds Ray Bull, Tim Valentine, Tom Williamson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 126-27; Foster, Memory, 50-51, 73-83; Gallo, Wheeler, ‘Episodic Memory’, 194; Gisli Gudjonsson, Psychology of Interrogations, 88-89, 99; Siobhan M. Hoscheidt, Bhaktee Dongaonkar, Jessica Payne and Lynn Nadel, ‘Emotion, Stress, and Memory’, Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology, ed. Reisberg, 565-66; Asher Koriat, ‘Control Processes of Remembering’, Oxford Handbook of Memory, eds Tulving, Craik, 333-36; Laney, ‘Sources of Memory Errors’, 235-37; Karen J. Mitchell and Marcia K. Johnson, ‘Source Monitoring. Attributing Mental Experiences’, Oxford Handbook of Memory, eds Tulving, Craik (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 179, 182-84; Neisser, Libby, ‘Remembering Life Experiences’, 317; Smith, Ryder, Flowe, ‘Eyewitness Evidence’, 189-92; Wheeler, ‘Episodic Memory’, 597.
[8] Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Paquette, ‘True and False Memories’, 38, 40, 42-43; Conway, Autobiographical Memory, 59-60, 98, 101, 104, 141; Foster, Memory, 62-64; Gisli Gudjonsson, Psychology of Interrogations, 99; Hoscheidt, Dongaonkar, Payne, Nadel, ‘Emotion’, 557-58; Read, Connolly, ‘Effects of Delay’, 119-20, 143; Smith, Ryder, Flowe, ‘Eyewitness Evidence’, 187-89.
[9] Angela Gutchess and Sarah Huff, ‘Cross-Cultural Differences in Memory’, The Oxford Handbook of Cultural Neuroscience, eds Joan Y. Chiao, Shu-Chen Li, Rebecca Seligman, Robert Turner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Suqing Meng, ‘Cultural Effects of Human Memory’, Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research 653 (2022).
[10] Rob Boddice, ‘The Cultural Brain as Historical Artifact’, Culture, Mind, and Brain. Emerging Concepts, Models, and Applications, eds Laurence J. Kirmayer, Carol M. Worthman, Shinobu Kitayama, Constance A. Cummings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
[11] Cf. Cubitt, ‘History, psychology and social memory’, who notes that a shared understanding of the reconstructive nature of human memory ‘supplies an important measure of common ground on which different approaches can be brought into contact.’ On the potential and challenges of consilience between history and psychology, see Paul H. Elovitz, ‘The successes and obstacles to the interdisciplinary marriage of psychology and history’, Psychology and History, eds Tileagă, Byford; Gergen, ‘Foreword’; Cristian Tileagă and Jordan Byford, ‘Introduction: psychology and history – themes, debates, overlaps and borrowings’, Psychology and History, eds Tileagă, Byford, 1-9.